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The Complete Works of
John L. Motley

VOLUME XI



History of the United Netherlands

From the Death of William the Silent to the
Twelve Years' Truce, 1609

VOL. VI
1605-1609

The Jenson Society

New York

The Truce Commissioners
From drawing by Frank N. Du Mond



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THE UNITED NETHERLANDS

CHAPTER XLV

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AFTER the close of the campaign of 1605 Spinola had gone once more to Spain. On his passage through Paris he had again been received with distinguished favor by that warm ally of the Dutch Republic, Henry IV., and on being questioned by that monarch as to his plans for the next campaign had replied that he intended once more to cross the Rhine and invade Friesland. Henry, convinced that the

Genoese would of course not tell him the truth on such an occasion, wrote accordingly to the States-General that they might feel safe as to their eastern frontier. Whatever else might happen, Friesland and the regions adjacent would be safe next year from attack.¹ The immediate future was to show whether the subtle Italian had not compassed as neat a deception by telling the truth as coarser politicians could do by falsehood.

Spinola found the royal finances in most dismal condition. Three hundred thousand dollars a month² were the least estimate of the necessary expenses for carrying on the Netherland war, a sum which could not possibly be spared by Lerma, Uceda, the Marquis of the Seven Churches, and other financiers then industriously occupied in draining dry the exchequer for their own uses. Once more the general aided his sovereign with purse and credit, as well as with his sword. Once more the exchange at Genoa was glutted with the acceptances of Marquis Spinola.³ Here at least was a man of a nature not quite so depraved as that of the parasites bred out of the corruption of a noble but dying commonwealth, and doubtless it was with gentle contempt that the great favorite and his friends looked at the military and financial enthusiasm of the volunteer. It was so much more sagacious to make a princely fortune than to sacrifice one already inherited in the service of one's country.

Spinola, being thus ready not only to fight but to help to pay for the fighting, found his plans of cam-

¹ Gallucci, 256, 257.

² Bentivoglio, 538. Grotius, xv. 714.

³ Grotius, xv. 680. Compare Gallucci, lib. xviii.-xx.

paign received with great benignity by the king and his ministers. Meantime there was much delay. The enormous labors thus devolved upon one pair of shoulders by the do-nothing king and a mayor of the palace whose soul was absorbed by his own private robberies were almost too much for human strength. On his return to the Netherlands Spinola fell dangerously ill in Genoa.¹

Meantime, during his absence and the enforced idleness of the Catholic armies, there was an opportunity for the republicans to act with promptness and vigor. They displayed neither quality. Never had there been so much sluggishness as in the preparations for the campaign of 1606. The states' exchequer was lower than it had been for years. The Republic was without friends. Left to fight their battle for national existence alone, the Hollanders found themselves perpetually subjected to hostile censure from their late allies, and to friendly advice still more intolerable. There were many brave Englishmen and Frenchmen sharing in the fatigues of the Dutch war of independence, but the governments of Henry and of James were as protective, as severely virtuous, as offensive, and, in their secret intrigues with the other belligerent, as mischievous as it was possible for the best-intentioned neutrals to be.

The fame and the popularity of the stadholder had been diminished by the results of the past campaign. The States-General were disappointed, dissatisfied, and inclined to censure very unreasonably the public servant who had always obeyed their decrees with docility. While Henry IV. was rapidly transferring his

¹ Gallucci, ii. 257 seq.

admiration from Maurice to Spinola, the disagreements at home between the advocate and the stadholder were becoming portentous.

There was a want of means and of soldiers for the new campaign. Certain causes were operating in Europe to the disadvantage of both belligerents. In the south, Venice had almost drawn her sword against the pope in her settled resolution to put down the Jesuits and to clip the wings of the church party, before, with bequests and donations, votive churches and magnificent monasteries, four fifths of the domains of the Republic should fall into mortmain, as was already the case in Brabant.¹

Naturally there was a contest between the ex-Huguenot, now eldest son of the Church, and the Most Catholic King as to who should soonest defend the pope. Henry offered thorough protection to his Holiness, but only under condition that he should have a monopoly of that protection.² He lifted his sword, but meantime it was doubtful whether the blow was to descend upon Venice or upon Spain. The Spanish levies, on their way to the Netherlands, were detained in Italy by this new exigency. The States-General offered the sister republic their maritime assistance, and, notwithstanding their own immense difficulties, stood ready to send a fleet to the Mediterranean. The

¹ Meteren, 536.

² "Nec dissimulabat Hispanus Pontifici se auxilio futurum, quo Gallus comperto significavit Romam, ita meritos majores suos ut ecclesiæ pericula non alias magis quam Francicas manus respicere deberent: sin Pontifex Hispanum prolatandæ dominationis avidum sibi assumeret haud immerito suspectum id sibi vel coactum contrariis in partibus fore."—Grotius, xv. 713. Compare Meteren, 546^{vo}.

offer was gratefully declined, and the quarrel with the pope arranged, but the incident laid the foundation of a lasting friendship between the only two important republics then existing.¹ The issue of the Gunpowder Plot, at the close of the preceding year, had confirmed James in his distaste for Jesuits, and had effected that which all the eloquence of the States-General and their ambassador had failed to accomplish, the prohibition of Spanish enlistments in his kingdom. Guido Fawkes had served under the archduke in Flanders.

Here, then, were delays additional to that caused by Spinola's² illness. On the other hand, the levies of the Republic were for a season paralyzed by the altercation, soon afterward adjusted, between Henry IV. and the Duke of Bouillon, brother-in-law of the stadholder and of the Palatine, and by the petty war between the Duke and Hanseatic city of Brunswick, in which Ernest of Nassau was for a time employed.³

During this period of almost suspended animation the war gave no signs of life, except in a few spasmodic efforts on the part of the irrepressible Du Terrail. Early in the spring, not satisfied with his double and disastrous repulse before Bergen-op-Zoom, that partisan now determined to surprise Sluis. That an attack was impending became known to the governor of that city, the experienced Colonel van der Noot. Not dreaming, however, that any mortal, even the most audacious of Frenchmen and adventurers, would ever think of carrying a city like Sluis by surprise, defended as it was by a splendid citadel and by a whole

¹ Grotius, xv. 684. Wagenaer, ix. 206. Meteren, 536.

² Meteren, 526.

³ Wagenaer, ix. 199-203.

chain of forts and water-batteries, and capable of withstanding three months long, as it had so recently done, a siege in form by the acknowledged master of the beleaguering science, the methodical governor went calmly to bed one fine night in June. His slumbers were disturbed before morning by the sound of trumpets sounding Spanish melodies in the streets, and by a great uproar and shouting. Springing out of bed, he rushed half dressed to the rescue. Less vigilant than Paul Bax had been the year before in Bergen, he found that Du Terrail had really effected a surprise. At the head of twelve hundred Walloons and Irishmen, that enterprising officer had waded through the drowned land of Cadsand, with the promised support of a body of infantry under Frederick van den Berg, from Dam, had stolen noiselessly by the forts of that island unchallenged and unseen, had effected with petards a small breach through the western gate of the city, and with a large number of his followers, creeping two and two through the gap, had found himself for a time master of Sluis.¹

The profound silence of the place had, however, somewhat discouraged the intruders. The whole population were as sound asleep as was the excellent commandant, but the stillness in the deserted streets suggested an ambush, and they moved stealthily forward, feeling their way with caution toward the center of the town.

It so happened, moreover, that the sacristan had forgotten to wind up the great town clock. The agreement with the party first entering and making their way to the opposite end of the city had been that at

¹ Grotius, xv. 687 seq. Wagenaer, ix. 207 seq.

the striking of a certain hour after midnight they should attack simultaneously and with a great outcry all the guard-houses, so that the garrison might be simultaneously butchered. The clock never struck, the signal was never given, and Du Terrail and his immediate comrades remained near the western gate, suspicious and much perplexed. The delay was fatal. The guard, the whole garrison, and the townspeople flew to arms, and, half naked, but equipped with pike and musket, and led on by Van der Noot in person, fell upon the intruders. A panic took the place of previous audacity in the breasts of Du Terrail's followers. Thinking only of escape, they found the gap by which they had crept into the town much less convenient as a means of egress in the face of an infuriated multitude. Five hundred of them were put to death in a very few minutes. Almost as many were drowned or suffocated in the marshes, as they attempted to return by the road over which they had come. A few stragglers of the fifteen hundred were all that were left to tell the tale.¹

It would seem scarcely worth while to chronicle such trivial incidents in this great war—the all-absorbing drama of Christendom—were it not that they were for the moment the whole war. It might be thought that hostilities were approaching their natural termination, and that the war was dying of extreme old age, when the quixotic pranks of a Du Terrail occupied so large a part of European attention. The winter had passed, another spring had come and gone, and Maurice had in vain attempted to obtain sufficient means from the states to take the field in force. Henry, look-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 207 seq.

ing on from the outside, was becoming more and more exasperated with the dilatoriness which prevented the Republic from profiting by the golden moments of Spinola's enforced absence.¹ Yet the best that could be done seemed to be to take measures for defensive operations.

Spinola never reached Brussels until the beginning of June, yet, during all the good campaigning weather which had been fleeting away, not a blow had been struck, nor a wholesome counsel taken, by the stadholder or the states. It was midsummer before the armies were in the field. The plans of the Catholic general, however, then rapidly developed themselves. Having assembled as large a force as had ever been under his command, he now divided it into two nearly equal portions. Buequoy, with ten thousand foot, twelve hundred cavalry, and twelve guns, arrived on the 18th July at Mook, on the Meuse. Spinola, with eleven thousand infantry, two thousand horse, and eight guns, crossed the Rhine at the old redouts of Ruhrort, and on the same 18th July took position at Goor, in Overijssel.² The first plan of the commander-in-chief was to retrace exactly his campaign of the previous year, even as he had with so much frankness stated to Henry. But the Republic, although deserted by her former friends and looked upon askance by the monarch of Britain and by the Most Christian King, had this year a most efficient ally in the weather. Jupiter Pluvius had descended from on high to the

¹ Van der Kemp, ii. 117, 520.

² For the campaign of 1606 compare Grotius, xv. 689-699; Meteren, 537-543; Bentivoglio, 539-546; Van der Kemp, ii. 117-120, and notes; Wagenaer, ix. 209-220.



SPINOLA

rescue of the struggling commonwealth, and his decrees were omnipotent as to the course of the campaign. The seasons that year seemed all fused into one. It was difficult to tell on midsummer day whether it were midwinter, spring, or autumn.¹ The rain came down day after day, week after week, as if the contending armies and the very country which was to be invaded and defended were to be all washed out of existence together.² Friesland resolved itself into a vast quagmire; the roads became fluid, the rivers lakes. Spinola turned his face from the east, and proceeded to carry out a second plan which he had long meditated, and even a more effective one, in the west.

The Waal and the Yssel formed two sides of a great quadrilateral, and furnished for the natural fortress thus inclosed two vast and admirable moats. Within lay Good Meadow and Foul Meadow,—Betuwe and Veluwe,—one the ancient Batavian island which from time immemorial had given its name to the commonwealth, the other the once dismal swamp which toil and intelligence had in the course of centuries transformed into the wealthy and flowery land of Guelders.

Beyond, but in immediate proximity, lay the ancient episcopal city and province of Utrecht, over which lay the road to the adjacent Holland and Zealand. The very heart of the Republic would be laid bare to the conqueror's sword if he could once force the passage and obtain the control of these two protecting streams. With Utrecht as his base, and all Brabant and Flan-

¹ Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

² Bentivoglio, Grotius, Meteren, *ubi sup.*

ders, obedient provinces, at his back, Spinola might accomplish more in one season than Alva, Don John, and Alexander Farnese had compassed in forty years, and destroy at a blow what was still called the Netherland rebellion. The passage of the rivers once effected, the two enveloping wings would fold themselves together, and the conquest would be made.

Thus reasoned the brilliant young general, and his projects, although far-reaching, did not seem wild. The first steps were, however, the most important as well as the most difficult, and he had to reckon with a wary and experienced antagonist. Maurice had at last collected and reviewed at Arnheim an army of nearly fifteen thousand men, and was now watching closely from Doesburg and Deventer every movement of the foe.

Having been forced to a defensive campaign, in which he was not likely at best to gain many additional laurels, he was the more determined to lay down his own life and sacrifice every man he could bring into the field, before Spinola should march into the cherished domains of Utrecht and Holland. Meantime the rain, which had already exerted so much influence on the military movements of the year, still maintained the supremacy over human plans. The Yssel and the Waal, always deep, broad, sluggish, but dangerous rivers,—the Rhine in its old age,—were swollen into enormous proportions, their currents flowing for the time with the vigor of their far-away youth.

Maurice had confided the defense of the Waal to Warner du Bois, under whose orders he placed a force of about seven thousand men, and whose business it

was to prevent Bucquoy's passage. His own task was to baffle Spinola.¹

Bucquoy's ambition was to cross the Waal at a point as near as possible to the fork of that stream with the true Rhine, seize the important city of Nijmegen, and then give the hand to Spinola so soon as he should be on the other side of the Yssel. At the village of Spardorp, or Kekerdon, he employed Pompey Giustianini to make a desperate effort, having secured a large number of barges in which he embarked his troops. As the boatmen neared the opposite bank, however, they perceived that Warner du Bois had made effective preparations for their reception. They lost heart, and, on pretense that the current of the river was too rapid to allow them to reach the point proposed for their landing, gradually dropped down the stream, and, in spite of the remonstrances of the commanders, pushed their way back to the shore which they had left. From that time forth the states' troops, in efficient numbers, fringed the inner side of the Waal, along the whole length of the Batavian island, while armed vessels of the Republic patrolled the stream itself. In vain Count Bucquoy watched an opportunity, either by surprise or by main strength, to effect a crossing. The Waal remained as impassable as if it were a dividing ocean.²

On the other side of the quadrilateral Maurice's dispositions were as effective as those of his lieutenant on the Waal. The left shore of the Yssel, along its whole length from Arnheim and Doesburg quite up

¹ Meteren, Bentivoglio, Grotius, Wagenaer, Van der Kemp, ubi sup.

² Ibid.

to Zwolle and Campen, where the river empties itself into the Zuyder Zee, was now sprinkled thickly with forts, hastily thrown up, but strong enough to serve the temporary purpose of the stadholder. In vain the fleet-footed and audacious Spinola moved stealthily or fiercely to and fro, from one point to another, seeking an opening through which to creep, or a weak spot where he might dash himself against the chain. The whole line was securely guarded. The swollen river, the redouts, and the musketeers of Maurice protected the heart of the Republic from the impending danger.

Wearied of this fruitless pacing up and down, Spinola, while apparently intending an assault upon Deventer, and thus attracting his adversary's attention to that important city, suddenly swerved to the right, and came down upon Lochem. The little town, with its very slender garrison, surrendered at once. It was not a great conquest, but it might possibly be of use in the campaign. It was taken before the stadholder could move a step to its assistance, even had he deemed it prudent to leave Yssel-side for an hour. The summer was passing away, the rain was still descending, and it was the 1st of August before Spinola left Lochem. He then made a rapid movement to the north, between Zwolle and Hasselt, endeavoring to cross the Blackwater and seize Geelmuyden, on the Zuyder Zee. Had he succeeded, he might have turned Maurice's position. But the works in that direction had been intrusted to an experienced campaigner, Warmelo, sheriff of Zalant, who received the impetuous Spinola and his lieutenant, Count Solre, so warmly that they reeled backward at last, after repeated assaults and great

loss of men, and nevermore attempted to cross the Yssel.¹

Obviously the campaign had failed. Utrecht and Holland were as far out of the Catholic general's reach as the stars in the sky, but at least, with his large armies, he could earn a few trophies, barren or productive as it might prove, before winter, uniting with the deluge, should drive him from the field.

On the 3d August he laid siege to Grol (or Groenlo), a fortified town of secondary importance in the country of Zutphen, and, squandering his men with much recklessness in his determination not to be baffled, reduced the place in eleven days. Here he paused for a breathing-spell, and then, renouncing all his schemes upon the inner defenses of the Republic, withdrew once more to the Rhine and laid siege to Rheinberg.²

This frontier place had been tossed to and fro so often between the contending parties in the perpetual warfare that its inhabitants must have learned to consider themselves rather as a convenient circulating medium for military operations than as burghers who had any part in the ordinary business of life. It had old-fashioned defenses of stone, which, during the recent occupation by the states, had been much improved, and had been strengthened with earthworks. Before it was besieged Maurice sent his brother Frederick Henry, with some picked companies, into the place, so that the garrison amounted to three thousand effective men.

The Prince de Soubise, brother of the Duc de Rohan, and other French volunteers of quality also threw themselves into the place, in order to take lessons in the

¹ Authorities last cited

² Ibid.

latest methods of attack and defense.¹ It was now admitted that no more accomplished pupil of the stadholder in the beleaguering art had appeared in Europe than his present formidable adversary. On this occasion, however, there was no great display of science. Maurice obstinately refused to move to the relief of the place, despite all the efforts of a deputation of the States-General who visited his camp in September, urging him strenuously to take the chances of a stricken field.²

Nothing could induce the stadholder, who held an observing position at Wesel, with his back against the precious watery quadrilateral, to risk the defense of those most vital lines of the Yssel and the Waal. While attempting to save Rheinberg, he felt it possible that he might lose Nimwegen, or even Utrecht. The swift but wily Genoese was not to be trifled with or lost sight of an instant. The road to Holland might still be opened, and the destiny of the Republic might hang on the consequences of a single false move. That destiny, under God, was in his hands alone, and no chance of winning laurels, even from his greatest rival's head, could induce him to shrink from the path of duty, however obscure it might seem. There were a few brilliant assaults and sorties, as in all sieges, the French volunteers especially distinguishing themselves; but the place fell at the end of forty days. The garrison marched out with the honors of war. In the modern practice, armies were rarely captured in strongholds, nor were the defenders, together with the population, butchered.

The loss, after a six weeks' siege, of Rheinberg,

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 214, 215.

² Van der Kemp, ii. 120.

which six years before, with far inferior fortifications, had held out a much longer time against the states, was felt as a bitter disappointment throughout the Republic. Frederick Henry, on leaving the place, made a feeble and unsuccessful demonstration against Venlo, by which the general dissatisfaction was not diminished. Soon afterward the war became more languid than ever. News arrived of a great crisis on the Genoa exchange. A multitude of merchants involved in pecuniary transactions with Spinola fell with one tremendous crash. The funds of the Catholic commander-in-chief were already exhausted; his acceptances could no longer be negotiated.¹ His credit was becoming almost as bad as the king's own. The inevitable consequence of the want of cash and credit followed. Mutiny, for the first time in Spinola's administration, raised its head once more, and stalked about defiant. Six hundred veterans marched to Breda, and offered their services to Justinus of Nassau. The proposal was accepted.² Other bands established their quarters in different places, chose their elettos and lesser officers, and enacted the scenes which have been so often depicted in these pages. The splendid army of Spinola melted like April snow. By the last week of October there hardly seemed a Catholic army in the field. The commander-in-chief had scattered such companies as could still be relied upon in the villages of the friendly archiepiscopate of Cologne, and had obtained, not by murders and blackmail,—according to the recent practice of the admiral of Aragon, at whose grim name the whole country-side still

¹ Grotius, xv. 696, 697.

² Grotius, Bentivoglio, Meteren, Wagenaer, ubi sup.

shuddered,—but from the friendship of the leading inhabitants and by honest loans, a sufficient sum to put bread into the mouths of the troops still remaining faithful to him.¹

The opportunity had at last arrived for the stadholder to strike a blow before the season closed. Bankruptcy and mutiny had reduced his enemy to impotence in the very season of his greatest probable success. On the 24th October Maurice came before Lochem, which he recaptured in five days. Next in the order of Spinola's victories was Grol, which the stadholder at once besieged. He had almost fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand horse.² A career of brief triumph before winter should close in upon those dripping fields seemed now assured. But the rain, which during nearly the whole campaign had been his potent ally, had of late been playing him false. The swollen Yssel, during a brief period of dry weather, had sunk so low in certain shallows as not to be navigable for his transports,³ and after his trains of artillery and munitions had been dragged wearily overland as far as Grol, the deluge had returned in such force that physical necessity as well as considerations of humanity compelled him to defer his intrenching operations until the weather should moderate. As there seemed no further danger to be apprehended from the broken, mutinous, and dispersed forces of the enemy, the siege operations were conducted in a leisurely manner. What was the astonishment, therefore, among the soldiers, when a rumor

¹ Grotius, Bentivoglio, Meteren, Wagenaer.

² Grotius, xv. 698.

³ Letter of Prince Maurice, in Van der Kemp, ii. 545.

flew about the camp in the early days of November that the indomitable Spinola was again advancing upon them!¹ It was perfectly true. With extraordinary perseverance he had gathered up six or seven thousand infantry and twelve companies of horse—all the remnants of the splendid armies with which he had taken the field at midsummer—and was now marching to the relief of Grol, besieged as it was by a force at least doubly as numerous as his own. It was represented to the stadholder, however, that an impassable morass lay between him and the enemy,² and that there would therefore be time enough to complete his intrenchments before Spinola could put his foolhardy attempt into execution. But the Catholic general, marching faster than rumor itself, had crossed the impracticable swamp almost before a spadeful of earth had been turned in the republican camp. His advance was in sight even while the incredulous were sneering at the absurdity of his supposed project. Informed by scouts of the weakest point in the stadholder's extended lines, Spinola was directing himself thither with beautiful precision.³ Maurice hastily contracted both his wings, and concentrated himself in the village of Lebel. At last the moment had come for a decisive struggle. There could be little doubt of the result. All the advantage was with the republican army. The Catholics had arrived in front of the enemy fatigued by forced marches through quagmires, in horrible weather, over roads deemed impassable. The states' troops were fresh, posted on ground of their own choosing, and partially

¹ Authorities cited.

² Van der Kemp, ii. 21.

³ Grotius, xv. 699.

intrenched. To the astonishment, even to the horror, of the most eager portion of the army, the stadholder deliberately, and despite the groans of his soldiers, refused the combat, and gave immediate orders for raising the siege and abandoning the field.¹

On the 12th November he broke up his camp and withdrew to a village called Zelhem. On the same day the marquis, having relieved the city, without paying the expected price, retired in another direction, and established what was left of his army in the province of Münster. The campaign was closed.² And thus the great war, which had run its stormy course for nearly forty years, dribbled out of existence, sinking away that rainy November in the dismal fens of Zutphen. The long struggle for independence had come, almost unperceived, to an end.

Peace had not arrived, but the work of the armies was over for many a long year. Freedom and independence were secured. A deed or two, never to be forgotten by Netherland hearts, was yet to be done on the ocean before the long and intricate negotiations for peace should begin, and the weary people permit themselves to rejoice; but the prize was already won.

Meantime the conduct of Prince Maurice in these last days of the campaign was the subject of biting censure by friend and foe. The military fame of Spinola throughout Europe grew apace, and the fame of his great rival seemed to shrink in the same proportion.

Henry of France was especially indignant at what he considered the shortcomings of the Republic and of its chief. Already, before the close of the summer,

¹ Authorities cited.

² *Ibid*,

the agent Aertsens had written from Paris that his Majesty was very much displeased with Spinola's prosperity, ascribing it to the want of good counsels on the part of the states' government that so fine an army should lie idle so long, without making an attempt to relieve the beleaguered places, so that Spinola felt assured of taking anything as soon as he made his appearance. "Your Mightinesses cannot believe," continued the agent, "what a trophy is made by the Spanish ministers out of these little exploits, and they have so much address at this court that if such things continue they may produce still greater results."¹

In December he wrote that the king was so discontent concerning the siege of Grol as to make it impossible to answer him with arguments, that he openly expressed regret at not having employed the money lent to the states upon strengthening his own frontiers, so distrustful was he of their capacity for managing affairs, and that he mentioned with disgust statements received from his ambassador at Brussels and from the Duc de Rohan, to the effect that Spinola had between five and six thousand men only at the relief of Grol, against twelve thousand in the stadholder's army.²

The motives of the deeds and the omissions of the prince at this supreme moment must be pondered with great caution. The States-General had doubtless been inclined for vigorous movements, and Olden-Barneveldt, with some of his colleagues, had visited the camp late in September to urge the relief of Rheinberg. Maurice was in daily correspondence with the government, and regularly demanded their advice, by which, on many former occasions, he had bound him-

¹ Van der Kemp, ii. 549.

² Ibid., 550.

self, even when it was in conflict with his own better judgment.

But throughout this campaign the responsibility was entirely, almost ostentatiously, thrown by the States-General upon their commander-in-chief, and, as already indicated, their preparations in the spring and early summer had been entirely inadequate. Should he lose the army with which he had so quietly but completely checked Spinola in all his really important moves during the summer and autumn, he might despair of putting another very soon into the field. That his force in that November week before Groel was numerically far superior to the enemy is certain, but he had lost confidence in his cavalry since their bad behavior at Mülheim the previous year, and a very large proportion of the infantry was on the sick-list at the moment of Spinola's approach. "Lest the continual bad weather should entirely consume the army," he said, "we are resolved, within a day or two after we have removed the sick, who are here in great numbers, to break up, unless the enemy should give us occasion to make some attempt upon him."¹

Maurice was the servant of a small republic, contending single-handed against an empire still considered the most formidable power in the world. His cue was not necessarily to fight on all occasions, for delay often fights better than an army against a foreign invader. When a battle and a victory were absolutely necessary we have seen the magnificent calmness which at Nieuport secured triumph under the shadow of death. Had he accepted Spinola's challenge in November, he would probably have defeated

¹ Letter of November 9, 1606, in Van der Kemp, ii. 536.

him and have taken Grol. He might not, however, have annihilated his adversary, who, even when worsted, would perhaps have effected his escape. The city was of small value to the Republic. The principal advantage of a victory would have been increased military renown for himself. Viewed in this light, there is something almost sublime in the phlegmatic and perfectly republican composure with which he disdained laurels easily enough, as it would seem, to have been acquired, and denied his soldiers the bloodshed and the suffering for which they were clamoring.

And yet, after thoroughly weighing and measuring all these circumstances, it is natural to regret that he did not on that occasion rise upon Spinola and smite him to the earth. The Lord had delivered him into his hands. The chances of his own defeat were small, its probable consequences, should it occur, insignificant. It is hardly conceivable that he could have been so completely overthrown as to allow the Catholic commander to do in November what he had tried all summer in vain to accomplish, cross the Yssel and the Waal, with the dregs of his army, and invade Holland and Zeeland in midwinter, over the prostrate bodies of Maurice and all his forces. On the other hand, that the stadholder would have sent the enemy reeling back to his bogs, with hardly the semblance of an army at his heels, was almost certain. The effect of such a blow upon impending negotiations, and especially upon the impressible imagination of Henry and the pedantic shrewdness of James, would have been very valuable. It was not surprising that the successful soldier who sat on the French throne, and who had been ever

ready to wager life and crown on the results of a stricken field, should be loud in his expressions of disapprobation and disgust. Yet no man knew better than the sagacious Gascon that fighting to win a crown and to save a republic were two essentially different things.

In the early summer of this year Admiral Haultain, whom we lately saw occupied with tossing Sarmiento's Spanish legion into the sea off the harbor of Dover, had been despatched to the Spanish coast on a still more important errand. The outward-bound Portuguese merchantmen and the home-returning fleets from America, which had been absent nearly two years, might be fallen in with at any moment, in the latitude of 36° – 38° . The admiral, having received orders, therefore, to cruise carefully in those regions, sailed for the shores of Portugal with a squadron of twenty-four war-ships. His expedition was not very successful. He picked up a prize or two here and there, and his presence on the coast prevented the merchant fleet from sailing out of Lisbon for the East Indies, the merchandise already on board being disembarked and the voyage postponed to a more favorable opportunity. He saw nothing, however, of the long-expected ships from the golden West Indies,—as Mexico, Peru, and Brazil were then indiscriminately called,—and after parting company with six of his own ships, which were dispersed and damaged in a gale, and himself suffering from a dearth of provisions, he was forced to return without much gain or glory.¹

In the month of September he was once more despatched on the same service. He had nineteen war-

¹ Grotius, xv. 685. Wagenaer, ix. 221 seq.

galiots of the first class, and two yachts, well equipped and manned.¹ Vice-admiral of the fleet was Regnier Klaaszoon (or Nicholson), of Amsterdam, a name which should always be held fresh in remembrance, not only by mariners and Netherlanders, but by all men whose pulses can beat in sympathy with practical heroism.

The admiral coasted deliberately along the shores of Spain and Portugal. It seemed impossible that the golden fleets which, as it was ascertained, had not yet arrived, could now escape the vigilance of the Dutch cruisers. An occasional merchant ship or small war-galley was met from time to time and chased into the harbors. A landing was here and there effected and a few villages burned. But these were not the prizes nor the trophies sought. On the 19th September a storm off the Portuguese coast scattered the fleet, six of the best and largest ships being permanently lost sight of and separated from the rest. With the other thirteen Haultain now cruised off Cape St. Vincent directly across the ordinary path of the homeward-bound treasure-ships.

On the 6th October many sails were descried in the distance, and the longing eyes of the Hollanders were at last gratified with what were supposed to be the great West India commercial squadrons. The delusion was brief. Instead of innocent and richly freighted merchantmen, the newcomers soon proved to be the war-ships of Admiral Don Luis de Fazardo, eighteen great galleons and eight galleys strong, besides lesser vessels—the most formidable fleet that for years had floated in those waters. There had been

¹ Meteren, 541, Grotius, xv. 699, 700. Wagenaer, ix. 220-224.

time for Admiral Haultain to hold but a very brief consultation with his chief officers. As it was manifest that the Hollanders were enormously overmatched, it was decided to manœuvre as well as possible for the weather-gage, and then to fight or to effect an escape, as might seem most expedient after fairly testing the strength of the enemy. It was blowing a fresh gale, and the Netherland fleet had as much as they could stagger with under close-reefed topsails.¹ The war-galleys, fit only for fair weather, were soon forced to take refuge under the lee of the land, but the eighteen galleons, the most powerful vessels then known to naval architecture, were bearing directly down, full before the wind, upon the Dutch fleet.²

It must be admitted that Admiral Haultain hardly displayed as much energy now as he had done in the Straits of Dover against the unarmed transports the year before. His ships were soon scattered right and left, and the manœuvres for the weather-gage resolved themselves into a general scramble for escape.³ Vice-Admiral Klaaszoon alone held firm, and met the onset of the first comers of the Spanish fleet. A fierce combat, yard-arm to yard-arm, ensued. Klaaszoon's main-mast went by the board, but Haultain, with five ships, all that could be rallied, coming to the rescue, the assailants for a moment withdrew. Five Dutch vessels of moderate strength were now in action against the eighteen great galleons of Fazardo. Certainly it was not an even game, but it might have been played

¹ Meteren, *ubi sup.*

² *Ibid.* It is true that two or three caracks, of a large size and mounting twenty-two guns, were scattered among the galleons.

³ Meteren, *ubi sup.*

with more heart and better skill. There was but a half-hour of daylight left when Klaaszoon's crippled ship was again attacked.¹ This time there was no attempt to offer him assistance; the rest of the Dutch fleet crowding all the sails their masts would bear, and using all the devices of their superior seamanship, not to harass the enemy, but to steal as swiftly as possible out of his way. Honestly confessing that they dared not come into the fight, they bore away for dear life in every direction.² Night came on, and the last that the fugitives knew of the events off Cape St. Vincent was that stout Regnier Klaaszoon had been seen at sunset in the midst of the Spanish fleet, the sound of his broadsides saluting their ears as they escaped.

Left to himself, alone in a dismasted ship, the vice-admiral never thought of yielding to the eighteen Spanish galleons. To the repeated summons of Don Luis Fazardo that he should surrender he remained obstinately deaf. Knowing that it was impossible for him to escape, and fearing that he might blow up his vessel rather than surrender, the enemy made no attempt to board. Spanish chivalry was hardly more conspicuous on this occasion than Dutch valor, as illustrated by Admiral Haultain. Two whole days and nights Klaaszoon drifted about in his crippled ship, exchanging broadsides with his antagonists, and with his colors flying on the stump of his mast. The fact would seem incredible were it not attested by perfectly

¹ Meteren, ubi sup.

² "Ende daernade bleef den vice-admiraal van d'een ende van d'ander verlaten d'een hem excuseerende of d'ander maer meets datse de Spaensche schepen niet dorsten aendoen."—Meteren, 541.

trustworthy contemporary accounts. At last his hour seemed to have come. His ship was sinking; a final demand for surrender,¹ with promise of quarter, was made. Out of his whole crew but sixty remained alive, many of them badly wounded.

He quietly announced to his officers and men his decision never to surrender, in which all concurred. They knelt together upon the deck, and the admiral made a prayer in which all fervently joined. With his own hand Klaaszoon then lighted the powder-magazine, and the ship was blown into the air. Two sailors, all that were left alive, were picked out of the sea by the Spaniards and brought on board one of the vessels of the fleet. Desperately mutilated, those grim Dutchmen lived a few minutes to tell the tale, and then died defiant on the enemy's deck.²

Yet it was thought that a republic which could produce men like Regnier Klaaszoon and his comrades could be subjected again to despotism, after a war for independence of forty years, and that such sailors could be forbidden to sail the eastern and western seas. No epigrammatic phrase has been preserved of this simple Regnier, the son of Nicholas. He only did what is sometimes talked about in phraseology more or less melodramatic, and did it in a very plain way.

Such extreme deeds may have become so much less necessary in the world that to threaten them is apt to seem fantastic. Exactly at that crisis of history, how-

¹ Meteren, ubi sup. Grotius, xv. 700. Wagenaer, ix. 223.

² "Duo semiusti paulum provixere ab Hispanio excepti cum miraculo spectantibus horridos vultus vocesque in ipsa morte contumaciam."—Grotius, ubi sup. Meteren. Wagenaer.

ever, and especially in view of the Dutch admiral commanding having refused a combat of one to three, the speechless self-devotion of the vice-admiral was better than three years of eloquent arguments and a ship-load of diplomatic correspondence, such as were already impending over the world.

Admiral Haultain returned with all his ships uninjured,—the six missing vessels having found their way at last safely back to the squadron,—but with a very great crack in his reputation. It was urged very justly, both by the States-General and the public, that if one ship under a determined commander could fight the whole Spanish fleet two days and nights, and sink unconquered at last, ten ships more might have put the enemy to flight, or at least have saved the vice-admiral from destruction.¹

But very few days after the incidents just described, the merchant fleet which, instead of Don Luis Fajardo's war-galleons, Admiral Haultain had so longed to encounter, arrived safely at San Lucar. It was the most splendid treasure-fleet that had ever entered a Spanish port, and the Dutch admiral's heart might well have danced for joy, had he chanced to come a little later on the track. There were fifty ships, under charge of General Alonzo de Ochoares Galindo and General Ganevaye. They had on board, according to the registers, \$1,914,176 worth of bullion for the king, and \$6,086,617 for merchants, or \$8,000,000 in all, besides rich cargoes of silk, cochineal, sarsaparilla, indigo, brazil-wood, and hides, the result of two years of pressure upon Peruvians, Mexicans, and Brazilians. Never had Spanish finances been at so low an ebb.

¹ Meteren, Wagenaer, *ubi sup.*

Never was so splendid an income more desirable. The king's share of the cargo was enough to pay half the arrearages due to his mutinous troops, and for such housekeeping this was to be in funds.¹

There were no further exploits on land or sea that year. There were, however, deaths of three personages often mentioned in this history. The learned Justus Lipsius died in Louvain, a good editor and scholar, and as sincere a Catholic at last as he had been alternately a bigoted Calvinist and an earnest Lutheran. His reputation was thought to have suffered by his later publications,² but the world at large was occupied with sterner stuff than those classic productions, and left the final decision to posterity.

A man of a different mold, the turbulent, high-born, hard-fighting, hard-drinking Hohenlo, died also this year, brother-in-law and military guardian, subsequently rival and political and personal antagonist, of Prince Maurice. His daring deeds and his troublesome and mischievous adventures have been recounted in these pages. His name will be always prominent in the history of the Republic, to which he often rendered splendid service, but he died, as he had lived, a glutton and a melancholy sot.³

The third remarkable personage who passed away was one whose name will be remembered as long as the Netherlands have a history, old Count John of Nassau, only surviving brother of William the Silent.⁴ He had been ever prominent and deeply interested in the great religious and political movements of Upper and Lower Germany, and his services in the foundation of

¹ Meteren, 541^{vo}.

² Grotius, xv. 709.

³ *Ibid.*, 708.

⁴ *Ibid.*

the Dutch commonwealth were signal, and ever generously acknowledged. At one period, as will be recollected, he was stadholder of Gelderland, and he was ever ready with sword, purse, and counsel to aid in the great struggle for independence.

CHAPTER XLVI

General desire for peace—Political aspect of Europe—Designs of the Kings of England, France, and Spain concerning the United Provinces—Matrimonial schemes of Spain—Conference between the French ministers and the Dutch envoy—Confidential revelations—Henry's desire to annex the Netherlands to France—Discussion of the subject—Artifice of Barneveldt—Impracticability of a compromise between the provinces and Spain—Formation of a West India company—Secret mission from the archdukes to The Hague—Reply of the States-General—Return of the archdukes' envoy—Arrangement of an eight months' armistice.

THE general tendency toward a pacification in Europe at the close of the year could hardly be mistaken. The languor of fatigue, rather than any sincere desire for peace, seemed to make negotiations possible. It was not likely that great truths would yet be admitted, or that ruling individuals or classes would recognize the rise of a new system out of the rapidly dissolving elements of the one which had done its work. War was becoming more and more expensive, while commerce, as the world slowly expanded itself and manifested its unsuspected resources, was becoming more and more lucrative. It was not, perhaps, that men hated each other less, but that they had for a time exhausted their power and their love for slaughter. Meanwhile new devices for injuring humanity and re-

tarding its civilization were revealing themselves out of that very intellectual progress which ennobled the new era. Although war might still be regarded as the normal condition of the civilized world, it was possible for the chosen ones to whom the earth and its fullness belonged to inflict general damage otherwise than by perpetual battles.

In the east, west, north, and south of Europe peace was thrusting itself as it were uncalled-for and unexpected upon the general attention. Charles and his nephew Sigismund, and the false Demetrius, and the intrigues of the Jesuits, had provided too much work for Sweden, Poland, and Russia to leave those countries much leisure for mingling in the more important business of Europe at this epoch, nor have their affairs much direct connection with this history. Venice, in its quarrels with the Jesuits, had brought Spain, France, and all Italy into a dead-lock, out of which a compromise had been made not more satisfactory to the various parties than compromises are apt to prove. The Dutch Republic still maintained the position, which it had assumed a quarter of a century before, of actual and legal independence; while Spain, on the other hand, still striving after universal monarchy, had not, of course, abated one jot of its pretensions to absolute dominion over its rebellious subjects in the Netherlands.

The Holy Roman and the Sublime Ottoman empires had also drifted into temporary peace, the exploits of the Persians and other Asiatic movements having given Ahmed more work than was convenient on his eastern frontier, while Stephen Botschkay had so completely got the better of Rudolph in Transylvania as to make

repose desirable. So there was a treaty between the great Turk and the great Christian on the basis of what each possessed; Stephen Botschkay was recognized as Prince of Transylvania, with part of Hungary, and when taken off soon afterward by family poison, he recommended on his death-bed the closest union between Hungary and Transylvania, as well as peace with the emperor, so long as it might be compatible with the rights of the Magyars.¹

France and England, while suspecting each other, dreading each other, and very sincerely hating each other, were drawn into intimate relations by their common detestation of Spain, with which power both had now formal treaties of alliance and friendship. This was the result of their mighty projects for humbling the house of Austria and annihilating its power. England hated the Netherlands because of the injuries she had done them, the many benefits she had conferred upon them, and more than all on account of the daily increasing commercial rivalry between the two most progressive states in Christendom, the two powers which, comparatively weak as they were in territory, capital, and population, were most in harmony with the spirit of the age.

The government of England was more hostile than its people to the United Provinces. James never spoke of the Netherlands but as upstarts and rebels, whose success ought to be looked upon with horror by the Lord's anointed everywhere. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that, with the Republic destroyed, and a Spanish sacerdotal despotism established in Holland and Zealand, with Jesuit seminaries in full bloom in

¹ Grotius, xv. 712, 713. Meteren, 543.

Amsterdam and The Hague, his own rebels in Ireland might prove more troublesome than ever, and gunpowder plots in London become common occurrences. The Earl of Tyrone at that very moment was receiving enthusiastic hospitality at the archduke's court, much to the disgust of the Presbyterian sovereign of the United Kingdom, who nevertheless, despite his cherished theology, was possessed with an unconquerable craving for a close family alliance with the Most Catholic King. His ministers were inclined to Spain, and the British government was at heart favorable to some kind of arrangement by which the Netherlands might be reduced to the authority of their former master, in case no scheme could be carried into effect for acquiring a virtual sovereignty over those provinces by the British crown. Moreover, and most of all, the King of France being supposed to contemplate the annexation of the Netherlands to his own dominions, the jealousy excited by such ambition made it even possible for James's government to tolerate the idea of Dutch independence. Thus the court and cabinet of England were as full of contradictory hopes and projects as a madman's brain.

The rivalry between the courts of England and France for the Spanish marriages, and by means of them to obtain ultimately the sovereignty of all the Netherlands, was the key to most of the diplomacy and interpalatial intrigue of the several first years of the century. The negotiations of Cornwallis at Madrid were almost simultaneous with the schemes of Villeroy and Rosny at Paris.

A portion of the English government, so soon as its treaty with Spain had been signed, seemed secretly

determined to do as much injury to the Republic as might lie in its power. While at heart convinced that the preservation of the Netherlands was necessary for England's safety, it was difficult for James and the greater part of his advisers to overcome their repugnance to the Republic, and their jealousy of the great commercial successes which the Republic had achieved.¹

It was perfectly plain that a continuance of the war by England and the Netherlands united would have very soon ended in the entire humiliation of Spain.²

¹ "For my own particular," wrote Cornwallis, "though I hold the preservation of the Low Countries most wholesome and necessary for the kingdom of Great Britain, yet dare I not wish their strength and wealth much increased, it being better to endure an advantage in a monarchy than in a people of their condition."—*Memorials of Affairs of State, from the Papers of Sir Ralph Winwood* (London, 1725), ii. 76.

"Though we must respect the Hollanders," wrote the Earl of Northampton, "for such reasons as need no dilatation to a man of your capacity, yet we resolve to mark our favors that they be without exception to Spain."—*Ibid.*, 92, 93.

² "The king [of Spain]," wrote Cornwallis, "being now freed from the distractions he was wont to find by the encounters of the English, proceeds against the Hollanders with more life and hope. If this peace had not been concluded, in mine own understanding I see not how it had been possible for him to have borne out the infinite weight of charges and business laid upon him." And again: "England never lost such an opportunity of winning honor and wealth as by relinquishing the war with Spain. The king and kingdom were reduced to such estate as they could not in all likelihood have endured the space of two years more. His own treasury was exhausted; his rents and customs subsigned for the most part for money borrowed; his nobility poor and much indebted; his merchants wasted; his people of the country in all extremity of necessity; his devices of gaining by the increase of the valuation of money and other such of that nature all played over; his credit in borrowing, by means of the incertainty of his

Now that peace had been made, however, it was thought possible that England might make a bargain with her late enemy for destroying the existence and dividing the territory of her late ally. Accordingly, the Spanish cabinet lost no time in propounding, under seal of secrecy, and with even more mystery than was usually employed by the most Catholic court, a scheme for the marriage of the Prince of Wales with the Infanta, the bridal pair, when arrived at proper age, to be endowed with all the Netherlands, both obedient and republican, in full sovereignty. One thing was necessary to the carrying out of this excellent plot—the reduction of the Republic into her ancient subjection to Spain before her territory could be transferred to the future Princess of Wales.¹

It was proposed by the Spanish government that England should undertake this part of the job, and that King James for such service should receive an annual pension of one million ducats a year. It was also stipulated that certain cities in the republican

estate during the war with England, much decayed; the subjects of his many distracted dominions held in obedience by force and fear, not by love and duty; himself very young, and in that regard with this people in no great veneration, and the less for suffering himself to be wholly governed by a man [viz., Duke of Lerma] generally hated of his own country. If this state, standing on such feeble foundations, had made but one such stumble as his father did in the time of the late queen, hardly could he have recovered without a fall, his nearest and last-gained kingdoms more hurting this nation than any other, desiring nothing more than the ruin of it.”—*Ibid.*, 72, 75, 76.

¹ The important facts connected with this intrigue—except such as, being too delicate to be committed to paper, were intrusted to confidential agents—may be found in Winwood’s *Memorials*, ii. 160–177. Compare Van Deventer, iii. 74.

dominions should be pledged to him as security for the regular payment of that stipend.¹ Sir Charles Cornwallis, English ambassador in Spain, lent a most favorable ear to these proposals, and James eagerly sanctioned them so soon as they were secretly imparted to that monarch. "The king here," said Cornwallis, "hath need of the King of Great Britain's arm. Our king . . . hath good occasion to use the help of the King of Spain's purse. The assistance of England to help this nation out of that quicksand of the Low Countries, where so long they have struggled to tread themselves out, and by proof find that they sink deeper in, will be a sovereign medicine to the malady of this estate. The addition of a million of ducats to the revenue of our sovereign will be a good help to his estate."²

The Spanish government had even the effrontery to offer the English envoy a reward of two hundred thousand crowns if the negotiations should prove successful.³ Care was to be taken, however, that Great Britain, by this accession of power, both present and in prospect, should not grow too great, Spain reserving to herself certain strongholds and maritime positions in the Netherlands for the proper security of her European and Indian commerce.⁴

It was thought high time for the bloodshed to cease in the provinces; and as England, by making a treaty of peace with Spain when Spain was at the last gasp, had come to the rescue of that power, it was logical

¹ See in particular Winwood, ii. 160, 161. ² Ibid., 177.

³ Winwood, ii. 215. Cornwallis repelled with indignation the attempts to bribe him. "Would they give me for every crown a million, I would not think upon so unfaithful a work," he said.

⁴ Ibid., 160.

that she should complete the friendly work by compelling the rebellious provinces to awake from their dream of independence. If the statesmen of Holland believed in the possibility of that independence, the statesmen of England knew better. If the turbulent little Republic was not at last convinced that it had no right to create so much turmoil and inconvenience for its neighbors and for Christendom in general in order to maintain its existence, it should be taught its duty by the sovereigns of Spain and Britain.¹

It was observed, however, that the more greedily James listened day after day to the marriage propositions, the colder became the Spanish cabinet in regard to that point, the more disposed to postpone those nuptials "to God's providence and future event."²

The high hopes founded on these secret stratagems were suddenly dashed to the earth before the end of the year, the explosion of the Gunpowder Plot blowing the castles in Spain into the air.

Of course Spanish politicians vied with each other in expressions of horror and indignation at the plot and the wicked contrivers thereof, and suggested to Cornwallis that the King of France was probably at the bottom of it.³

¹ "Never can those other people [viz., of the United Provinces] take a better opportunity to compound so great a difference, neither can they require more, with any proportion of reason and justice, than will be yielded unto them. If their purpose be to maintain a popular liberty with the yearly effusion of so much blood, and the infesting of all Christendom so as a few particulars may continue the means of their authority and enrich themselves, they will by his Majesty be unmasked."—Sir Charles Cornwallis to Earl of Salisbury, *ibid.*, 174.

² *Ibid.*, 166.

³ Winwood, ii. 173.

They declined to give up Owen and Baldwin, however, and meantime the negotiations for the marriage of the Prince of Wales and the Infanta, the million ducats of yearly pension for the needy James, and the reduction of the Dutch Republic to its ancient slavery to Spain "under the eye and arm of Britain," faded indefinitely away. Salisbury, indeed, was always too wise to believe in the possibility of the schemes with which James and some of his other counselors had been so much infatuated.

It was almost dramatic that these plottings between James and the Catholic king against the life of the Republic should have been signally and almost simultaneously avenged by the conspiracy of Guido Fawkes.

On the other hand, Rosny had imparted to the Dutch envoy the schemes of Henry and his ministers in regard to the same object early in 1605. "Spain is more tired of the war," said he to Aertsens, under seal of absolute secrecy, "than you are yourselves. She is now negotiating for a marriage between the Dauphin and the Infanta, and means to give her the United Provinces, as at present constituted, for a marriage portion. Villeroy and Sillery believe the plan feasible, but demand all the Netherlands together. As for me, I shall have faith in it if they send their Infanta hither at once, or make a regular cession of the territory. Do you believe that my lords the states will agree to the proposition?"¹

It would be certainly difficult to match in history the effrontery of such a question. The republican envoy was asked point-blank whether his country would resign her dearly gained liberty and give her-

¹ Deventer, 41.

self as a dowry for Philip II.'s three-years-old granddaughter. Aertsens replied cautiously that he had never heard the matter discussed in the provinces. It had always been thought that the French king had no pretensions to their territory, but had ever advocated their independence. He hinted that such a proposition was a mere apple of discord thrown between two good allies by Spain. Rosny admitted the envoy's arguments, and said that his Majesty would do nothing without the consent of the Dutch government, and that he should probably be himself sent erelong to The Hague to see if he could not obtain some little recognition from the states.¹

Thus it was confidentially revealed to the agent of the Republic that her candid adviser and ally was hard at work, in conjunction with her ancient enemy, to destroy her independence, annex her territory, and appropriate to himself all the fruits of her great war, her commercial achievements, and her vast sacrifices; while, as we have just seen, English politicians at the same moment were attempting to accomplish the same feat for England's supposed advantage. All that was wished by Henry to begin with was a little, a very little, recognition of his sovereignty. "You will do well to reflect on this delicate matter in time," wrote Aertsens to the advocate; "I know that the King of Spain is inclined to make this offer, and that they are mad enough in this place to believe the thing feasible. For me, I reject all such talk until they have got the Infanta—that is to say, until the Greek calends. I am ashamed that they should believe it here, and fearful that there is still more evil concealed than I know of."²

¹ Deventer, 42.

² *Ibid.*, 43.

Toward the close of the year 1606 the French government became still more eager to carry out their plans of alliance and absorption. Aertsens, who loved a political intrigue better than became a republican envoy, was perfectly aware of Henry's schemes. He was disposed to humor them, in order to make sure of his military assistance, but with the secret intention of seeing them frustrated by the determined opposition of the states.

The French ministers, by command of their sovereign, were disposed to deal very plainly. They informed the Dutch diplomatist, with very little circumlocution, that if the Republic wished assistance from France she was to pay a heavy price for it. Not a pound of flesh only, but the whole body corporate, was to be surrendered if its destruction was to be averted by French arms.

"You know," said Sillery, "that princes in all their actions consider their interests, and his Majesty has not so much affection for your conservation as to induce him to resign his peaceful position. Tell me, I pray you, what would you do for his Majesty in case anything should be done for you? You were lately in Holland. Do you think that they would give themselves to the king if he assisted them? Do you not believe that Prince Maurice has designs on the sovereignty, and would prevent the fulfilment of the king's hopes? What will you do for us in return for our assistance?"¹

Aertsens was somewhat perplexed, but he was cunning at fence. "We will do all we can," said he, "for

¹ Aertsens to Olden-Barneveldt, October 7, 1606, in Deventer, iii. 87-93.

any change is more supportable than the yoke of Spain."

"What can you do, then?" persisted Sillery. "Give us your opinion in plain French, I beg of you, and lay aside all passion; for we have both the same object—your preservation. Besides interest, his Majesty has affection for you. Let him only see some advantage for himself to induce him to assist you more powerfully. Suppose you should give us what you have and what you may acquire in Flanders, with the promise to treat secretly with us when the time comes. Could you do that?"¹

The envoy replied that this would be tearing the commonwealth in pieces. If places were given away, the jealousy of the English would be excited. Certainly it would be no light matter to surrender Sluis, the fruit of Maurice's skill and energy, the splendidly earned equivalent for the loss of Ostend. "As to Sluis and other places in Flanders," said Aertsens, "I don't know if towns comprised in our Union could be transferred or pledged without their own consent and that of the states. Should such a thing get wind we might be ruined. Nevertheless, I will write to learn what his Majesty may hope."

"The people," returned Sillery, "need know nothing of this transfer; for it might be made secretly by Prince Maurice, who could put the French quietly into Sluis and other Flemish places. Meantime you had best make a journey to Holland to arrange matters so that the deputies coming hither may be amply instructed in regard to Sluis, and no time be lost. His

¹ Aertsens to Olden-Barneveld, October 7, 1606, in Deventer, iii. 87-93.

Majesty is determined to help you if you know how to help yourselves.”¹

The two men then separated, Sillery enjoining it upon the envoy to see the king next morning, “in order to explain to his Majesty, as he had just been doing to himself, that this sovereignty could not be transferred without the consent of the whole people, nor the people be consulted in secret.”

“It is necessary therefore to be armed,” continued Henry’s minister, very significantly, “before aspiring to the sovereignty.”²

Thus there was a faint glimmer of appreciation at the French court of the meaning of popular sovereignty. It did not occur to the minister that the right of giving consent was to be respected. The little obstacle was to be overcome by stratagem and by force. Prince Maurice was to put French garrisons stealthily into Sluis and other towns conquered by the Republic in Flanders. Then the magnanimous ally was to rise at the right moment and overcome all resistance by force of arms. The plot was a good one. It is passing strange, however, that the character of the Nassaus and of the Dutch nation should after the last fifty years have been still so misunderstood. It seemed in France possible that Maurice would thus defile his honor and the Netherlands barter their liberty by accepting a new tyrant in place of the one so long ago deposed.

“This is the marrow of our conference,” said Aertsens to Barneveldt, reporting the interview, “and you may thus perceive whither are tending the designs of his Majesty. It seems that they are aspiring here to

¹ Aertsens to Olden-Barneveldt, *ubi sup.*

² *Ibid.*

the sovereignty, and all my letters have asserted the contrary. If you will examine a little more closely, however, you will find that there is no contradiction. This acquisition would be desirable for France if it could be made peacefully. As it can only be effected by war, you may make sure that it will not be attempted; for the great maxim and basis of this kingdom is to preserve repose, and at the same time give such occupation to the King of Spain that his means shall be consumed and his designs frustrated. All this will cease if we make peace.

“Thus in treating with the king we must observe two rules. The first is that we can maintain ourselves no longer unless powerfully assisted, and that, the people inclining to peace, we shall be obliged to obey the people. Secondly, we must let no difficulty appear as to the desire expressed by his Majesty to have the sovereignty of these provinces. We ought to let him hope for it, but to make him understand that by ordinary and legitimate means he cannot aspire to it. We will make him think that we have an equal desire with himself, and we shall thus take from those evil-disposed councilors the power to injure us who are always persuading him that he is only making us great for ourselves, and thus giving us the power to injure him. In short, the king can hope nothing from us overtly, and certainly nothing covertly. By explaining to him that we require the authorization of the people, and by showing ourselves prompt to grant his request, he will be the very first to prevent us from taking any steps, in order that his repose may not be disturbed. I know that France does not wish to go to war with Spain. Let us then pretend that

we wish to be under the dominion of France, and that we will lead our people to that point if the king desires it, but that it cannot be done secretly. Believe me, he will not wish it on such conditions, while we shall gain much by this course. Would to God that we could engage France in war with Spain. All the utility would be ours, and the accidents of arms would so press them to Spain, Italy, and other places that they would have little leisure to think of us. Consider all this and conceal it from Buzanval.”¹

Buzanval, it is well known, was the French envoy at The Hague, and it must be confessed that these schemes and paltry falsehoods on the part of the Dutch agent were as contemptible as any of the plots contrived every day in Paris or Madrid. Such base coin as this was still circulating in diplomacy as if fresh from the Machiavellian mint, but the republican agent ought to have known that his government had long ago refused to pass it current.

Soon afterward this grave matter was discussed at The Hague between Henry's envoy and Barneveldt. It was a very delicate negotiation. The advocate wished to secure the assistance of a powerful but most unscrupulous ally, and at the same time to conceal his real intention to frustrate the French design upon the independence of the Republic.

Disingenuous and artful as his conduct unquestionably was, it may at least be questioned whether in that age of deceit any other great statesman would have been more frank. If the comparatively weak commonwealth, by openly and scornfully refusing all the insidious and selfish propositions of the French king, had

¹ Aertsens to Olden-Barneveldt, *ubi sup.*

incurred that monarch's wrath, it would have taken a noble position, no doubt, but it would have perhaps been utterly destroyed. The advocate considered himself justified in using the artifices of war against a subtle and dangerous enemy who wore the mask of a friend. When the price demanded for military protection was the voluntary abandonment of national independence in favor of the protector, the man who guided the affairs of the Netherlands did not hesitate to humor and to outwit the king who strove to subjugate the Republic. At the same time, however one may be disposed to censure the dissimulation from the standing-ground of a lofty morality, it should not be forgotten that Barneveldt never hinted at any possible connivance on his part with an infraction of the laws. Whatever might be the result of time, of persuasion, of policy, he never led Henry or his ministers to believe that the people of the Netherlands could be deprived of their liberty by force or fraud. He was willing to play a political game in which he felt himself inferior to no man, trusting to his own skill and coolness for success. If the tyrant were defeated, and at the same time made to serve the cause of the free commonwealth, the advocate believed this to be fair play.

Knowing himself surrounded by gamblers and tricksters, he probably did not consider himself to be cheating because he did not play his cards upon the table.

So when Buzanval informed him early in October that the possession of Sluis and other Flemish towns would not be sufficient for the king, but that they must offer the sovereignty on even more favorable conditions than had once been proposed to Henry III., the advocate told him roundly that my lords the states

were not likely to give the provinces to any man, but meant to maintain their freedom and their rights.¹ The envoy replied that his Majesty would be able to gain more favor, perhaps, with the common people of the country.

When it is remembered that the states had offered the sovereignty of the provinces to Henry III., abjectly and as it were without any conditions at all,² the effrontery of Henry IV. may be measured, who claimed the same sovereignty, after twenty years of republican independence, upon even more favorable terms than those which his predecessor had rejected.

Barneveldt, in order to mitigate the effect of his plump refusal of the royal overtures, explained to Buzanval, what Buzanval very well knew, that the times had now changed; that, in those days immediately after the death of William the Silent, despair and disorder had reigned in the provinces, "while that dainty delicacy, liberty, had not so long been sweetly tickling the appetites of the people; that the English had not then acquired their present footing in the country, nor the house of Nassau the age, the credit, and authority to which it had subsequently attained."³

He then intimated—and here began the deception, which certainly did not deceive Buzanval—that if things were handled in the right way there was little doubt as to the king's reaching the end proposed, but that all depended on good management. It was an error, he said, to suppose that in one, two, or three

¹ Memorandum of an interview with Buzanval by Olden-Barneveldt, October, 1606, in Deventer, iii. 94, 95.

² Vol. i. of this work, chaps. ii. and iv.

³ Buzanval, in Deventer, iii. 95, 96.

months eight provinces and their principal members, to wit, forty good cities, all enjoying liberty and equality, could be induced to accept a foreign sovereign.

Such language was very like irony, and probably not too subtle to escape the fine perception of the French envoy.

The first thing to be done, continued the advocate, is to persuade the provinces to aid the king with all their means to conquer the disunited provinces,—to dispose of the archdukes, in short, and to drive the Spaniards from the soil,—and then, little by little, to make it clear that there could be no safety for the states except in reducing the whole body of the Netherlands under the authority of the king. Let his Majesty begin by conquering and annexing to his crown the provinces nearest him, and he would then be able to persuade the others to a reasonable arrangement.

Whether the advocate's general reply was really considered by Buzanval as a grave sarcasm, politely veiled, may be a question. That envoy, however, spoke to his government of the matter as surrounded with difficulties, but not wholly desperate. Barneveldt was, he said, inclined to doubt whether the archdukes would be able, before any negotiations were begun, to comply with the demand which he had made upon them to have a declaration in writing that the United Provinces were to be regarded as a free people over whom they pretended to no authority. If so, the French king would at once be informed of the fact. Meantime the envoy expressed the safe opinion that, if Prince Maurice and the advocate together should take the matter of Henry's sovereignty in hand with zeal, they might conduct the bark to the desired haven.

Surely this was an "if" with much virtue in it. And notwithstanding that he chose to represent Barneveldt as rich, tired, at the end of his Latin, and willing enough to drop his anchor in a snug harbor, in order to make his fortune secure, it was obvious enough that Buzanval had small hope at heart of seeing his master's purpose accomplished.¹

As to Prince Maurice, the envoy did not even affect to believe him capable of being made use of, strenuous as the efforts of the French government in that direction had been. "He has no private designs that I can find out," said Buzanval, doing full justice to the straightforward and sincere character of the prince. "He asks no change for himself or for his country." The envoy added, as a matter of private opinion, however, that if an alteration were to be made in the constitution of the provinces, Maurice would prefer that it should be made in favor of France than of any other government.

He lost no opportunity, moreover, of impressing it upon his government that if the sovereignty were to be secured for France at all, it could only be done by observing great caution, and by concealing their desire to swallow the Republic of which they were professing themselves the friends. The jealousy of England was sure to be awakened if France appeared too greedy at the beginning. On the other hand, that power "might be the more easily rocked into a profound sleep

¹ Buzanval, in Deventer, iii. 95, 96. See also the letter of Aertsens to Olden-Barneveldt, November 14, 1606, in which he again urges the propriety of pretending to bestow the sovereignty on France, in the certainty that she will find it impossible to accept it. Also the memoir of Aertsens of January 6, 1606, *ibid.*, 99-103. Groen v. Prinsterer, Archives, ii. 370-374.

if France did not show its appetite at the very beginning of the banquet.”¹ That the policy of France should be steadily but stealthily directed toward getting possession of as many strong places as possible in the Netherlands had long been his opinion.” Since we don’t mean to go to war,” said he a year before to Villeroy, “let us at least follow the example of the English, who have known how to draw a profit out of the necessities of this state. Why should we not demand, or help ourselves to, a few good cities? Sluis, for example, would be a security for us, and of great advantage.”²

Suspicion was rife on this subject at the court of Spain. Certainly it would be less humiliating to the Catholic crown to permit the independence of its rebellious subjects than to see them incorporated into the realms of either France or England. It is not a very striking indication of the capacity of great rulers to look far into the future that both France and England should now be hankering after the sovereignty of those very provinces, the solemn offer of which by the provinces themselves both France and England had peremptorily and almost contemptuously refused.

In Spain itself the war was growing very wearisome. Three hundred thousand dollars a month could no longer be relied upon from the royal exchequer, or from the American voyages, or from the kite-flying operations of the merchant princes on the Genoa exchange.

A great fleet, to be sure, had recently arrived, splendidly laden, from the West Indies, as already stated. Pagan slaves, scourged to their dreadful work, con-

¹ Authorities last cited.

² Deventer, iii., xiv.

tinued to supply to their Christian taskmasters the hidden treasures of the New World in exchange for the blessings of the evangel as thus revealed; but these treasures could never fill the perpetual sieve of the Netherland war, rapidly and conscientiously as they were poured into it year after year.

The want of funds in the royal exchequer left the soldiers in Flanders unpaid, and as an inevitable result mutiny admirably organized and calmly defiant was again established throughout the obedient provinces. This happened regularly once a year, so that it seemed almost as businesslike a proceeding for an *eletto* to proclaim mutiny as for a sovereign to declare martial law. Should the whole army mutiny at once, what might become of the kingdom of Spain?

Moreover, a very uneasy feeling was prevalent that, as formerly the Turks had crossed the Hellespont into Europe by means of a Genoese alliance and Genoese galleys, so now the Moors were contemplating the reconquest of Granada, and of their other ancient possessions in Spain, with the aid of the Dutch Republic and her powerful fleets.¹

The Dutch cruisers watched so carefully on the track of the homeward-bound argosies that the traffic was becoming more dangerous than lucrative, particularly since the public law established by Admiral Fazardo, that it was competent for naval commanders to hang, drown, or burn the crews of the enemy's merchantmen.

The Portuguese were still more malcontent than the Spaniards. They had gained little by the absorption of their kingdom by Spain, save participation in the war against the Republic, the result of which had been

¹ Grotius, xv. 715.

to strip them almost entirely of the conquests of Vasco da Gama and his successors, and to close to them the ports of the Old World and the New.

In the Republic there was a party for peace, no doubt, but peace only with independence. As for a return to their original subjection to Spain, they were unanimously ready to accept forty years more of warfare rather than to dream of such a proposition. There were many who deliberately preferred war to peace. Bitter experience had impressed very deeply on the Netherlanders the great precept that faith would never be kept with heretics.¹ The present generation had therefore been taught from their cradles to believe that the word "peace" in Spanish mouths simply meant the Holy Inquisition. It was not unnatural, too, perhaps, that a people who had never known what it was to be at peace might feel, in regard to that blessing, much as the blind or the deaf toward color or music—as something useful and agreeable, no doubt, but with which they might the more cheerfully dispense, as peculiar circumstances had always kept them in positive ignorance of its nature. The instinct of commercial greediness made the merchants of Holland and Zealand, and especially those of Amsterdam, dread the revival of Antwerp in case of peace, to the imagined detriment of the great trading centers of the Republic. It was felt also to be certain that Spain, in case of negotiations, would lay down as an indispensable pre-

¹ "The Spaniard, who hath been accustomed to serve himself of all the advantages without mercy and sometimes to fail of treaties and contracts, *the memory of which is engraved in the marble hearts of this people to all posterity.*"—Winwood to Lord Cranborne, September 12, 1604, *Memorials*, ii. 30.

liminary the abstinence on the part of the Netherlands from all intercourse with the Indies, East or West; and although such a prohibition would be received by those republicans with perfect contempt, yet the mere discussion of the subject moved their spleen. They had already driven the Portuguese out of a large portion of the field in the East, and they were now preparing by means of the same machinery to dispute the monopoly of the Spaniards in the West. To talk of excluding such a people as this from intercourse with any portion of the Old World or the New was the mumbling of dotage; yet nothing could be more certain than that such would be the pretensions of Spain.

As for the stadholder, his vocation was war, his greatness had been derived from war, his genius had never turned itself to pacific pursuits. Should a peace be negotiated, not only would his occupation be gone, but he might even find himself hampered for means. It was probable that his large salaries as captain and admiral-general of the forces of the Republic would be seriously curtailed in case his services in the field were no longer demanded, while such secret hopes as he might entertain of acquiring that sovereign power which Barneveldt had been inclined to favor were more likely to be fulfilled if the war should be continued. At the same time, if sovereignty were to be his at all, he was distinctly opposed to such limitations of his authority as were to have been proposed by the states to his father. Rather than reign on those conditions, he avowed that he would throw himself head foremost from the great tower of Hague Castle.

Moreover, the prince was smarting under the consciousness of having lost military reputation, however

undeservedly, in the latter campaigns, and might reasonably hope to gain new glory in the immediate future. Thus, while his great rival, Marquis Spinola, whose fame had grown to so luxuriant a height in so brief a period, had many reasons to dread the results of future campaigning, Maurice seemed to have personally much to lose and nothing to hope for in peace. Spinola was over head and ears in debt. In the past two years he had spent millions of florins out of his own pocket.¹ His magnificent fortune and boundless credit were seriously compromised. He had found it an easier task to take Ostend and relieve Grol than to bolster up the finances of Spain. His acceptances were becoming as much a drug upon the exchanges of Antwerp, Genoa, or Augsburg as those of the Most Catholic King or their Highnesses the archdukes. Ruin stared him in the face, notwithstanding the deeds with which he had startled the world, and he was therefore sincerely desirous of peace, provided, of course, that all those advantages for which the war had been waged in vain could now be secured by negotiation.

There had been, since the arrival of the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands, just forty years of fighting. Maurice and the war had been born in the same year, and it would be difficult for him to comprehend that his whole life's work had been a superfluous task, to be rubbed away now with a sponge. Yet that Spain, on the entrance to negotiations, would demand of the provinces submission to her authority, reëstablishment of the Catholic religion, abstinence from Oriental or

¹ Hoofd's Brieven, N. 3, bl. 3, cited by Wagenaer, ix. 234. The preposterous statement is there made that he had spent *fourteen millions* of his own money.

American commerce, and the toleration of Spanish soldiers over all the Netherlands, seemed indubitable.

It was equally unquestionable that the seven provinces would demand recognition of their national independence by Spain, would refuse public practice of the Roman religion within their domains, and would laugh to scorn any proposed limitations to their participation in the world's traffic. As to the presence of Spanish troops on their soil, that was, of course, an inconceivable idea.

Where, then, could even a loophole be found through which the possibility of a compromise could be espied? The ideas of the contending parties were as much opposed to each other as fire and snow. Nevertheless, the great forces of the world seemed to have gradually settled into such an equilibrium as to make the continuance of the war for the present impossible.

Accordingly, the peace party in Brussels had cautiously put forth its tentacles late in 1606, and again in the early days of the new year. Walrave van Witenhorst and Dr. Gevaerts had been allowed to come to The Hague, ostensibly on private business, but with secret commission from the archdukes to feel and report concerning the political atmosphere. They found that it was a penal offense in the Republic to talk of peace or of truce. They nevertheless suspected that there might be a more sympathetic layer beneath the very chill surface which they everywhere encountered. Having intimated in the proper quarters that the archdukes would be ready to receive or to appoint commissioners for peace or armistice, if becoming propositions should be made, they were allowed on the 10th January, 1607, to make a communication to the States-

General.¹ They indulged in the usual cheap common-places on the effusion of blood, the calamities of war, and the blessings of peace, and assured the states of the very benignant disposition of their Highnesses at Brussels.

The States-General, in their reply, seventeen days afterward, remarking that the archdukes persisted in their unfounded pretensions of authority over them, took occasion to assure their Highnesses that they had no chance to obtain such authority except by the sword.² Whether they were like to accomplish much in that way the history of the past might sufficiently indicate, while, on the other hand, the states would always claim the right, and never renounce the hope, of recovering those provinces which had belonged to their free commonwealth since the Union of Utrecht, and which force and fraud had torn away.

During twenty-five years that Union had been confirmed as a free state by solemn decrees and many public acts and dealings with the mightiest potentates of Europe, nor could any other answer now be made to the archdukes than the one always given to his Holy Roman Imperial Majesty and other princes, to wit, that no negotiations could be had with powers making any pretensions in conflict with the solemn decrees and well-maintained rights of the United Netherlands.³

It was in this year that two words became more frequent in the mouths of men than they had ever been before—two words which, as the ages rolled on, were destined to exercise a wider influence over the affairs of this planet than was yet dreamed of by any thinker

¹ Gallucci, xx. 313. Meteren, 545 and^{vo}. Grotius, xv. 717.

² Meteren, ubi sup.

³ Ibid.

in Christendom. Those words were "America" and "Virginia." Certainly both words were known before, although India was the more general term for these auriferous regions of the West, which, more than a century long, had been open to European adventure, while the land baptized in honor of the throned vestal had been already made familiar to European ears by the exploits of Raleigh. But it was not till 1607 that Jamestown was founded, that Captain John Smith's adventures with Powhatan, "Emperor of Virginia," and his daughter the Princess Pocahontas, became fashionable topics in England, that the English attempts to sail up the Chickahominy to the Pacific Ocean—as abortive as those of the Netherlands to sail across the north pole to Cathay—were creating scientific discussion in Europe, and that the first cargo of imaginary gold-dust was exported from the James River.¹

With the adventurous minds of England all aflame with enthusiasm for those golden regions, with the thick-coming fancies for digging, washing, refining the precious sands of Virginia rivers, it was certain that a great rent was now to be made in the Borgian grant. It was inevitable that the rivalry of the Netherlands should be excited by the achievements and the marvelous tales of Englishmen beyond the Atlantic, and that they, too, should claim their share of traffic with that golden and magnificent unknown which was called America. The rivalry between England and Holland, already so conspicuous in the spicy archipelagoes of the East, was now to be extended over the silvery regions of the West. The two leading com-

¹ Hildreth's *History of the United States*, i. 105.

mercial powers of the Old World were now to begin their great struggle for supremacy in the western hemisphere.

A charter for what was called a West India Company was accordingly granted by the States-General. West India was understood to extend from the French settlements in Newfoundland or Acadia, along the American coast to the Straits of Magellan, and so around to the South Sea, including the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, besides all of Africa lying between the tropic of Cancer and the Cape of Good Hope. At least, within those limits the West India Company was to have monopoly of trade, all other Netherlanders being warned off the precincts. Nothing could be more magnificent, nor more vague.¹

The charter was for thirty-six years. The company was to maintain armies and fleets, to build forts and cities, to carry on war, to make treaties of peace and of commerce. It was a small peripatetic republic of merchants and mariners, evolved out of the mother republic,—which had at last established its position among the powers of Christendom,—and it was to begin its career full-grown and in full armor.

The States-General were to furnish the company at starting with one million of florins and with twenty ships of war. The company was to add twenty other ships. The government was to consist of four chambers of directors. One half the capital was to be contributed by the chamber of Amsterdam, one quarter by that of Zealand, one eighth respectively by the chambers of the Meuse and of North Holland. The

¹ Grotius, xvi. 721-725. Meteren, 545, 546. Wagenauer, ix. 226-230.

chambers of Amsterdam, of Zealand, of the Meuse, and of North Holland were to have respectively thirty, eighteen, fifteen, and fifteen directors. Of these seventy-eight, one third were to be replaced every sixth year by others, while from the whole number seventeen persons were to be elected as a permanent board of managers. Dividends were to be made as soon as the earnings amounted to ten per cent. on the capital. Maritime judges were to decide upon prizes, the proceeds of which were not to be divided for six years, in order that war might be self-sustaining. Afterward, the treasury of the United Provinces should receive one tenth, Prince Maurice one thirtieth, and the merchant stockholders the remainder. Governors and generals were to take the oath of fidelity to the States-General. The merchandise of the company was to be perpetually free of taxation, so far as regarded old duties, and exempt from war-taxes for the first twenty years.¹

Very violent and conflicting were the opinions expressed throughout the Republic in regard to this project. It was urged by those most in favor of it that the chief sources of the greatness of Spain would be thus transferred to the States-General; for there could be no doubt that the Hollanders, unconquerable at sea, familiar with every ocean path, and whose hardy constitutions defied danger and privation and the extremes of heat and cold, would easily supplant the more delicately organized adventurers from southern Europe, already enervated by the exhausting climate of America. Moreover, it was idle for Spain to attempt the defense of so vast a portion of the world.

¹ Authorities last cited.

Every tribe over which she had exercised sway would furnish as many allies for the Dutch company as it numbered men; for to obey and to hate the tyrannical Spaniard were one. The Republic would acquire, in reality, the grandeur which with Spain was but an empty boast, would have the glory of transferring the great war beyond the limits of home into those far-distant possessions, where the enemy deemed himself most secure, and would teach the true religion to savages sunk in their own superstitions, and still further depraved by the imported idolatries of Rome. Commerce was now world-wide, and the time had come for the Netherlanders, to whom the ocean belonged, to tear out from the pompous list of the Catholic king's titles his appellation of Lord of the Seas.

There were others, however, whose language was not so sanguine. They spoke with a shiver of the inhabitants of America, who hated all men, simply because they were men, or who had never manifested any love for their species except as an article of food. To convert such cannibals to Christianity and Calvinism would be a hopeless endeavor, and meanwhile the Spaniards were masters of the country. The attempt to blockade half the globe with forty galiots was insane; for, although the enemy had not occupied the whole territory, he commanded every harbor and position of vantage. Men, scarcely able to defend inch by inch the meager little sand-banks of their fatherland, who should now go forth in hopes to conquer the world, were but walking in their sleep. They would awake to the consciousness of ruin.

Thus men in the United Provinces spake of America. Especially Barneveldt had been supposed to be promi-

nent among the opponents of the new company, on the ground that the more violently commercial ambition excited itself toward wider and wider fields of adventure, the fainter grew inclinations for peace. The advocate, who was all but omnipotent in Holland and Zealand, subsequently denied the imputation of hostility to the new corporation, but the establishment of the West India Company, although chartered, was postponed.¹

The archdukes had not been discouraged by the result of their first attempts at negotiation, for Wittenhorst had reported a disposition toward peace as prevalent in the rebellious provinces, so far as he had contrived, during his brief mission, to feel the public pulse.

On the 6th February, 1607, Werner Cruwel, an insolvent tradesman of Brussels, and a relative of Recorder Aertsens, father of the envoy at Paris, made his appearance very unexpectedly at the house of his kinsman at The Hague. Sitting at the dinner-table, but neither eating nor drinking, he was asked by his host what troubled him. He replied that he had a load on his breast. Aertsens begged him, if it was his recent bankruptcy that oppressed him, to use philosophy and patience. The merchant answered that he who confessed well was absolved well. He then took from his pocket-book a letter from President Richardot, and said he would reveal what he had to say after dinner. The cloth being removed, and the wife and children of Aertsens having left the room, Cruwel disclosed that he had been sent by Richardot and Father Neyen on a secret mission. The recorder, much amazed

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 230.

and troubled, refused to utter a word, save to ask if Cruwel would object to confer with the advocate. The merchant expressing himself as ready for such an interview, the recorder, although it was late, immediately sent a message to the great statesman. Barneveldt was in bed and asleep, but was aroused to receive the communication of Aertsens. "We live in such a calumnious time," said the recorder, "that many people believe that you and I know more of the recent mission of Wittenhorst than we admit. You had best interrogate Cruwel in the presence of witnesses. I know not the man's humor, but it seems to me since his failure that in spite of his shy and lumpish manner, he is false and cunning."¹

The result was a secret interview, on the 8th February, between Prince Maurice, Barneveldt, and the recorder, in which Cruwel was permitted to state the object of his mission. He then produced a short memorandum, signed by Spinola and by Father Neyen, to the effect that the archdukes were willing to treat for a truce of ten or twelve years, on the sole condition that the states would abstain from the India navigation. He exhibited also another paper, signed only by Neyen, in which that friar proposed to come secretly to The Hague, no one in Brussels to know of the visit save the archdukes and Spinola, and all in the United Provinces to be equally ignorant except the prince, the advocate, and the recorder. Cruwel was then informed that if Neyen expected to discuss such grave matters with the prince he must first send in a written proposal that could go on all fours and deserve attention. A week afterward Cruwel came back with a paper in

¹ Original documents in Deventer, iii. 104-109.

which Neyen declared himself authorized by the archdukes to treat with the states on the basis of their liberty and independence, and to ask what they would give in return for so great a concession as this remuneration of all right to "the so-called United Provinces." ¹

This being a step in advance, it was decided to permit the visit of Neyen. It was, however, the recorded opinion of the distinguished personages to whom the proposal was made that it was a trick and a deception. The archdukes would, no doubt, it was said, nominally recognize the provinces as a free estate, but without really meaning it. Meantime they would do their best to corrupt the government and to renew the war after the Republic had by this means been separated from its friends.²

John Neyen, father commissary of the Franciscans, who had thus invited himself to the momentous conference, was a very smooth Flemish friar, who seemed admirably adapted, for various reasons, to glide into the rebel country and into the hearts of the rebels. He was a Netherlander, born at Antwerp when Antwerp was a portion of the united commonwealth, of a father who had been in the confidential service of William the Silent. He was eloquent in the Dutch language, and knew the character of the Dutch people. He had lived much at court, both in Madrid and Brussels, and was familiar with the ways of kings and courtiers. He was a holy man, incapable of a thought of worldly advancement for himself, but he was a master of the logic often thought most conclusive in those days, no man insinuating golden arguments more

¹ Original documents in Deventer, iii. 104-109.

² Ibid.

adroitly than he into half-reluctant palms. Blessed with a visage of more than Flemish frankness, he had in reality a most wily and unscrupulous disposition. Insensible to contumely, and incapable of accepting a rebuff, he could wind back to his purpose when less supple negotiators would have been crushed.¹

He was described by his admirers as uniting the wisdom of the serpent with the guilelessness of the dove.² Who better than he, then, in this double capacity, to coil himself around the rebellion, and to carry the olive-branch in his mouth?

On the 25th February the monk, disguised in the dress of a burgher, arrived at Ryswick, a village a mile and a half from The Hague. He was accompanied on the journey by Cruwel, and they gave themselves out as "traveling tradesmen."³ After nightfall, a carriage having been sent to the hostelry, according to secret agreement, by Recorder Aertsens, John Neyen was brought to The Hague. The friar, as he was driven on through these hostile regions, was somewhat startled, on looking out, to find himself accompanied by two mounted musketeers on each side of the carriage, but they proved to have been intended as a protective escort. He was brought to the recorder's house, whence, after some delay, he was conveyed to the palace. Here he was received by an unknown and silent attendant, who took him by the hand and led him through entirely deserted corridors and halls. Not a human being was seen nor a sound heard until his conductor at last reached the door of an inner apartment, through which he ushered him without speaking a syl-

¹ Grotius, xvi. 728.

² Gallucci, xx. 316, 317.

³ Wagenaer, ix. 272.

lable.¹ The monk then found himself in the presence of two personages, seated at a table covered with books and papers. One was in military undress, with an air about him of habitual command, a fair-complexioned man of middle age, inclining to baldness, rather stout, with a large blue eye, regular features, and a mouse-colored beard. The other was in the velvet cloak and grave habiliments of a civil functionary, apparently sixty years of age, with a massive forehead, heavy features, and a shaggy beard. The soldier was Maurice of Nassau, the statesman was John of Olden-Barneveldt.

Both rose as the friar entered, and greeted him with cordiality.

"But," said the prince, "how did you dare to enter The Hague, relying only on the word of a Beggar?"

"Who would not confide," replied Neyen, "in the word of so exalted, so respectable a Beggar as you, O most excellent Prince?"²

With these facetious words began the negotiations through which an earnest attempt was at last to be made for terminating a seemingly immortal war. The conversation, thus begun, rolled amicably and informally along. The monk produced letters from archdukes, in which, as he stated, the truly royal soul of the writers shone conspicuously forth. Without a thought for their own advantage, he observed, and moved only by a contemplation of the tears shed by so many thousands of human beings reduced to extreme misery, their Highnesses, although they were such exalted princes, cared nothing for what would be said by the kings of Europe and all the potentates of the universe about their excessive indulgence.³

¹ Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

² Gallucci, 317.

³ *Ibid.*

“What indulgence do you speak of?” asked the stadholder.

“Does that seem a trifling indulgence,” replied John Neyen, “that they are willing to abandon the right which they inherited from their ancestors over these provinces, to allow it so easily to slip from their fingers, to declare these people to be free, over whom, as their subjects refusing the yoke, they have carried on war so long?”

“It is our right hands that have gained this liberty,” said Maurice, “not the archdukes that have granted it. It has been acquired by our treasure, poured forth how freely, by the price of our blood, by so many thousands of souls sent to their account. Alas, how dear a price have we paid for it! All the potentates of Christendom, save the King of Spain alone, with his relatives the archdukes, have assented to our independence. In treating for peace we ask no gift of freedom from the archdukes. We claim to be regarded by them as what we are—free men. If they are unwilling to consider us as such, let them subject us to their dominion if they can. And as we have hitherto done, we shall contend more fiercely for liberty than for life.”¹

With this the tired monk was dismissed to sleep off the effects of his journey and of the protracted discussion, being warmly recommended to the captain of the citadel, by whom he was treated with every possible consideration.

Several days of private discussion ensued between Neyen and the leading personages of the Republic.

¹ Gallucci, 317 seq., who wrote from the original letters and journals of Neyen, Spinola, and many others.

The emissary was looked upon with great distrust. All schemes of substantial negotiation were regarded by the public as visions, while the monk on his part felt the need of all his tact and temper to wind his way out of the labyrinth into which he felt that he had perhaps too heedlessly entered. A false movement on his part would involve himself and his masters in a hopeless maze of suspicion, and make a pacific result impossible.

At length, it having been agreed to refer the matter to the States-General, Recorder Aertsens waited upon Neyen to demand his credentials for negotiation. He replied that he had been forbidden to deliver his papers, but that he was willing to exhibit them to the States-General.

He came accordingly to that assembly, and was respectfully received. All the deputies rose, and he was placed in a seat near the presiding officer. Olden-Barneveldt then in a few words told him why he had been summoned. The monk begged that a want of courtesy might not be imputed to him, as he had been sent to negotiate with three individuals, not with a great assembly.

Thus already the troublesome effect of publicity upon diplomacy was manifesting itself. The many-headed, many-tongued Republic was a difficult creature to manage, adroit as the negotiator had proved himself to be in gliding through the cabinets and council-chambers of princes and dealing with the important personages found there.

The power was, however, produced, and handed around the assembly, the signature and seals being duly inspected by the members. Neyen was then asked

if he had anything to say in public. He replied in the negative, adding only a few vague commonplaces about the effusion of blood and the desire of the archdukes for the good of mankind. He was then dismissed.

A few days afterward a committee of five from the States-General, of which Barneveldt was chairman, conferred with Neyen. He was informed that the paper exhibited by him was in many respects objectionable, and that they had therefore drawn up a form which he was requested to lay before the archdukes for their guidance in making out a new power. He was asked also whether the King of Spain was a party to these proposals for negotiation. The monk answered that he was not informed of the fact, but that he considered it highly probable.¹

John Neyen then departed for Brussels with the form prescribed by the States-General in his pocket. Nothing could exceed the indignation with which the royalists and Catholics at the court of the archdukes were inspired by the extreme arrogance and obstinacy thus manifested by the rebellious heretics. That the offer on the part of their master to negotiate should be received by them with cavils, and almost with contempt, was as great an offense as their original revolt. That the servant should dare to prescribe a form for the sovereign to copy seemed to prove that the world was coming to an end. But it was ever thus with the vulgar, said the courtiers and church dignitaries, debating these matters. The insanity of plebeians was always enormous, and never more so than when fortune for a moment

¹ Gallucci, ubi sup.

smiled.¹ Full of arrogance and temerity when affairs were prosperous, plunged in abject cowardice when dangers and reverses came—such was the People, such it must ever be.

Thus blustered the priests and the parasites surrounding the archduke, nor need their sentiments amaze us. Could those honest priests and parasites have ever dreamed, before the birth of this upstart Republic, that merchants, manufacturers, and farmers, mechanics and advocates,—the People, in short,—should presume to meddle with affairs of state? Their vocation had been long ago prescribed: to dig and to draw, to brew and to bake, to bear burdens in peace and to fill bloody graves in war—what better lot could they desire? Meantime their superiors, especially endowed with wisdom by the Omnipotent, would direct trade and commerce, conduct war and diplomacy, make treaties, impose taxes, fill their own pockets, and govern the universe. Was not this reasonable and according to the elemental laws? If the beasts of the field had been suddenly gifted with speech, and had constituted themselves into a free commonwealth for the management of public affairs, they would hardly have caused more profound astonishment at Brussels and Madrid than had been excited by the proceedings of the rebellious Dutchmen.

Yet it surely might have been suggested, when the lament of the courtiers over the abjectness of the People in adversity was so emphatic, that Dorp and Van

¹ "Sempre son grandi le insanie del volgo ma più allora che gli arride l' aura festigianze della fortuna. Pieno d' arroganza e di temerità nelle cose proprie, tutto abjettione e viltà all' incontro poi nelle avverse."—Bentivoglio, iii. 554.

Loon, Berendrecht and Gieselles, with the men under their command, who had disputed every inch of Little Troy for three years and three months, and had covered those fatal sands with a hundred thousand corpses, had not been giving of late such evidence of the People's cowardice in reverses as theory required. The siege of Ostend had been finished only three years before, and it is strange that its lessons should so soon have been forgotten.

It was thought best, however, to dissemble. Diplomacy in those days—certainly the diplomacy of Spain and Rome—meant simply dissimulation. Moreover, that solid apothegm, "*Hæreticis non servanda fides*," the most serviceable anchor ever forged for true believers, was always ready to be thrown out, should storm or quicksand threaten, during the intricate voyage to be now undertaken.

John Neyen soon returned to The Hague, having persuaded his masters that it was best to affect compliance with the preliminary demand of the states. During the discussions in regard to peace it would not be dangerous to treat with the rebel provinces as with free states, over which the archdukes pretended to no authority, because—so it was secretly argued—this was to be understood with a sense of similitude. "We will negotiate with them *as if they were free*," said the Gray Friar to the archduke and his own counsellors, "but not with the signification of true and legitimate liberty. They have laid down in their formula that we are to pretend to no authority over them. Very well. For the time being we will pretend that we do not pretend to any such authority. To negotiate with them as if they were free will not make them

free. It is no recognition by us that they are free. Their liberty could never be acquired by their rebellion.¹ This is so manifest that neither the king nor the archdukes can lose any of their rights over the United Provinces, even should they make this declaration."²

Thus the hair-splitters at Brussels, spinning a web that should be stout enough to entrap the noisy, blundering republicans at The Hague, yet so delicate as to go through the finest dialectical needle. Time was to show whether subtlety or bluntness was the best diplomatic material.

The monk brought with him three separate instruments or powers, to be used according to his discretion. Admitted to the assembly of the States-General, he produced number one. It was instantly rejected. He then offered number two, with the same result. He now declared himself offended, not on his own account, but for the sake of his masters, and asked leave to retire from the assembly, leaving with them the papers which had been so benignantly drawn up, and which deserved to be more carefully studied.³

The states, on their parts, were sincerely and vehemently indignant. What did all this mean, it was demanded, this producing one set of propositions after another? Why did the archdukes not declare their intentions openly and at once? Let the states depart each to the several provinces, and let John Neyen be instantly sent out of the country. Was it thought to

¹ "Ciò si sarebbe dovuto sempre intendere con senso di similitudine ciò e come se fossero libere e non con significazione di vera e legittima libertà."—Bentivoglio, iii. 552.

² Ibid.

³ Gallucci, 318-325, from Neyen's letters and journals.

bait a trap for the ingenuous Netherlanders, and catch them little by little, like so many wild animals? This was not the way the states dealt with the archdukes. What they meant they put in front, first, last, and always. Now and in the future they said they would say exactly what they wished, candidly and seriously. Those who pursued another course would never come into negotiation with them.¹

The monk felt that he had excited a wrath which it would be difficult to assuage. He already perceived the difference between a real and an affected indignation, and tried to devise some soothing remedy. Early next morning he sent a petition in writing to the states for leave to make an explanation to the assembly. Barneveldt and Recorder Aertsens, in consequence, came to him immediately, and heaped invectives upon his head for his duplicity.²

Evidently it was a different matter dealing with this many-headed roaring beast, calling itself a republic, from managing the supple politicians with whom he was more familiar. The noise and publicity of these transactions were already somewhat appalling to the smooth friar who was accustomed to negotiate in comfortable secrecy. He now vehemently protested that never man was more sincere than he, and implored for time to send to Brussels for another power. It is true that number three was still in his portfolio, but he had seen so much indignation on the production of number two as to feel sure that the fury of the states would know no bounds should he now confess that he had come provided with a third.

It was agreed accordingly to wait eight days, in

¹ Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

² *Ibid.*

which period he might send for and receive the new power already in his possession. These little tricks were considered masterly diplomacy in those days and by this kind of negotiators; and such was the way in which it was proposed to terminate a half-century of warfare.¹ The friar wrote to his masters, not, of course, to ask for a new power, but to dilate on the difficulties to be anticipated in procuring that which the losing party is always bent upon in circumstances like these, and which was most ardently desired by the archdukes—an armistice. He described Prince Maurice as sternly opposed to such a measure, believing that temporary cessation of hostilities was apt to be attended with mischievous familiarity between the opposing camps, with relaxation of discipline, desertion, and various kinds of treachery, and that there was no better path to peace than that which was trampled by contending hosts.

Seven days passed, and then Neyen informed the states that he had at last received a power which he hoped would prove satisfactory. Being admitted accordingly to the assembly, he delivered an eloquent eulogy upon the sincerity of the archdukes, who, with perhaps too little regard for their own dignity and authority, had thus, for the sake of the public good, so benignantly conceded what the states had demanded.

Barneveldt, on receiving the new power, handed to Neyen a draft of an agreement which he was to study at his leisure, and in which he might suggest alterations. At the same time it was demanded that within three months the written consent of the King of Spain

¹ The narrative is the monk's own, as preserved by his admirer, the Jesuit Gallucci (*ubi sup.*).

to the proposed negotiations should be produced. The Franciscan objected that it did not comport with the dignity of the archdukes to suppose the consent of any other sovereign needful to confirm their acts. Barneveldt insisted with much vehemence on the necessity of this condition. It was perfectly notorious, he said, that the armies commanded by the archdukes were subject to the King of Spain and were called royal armies. Prince Maurice observed that all prisoners taken by him had uniformly called themselves soldiers of the crown, not of the archdukes, nor of Marquis Spinola.¹

Barneveldt added that the royal power over the armies in the Netherlands and over the obedient provinces was proved by the fact that all commanders of regiments, all governors of fortresses, especially of Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and the like, were appointed by the King of Spain. These were royal citadels, with royal garrisons. That without the knowledge and consent of the King of Spain it was impossible to declare the people of the United Provinces free, was obvious; for in the cession by Philip II. of all the Netherlands it was provided that, without the consent of the king, no part of that territory could be ceded, and this on pain of forfeiting all the sovereignty. To treat without the king was therefore impossible.

The Franciscan denied that because the sovereigns of Spain sent funds and auxiliary troops to Flanders, and appointed military commanders there of various degrees, the authority of the archdukes was any the less supreme. Philip II. had sent funds and

¹ Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

troops to sustain the League, but he was not King of France.

Barneveldt probably thought it not worth his while to reply that Philip, with those funds and those troops, had done his best to become King of France, and that his failure proved nothing for the argument either way.

Neyen then returned once more to Brussels, observing, as he took leave, that the decision of the archdukes as to the king's consent was very doubtful, although he was sure that the best thing for all parties would be to agree to an armistice out of hand.

This, however, was far from being the opinion of the states or the stadholder.

After conferring with his masters, the monk came down by agreement from Antwerp to the Dutch ships which lay in the Schelde before Fort Lillo. On board one of these Dirk van der Does had been stationed with a special commission from the states to compare documents. It was expressly ordered that in these preliminary negotiations neither party was to go on shore.¹ On a comparison of the agreement brought by Neyen from Brussels with the draft furnished by Barneveldt, of which Van der Does had a copy, so many discrepancies appeared that the document of the archdukes was at once rejected. But of course the monk had a number two, and this, after some trouble, was made to agree with the prescribed form. Brother John then, acting upon what he considered the soundest of principles,—that no job was so difficult as not to be accomplished with the help of the precious metals,—offered his fellow-negotiator a valuable gold chain as

¹ Gallucci, 322.

a present from the archdukes.¹ Dirk van der Does accepted the chain, but gave notice of the fact to his government.

The monk had become urgent to accompany his friend to The Hague, but this had been expressly forbidden by the states. Neyen felt sure, he said, of being able by arguments, which he could present by word of mouth, to overcome the opposition to the armistice were he once more to be admitted to the assembly. Van der Does had already much overstayed his appointed time, bound to the spot, as it were, by the golden chain thrown around him by the excellent friar,² and he now, in violation of orders, wrote to The Hague for leave to comply with this request. Pending the answer, the persuasive Neyen convinced him, much against his will, that they might both go together as far as Delft. To Delft they accordingly went, but, within half a league of that place, met a courier with strict orders that the monk was at once to return to Brussels. Brother John was in great agitation. Should he go back, the whole negotiation might come to naught; should he go on, he might be clapped into prison as a spy. Being conscious, however, that his services as a spy were intended to be the most valuable part of his mission, he resolved to proceed in that capacity.³ So he persuaded his friend Dirk to hide

¹ "Optime quippe norant negotium nullum esse tam arduum quod auri ope non conficiatur."—*Ibid.* Compare Wagenaer, ix. 249.

² "Quasi valde tenaciter aurea illa catena Neyo devinctus."—Gallucci, 323.

³ "Op dat hy den staat der vereinigden Landen van naby doorsnuffelen zou en heimelyk arbeiden tot bevordering van den handel."—Wagenaer, ix. 249. Compare Van der Kemp, iii. 12.

him in the hold of a canal-boat. Van der Does was in great trepidation himself, but on reaching The Hague and giving up his gold chain to Barneveldt, he made his peace, and obtained leave for the trembling but audacious friar to come out of his hiding-place.

Appearing once more before the States-General on the afternoon of 7th May,¹ Neyen urged with much eloquence the propriety of an immediate armistice both by sea and land, insisting that it would be a sanguinary farce to establish a cessation of hostilities upon upon one element while blood and treasure were profusely flowing on the ocean.² There were potent reasons for this earnestness on the part of the monk to procure a truce to maritime operations, as very soon was to be made evident to the world. Meantime, on this renewed visit, the negotiator expressed himself as no longer doubtful in regard to the propriety of requesting the Spanish king's consent to the proposed negotiations. That consent, however, would, in his opinion, depend upon the earnestness now to be manifested by the states in establishing the armistice by sea and land, and upon their promptness in recalling the fleets now infesting the coast of Spain. No immediate answer was given to these representations, but Neyen was requested to draw up his argument in writing, in order that it might be duly pondered by the states of the separate provinces.

The radical defect of the Dutch constitution—the independent sovereignty claimed by each one of the provinces composing the confederation, each of those provinces on its part being composed of cities, each

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 119.

² Gallucci, 324. Van der Kemp, iii. 118. Grotius, xvi. 745.

again claiming something very like sovereignty for itself—could not fail to be manifested whenever great negotiations with foreign powers were to be undertaken. To obtain the unanimous consent of seven independent little republics was a work of difficulty, requiring immense expenditure of time in comparatively unimportant contingencies. How intolerable might become the obstructions, the dissensions, and the delays, now that a series of momentous and world-wide transactions was beginning, on the issue of which the admission of a new commonwealth into the family of nations, the international connections of all the great powers of Christendom, the commerce of the world, and the peace of Europe depended!

Yet there was no help for it but to make the best present use of the institutions which time and great events had bestowed upon the young Republic, leaving to a more convenient season the task of remodeling the law. Meanwhile, with men who knew their own minds, who meant to speak the truth, and who were resolved to gather in at last the harvest honestly and bravely gained by nearly a half-century of hard fighting, it would be hard for a legion of friars, with their heads full of quirks and their wallets full of bills of exchange, to carry the day for despotism.

Barneveldt was sincerely desirous of peace. He was well aware that his province of Holland, where he was an intellectual autocrat, was staggering under the burden of one half the expenses of the whole Republic. He knew that Holland in the course of the last nine years, notwithstanding the constantly heightened rate of impost on all objects of ordinary consumption, was twenty-six millions of florins behindhand, and that she

had reason, therefore, to wish for peace.¹ The great advocate, than whom no statesman in Europe could more accurately scan the world's horizon, was convinced that the propitious moment for honorable, straightforward negotiations to secure peace, independence, and free commerce, free religion, and free government, had come, and he had succeeded in winning the reluctant Maurice into a partial adoption, at least, of his opinions.²

The Franciscan remained at Delft, waiting, by direction of the states, for an answer to his propositions, and doing his best, according to the instructions of his own government, to espy the condition and sentiments of the enemy. Becoming anxious after the lapse of a fortnight, he wrote to Barneveldt. In reply the advocate twice sent a secret messenger, urging him to be patient, assuring him that the affair was working well; that the opposition to peace came chiefly from Zeeland and from certain parties in Amsterdam vehemently opposed to peace or truce, but that the rest of Holland was decidedly in favor of the negotiations.³

A few days passed, and Neyen was again summoned before the assembly. Barneveldt now informed him that the Dutch fleet would be recalled from the coast of Spain so soon as the consent of his Catholic Majesty to the negotiations arrived, but that it would be necessary to confine the cessation of naval warfare within certain local limits. Both these conditions were strenuously opposed by the Franciscan, who urged that the

¹ Remonstr. van Olden-Barneveldt, in *Leven van Olden-Barneveldt*, bl. 157. Wagenaer, ix. 241.

² Wagenaer, ix. 241. Grotius, xviii.

³ Gallucci, 326, 327.

consent of the Spanish king was certain, but that this new proposition to localize the maritime armistice would prove to be fraught with endless difficulties and dangers. Barneveldt and the states remaining firm, however, and giving him a formal communication of their decision in writing, Neyen had nothing for it but to wend his way back rather malcontent to Brussels.

It needed but a brief deliberation at the court of the archdukes to bring about the desired arrangement. The desire for an armistice, especially for a cessation of hostilities by sea, had been marvelously stimulated by an event to be narrated in the next chapter. Meantime more than the first three months of the year had been passed in these secret preliminary transactions, and so softly had the stealthy friar sped to and fro between Brussels and The Hague that when at last the armistice was announced it broke forth like a sudden flash of fine weather in the midst of a raging storm. No one at the archdukes' court knew of the mysterious negotiations save the monk himself, Spinola, Richardot, Verreycken, the chief auditor, and one or two others.¹ The great Belgian nobles, from whom everything had been concealed, were very wroth, but the Belgian public was as much delighted as amazed at the prospects of peace. In the United Provinces opinions were conflicting, but doubtless joy and confidence were the prevailing emotions.

Toward the middle of April the armistice was publicly announced. It was to last for eight months from the 4th of May. During this period no citadels were to be besieged, no camps brought near a city, no new

¹ Meteren, 551^{vo}. Gallucci, 325.

fortifications built, and all troops were to be kept carefully within walls. Meantime commissioners were to be appointed by the archdukes to confer with an equal number of deputies of the United Provinces for peace or for a truce of ten, fifteen, or twenty years, on the express ground that the archdukes regarded the United Provinces as free countries, over which their Highnesses pretended to no authority.¹

The armistice on land was absolute. On sea, hostilities were to cease in the German Ocean and in the channel between England and France, while it was also provided that the Netherland fleet should, within a certain period, be recalled from the Spanish coast.

A day of public fast, humiliation, thanksgiving, and prayer was ordered throughout the Republic for the 9th of May, in order to propitiate the favor of Heaven on the great work to be undertaken; and, as a further precaution, Prince Maurice ordered all garrisons in the strong places to be doubled, lest the slippery enemy should take advantage of too much confidence reposed in his good faith. The preachers throughout the commonwealth, each according to his individual bias, improved the occasion by denouncing the Spaniard from their pulpits and inflaming the popular hatred against the ancient enemy, or by dilating on the blessings of peace and the horrors of war.² The peace party and the war party, the believers in Barneveldt and the especial adherents of Prince Maurice, seemed to divide the land in nearly equal portions.

While the Netherlands, both rebellious and obedient, were filled with these various emotions, the other coun-

¹ Meteren, 551. Gallucci, 326. Grotius, xvi. 738. Wagenaer, ix. 250 seq.

² Wagenaer, ix. 251.

tries of Europe were profoundly amazed at the sudden revelation. It was on the whole regarded as a confession of impotence on the part of Spain that the archdukes should now prepare to send envoys to the revolted provinces as to a free and independent people. Universal monarchy brought to such a pass as this was hardly what had been expected after the tremendous designs and the grandiloquent language on which the world had so long been feeding as its daily bread. The spectacle of anointed monarchs thus far humbling themselves to the people, of rebellion dictating terms instead of writhing in dust at the foot of the throne, was something new in history. The heavens and earth might soon be expected to pass away, now that such a catastrophe was occurring.

The King of France had also been kept in ignorance of these events. It was impossible, however, that the negotiations could go forward without his consent and formal participation. Accordingly, on receiving the news he appointed an especial mission to The Hague—President Jeannin and De Russy, besides his regular resident ambassador Buzanval. Meantime startling news reached the Republic in the early days of May.

CHAPTER XLVII

A Dutch fleet under Heemskerk sent to the coast of Spain and Portugal—Encounter with the Spanish war-fleet under D'Avila—Death of both commanders-in-chief—Victory of the Netherlanders—Massacre of the Spaniards.

THE States-General had not been inclined to be tranquil under the check which Admiral Haultain had received upon the coast of Spain in the autumn of 1606. The deed of terrible self-devotion by which Klaaszoon and his comrades had in that crisis saved the reputation of the Republic had proved that her fleets needed only skilful handling and determined leaders to conquer their enemy in the Western seas as certainly as they had done in the archipelagoes of the East. And there was one preëminent naval commander, still in the very prime of life, but seasoned by an experience at the poles and in the tropics such as few mariners in that early but expanding maritime epoch could boast. Jacob van Heemskerk, unlike many of the navigators and ocean warriors who had made and were destined to make the orange flag of the United Provinces illustrious over the world, was not of humble parentage. Sprung of an ancient, knightly race, which had frequently distinguished itself in his native province of Holland, he had followed the seas almost from his

cradle. By turns a commercial voyager, an explorer, a privateersman, or an admiral of war-fleets, in days when sharp distinctions between the merchant service and the public service, corsairs' work and cruisers' work, did not exist, he had ever proved himself equal to any emergency—a man incapable of fatigue, of perplexity, or of fear. We have followed his career during that awful winter in Nova Zembla, where, with such unflinching, cheerful heroism, he sustained the courage of his comrades—the first band of scientific martyrs that had ever braved the dangers and demanded the secrets of those arctic regions. His glorious name, as those of so many of his comrades and countrymen, has been rudely torn from cape, promontory, island, and continent, once illustrated by courage and suffering, but the noble record will ever remain.¹

Subsequently he had much navigated the Indian Ocean, his latest achievement having been, with two hundred men, in a couple of yachts, to capture an immense Portuguese carack, mounting thirty guns and manned with eight hundred sailors, and to bring back a prodigious booty for the exchequer of the Republic. A man with delicate features, large brown eyes, a thin high nose, fair hair and beard, and a soft, gentle expression, he concealed, under a quiet exterior, and on ordinary occasions a very plain and pacific costume, a most daring nature, and an indomitable ambition for military and naval distinction.

He was the man of all others in the commonwealth

¹ For a full and learned dissertation on the causes of the oblivion into which the early Dutch voyages have fallen, see in particular Bennet and Van Wijk, 111; Hoofdstuk, 156 seq.

to lead any new enterprise that audacity could conceive against the hereditary enemy.

The public and the States-General were anxious to retrace the track of Haultain, and to efface the memory of his inglorious return from the Spanish coast. The sailors of Holland and Zealand were indignant that the richly freighted fleets of the two Indies had been allowed to slip so easily through their fingers. The great East India corporation was importunate with government that such blunders should not be repeated, and that the armaments known to be preparing in the Portuguese ports, the homeward-bound fleets that might be looked for at any moment off the Peninsular coast, and the Spanish cruisers which were again preparing to molest the merchant fleets of the company, should be dealt with effectively and in season.

Twenty-six vessels of small size but of good sailing qualities, according to the idea of the epoch, were provided, together with four tenders. Of this fleet the command was offered to Jacob van Heemskerk. He accepted with alacrity, expressing with his usual quiet self-confidence the hope that, living or dead, his fatherland would have cause to thank him. Inspired only by the love of glory, he asked for no remuneration for his services save thirteen per cent. of the booty, after half a million florins should have been paid into the public treasury. It was hardly probable that this would prove a large share of prize-money, while considerable victories alone could entitle him to receive a stiver.

The expedition sailed in the early days of April for the coast of Spain and Portugal, the admiral having full discretion to do anything that might in his judg-

ment redound to the advantage of the Republic. Next in command was the vice-admiral of Zealand, Laurenz Alteras. Another famous seaman in the fleet was Captain Henry Janszoon of Amsterdam, commonly called "Long Harry," while the weather-beaten and well-beloved Admiral Lambert, familiarly styled by his countrymen "Pretty Lambert," some of whose achievements have already been recorded in these pages, was the comrade of all others upon whom Heemskerk most depended.¹ After the 10th April the admiral, lying off and on near the mouth of the Tagus, sent a lugger in trading disguise to reconnoiter that river. He ascertained by his spies, sent in this and subsequently in other directions, as well as by occasional merchantmen spoken with at sea, that the Portuguese fleet for India would not be ready to sail for many weeks; that no valuable argosies were yet to be looked for from America, but that a great war-fleet, comprising many galleons of the largest size, was at that very moment cruising in the Straits of Gibraltar. Such of the Netherland traders as were returning from the Levant, as well as those designing to enter the Mediterranean, were likely to fall prizes to this formidable enemy. The heart of Jacob Heemskerk danced for joy. He had come forth for glory, not for booty, and here was what he had scarcely dared to hope for—a powerful antagonist instead of peaceful, scarcely resisting, but richly laden merchantmen. The accounts received were so accurate as to assure him that the Gibraltar fleet was far superior to his own in size of vessels, weight of metal, and number of combatants. The circumstances only increased his eagerness. The more he

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 252.

was overmatched, the greater would be the honor of victory, and he steered for the straits, tacking to and fro in the teeth of a strong head wind.

On the morning of the 25th April he was in the narrowest part of the mountain-channel, and learned that the whole Spanish fleet was in the Bay of Gibraltar. The marble Pillars of Hercules rose before him. Heemskerk was of a poetic temperament, and his imagination was inflamed by the spectacle which met his eyes. Geographical position, splendor of natural scenery, immortal fable, and romantic history had combined to throw a spell over that region. It seemed marked out for perpetual illustration by human valor. The deeds by which, many generations later, those localities were to become identified with the fame of a splendid empire, then only the most energetic rival of the young Republic, but destined under infinitely better geographical conditions to follow on her track of empire, and with far more prodigious results—were still in the womb of futurity. But St. Vincent, Trafalgar, Gibraltar—words which were one day to stir the English heart, and to conjure heroic English shapes from the depths so long as history endures—were capes and promontories already familiar to legend and romance.

Those Netherlanders had come forth from their slender little fatherland to offer battle at last within his own harbors and under his own fortresses to the despot who aspired to universal monarchy and who claimed the lordship of the seas. The Hollanders and Zealanders had gained victories on the German Ocean, in the Channel, throughout the Indies, but now they were to measure strength with the ancient enemy in this most conspicuous theater, and before the eyes of Chris-

tendom. It was on this famous spot that the ancient demigod had torn asunder by main strength the continents of Europe and Africa. There stood the opposite fragments of the riven mountain-chain, Calpe and Abyla, gazing at each other, in eternal separation, across the gulf, emblems of those two antagonistic races which the terrible hand of Destiny has so ominously disjoined. Nine centuries before, the African king, Moses, son of Nuzir, and his lieutenant, Tarik, son of Abdallah, had crossed that strait and burned the ships which brought them. Black Africa had conquered a portion of whiter Europe, and laid the foundation of the deadly mutual repugnance which nine hundred years of bloodshed had heightened into insanity of hatred. Tarik had taken the town and mountain, Cartaya and Calpe, and given to both his own name. Gebel-al-Tarik, the cliff of Tarik, they are called to this day.

Within the two horns of that beautiful bay, and protected by the fortress on the precipitous rock, lay the Spanish fleet at anchor. There were ten galleons of the largest size, besides lesser war-vessels and caracks, in all twenty-one sail. The admiral commanding was Don Juan Alvarez d'Avila, a veteran who had fought at Lepanto under Don Juan of Austria. His son was captain of his flag-ship, the *St. Augustine*. The vice-admiral's galleon was called *Our Lady of La Vega*, the rear-admiral's was the *Mother of God*, and all the other ships were baptized by the holy names deemed most appropriate, in the Spanish service, to deeds of carnage.

On the other hand, the nomenclature of the Dutch ships suggested a menagerie. There was the *Tiger*,

the *Sea Dog*, the *Griffin*, the *Red Lion*, the *Golden Lion*, the *Black Bear*, the *White Bear*; these, with the *Æolus* and the *Morning Star*, were the leading vessels of the little fleet.

On first attaining a distant view of the enemy, Heemskerk summoned all his captains on board his flag-ship, the *Æolus*, and addressed them in a few stirring words.

“It is difficult,” he said, “for Netherlanders not to conquer on salt water.¹ Our fathers have gained many a victory in distant seas, but it is for us to tear from the enemy’s list of titles his arrogant appellation of Monarch of the Ocean. Here, on the verge of two continents, Europe is watching our deeds, while the Moors of Africa are to learn for the first time in what estimation they are to hold the Batavian Republic. Remember that you have no choice between triumph and destruction. I have led you into a position whence escape is impossible,—and I ask of none of you more than I am prepared to do myself,—whither I am sure that you will follow. The enemy’s ships are far superior to ours in bulk; but remember that their excessive size makes them difficult to handle and easier to hit, while our own vessels are entirely within control. Their decks are swarming with men, and thus there will be more certainty that our shot will take effect. Remember, too, that we are all sailors, accustomed from our cradles to the ocean, while yonder Spaniards are mainly soldiers and landmen, qualmish at the smell of bilge-water, and sickening at the roll of the

¹ Grotius, Meteren, and Wagenaer all give essentially the same report of this speech, and I am inclined to think, therefore, that something very like it was really spoken.

waves.¹ This day begins a long list of naval victories, which will make our fatherland forever illustrious, or lay the foundation of an honorable peace, by placing, through our triumph, in the hands of the States-General, the power of dictating its terms.'"

His comrades long remembered the enthusiasm which flashed from the man, usually so gentle and composed in demeanor, so simple in attire. Clad in complete armor, with the orange plumes waving from his casque and the orange scarf across his breast, he stood there in front of the mainmast of the *Æolus*, the very embodiment of an ancient viking.

He then briefly announced his plan of attack. It was of antique simplicity. He would lay his own ship alongside that of the Spanish admiral. Pretty Lambert, in the *Tiger*, was to grapple with her on the other side. Vice-Admiral Alteras and Captain Bras were to attack the enemy's vice-admiral in the same way. Thus, two by two, the little Netherland ships were to come into closest quarters with each one of the great galleons. Heemskerk would himself lead the way, and all were to follow, as closely as possible, in his wake. The oath to stand by each other was then solemnly renewed, and a parting health was drunk. The captains then returned to their ships.

As the Lepanto warrior, Don Juan d'Avila, saw the little vessels slowly moving toward him, he summoned a Hollander whom he had on board, one Skipper Gevaerts of a captured Dutch trading-bark, and asked

¹ "Illud vero vel præcipuum quod apud nos nautæ pugnant, apud illos milites quos ego mihi videre videor ut sunt delicati sentinæ odore ac jactatione fluctuum prope exanimis in vertiginem dari."—Grotius, 734.

him whether those ships in the distance were Netherlanders.

“Not a doubt of it,” replied the skipper.

The admiral then asked him what their purpose could possibly be in venturing so near Gibraltar.

“Either I am entirely mistaken in my countrymen,” answered Gevaerts, “or they are coming for the express purpose of offering you battle.”¹

The Spaniard laughed loud and long. The idea that those puny vessels could be bent on such a purpose seemed to him irresistibly comic, and he promised his prisoner, with much condescension, that the *St. Augustine* alone should sink the whole fleet.

Gevaerts, having his own ideas on the subject, but not being called upon to express them, thanked the admiral for his urbanity, and respectfully withdrew.

At least four thousand soldiers were in D’Avila’s ships, besides seamen. There were seven hundred in the *St. Augustine*, four hundred and fifty in *Our Lady of Vega*, and so on in proportion. There were also one or two hundred noble volunteers who came thronging on board, scenting the battle from afar, and desirous of having a hand in the destruction of the insolent Dutchmen.

It was about one in the afternoon. There was not much wind, but the Hollanders, slowly drifting on the eternal river that pours from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean, were now very near. All hands had been piped on board every one of the ships, all had gone down on their knees in humble prayer, and the loving-cup had then been passed around.²

Heemskerck, leading the way toward the Spanish ad-

¹ Meteren, 547.

² Meteren, Wagenaer, Grotius.

miral, ordered the gunners of the *Æolus* not to fire until the vessels struck each other. "Wait till you hear it crack,"¹ he said, adding a promise of a hundred florins to the man who should pull down the admiral's flag. Avila, notwithstanding his previous meriment, thought it best, for the moment, to avoid the coming collision. Leaving to other galleons, which he interposed between himself and the enemy, the task of summarily sinking the Dutch fleet, he cut the cable of the *St. Augustine* and drifted farther into the bay. Heemskerk, not allowing himself to be foiled in his purpose, steered past two or three galleons, and came crashing against the admiral. Almost simultaneously, Pretty Lambert laid himself along her quarter on the other side. The *St. Augustine* fired into the *Æolus* as she approached, but without doing much damage. The Dutch admiral, as he was coming in contact, discharged his forward guns and poured an effective volley of musketry into his antagonist.

The *St. Augustine* fired again, straight across the center of the *Æolus*, at a few yard's distance. A cannon-ball took off the head of a sailor standing near Heemskerk, and carried away the admiral's leg close to the body. He fell on deck, and, knowing himself to be mortally wounded, implored the next in command on board, Captain Verhoef, to fight his ship to the last and to conceal his death from the rest of the fleet. Then prophesying a glorious victory for the Republic, and piously commending his soul to his Maker, he soon breathed his last. A cloak was thrown over him, and the battle raged. The few who were aware that the noble Heemskerk was gone burned to avenge his death

¹ "En dat sy het hoorden kraaken."—Meteren, 547^{vo}.

and to obey the dying commands of their beloved chief. The rest of the Hollanders believed themselves under his directing influence, and fought as if his eyes were upon them. Thus the spirit of the departed hero still watched over and guided the battle.

The *Æolus* now fired a broadside into her antagonist, making fearful havoc and killing Admiral d'Avila. The commanders-in-chief of both contending fleets had thus fallen at the very beginning of the battle. While the *St. Augustine* was engaged in deadly encounter, yard-arm and yard-arm, with the *Æolus* and the *Tiger*, Vice-Admiral Alteras had, however, not carried out his part of the plan. Before he could succeed in laying himself alongside of the Spanish vice-admiral, he had been attacked by two galleons. Three other Dutch ships, however, attacked the vice-admiral, and, after an obstinate combat, silenced all her batteries and set her on fire. Her conquerors were then obliged to draw off rather hastily and to occupy themselves for a time in extinguishing their own burning sails, which had taken fire from the close contact with their enemy. *Our Lady of Vega*, all ablaze from topgallantmast to quarter-deck, floated helplessly about, a specter of flame, her guns going off wildly, and her crew dashing themselves into the sea, in order to escape by drowning from a fiery death. She was consumed to the water's edge.

Meantime Vice-Admiral Alteras had successively defeated both his antagonists, drifting in with them until almost under the guns of the fortress, but never leaving them until, by his superior gunnery and seamanship, he had sunk one of them and driven the other, a helpless wreck, on shore.

Long Harry, while Alteras had been thus employed, had engaged another great galleon and set her on fire. She, too, was thoroughly burned to her hulk; but Admiral Harry was killed.

By this time, although it was early of an April afternoon, heavy clouds of smoke, enveloping the combatants pent together in so small a space, seemed to make an atmosphere of midnight, as the flames of the burning galleons died away. There was a difficulty, too, in bringing all the Netherland ships into action, several of the smaller ones having been purposely stationed by Heemskerk on the edge of the bay to prevent the possible escape of any of the Spaniards. While some of these distant ships were crowding sail in order to come to closer quarters, now that the day seemed going against the Spaniards, a tremendous explosion suddenly shook the air. One of the largest galleons, engaged in combat with a couple of Dutch vessels, had received a hot shot full in her powder-magazine, and blew up with all on board. The blazing fragments drifted about among the other ships, and two more were soon on fire, their guns going off and their magazines exploding. The rock of Gibraltar seemed to reel. To the murky darkness succeeded the intolerable glare of a new and vast conflagration. The scene in that narrow roadstead was now almost infernal. It seemed, said an eye-witness, as if heaven and earth were passing away. A hopeless panic seized the Spaniards. The battle was over. The *St. Augustine* still lay in the deadly embrace of her antagonist, but all the other galleons were sunk or burned. Several of the lesser war-ships had also been destroyed. It was nearly sunset. The *St. Augustine* at last ran up a white flag,

but it was not observed in the fierceness of the last moments of combat, the men from the *Æolus* and the *Tiger* making a simultaneous rush on board the vanquished foe.

The fight was done, but the massacre was at its beginning. The trumpeter of Captain Kleinsorg clambered like a monkey up the mast of the *St. Augustine*, hauled down the admiral's flag, the last which was still waving, and gained the hundred florins. The ship was full of dead and dying; but a brutal, infamous butchery now took place. Some Netherland prisoners were found in the hold, who related that two messengers had been successively despatched to take their lives as they lay there in chains, and that each had been shot as he made his way toward the execution of the orders. This information did not chill the ardor of their victorious countrymen. No quarter was given. Such of the victims as succeeded in throwing themselves overboard, out of the *St. Augustine* or any of the burning or sinking ships, were pursued by the Netherlanders, who rowed about among them in boats, shooting, stabbing, and drowning their victims by hundreds. It was a sickening spectacle. The bay, said those who were there, seemed sown with corpses. Probably two or three thousand were thus put to death, or had met their fate before. Had the chivalrous Heemskerk lived, it is possible that he might have stopped the massacre. But the thought of the grief which would fill the commonwealth when the news should arrive of his death, thus turning the joy of the great triumph into lamentations, increased the animosity of his comrades. Moreover, in ransacking the Spanish admiral's ship, all his papers had been found, among

them many secret instructions from government signed, "I the King," ordering most inhuman persecutions, not only of the Netherlanders, but of all who should in any way assist them, at sea or ashore. Recent examples of the thorough manner in which the royal admirals could carry out these bloody instructions had been furnished by the hangings, burnings, and drownings of Fazardo. But the barbarous ferocity of the Dutch on this occasion might have taught a lesson even to the comrades of Alva.

The fleet of Avila was entirely destroyed. The hulk of the *St. Augustine* drifted ashore, having been abandoned by the victors, and was set on fire by a few Spaniards who had concealed themselves on board, lest she might fall again into the enemy's hands.

The battle had lasted from half-past three until sunset. The Dutch vessels remained all the next day on the scene of their triumph. The townspeople were discerned, packing up their goods, and speeding panic-stricken into the interior. Had Heemskerk survived he would doubtless have taken Gibraltar, fortress and town, and perhaps Cadiz, such was the consternation along the whole coast.

But his gallant spirit no longer directed the fleet. Bent rather upon plunder than glory, the ships now dispersed in search of prizes toward the Azores, the Canaries, or along the Portuguese coast, having first made a brief visit to Tetuan, where they were rapturously received by the bey.

The Hollanders lost no ships, and but one hundred seamen were killed. Two vessels were despatched homeward directly, one with sixty wounded sailors, the other with the embalmed body of the fallen Heems-

kerk. The hero was honored with a magnificent funeral in Amsterdam at the public expense,—the first instance in the history of the Republic,—and his name was enrolled on the most precious page of her records.¹

¹ The chief authorities for this remarkable battle are Meteren, 547, 548; Grotius, xvi. 731-738; Wagenaer, ix. 251-258.

CHAPTER XLVIII

Internal condition of Spain—Character of the people—Influence of the Inquisition—Population and revenue—Incomes of church and government—Degradation of labor—Expulsion of the Moors and its consequences—Venality the special characteristic of Spanish polity—Maxims of the foreign polity of Spain—The Spanish army and navy—Insolvent state of the government—The Duke of Lerma—His position in the state—Origin of his power—System of bribery and trafficking—Philip III.—His character—Domestic life of the king and queen.

A GLANCE at the interior condition of Spain, now that there had been more than nine years of a new reign, should no longer be deferred.

Spain was still superstitiously regarded as the leading power of the world, although foiled in all its fantastic and gigantic schemes. It was still supposed, according to current dogma, to share with the Ottoman Empire the dominion of the earth.¹ A series of fortunate marriages having united many of the richest and fairest portions of Europe under a single scepter, it was popularly believed, in a period when men were not much given as yet to examine very deeply the principles of human governments or the causes of national greatness, that an aggregation of powers which had resulted from preposterous laws of succession really

¹ Girº Soranzo, *Relazione*.

constituted a mighty empire, founded by genius and valor.

The Spanish people, endowed with an acute and exuberant genius, which had exhibited itself in many paths of literature, science, and art, with singular aptitude for military adventure, organization, and achievement, with a great variety, in short, of splendid and ennobling qualities, had been, for a long succession of years, accursed with almost the very worst political institutions known to history. The depth of their misery and of their degradation was hardly yet known to themselves, and this was perhaps the most hideous proof of the tyranny of which they had been the victims. To the outward world, the hollow fabric, out of which the whole pith and strength had been slowly gnawed away, was imposing and majestic still. But the priest, the soldier, and the courtier had been busy too long, and had done their work too thoroughly, to leave much hope of arresting the universal decay.

Nor did there seem any probability that the attempt would be made.

It is always difficult to reform wide-spread abuses, even when they are acknowledged to exist, but when gigantic vices are proudly pointed to as the noblest of institutions and as the very foundations of the state, there seems nothing for the patriot to long for but the deluge.

It was acknowledged that the Spanish population, having a very large admixture of those races which, because not Catholic at heart, were stigmatized as miscreants, heretics, pagans, and, generally, as accursed, was by nature singularly prone to religious innova-

tion.¹ Had it not been for the Holy Inquisition, it was the opinion of acute and thoughtful observers in the beginning of the seventeenth century that the infamous heresies of Luther, Calvin, and the rest would have long before taken possession of the land.² To that most blessed establishment it was owing that Spain had not polluted itself in the filth and ordure of the Reformation, and had been spared the horrible fate which had befallen large portions of Germany, France, Britain, and other barbarous Northern nations. It was conscientiously and thankfully believed in Spain, two centuries ago, that the state had been saved from political and moral ruin by that admirable machine which detected heretics with unerring accuracy, burned them when detected, and consigned their descendants to political incapacity and social infamy to the remotest generation.³

¹ "Li popoli per la gran mescolanza che hanno avuto coi Mori e Giudei sono molto facili a divertire dal diretto sentiero della fede."—Gir^o Soranzo, Relazione. "Tremando gli Spagnuoli perchè incominciarono a colpirli l'eresia nei tempi di Filippo II. non solo nel volgo ma anche nella alta nobiltà."—S. Contarini, Relazione.

² "È rispettato l'inquisitore maggiore come se fosse un papa, ha il tribunal del suo officio per tutte le terre. In somma si può dire che il rigore di questo officio mantiene il rito della vera religione in Spagna che senza questo si può grandemente temere che per li tanti Moreschi e Marani che sono sparsi per il paese si vederiano per questo rispetto di religione dei movimenti e delle commozioni importanti."—Soranzo.

³ "Con tanta vergogna ed ignominia che in eterno resta macchiata quella discendenza di infamia nè sono capaci i posterì di dignità nè di onore alcuno onde tutti procurano di vivere in maniera da non imbrattarsi in tanta lordura mantenere la Spagna libera dall'infezione dell'eresia, peste che ha infettato e rovinato gran parte del mondo," etc.—Gir^o Soranzo, Relazione.

As the awful consequences of religious freedom, men pointed with a shudder to the condition of nations already speeding on the road to ruin, from which the two peninsulas at least had been saved. Yet the British Empire, with the American Republic still an embryo in its bosom, France, North Germany, and other great powers, had hardly then begun their headlong career. Whether the road of religious liberty was leading exactly to political ruin, the coming centuries were to judge.

Enough has been said in former chapters for the characterization of Philip II. and his polity. But there had now been nearly ten years of another reign. The system inaugurated by Charles and perfected by his son had reached its last expression under Philip III.

The evil done by father and son lived and bore plentiful fruit in the epoch of the grandson. And this is inevitable in history. No generation is long-lived enough to reap the harvest, whether of good or evil, which it sows.

Philip II. had been indefatigable in evil, a thorough believer in his supernatural mission as despot, not entirely without capacity for affairs, personally absorbed by the routine of his bureau.

He was a king, as he understood the meaning of the kingly office. His policy was continued after his death; but there was no longer a king. That important regulator to the governmental machinery was wanting. How its place was supplied will soon appear.

Meantime the organic functions were performed very much in the old way. There was, at least, no lack of priests or courtiers.

Spain at this epoch had probably less than twelve millions of inhabitants, although the statistics of those days cannot be relied upon with accuracy.¹ The whole revenue of the state was nominally sixteen or seventeen millions of dollars, but the greater portion of that income was pledged for many coming years to the merchants of Genoa.² All the little royal devices for increasing the budget by debasing the coin of the realm, by issuing millions of copper tokens, by lowering the promised rate of interest on government loans, by formally repudiating both interest and principal, had been tried, both in this and the preceding reign, with the usual success. An inconvertible paper currency, stimulating industry and improving morals by converting beneficent commerce into baleful gambling—that fatal invention did not then exist. Meantime the legitimate trader and innocent citizen were harassed, and the general public endangered, as much as the limited machinery of the epoch permitted.

The available, unpledged revenue of the kingdom hardly amounted to five millions of dollars a year. The regular annual income of the Church was at least six millions.³ The whole personal property of the na-

¹ Priuli (1604–1608) puts the population of Spain, inclusive of foreign residents, at 13,000,000 (F. Priuli, *Relazione*). But Agostino de Blas, in his work on the population of Spain from official records, cited by N. Barozzi (notes, S. I. vol. i. p. 353), allows but 9,680,191 inhabitants for the whole peninsula.

² “Sono l’ entrate di S. M. come dicono da 16 milioni in circa quasi tutte impegnate e non solo impegnate ma si può dire annulate perchè sono obbligate a maggior prezzo che vagliano,” etc.—Ott^o Bon, *Relazione*. Compare Gir^o Soranzo, who puts the nominal whole at 17,000,000, but “impegnate ed annihilate affatto.”

³ F. Priuli, *Relazione*.

tion was estimated—in a very clumsy and unsatisfactory way, no doubt—at sixty millions of dollars.¹ Thus the income of the priesthood was ten per cent. of the whole funded estate of the country, and at least a million a year more than the income of the government. Could a more biting epigram be made upon the condition to which the nation had been reduced?

Labor was more degraded than ever. The industrious classes, if such could be said to exist, were esteemed every day more and more infamous. Merchants, shopkeepers, mechanics, were reptiles, as vilely esteemed as Jews, Moors, Protestants, or pagans. Acquiring wealth by any kind of production was dishonorable. A grandee who should permit himself to sell the wool from his boundless sheep-walks disgraced his caste, and was accounted as low as a merchant.² To create was the business of slaves and miscreants; to destroy was the distinguishing attribute of Christians and nobles. To cheat, to pick, and to steal, on the most minute and the most gigantic scale—these were also among the dearest privileges of the exalted classes. No merchandise was polluting save the produce of honest industry. To sell places in church and state, the army, the navy, and the sacred tribunals of law; to take bribes from rich and poor, high and low, in sums infinitesimal or enormous; to pillage the exchequer in every imaginable form; to dispose of titles of honor, orders of chivalry, posts in municipal coun-

¹ "Eppure la Spagna è povera non trovandosene in essa più di sessanta milioni fra capitali e robe di servizio."—Fran. Priuli, *Ambas. a Filippo III.*, 1604–1608.

² *Ibid.* Compare notes of Barozzi, *S. I.* vol. i. p. 351.

cil¹ at auction; to barter influence, audiences, official interviews against money cynically paid down in rascal counters—all this was esteemed consistent with patrician dignity.

The ministers, ecclesiastics, and those about court, obtaining a monopoly of such trade, left the business of production and circulation to their inferiors, while, as has already been sufficiently indicated, religious fanaticism and a pride of race, which nearly amounted to idiocy, had generated a scorn for labor even among the lowest orders. As a natural consequence, commerce and the mechanical arts fell almost exclusively into the hands of foreigners—Italians, English, and French—who resorted in yearly increasing numbers to Spain for the purpose of enriching themselves by the industry which the natives despised.²

The capital thus acquired was at regular intervals removed from the country to other lands, where wealth resulting from traffic or manufactures was not accounted infamous.

Moreover, as the soil of the country was held by a few great proprietors,—an immense portion in the dead-hand of an insatiate and ever-grasping church, and much of the remainder in vast entailed estates,—it was nearly impossible for the masses of the people to become owners of any portion of the land. To be an agricultural day-laborer at less than a beggar's wage could hardly be a tempting pursuit for a proud

¹ "Quelli che governano nelle città sono chiamati Regidores e sono nelle città grandi in numero di 40 e forse più e nelle piccole in minor numero; questi impieghi il re vende per denari e secondo i luoghi dove vanno sogliono esser venduti per 4 o 6 mille ducati ciò che porta al popolo gran danno," etc.—S. Contarini.

² Gir^o Soranzo.

and indolent race. It was no wonder, therefore, that the business of the brigand, the smuggler, the professional mendicant became from year to year more attractive and more overdone; while an ever-thickening swarm of priests, friars, and nuns of every order, engendered out of a corrupt and decaying society, increasing the general indolence, immorality, and unproductive consumption, and frightfully diminishing the productive force of the country, fed like locusts upon what was left in the unhappy land. "To shirk labor, infinite numbers become priests and friars," said a good Catholic in the year 1608.¹

Before the end of the reign of Philip III. the Peninsula, which might have been the granary of the world, did not produce food enough for its own population. Corn became a regular article of import into Spain, and would have come in larger quantities than it did had the industry of the country furnished sufficient material to exchange for necessary food.

And as if it had been an object of ambition with the priests and courtiers who then ruled a noble country to make at exactly this epoch the most startling manifestation of human fatuity that the world had ever seen, it was now resolved by government to expel by armed force nearly the whole stock of intelligent and experienced labor, agricultural and mechanical, from the country. It is unnecessary to dwell long upon an event which, if it were not so familiarly known to mankind, would seem almost incredible. But the expulsion of the Moors is, alas! no exaggerated and

¹ "Per schivar il travaglio ed infiniti si fanno preti e frati."—Gir° Soranzo, *Ambas. a Filippo III.*, 1608–1611.

imaginary satire, but a monument of wickedness and insanity such as is not often seen in human history.

Already, in the very first years of the century, John Ribera, Archbishop of Valencia, had recommended and urged the scheme.

It was too gigantic a project to be carried into execution at once, but it was slowly matured by the aid of other ecclesiastics. At last there were indications, both human and divine, that the expulsion of these miscreants could no longer be deferred. It was rumored and believed that a general conspiracy existed among the Moors to rise upon the government, to institute a general massacre, and, with the assistance of their allies and relatives on the Barbary coast, to reestablish the empire of the infidels.¹

A convoy of eighty ass-loads of oil on the way to Madrid had halted at a wayside inn. A few flasks were stolen, and those who consumed it were made sick. Some of the thieves even died, or were said to have died, in consequence.² Instantly the rumor flew from mouth to mouth, from town to town, that the royal family, the court, the whole capital, all Spain, were to be poisoned with that oil. If such were the scheme it was certainly a less ingenious one than the famous plot by which the Spanish government was suspected but a few years before to have so nearly succeeded in blowing the king, peers, and commons of England into the air.

The proof of Moorish guilt was deemed all-sufficient, especially as it was supported by supernatural evidence of the most portentous and convincing kind. For sev-

¹ Girº Soranzo.

² Ibid.

eral days together a dark cloud, tinged with blood-red, had been seen to hang over Valencia.¹

In the neighborhood of Daroca, a din of drums and trumpets and the clang of arms had been heard in the sky, just as a procession went out of a monastery.²

At Valencia the image of the Virgin had shed tears. In another place her statue had been discovered in a state of profuse perspiration.³

What more conclusive indications could be required as to the guilt of the Moors? what other means devised for saving crown, church, and kingdom from destruction but to expel the whole mass of unbelievers from the soil which they had too long profaned?

Archbishop Ribera was fully sustained by the Archbishop of Toledo, and the whole ecclesiastical body received energetic support from government.

Ribera had solemnly announced that the Moors were so greedy of money, so determined to keep it, and so occupied with pursuits most apt for acquiring it, that they had come to be the sponge of Spanish wealth. The best proof of this, continued the reverend sage, was that, inhabiting in general poor little villages and sterile tracts of country, paying to the lords of the manor one third of the crops, and being overladen with special taxes imposed only upon them, they nevertheless became rich, while the Christians, cultivating the most fertile land, were in abject poverty.⁴

It seems almost incredible that this should not be satire. Certainly the most delicate irony could not

¹ Giro Soranzo, and notes of N. Barozzi.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Escriba, Vida de Don Juan de Ribera, papel segundo, quoted by Lafuente, xv. 370-390.

portray the vicious institutions under which the magnificent territory and noble people of Spain were thus doomed to ruin more subtly and forcibly than was done by the honest brutality of this churchman. The careful tillage; the beautiful system of irrigation by aqueduct and canal; the scientific processes by which these "accursed" had caused the wilderness to bloom with cotton, sugar, and every kind of fruit and grain; the untiring industry, exquisite ingenuity, and cultivated taste by which the merchants, manufacturers, and mechanics, guilty of a darker complexion than that of the peninsular Goths, had enriched their native land with splendid fabrics in cloth, paper, leather, silk, tapestry, and by so doing had acquired fortunes for themselves, despite iniquitous taxation, religious persecution, and social contumely—all these were crimes against a race of idlers, steeped to the lips in sloth which imagined itself to be pride.

The industrious, the intelligent, the wealthy, were denounced as criminals, and hunted to death or into exile as vermin, while the Lermas, the Ucedas, and the rest of the brood of cormorants settled more thickly than ever around their prey.

Meantime government declared that the piece of four maravedis should be worth eight maravedis; the piece of two maravedis being fixed at four.¹ Thus the specie of the kingdom was to be doubled, and by means of this enlightened legislation, Spain, after destroying agriculture, commerce, and manufacture, was to maintain great armies and navies and establish universal monarchy.

This measure, which a wiser churchman than Ribera,

¹ Lafuente, *Hist. Gen. de España*, xv. 295.

Cardinal Richelieu, afterward declared the most audacious and barbarous ever recorded by history, was carried out with great regularity of organization.¹ It was ordained that the Moors should be collected at three indicated points, whence they were not to move on pain of death, until duly escorted by troops to the ports of embarkation. The children under the age of four years were retained, of course without their parents, from whom they were forever separated. With admirable forethought, too, the priests took measures, as they supposed, that the arts of refining sugar, irrigating the rice-fields, constructing canals and aqueducts, besides many other useful branches of agricultural and mechanical business, should not die out with the intellectual, accomplished, and industrious race, alone competent to practise them, which was now sent forth to die. A very small number, not more than six in each hundred, were accordingly reserved to instruct other inhabitants of Spain in those useful arts which they were now more than ever encouraged to despise.

Five hundred thousand full-grown human beings, as energetic, ingenious, accomplished, as any then existing in the world, were thus thrust forth into the deserts beyond sea, as if Spain had been overstocked with skilled labor, and as if its native production had already outgrown the world's power of consumption.

Had an equal number of mendicant monks, with the two archbishops who had contrived this deed at their head, been exported instead of the Moors, the future of Spain might have been a more fortunate one than it was likely to prove. The event was in itself perhaps of temporary advantage to the Dutch Republic,

¹ *Mém. de Richelieu*, x. 231, cited by Lafuente, *ubi sup.*

as the poverty and general misery, aggravated by this disastrous policy, rendered the acknowledgment of the states' independence by Spain almost a matter of necessity.¹

It is superfluous to enter into any further disquisition as to the various branches of the royal revenue. They remained essentially the same as during the preceding reign, and have been elaborately set forth in a previous chapter. The gradual drying up of resources in all the wide-spread and heterogeneous territories subject to the Spanish scepter is the striking phenomenon of the present epoch. The distribution of such wealth as was still created followed the same laws which had long prevailed, while the decay and national paralysis, of which the prognostics could hardly be mistaken, were a natural result of the system.

The six archbishops had now grown to eleven,² and still received gigantic revenues, the income of the Archbishop of Toledo, including the fund of one hundred thousand destined for repairing the cathedral, being estimated at three hundred thousand dollars a year, that of the Archbishop of Seville and the others varying from one hundred and fifty dollars to fifty thousand.³ The sixty-three bishops perhaps averaged fifty thousand a year each,⁴ and there were eight more in Italy.⁵

The commanderies of chivalry, two hundred at least in number, were likewise enormously profitable. Some of them were worth thirty thousand a year, the aggre-

¹ Gir° Soranzo, *Relazione*. The ambassador expressly states it as a fact. Compare especially Lafuente's admirable history of Spain, xv. 294, 295 seq., 370-394.

² *Ibid.*

³ S. Contarini, *Relazione*. Fran. Priuli.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

gate annual value being from one and a half to two millions, and all in Lerma's gift, upon his own terms.¹

Chivalry, that noblest of ideals, without which, in some shape or another, the world would be a desert and a sty; which included within itself many of the noblest virtues which can adorn mankind—generosity, self-denial, chastity, frugality, patience, protection to the feeble, the downtrodden, and the oppressed, the love of daring adventure, devotion to a pure religion and a lofty purpose; most admirably pathetic, even when in the eyes of the vulgar most fantastic—had been the proudest and most poetical of Spanish characteristics, never to be entirely uprooted from the national heart.

Alas! what was there in the commanderies of Calatrava, Alcantara, Santiago, and all the rest of those knightly orders, as then existing, to respond to the noble sentiments on which all were supposed to be founded? Institutions for making money, for pillaging the poor of their hard-earned pittance, trafficked in by greedy ministers and needy courtiers with a shamelessness which had long ceased to blush at vices however gross, at venality however mean.

Venality was in truth the prominent characteristic of the Spanish polity at this epoch. Everything political or ecclesiastical, from highest to lowest, was matter of merchandise.

It was the autocrat, governing king and kingdom, who disposed of episcopal miters, cardinals' hats, commanders' crosses, the offices of regidores or municipal magistrates in all the cities, farmings of revenues, collectorships of taxes, at prices fixed by himself.

¹ Authorities last cited. Gir° Soranzo: "Essendo capaci li maritati e ogni altra condizione di persone non eccettuate le donne."

It was never known that the pope refused to confirm the ecclesiastical nominations which were made by the Spanish court.

The nuncius had the privilege of dispensing the small cures from thirty dollars a year downward,¹ of which the number was enormous. Many of these were capable, in careful hands, of becoming ten times as valuable as their nominal estimate,² and the business in them became in consequence very extensive and lucrative. They were often disposed of for the benefit of servants and the hangers-on of noble families, to laymen, to women, children, to babes unborn.

When such was the most thriving industry in the land, was it wonderful that the poor of high and low degree were anxious in ever-increasing swarms to effect their entrance into convent, monastery, and church, and that trade, agriculture, and manufactures languished?

The foreign polity of the court remained as it had been established by Philip II.

Its maxims were very simple. To do unto your neighbor all possible harm, and to foster the greatness of Spain by sowing discord and maintaining civil war in all other nations, was the fundamental precept. To bribe and corrupt the servants of other potentates, to maintain a regular paid body of adherents in foreign lands, ever ready to engage in schemes of assassination, conspiracy, sedition, and rebellion against the legitimate authority, to make mankind miserable, so far as it was in the power of human force or craft to produce wretchedness, were objects still faithfully pur-

¹ F. Soranzo.

² Ibid.

sued.¹ They had not yet led to the entire destruction of other realms and their submission to the single scepter of Spain, nor had they developed the resources, material or moral, of a mighty empire so thoroughly as might have been done perhaps by a less insidious policy, but they had never been abandoned.

It was a steady object of policy to keep such potentates of Italy as were not already under the dominion of the Spanish crown in a state of internecine feud with each other and of virtual dependence on the powerful kingdom. The same policy pursued in France, of fomenting civil war by subsidy, force, and chicane during a long succession of years in order to reduce that magnificent realm under the scepter of Philip, has been described in detail. The chronic rebellion of Ireland against the English crown had been assisted and inflamed in every possible mode, the system being considered as entirely justified by the aid and comfort afforded by the queen to the Dutch rebels.

It was a natural result of the system according to which kingdoms and provinces, with the populations

¹ "In Francia medesimamente procurava col tener le provincie disunite, divise le forze, separati gli animi, diffidenti i pensieri, ribellati i principi, sollevati i popoli e tirando per questa via le cose al lungo di stancare e si fosse potuto di ridurre in niente le forze di quella corona . . . la prima giova alla Spagna per conservarsi, procurando di tener lontane le sedizioni nei proprii regni e di nutrire le discordie negli altri potentati . . . e vedendo che questo imperio non è appoggiato alle ricchezze de' grandi chi pochissimi sono che non siano in qualche via consumati, non alle speranze dei popoli perchè questi con le molte gravezze sono oppresse, non alle armi poiche propria milizia che sia disciplinata non tiene la Spagna . . . si può affirmare che resti il principale fondamento di questo imperio collocato negli travagli nella debolezza e divisione degli altri potentati," etc.—F. Soranzo.

dwelling therein, were transferable like real estate by means of marriage-settlements, entails, and testaments, that the proprietorship of most of the great realms in Christendom was matter of fierce legal dispute. Law-suits, which in chancery could last for centuries before a settlement of the various claims was made, might have infinitely enriched the gentlemen of the long robe and reduced all the parties to beggary, had there been any tribunal but the battle-field to decide among the august litigants. Thus the King of Great Britain claimed the legal proprietorship and sovereignty of Brittany, Normandy, Anjou, Gascony, Calais, and Boulogne in France, besides the whole kingdom by right of conquest.¹ The French king claimed to be rightful heir of Castile, Biscay, Guipuzcoa, Aragon, Navarre, nearly all the Spanish peninsula, in short, including the whole of Portugal and the Balearic Islands to boot.² The King of Spain claimed, as we have seen often enough, not only Brittany but all France as his lawful inheritance. Such was the virtue of the prevalent doctrine of proprietorship. Every potentate was defrauded of his rights, and every potentate was a criminal usurper. As for the people, it would have excited a smile of superior wisdom on regal, legal, or sacerdotal lips had it been suggested that by any possibility the governed could have a voice or a thought in regard to the rulers whom God in his grace had raised up to be their proprietors and masters.

The army of Spain was sunk far below the standard at which it had been kept when it seemed fit to con-

¹ Niccolo Molin, *Ambasc. appresso Giacomo I.*, 1607, in Barozzi and Berchet, S. IV. vol. i. Pietro Priuli, *Ambasc. in Francia*, 1608, *ibid.*

² P. Priuli, *ubi sup.*

quer and govern the world. Neither by Spain nor by Italy could those audacious, disciplined, and obedient legions be furnished,¹ at which the enemies of the mighty despot trembled from one extremity of the earth to the other. Peculation, bankruptcy, and mutiny had done their work at last. We have recently had occasion to observe the conduct of the veterans in Flanders at critical epochs. At this moment seventy thousand soldiers were on the muster- and pay-roll of the army serving in those provinces, while not thirty thousand men existed in the flesh.

The navy was sunk to fifteen or twenty old galleys, battered, dismantled, unseaworthy, and a few armed ships for convoying the East- and West-Indiamen to and from their destinations.²

The general poverty was so great that it was often absolutely impossible to purchase food for the royal household.³ "If you ask me," said a cool observer, "how this great show of empire is maintained, when the funds are so small, I answer that it is done by not paying at all."⁴ The government was shamelessly, hopelessly bankrupt. The noble band of courtiers were growing enormously rich. The state was a carcass which unclean vultures were picking to the bones.

The foremost man in the land—the autocrat, the absolute master in state and church—was the Duke of Lerma.⁵

¹ S. Contarini, *Relazione*: "Perchè la Spagna si trova spopolata."

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*: "Momenti nei quali le mense reali mancavano del necessario onde cibarsi."

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Francesco Soranzo, *Relazione di Spagna Ambasciatore dall' anno 1597-1602*, in Barozzi and Berchet, *S. I.* vol. i. pp. 1-214. Ott^o Bon, *Ambasciatore stra^o a Filippo III. nel 1602*, *Relazione*,

Very rarely in human history has an individual attained to such unlimited power under a monarchy without actually placing the crown upon his own head. Mayors of the palace, in the days of the do-nothing kings, wielded nothing like the imperial control which was firmly held by this great favorite. Yet he was a man of very moderate capacity and limited acquirements, neither soldier, lawyer, nor priest.

The duke was past sixty years of age, a tall, stately, handsome man, of noble presence and urbane manner. Born of the patrician house of Sandoval, he possessed, on the accession of Philip, an inherited income of ten or twelve thousand dollars. He had now, including what he had bestowed on his son, a funded revenue of seven hundred thousand a year.¹ He had besides, in cash, jewels, and furniture, an estimated capital of six millions.² All this he had accumulated in ten years of service, as prime minister, chief equery, and first valet of the chamber to the king.

The tenure of his authority was the ascendancy of a firm character over a very weak one. At this moment he was doubtless the most absolute ruler in Christendom, and Philip III. the most submissive and uncomplaining of his subjects.³

ibid., S. I. vol. i. pp. 215-275. S. Contarini, *Ambasc. a Filippo III.*, 1602-1604, ibid., S. I. vol. i. pp. 277-337. F. Priuli, *Ambasc. a Filippo III.*, 1604-1608, ibid., S. I. vol. i. pp. 339-402. Gir° Soranzo, *Ambasc. a Filippo III.*, 1608-1611, ibid., S. I. vol. i. pp. 431-492.

¹ Gir° Soranzo.

² Ibid.

³ "Ed in questo duca si può dire che sia ridotta la somma di tutto il governo, la dispensa delle grazie e tutto il bene ed il male di chi pretende alcuna cosa a quelle corte, perchè e veramente senza esempio l' autorità e la grazia che egli possiede appresso il

The origin of his power was well known. During the reign of Philip II., the prince, treated with great severity by his father, was looked upon with contempt by every one about court. He was allowed to take no part in affairs, and, having heard of the awful tragedy of his eldest half-brother, enacted ten years before

re; anzi che per ottenere quello che si pretende importa più l'aver favorevole il duca di Lerma che quasi il re medesimo," etc.—F. Soranzo.

"E che finalmente tutte le cose si riducono alla volontà ed all'autorità del duca e gli altri consiglieri attendono non meno al insinuarsi nelle grazie di S. E. che alli loro proprii interessi in modo che si può dire che questo re sia assolutamente governato e che la maggiore parte delli ministri più principali, per non dire tutti, attendino fuori dell' ordinario al proprio bene."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

"Dal che nasce il potere che tiene sopra di lui il privato che lo governa. Sarà difficile d'ottenere la volontà di questo principe perchè il privato lo tiene in suo potere fino dai primi anni della sua gioventù. Il potere di lui si conserva intieramente nella persona del duca di Lerma."—S. Contarini, Relazione.

"Questo re viene retto da un solo servitore. In questo regno il padrone non ha parte di niente."—F. Priuli.

"Il duca di Lerma, erminentissimo ed assoluto signore di quel governo . . . si ha impossessato della volontà di S. M. che ne è oggidì talmente signore che domina e regge il tutto ai suoi cenni. Assoluto maestro e dispensatore delle grazie regie, egli assegna tutti i vescovati e commende, egli fa i cardinali che sono nominati dal rè di Spagna ed è libero signore e padrone di tutta la corona reale."—Gir^o Soranzo, Relazione.

"Essendo il duca così accorto ed avendo così ben disposto a suo gusto il governo del palazzo e circondato il semplice re da suoi dependenti ch'oltre il non esser possibile che alcuno gli parli senza sua saputa quando anco gli fosse parlato da chi si voglia sa tutto quello che gli viene detto da che segue che non è persona per grande per importante che sia che avesse tant' animo di svegliare il rè che non temesse di pagare subito con la sua rovina la pena del suo ardire."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

his own birth, he had no inclination to confront the wrath of that terrible parent and sovereign before whom all Spain trembled. Nothing could have been more humble, more effaced, more obscure, than his existence as prince.¹ The Marquis of Denia, his chamberlain, alone was kind to him, furnished him with small sums of money, and accompanied him on the shooting-excursions in which his father occasionally permitted him to indulge.² But even these little attentions were looked upon with jealousy by the king, so that the marquis was sent into honorable exile from court as governor of Valencia.³ It was hoped that absence would wean the prince of his affection for the kind chamberlain. The calculation was erroneous. No sooner were the eyes of Philip II. closed in death than the new king made haste to send for Denia, who was at once created Duke of Lerma, declared of the privy council, and appointed master of the horse and first gentleman of the bedchamber. From that moment the favorite became supreme. He was entirely without education, possessed little experience in affairs of state, and had led the life of a commonplace idler and voluptuary until past the age of fifty. Nevertheless, he had a shrewd mother-wit, tact in dealing with men, aptitude to take advantage of events. He had directness of purpose, firmness of will, and always knew his own mind. From the beginning of his political career unto its end he conscientiously and without swerving pursued a single aim. This was to rob the exchequer by every possible mode and at every instant of his life. Never was a more masterly financier in this respect. With a single eye to his own in-

¹ F. Soranzo.² Ibid.³ Ibid.

terests, he preserved a magnificent unity in all his actions. The result had been to make him in ten years the richest subject in the world, as well as the most absolute ruler.

He enriched his family, as a matter of course. His son was already made Duke of Uceda, possessed enormous wealth, and was supposed by those who had vision in the affairs of court to be the only individual ever likely to endanger the power of the father. Others thought that the young duke's natural dullness would make it possible for him to supplant the omnipotent favorite.¹ The end was not yet, and time was to show which class of speculators was in the right. Meantime the whole family was united and happy. The sons and daughters had intermarried with the Infantados and other most powerful and wealthy families of grandees.² The uncle, Sandoval, had been created by Lerma a cardinal and Archbishop of Toledo,³ the king's own schoolmaster being removed from that dignity, and disgraced and banished from court for having spoken disrespectfully of the favorite.⁴ The duke had reserved for himself twenty thousand a year from the revenues of the archbishopric,⁵ as a moderate price for thus conducting himself as became a dutiful nephew. He had ejected Rodrigo de Vasquez from his post as president of the council.⁶ As a more conclusive proof of his unlimited sway than any other of his acts had been, he had actually unseated and banished the inquisitor-general, Don Pietro Porto Carrero,⁷ and sup-

¹ "Ma l' ottusità sua non lo renderà mai atto a un tanto carico."—F. Priuli.

² Otto Bon.

³ F. Soranzo.

⁴ S. Contarini. F. Soranzo.

⁵ F. Priuli, Relazione.

⁶ F. Soranzo.

⁷ Ibid.

planted him in that dread office, before which even anointed sovereigns trembled, by one of his own creatures.

In the discharge of his various functions the duke and all his family were domesticated in the royal palace, so that he was at no charges for housekeeping. His apartments there were more sumptuous than those of the king and queen.¹ He had removed from court the Duchess of Candia,² sister of the great constable of Castile, who had been for a time in attendance on the queen, and whose possible influence he chose to destroy in the bud. Her place as mistress of the robes was supplied by his sister, the Countess of Lemos, while his wife, the terrible Duchess of Lerma, was constantly with the queen, who trembled at her frown. Thus the royal pair were completely beleaguered, surrounded, and isolated from all except the Lermas.³ When the duke conferred with the king, the doors were always double-locked.⁴

¹ Ott^o Bon, Relazione. "Tanto sontuosi da abbagliare quelli del re stesso."—S. Contarini.

² F. Soranzo.

³ Ibid. "Vi saria anco la regina che potria e sapria svegliarlo per la comodità ma è lei ancora *tenuta oppressa* dalla duchessa e dal medesimo duca suo marito che non può nè parlare nè respirare e poi conoscendo il re di tanta semplicità como è veramente e vedendolo esser così innamorato del duca si crede che temi prima di non fare frutto e poi di esser scoperta da S. M. al medesimo duca da che ne potesse seguire mala disposizione tra loro tanta è in particolare la duchessa terribile e formidabile il favore del duca. In tanto che il povero Re per esser di natura poco atto al governare è circondato, sta e starà sempre così dormendo se non è svegliato di qualche gran rovina che straordinariamente lo punge e che insieme necessiti una buona mano de soggetti grandi a sollevarlo ed a liberare tutto il governo da così violenta oppressione," etc.—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

⁴ S. Contarini, Relazione.

In his capacity as first valet¹ it was the duke's duty to bring the king's shirt in the morning, to see to his wardrobe and his bed, and to supply him with ideas for the day. The king depended upon him entirely and abjectly, was miserable when separated from him four-and-twenty hours, thought with the duke's thoughts and saw with the duke's eyes. He was permitted to know nothing of state affairs, save such portions as were communicated to him by Lerma. The people thought their monarch bewitched, so much did he tremble before the favorite, and so unscrupulously did the duke appropriate for his own benefit and that of his creatures everything that he could lay his hands upon. It would have needed little to bring about a revolution, such was the universal hatred felt for the minister, and the contempt openly expressed for the king.²

The duke never went to the council. All papers and documents relating to business were sent to his apartments. Such matters as he chose to pass upon,

¹ "Somiglier del corpo. L' Uffizio del somiglier del corpo consiste nell' aver cura dei vestiti del re e del suo letto."—S. Contarini.

² "Il volgo si esprime dicendo che il rè fu stregato, altri che trema del su favorito . . . vi vorrebbe poco per far nascere una rivoluzione . . . il duca di Lerma prende per se e per i suoi quello che più gli pare e piace, l' odio del popolo è tanto grande verso il duca per il mal uso del suo potere come verso il re a cagione della sua debolezza."—S. Contarini.

"Hat diese wenige Jahre für ihn und die Seinigen das Gras wol geschnitten und so vil dasz ich mirs nicht trauwe zu schreiben, denn es mehr ein Gedicht als der Wahrheit gleich sieht und doch *in re ipsa* ist."—Khevenhüller, Ann. Ferd., vi. 3041.

"Parlano del re in guisa che non oso riferirlo perche lo tengono in assai poca considerazione e perche fa tutto quello che vuole il duca di Lerma."—S. Contarini.

such decrees as he thought proper to issue, were then taken by him to the king, who signed them with perfect docility.¹ As time went on, this amount of business grew too onerous for the royal hand, or this amount of participation by the king in affairs of state came to be esteemed superfluous and inconvenient by the duke, and his own signature was accordingly declared to be equivalent to that of the sovereign's sign manual. It is doubtful whether such a degradation of the royal prerogative had ever been heard of before in a Christian monarch.²

It may be imagined that this system of government was not of a nature to expedite business, however swiftly it might fill the duke's coffers. High officers of state, foreign ambassadors, all men, in short, charged with important affairs, were obliged to dance attendance for weeks and months on the one man whose hands grasped all the business of the kingdom, while many departed in despair without being able to secure a single audience. It was entirely a matter of trade. It was necessary to bribe in succession all the creatures of the duke before getting near enough to headquarters to bribe the duke himself.³ Never were such itching

¹ Ottaviano Bon, Relazione. Giro Soranzo. S. Contarini, Relazione. F. Priuli. "Rimettendoli quasi tutti al duca senza vederli."

² "La segnatura del duca di Lerma fu dal re parificata alla propria, esempio unico nella storia delle monarchie," says N. Barozzi, citing Relazione della vita del re Filippo III. e delli suoi favoriti, MS. della Biblioteca reale di Berlino. Barozzi and Berchet, S. I. vol. vi. p. 288. See also Lafuente, xv. 294, s. 99.

"Dasz er *absolutus Dominus* kann genannt werden."—Khevenhüller, Ann. Ferd., vi. 3041.

³ "E che per fargli capitar polizze o d' udiencia o di negozio bisogna durar fatica di settimane entiere ed andar a diverse mani con

palms. To do business at court required the purse of Fortunatus. There was no deception in the matter. Everything was frank and aboveboard in that age of chivalry. Ambassadors wrote to their sovereigns that there was no hope of making treaties or of accomplishing any negotiation except by purchasing the favor of the autocrat;¹ and Lerma's price was always high. At one period the republic of Venice wished to put a stop to the depredations by Spanish pirates upon Venetian commerce, but the subject could not even be approached by the envoy until he had expended far more than could be afforded out of his meager salary in buying an interview.²

favori straordinarii e per aver la risposta poi bisogna alle volte star a quella discrezione che mai viene," etc.—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

"In modo che per la suprema autorità che lui tiene appresso S. M. (la qual non vede nè ricerca nè fa mai di più di quello che le vien detto e portato da esso duca) in suo potere sta l' espedire quello che comporta il suo interesse."—Ibid.

"Ogni principe o cavaliere avendo qualsivoglia interesse colla corona concorre con richissimi presenti e doni . . . e non vi è ministro o rappresentate regio che non profondi per mantenere lo ben affetto e per goder l' autorità della sua intercessione."—Ghirolamo Soranzo.

"Ottiene dal re ciò che vuole; ha avuto finora beni, commende, entrate donativi per la casa e per la persona sua pel valore di più di due milioni d' oro e ne averà quanti vorrà, e quante ne porterà l' occasione; perciocchè oltre quelle mercedi che le sono fatte dal re che sono grandissime, la libertà ch' ha di accettar presenti lo farà opulentissimo, perchè non è chi pretenda in corte cosa di momento che passando necessariamente per mano del duca non lo presenta largamente, come si fa anco con gran parte di questi ministri novelli, che tutti però si vanno facendo richissimi."—F. Soranzo.

¹ F. Soranzo. Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

² Ott^o Bon, Relazione. The small amount of salary paid by the Venetian republic to its envoys, who had the rank of ambas-

When it is remembered that with this foremost power in the world affairs of greater or less importance were perpetually to be transacted by the representatives of other nations as well as by native subjects of every degree, that all these affairs were to pass through the hands of Lerma, and that those hands had ever to be filled with coin, the stupendous opulence of the one man can be easily understood. Whether the foremost power of the world, thus governed, were likely to continue the foremost power, could hardly seem doubtful to those accustomed to use their reason in judging of the things of this world.¹

sador at all the principal courts, and were expected to live in as splendid style as did the better-paid ministers of other powers, was a perpetual subject of complaint. Some of the royal ambassadors had five hundred dollars a month, a few had a thousand dollars a month, while the diplomatic agent (who was not ambassador) of the Grand Duke of Florence in France had a larger salary than that of the Venetian ambassador at the same court. "We are equal to royal ambassadors in dignity," said Badoer; "we are obliged to approximate to them in expense; one of three things must therefore happen: our salary must be increased over the sum fixed sixty years ago, which averages only one hundred and seventy miserable dollars a month, or the richest citizens of the republic must always be selected to fill all the embassies, or persons must be made use of for the posts who will prejudice the esteem and service of this most serene republic: the esteem, because they must suffer the thousand indignities which are caused by contempt; the service, because they will not be able to make their way toward matters of business and information, which nowadays can only be done all over the world with money."—A. Badoer, *Relazione di Francia*, in Barozzi and Berchet, S. II. vol. i. p. 168.

¹ "Questi sono tutti quelli che governano questa gran macchina, la maggiore parte de quali si lascia vincere e dominare dall' avarizia e per ciò sono applicati a ricever volontieri presenti e come presidenti dei consigli liberamente vendono la maggiore parte delle

Meantime the duke continued to transact business; to sell his interviews and his interest; to traffic in cardinals' hats, bishops' miters, judges' ermine, civic and magisterial votes in all offices, high or humble, of church, army, or state.

He possessed the art of remembering, or appearing to remember, the matters of business which had been communicated to him. When a negotiator, of whatever degree, had the good fortune to reach the presence, he found the duke to all appearance mindful of the particular affair which led to the interview, and fully absorbed by its importance.¹ There were men who, trusting to the affability shown by the great favorite, and to the handsome price paid down in cash for that urbanity, had been known to go away from their interview believing that their business was likely to be accomplished, until the lapse of time revealed to them the wildness of their dream.

The duke perhaps never manifested his omnipotence

vacanze e le volontà loro istesse e con l' esempio di questi, gl' inferiori che sono ad essi subordinati s' accomodano all' istesso e in questo tutto sono talmente domesticati ed accordati che sapendolo il rè e non lo proibendo anzi approvandolo con il dare licenza a quello che glielo domandano di poter ricever da qualche soggetto cospicuo gran somma nelli negozii non si cammina d' altra maniera nè per altra via s' ottiene oggidì giustizia e favori a quella corte e non mancano li mezzi a quest' affetto ordinati e conosciuti da tutti."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione. Compare S. Contarini, Relazione: "Non è difficile regalare il duca di Lerma. Egli fa, scioglie ed ordina tutto quello che vuole," etc. "They toss causes from one to another like tennis-balls," wrote Cornwallis from Madrid. "A man may lawfully say here, *non est qui facit bonum, non usque ad unum*. God Almighty deliver me from amongst them."—Winwood, li. 312.

¹ F. Soranzo.

on a more striking scale than when by his own fiat he removed the court and the seat of government to Valladolid, and kept it there six years long.¹ This was declared by disinterested observers to be not only contrary to common sense, but even beyond the bounds of possibility.² At Madrid the king had splendid palaces, and in its neighborhood beautiful country residences, a pure atmosphere, and the facility of changing the air at will. At Valladolid there were no conveniences of any kind, no sufficient palace, no summer villa, no park, nothing but an unwholesome climate.³ But most of the duke's estates were in that vicinity, and it was desirable for him to overlook them in person.⁴ Moreover, he wished to get rid of the possible influence over the king of the Empress Dowager Maria, widow of Maximilian II. and aunt and grandmother of Philip III.⁵ The minister could hardly drive this exalted personage from court, so easily as he had banished the ex-Archbishop of Toledo,

¹ F. Soranzo. F. Priuli: "Essendo ascenso tanto il credito appresso S. M. che teme di contradirgli e perciò guidato da' suoi interessi si lasciò persuadere a condurre la corte in Valladolid tenendove la vicino a sei anni contra il senso commune e quasi contro al possibile per l'incapacità del luogo."

² F. Priuli.

³ F. Soranzo.

⁴ Ibid. "I fear some evil event to that duke," wrote Cornwallis, "whose immoderate desires of his own particular interests draw him to precipitate himself into the gulf of envy and malediction of the people, by leading a king in such an unfitting sort after him, with manifest neglect of the important affairs of his kingdom, and disregard of what belongs to his kingly office. The wisest say here, according to our English proverb, that hell is broken loose." —Winwood, ii. 395.

⁵ Ibid. She was sister of Philip II. Her daughter Anna was Philip II.'s fourth wife, and mother of Philip III.

the inquisitor-general, the Duchess of Candia, besides a multitude of lesser note. So he did the next best thing, and banished the court from the empress, who was not likely to put up with the inconveniences of Valladolid for the sake of outrivaling the duke. This Babylonian captivity lasted until Madrid was nearly ruined, until the desolation of the capital, the moans of the tradespeople, the curses of the poor, and the grumblings of the courtiers finally produced an effect even upon the arbitrary Lerma.¹ He then accordingly reëmigrated, with king and government, to Madrid, and caused it to be published that he had at last overcome the sovereign's repugnance to the old capital, and had persuaded him to abandon Valladolid.²

There was but one man who might perhaps from his position have competed with the influence of Lerma. This was the king's father confessor, whom Philip wished—although of course his wish was not gratified—to make a member of the council of state.³ The monarch, while submitting in everything secular to the duke's decrees, had a feeble determination to consult and to be guided by his confessor in all matters of conscience. As it was easy to suggest that high affairs of state, the duties of government, the interests of a great people, were matters not entirely foreign to the conscience of anointed kings, an opening to power might have seemed easy to an astute and ambitious churchman. But the Dominican who kept Philip's conscience, Gasparo de Cordova by name,⁴ was, fortunately for the favorite, of a very tender paste, easily molded to the duke's purpose. Dull and ignorant

¹ Priuli. F. Soranzo.

³ F. Soranzo.

² Priuli.

⁴ Ibid.

enough, he was not so stupid as to doubt that, should he whisper any suggestions or criticisms in regard to the minister's proceedings, the king would betray him and he would lose his office.¹ The cautious friar accordingly held his peace and his place, and there was none to dispute the sway of the autocrat.

What need to dilate further upon such a minister and upon such a system of government? To bribe and to be bribed, to maintain stipendiaries in every foreign government, to place the greatness of the empire upon the weakness, distraction, and misery of other nations, to stimulate civil war, revolts of nobles and citizens against authority, separation of provinces, religious discontents in every land of Christendom—such were the simple rules ever faithfully enforced.

The other members of what was called the council were insignificant.

Philip III., on arriving at the throne, had been heard to observe that the day of simple esquires and persons of low condition was past, and that the turn of great nobles had come.² It had been his father's policy to hold the grandees in subjection, and to govern by means of ministers who were little more than clerks, generally of humble origin, keeping the reins in his own hands. Such great personages as he did employ, like Alva, Don John of Austria, and Farnese,

¹ "Ed il confessore, che è quello che parlando al re di secreto potria avvertirlo, è di pasta così tenera, di così poco intendimento, del tutto ignaro del governo di stato ed incapace di tutte le cose grandi che non sapria farlo e forse per il timore che il re stesso non lo palesasse a S. E. dal che non seguisse la sua total depressione."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

² F. Soranzo, Relazione: "Scudieri, certa bassa taglia d' uomini."

were sure at last to excite his jealousy and to incur his hatred. Forty-three years of this kind of work had brought Spain to the condition in which the third Philip found it. The new king thought to have found a remedy in discarding the clerks and calling in the aid of dukes. Philip II. was at least a king. The very first act of Philip III. at his father's death was to abdicate.

It was, however, found necessary to retain some members of the former government. Fuentes, the best soldier and accounted the most dangerous man in the empire, was indeed kept in retirement as governor of Milan, while Cristoval di Moura, who had enjoyed much of the late king's confidence, was removed to Portugal as viceroy. But Don John of Idiaquez, who had really been the most efficient of the old administration, still remained in the council. Without the subordinate aid of his experience in the routine of business it would have been difficult for the favorite to manage the great machine with a single hand. But there was no disposition on the part of the ancient minister to oppose the new order of things. A cautious, caustic, dry old functionary, talking more with his shoulders than with his tongue,¹ determined never to commit himself, or to risk shipwreck by venturing again into deeper waters than those of the harbor in which he now hoped for repose, Idiaquez knew that his day of action was past. Content to be confidential clerk to the despot duke, he was the despair of courtiers and

¹ "In modo che è conosciuto da tutti per testa secca e che poco possa ad altri che al rè solo giovare . . . l' ho provato tanto cauto avido e riservato che alle volte più mi rispondeva con le spalle che con la bocca."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

envoys who came to pump, after having endeavored to fill an inexhaustible cistern. Thus he proved, on the whole, a useful and comfortable man, not to the country, but to its autocrat.

Of the Count of Chinchon, who at one time was supposed to have court influence because a dabbler in architecture, much consulted during the building of the Escorial by Philip II., until the auditing of his accounts brought him into temporary disgrace,¹ and the Marquises of Velada, Villalonga, and other ministers, it is not necessary to speak. There was one man in the council, however, who was of great importance, wielding a mighty authority in subordination to the duke. This was Don Pietro de Franqueza.² An emancipated slave, as his name indicated, and subsequently the body-servant of Lerma, he had been created by that minister secretary of the privy council. He possessed some of the virtues of the slave, such as docility and attachment to the hand that fed and scourged him, and many vices of both slave and freedman. He did much of the work which it would have been difficult for the duke to accomplish in person, received his fees, sold and dispensed his interviews, distributed his bribes. In so doing, as might be supposed, he did not neglect his own interest. It was a matter of notoriety, no man knowing it better than the king, that no business, foreign or domestic, could be conducted or even begun at court without large preliminary fees to the secretary of the council, his wife, and his children. He had, in consequence, already accumulated an enormous fortune. His annual income, when it was stated, excited amazement. He was insolent and overbearing to all

¹ F. Soranzo, *Relazione*.

² Otto Bon, *Relazione*.

comers until his dues had been paid, when he became at once obliging, supple, and comparatively efficient. Through him alone lay the path to the duke's sanctuary.¹

The nominal sovereign, Philip III., was thirty years of age. A very little man, with pink cheeks, flaxen hair, and yellow beard, with a melancholy expression of eye, and protruding under lip and jaw, he was now comparatively alert and vigorous in constitution, although for the first seven years of his life it had been doubtful whether he would live from week to week.² He had been afflicted during that period with a chronic itch or leprosy, which had undermined his strength, but which had almost entirely disappeared as he advanced in life.³

He was below mediocrity in mind,⁴ and had received scarcely any education. He had been taught to utter a few phrases, more or less intelligible, in French, Italian, and Flemish, but was quite incapable of sustaining a conversation in either of those languages.⁵ When a child, he had learned and subsequently forgotten the rudiments of the Latin grammar.⁶

¹ Ott^o Bon, *Relazione*: "Di bassissima condizione, nato d' uno schiavo fatto libero che ha conservato e portato il nome di franchezza," etc.

² "È il rè di buona complessione, agile della vita, piccolo della persona ma ben formato, di pelo rosso e biondo, di carnagione bianca e colorita, col labbro del mento sollevato all' Austriaca. Ha la guardatura un poco malinconica," etc.—F. Soranzo.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ S. Contarini. "La sua intelligenza meno che mediocre."—F. Priuli.

⁵ S. Contarini: "Parla alcune lingue ma corrottementemente solo che basti per farsi intendere . . . ed ha avuto qualche principio di lingua Latina quando era giovinissimo." ⁶ *Ibid.*



PHILIP III

These acquirements, together with the catechism and the offices of the Church, made up his whole stock of erudition. That he was devout as a monk of the middle ages, conforming daily and hourly to religious ceremonies, need scarcely be stated. It was not probable that the son of Philip II. would be a delinquent to church observances. He was not deficient in courage, rode well, was fond of hunting, kept close to the staghounds, and confronted, spear in hand, the wild boar with coolness and success.¹ He was fond of tennis, but his especial passion and chief accomplishment was dancing. He liked to be praised for his proficiency in this art, and was never happier than when gravely leading out the queen or his daughter, then four or five years of age,—for he never danced with any one else,—to perform a stately bolero.²

¹ "Corre dietro ai cani velocissamente, affronta i porchi cinghiali con grande ardore, tira d' archibugio in eccellenza bene," etc. —F. Soranzo.

² "Non beve vino e mangia assai, si diletta della caccia e perciò esce spesso in campagna e fa volentieri viaggi impiegando il resto del tempo in giuocare alla pillotta ed in danzare; è soggetto di debole ingegno, nimicissimo del negozio e di governare non pensando nè a guerra nè a pace come se non fosse nè avesse stati, non inclinando al governo nè per natura nè per educazione anzi per propria volontà si è allontanato del tutto; è per sua natura liberale sebbene alli negozii di grazia e di giustizia ancora non fa nè più nè meno di quello che vuole il D. di Lerma è in continuo bisogno di denaro, ha qualche notizia degli travagli che gli occorrono di Fiandra, d' Inghilterra e d' altri luoghi ma come quello che non ha gusto nè si può dire parte nel governo . . . ma non vedendo nè considerando l' espedizioni e credo io non essendo capace di cose grandi con il sotto scrivere pare che dalla S. M. esca il tutto ma realmente sebbene vi sono li consigli il duca fa e risolve tutte le cose a suo beneplacito."—Ottaviano Bon, Relazione.

He never drank wine, but, on the other hand, was an enormous eater, so that, like his father in youth, he was perpetually suffering from stomachache as the effect of his gluttony.¹ He was devotedly attached to his queen, and had never known, nor hardly looked at, any other woman.² He had no vice but gambling, in which he indulged to a great extent, very often sitting up all night at cards.³ This passion of the king's was much encouraged by Lerma, for obvious reasons. Philip had been known to lose thirty thousand dollars at a sitting, and always to some one of the family or dependents of the duke, who of course divided with them the spoils. At one time the Count of Pelbes, nephew of Lerma, had won two hundred thousand dollars in a very few nights from his sovereign.⁴

For the rest, Philip had few peculiarities or foibles. He was not revengeful, nor arrogant, nor malignant. He was kind and affectionate to his wife and children, and did his best to be obedient to the Duke of Lerma. Occasionally he liked to grant audiences, but there were few to request them. It was ridiculous and pathetic at the same time to see the poor king, as was very frequently the case, standing at a solemn green table till his little legs were tired, waiting to transact busi-

"Balla molto bene ed è la cosa che gusta di più piacendogli d'esser lodato in queste divertimento . . . quando balla balla sempre con sua figlia o con la regina," etc.—S. Contarini, Relazione.

¹ S. Contarini. "Sottoposto al dolor di stomaco per il soverchio mangiare. Nondimeno mangia carne del continuo e con essa si nutrisce quattro volte il giorno."—F. Priuli, Relazione.

² Ott^o Bon. F. Soranzo.

³ S. Contarini. F. Priuli.

⁴ S. Contarini, Relazione. "Si intratiene la sera dopo la cena nel ginoco con il quale ha arricchito molti cavalieri che lo servono."—Girolamo Soranzo.

ness with applicants who never came; while ushers, chamberlains, and valets were rushing up and down the corridors, bawling for all persons so disposed to come and have an audience with their monarch. Meantime the doors of the great duke's apartments in the same palace would be beleaguered by an army of courtiers, envoys, and contractors, who had paid solid gold for admission, and who were often sent away grumbling and despairing without entering the sacred precincts.¹

As time wore on, the king, too much rebuked for attempting to meddle in state affairs, became solitary and almost morose, moping about in the woods by himself,² losing satisfaction in his little dancing and ball-playing diversions, but never forgetting his affection for the queen nor the hours for his four daily substantial repasts of meats and pastry. It would be unnecessary and almost cruel to dwell so long upon a picture of what was, after all, not much better than human imbecility, were it not that humanity is a more

¹ "Ed è cosa ridicola il vedere che quando il rè vuole dar udienza il che segue più giorni alla settimana non si ritrova alcuno che la voglia e per non lasciarlo con questa indignità, li valletti di camera salgono sino nelli corridori del palazzogridando ed invitando le persone a entrare all' udienza di sua Maestà; neppure poi questo giova in modo che ben spesso le occorre levarsi dalla tavola dove appoggiato suole stare aspettando senza che alcuno o pochi le abbino parlato, ed all' incontro alle stanze del duca di Lerma è tanta frequenza d' ogni sorte di persone che vorrebbero udienza che è cosa non meno di stupore che di compassione il vederlo."—Ottaviano Bon, Relazione.

² "E dopo di aversi entieramente dato al duca di Lerma il suo carattere è divenuto solitario ed amante di vagar nei boschi tanto che si dice che questi boschi ed il duca di Lerma siano il re."—S. Contarini.

sacred thing than royalty. A satire upon such an embodiment of kingship is impossible, the simple and truthful characteristics being more effective than fiction or exaggeration. It would be unjust to exhume a private character after the lapse of two centuries merely to excite derision, but if history be not powerless to instruct, it certainly cannot be unprofitable to ponder the merits of a system which, after bestowing upon the world forty-three years of Philip the tyrant, had now followed them up with a decade of Philip the simpleton.

In one respect the reigning sovereign was in advance of his age. In his devotion to the Madonna he claimed the same miraculous origin for her mother as for herself. When the prayer "O Sancta Maria sine labe originali concepta" was chanted, he would exclaim with emotion that the words embodied his devoutest aspirations. He had frequent interviews with doctors of divinity on the subject, and instructed many bishops to urge upon the pope the necessity of proclaiming the virginity of the Virgin's mother. Could he secure this darling object of his ambition, he professed himself ready to make a pilgrimage on foot to Rome.¹ The pilgrimage was never made, for it may well be imagined that Lerma would forbid any such adventurous scheme. Meantime the duke continued to govern the empire and to fill his coffers, and the king to shoot rabbits.

The queen was a few years younger than her husband, and far from beautiful. Indeed, the lower por-

¹ S. Contarini, *Relazione*. Gir° Soranzo. Notes of N. Barozzi, S. I. vol. i. p. 289. Poreno, *Dichos y Hechos de Felipe III.*, chap. xii., cited by Barozzi.

tion of her face was almost deformed. She was graceful, however, in her movements, and pleasing and gentle in manner.¹ She adored the king, looking up to him with reverence as the greatest and wisest of beings. To please him she had upon her marriage given up drinking wine, which, for a German, was considered a great sacrifice.² She recompensed herself, as the king did, by eating to an extent which, according to contemporary accounts, excited amazement.³ Thus there was perfect sympathy between the two in the important article of diet. She had also learned to play at cards, in order to take a hand with him at any moment, feebly hoping that an occasional game for love might rescue the king from that frantic passion by which his health was shattered and so many courtiers were enriched.⁴

Not being deficient in perception, the queen was quite aware of the greediness of all who surrounded the palace. She had spirit enough, too, to feel the galling tyranny to which the king was subjected. That the people hated the omnipotent favorite, and believed the king to be under the influence of sorcery, she was well aware. She had even a dim notion that the ad-

¹ "Non si può dire brutta ma non è manco bella per avere la faccia deformata assai dalla bocca a basso, tuttavia la vaghezza del colore e l'agilità del corpo la fa riuscire grata ad ognuno e dal marito è grandemente amata."—F. Priuli, Relazione.

² F. Soranzo. Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

³ "Le hanno levato il vino per rispetto della conversazione col re che gli riesce molesto ma si rifà col mangiare tanto che è cosa di maraviglia."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

⁴ "Ne mostra di gustare d'altro trattenimento che del giuoco per conformarsi col re pretendendo per tal via di deviarlo dal giuocar con altri che lo fa cadere nelle sopradette perdite."—F. Priuli.

ministration of the empire was not the wisest nor the noblest that could be devised for the first power in Christendom. But considerations of high politics scarcely troubled her mind. Of a People she had perhaps never heard, but she felt that the king was oppressed. She knew that he was helpless, and that she was herself his only friend. But of what avail were her timid little flutterings of indignation and resistance? So pure and fragile a creature could accomplish little good for king or people. Perpetually guarded and surrounded by the Countess of Lemos and the Duchess of Lerma, she lived in mortal awe of both.¹ As to the duke himself, she trembled at his very name. On her first attempts to speak with Philip on political matters—to hint at the unscrupulous character of his government, to arouse him to the necessity of striking for a little more liberty and for at least a trifling influence in the state—the poor little king instantly betrayed her to the favorite, and she was severely punished. The duke took the monarch off at once on a long journey, leaving her alone for weeks long with the terrible duchess and countess. Never before had she been separated for a day from her husband, it having been the king's uniform custom to take her with him in all his expeditions. Her ambition to interfere was thus effectually cured.² The

¹ F. Priuli. F. Soranzo.

² "Voleva alcuni anni sono estendersi nel maneggio dei negozii ma il duca di Lerma che lo sentiva malissimo per levarla da questi pensieri la mortificò conducendo alcune volte il re in campagna senza di lei e tenendo glielo separato le settimane entiere. Sentì tanto la regina quest' assenza regia e conobbe l' origine di questo disgusto che da se si astenne affatto d' ingerirsi più nei negozii ed in questa maniera si pacificò col duca."—Gir° Soranzo.

duke forbade her thenceforth ever to speak of politics to her husband in public or in private,—not even in bed,—and the king was closely questioned whether these orders had been obeyed.¹ She submitted without a struggle. She saw how completely her happiness was at Lerma's mercy. She had no one to consult with, having none but Spanish people about her, except her German father confessor, whom, as a great favor, and after a severe struggle, she had been allowed to retain, as otherwise her ignorance of the national language would have made it impossible for her to confess her little sins.² Moreover, her brothers, the archdukes at Gratz, were in receipt of considerable annual stipends from the Spanish exchequer, and the duke threatened to stop those pensions at once should the queen prove refractory.³ It is painful to dwell

¹ F. Contarini. "Nemmeno trovandosi a letto."—N. Barozzi, S. I. vol. i. p. 325, citing *Relazione della vita*, etc., MS. of Berlin.

"Ihr seyen alle Händt gebunden. Wasz man ihr zuwider thun kan, das thue man, wann sie was heimlich redt so hält man sie in Argwohn, es sey wider die Hertzogen herma und Uzeda oder die ihrigen angesehen. *Ihren Gemahl examinirten sie was sie mit ihm im Bedt redt und haben ihr verboten bey dem König um kein Sachen zu intercediren noch im Bedt oder allein mit ihm Negocio zu tractiren.* Was sie nach Deutschland schreibt will man wissen," etc.—Khevenhüller, *Annales Ferdinandeï*, tom. vi. 3038. Surely never was a more dismal picture painted of tyranny exercised by subject over his sovereigns. It was no wonder that the unfortunate queen protested to Count Khevenhüller that she "would rather go into a convent at Gratz than be Queen of Spain" (*ibid.*).

² Ott^o Bon, *Relazione*. "Confessore della medesima nazione da lei tenuto a viva forza."—F. Priuli, *Relazione*.

³ Giro Soranzo, *Relazione*. Five thousand crowns a month to the Archduke Ferdinand, and much help besides to the others. "L' arciduca Ferdinando al quale ha assegnato 5000 scudi di provisione al mese, e lui ed i fratelli cavano del continuo grossi ajuti

any longer on the abject servitude in which the king and queen were kept.¹ The two were at least happy in each other's society, and were blessed with mutual affection, with pretty and engaging children, and with a similarity of tastes. It is impossible to imagine anything more stately, more devout, more regular, more innocent, more utterly dismal and insipid, than the lives of this wedded pair.

This interior view of the court and council of Spain will suffice to explain why, despite the languor and hesitations with which the transactions were managed, the inevitable tendency was toward a peace. The inevitable slowness, secrecy, and tergiversations were due to the dignity of the Spanish court, and in harmony with its most sacred traditions. But what profit could the Duke of Lerma expect by the continuance of the Dutch war, and who in Spain was to be consulted except the Duke of Lerma?

di corte, e la regina non cessa mai di procurar loro alcuna cosa; e questa è una delle cause principali che tiene la regina in necessità di stare unita e si può dire dependente dal duca di Lerma; poichè procurando lei sempre alcun sussidio per i fratelli e convenendo valersi dell' autorità del duca, non può per questo importante rispetto dargli alcun disgusto nè intromettersi in quello che non è di sua soldisfazione."

¹ "Nel resto vive in continua servitù e con tanto rispetto che maggiore non si può dire."—Ott^o Bon, Relazione.

CHAPTER XLIX

Peace deliberations in Spain—Unpopularity of the project—Disaffection of the courtiers—Complaints against Spinola—Conference of the Catholic party—Position of Henry IV. toward the Republic—State of France—Further peace negotiations—Desire of King James of England for the restoration of the states to Spain—Arrival of the French commissioners—President Jeannin before the States-General—Dangers of a truce with Spain—Dutch legation to England—Arrival of Louis Verreyken at The Hague with Philip's ratification—Rejection of the Spanish treaty—Withdrawal of the Dutch fleet from the Peninsula—The peace project denounced by the party of Prince Maurice—Opposition of Maurice to the plans of Barneveldt—Amended ratification presented to the States-General—Discussion of the conditions—Determination to conclude a peace—Indian trade—Exploits of Admiral Matelieff in the Malay peninsula—He lays siege to Malacca—Victory over the Spanish fleet—Endeavor to open a trade with China—Return of Matelieff to Holland.

THE Marquis Spinola had informed the Spanish government that if three hundred thousand dollars a month could be furnished, the war might be continued, but that otherwise it would be better to treat upon the basis of *uti possidetis*, and according to the terms proposed by the States-General. He had further intimated his opinion that, instead of waiting for the king's consent, it more comported with the king's dignity for the archdukes to enter into negotiations, to make a preliminary and brief armistice with the

enemy, and then to solicit the royal approval of what had been done.

In reply, the king—that is to say, the man who thought, wrote, and signed in behalf of the king—had plaintively observed that among evils the vulgar rule was to submit to the least.¹ Although, therefore, to grant to the Netherland rebels not only peace and liberty, but to concede to them whatever they had obtained by violence and the most abominable outrages, was the worst possible example to all princes, yet as the enormous sum necessary for carrying on the war was not to be had, even by attempting to scrape it together from every corner of the earth, he agreed with the opinion of the archdukes that it was better to put an end to this eternal and exhausting war by peace or truce, even under severe conditions. That the business had thus far proceeded without consulting him was publicly known, and he expressed approval of the present movements toward a peace or a long truce, assuring Spinola that such a result would be as grateful to him as if the war had been brought to a successful issue.

When the marquis sent formal notice of the armistice to Spain there were many complaints at court. Men said that the measure was beneath the king's dignity and contrary to his interest. It was a cessation of arms under iniquitous conditions, accorded to a people formerly subject and now rebellious. Such a truce was more fatal than any conflict, than any amount of slaughter. During this long and dreadful war the king had suffered no disaster so terrible as this, and the courtiers now declared openly that the arch-

¹ The king to Spinola, February 28, 1607, in Gallucci, 328.

duke was the cause of the royal and national humiliation. Having no children, nor hope of any, he desired only to live in tranquillity and selfish indulgence, like the indolent priest that he was, not caring what detriment or dishonor might accrue to the crown after his life was over.

Thus murmured the parasites and the plunderers within the dominions of the do-nothing Philip, denouncing the first serious effort to put an end to a war which the laws of nature had proved to be hopeless on the part of Spain.

Spinola, too, who had spent millions of his own money, who had plunged himself into debt and discredit while attempting to sustain the financial reputation of the king, who had by his brilliant services in the field revived the ancient glory of the Spanish arms, and who now saw himself exposed with empty coffers to a vast mutiny, which was likely to make his future movements as paralytic as those of his immediate predecessors—Spinola, already hated because he was an Italian, because he was of a mercantile family, and because he had been successful, was now as much the object of contumely with the courtiers as with the archduke himself.

The splendid victory of Heemskerk had struck the government with dismay and diffused a panic along the coast. The mercantile fleets destined for either India dared not venture forth so long as the terrible Dutch cruisers, which had just annihilated a splendid Spanish fleet, commanded by a veteran of Lepanto, and under the very guns of Gibraltar, were supposed to be hovering off the Peninsula.¹ Very naturally,

¹ Letter of Henry IV., June 13, 1607, in Jeannin, i. 146.

therefore, there was discontent in Spain that the cessation of hostilities had not originally been arranged for sea as well as land, and men said openly at court that Spinola ought to have his head cut off for agreeing to such an armistice.¹ Quite as reasonably, however, it was now felt to be necessary to effect as soon as possible the recall of this very inconvenient Dutch fleet from the coast of Spain.

The complaints were so incessant against Spinola that it was determined to send Don Diego d'Ybarra to Brussels, charged with a general superintendence of the royal interests in the present confused condition of affairs. He was especially instructed to convey to Spinola the most vehement reproaches in regard to the terms of the armistice, and to insist upon the cessation of naval hostilities and the withdrawal of the cruisers.

Spinola, on his part, was exceedingly irritated that the arrangement which he had so carefully made with the archduke at Brussels should be so contumaciously assailed, and even disavowed, at Madrid. He was especially irritated that Ybarra should now be sent as his censor and overseer, and that Fuentes should have received orders to levy seven thousand troops in the Milanese for Flanders, the arrival of which reinforcements would excite suspicion and probably break off negotiations.²

He accordingly sent his private secretary, Biraga, post-haste to Spain with two letters. In number one he implored his Majesty that Ybarra might not be sent to Brussels. If this request were granted, num-

¹ Letters of F. Aertsens, in Van der Kemp, iii. 123.

² Gallucci, 329.

ber two was to be burned. Otherwise number two was to be delivered, and it contained a request to be relieved from all further employment in the king's service. The marquis was already feeling the same effects of success as had been experienced by Alexander Farnese, Don John of Austria, and other strenuous maintainers of the royal authority in Flanders. He was railed against, suspected, spied upon, put under guardianship, according to the good old traditions of the Spanish court. Public disgrace or secret poison might well be expected by him as the natural guerdons of his eminent deeds.

Biraga also took with him the draft of the form in which the king's consent to the armistice and pending negotiations was desired, and he was particularly directed to urge that not one letter or comma should be altered, in order that no pretext might be afforded to the suspicious Netherlanders for a rupture.

In private letters to his own superintendent Strata, to Don John of Idiaquez, to the Duke of Lerma, and to Stephen Ybarra, Spinola enlarged upon the indignity about to be offered him, remonstrated vehemently against the wrong and stupidity of the proposed policy, and expressed his reliance upon the efforts of these friends of his to prevent its consummation. He intimated to Idiaquez that a new liberation would be necessary to effect the withdrawal of the Dutch fleet,—a condition not inserted in the original armistice,—but that within the three months allowed for the royal ratification there would be time enough to procure the consent of the states to that measure.¹ If the king really desired to continue the war, he had but to alter

¹ Gallucci, 329, 331.

a single comma in the draft, and out of that comma the stadholder's party would be certain to manufacture for him as long a war as he could possibly wish.¹

In a subsequent letter to the king, Spinola observed that he was well aware of the indignation created in Spain by the cessation of land hostilities without the recall of the fleet, but that nevertheless John Neyen had confidentially represented to the archdukes the royal assent as almost certain. As to the mission of Ybarra, the marquis reminded his master that the responsibility and general superintendence of the negotiations had been almost forced upon him. Certainly he had not solicited them. If another agent were now interposed, it was an advertisement to the world that the business had been badly managed. If the king wished a rupture, he had but to lift his finger or his pen; but to appoint another commissioner was an unfit reward for his faithful service. He was in the king's hands. If his reputation were now to be destroyed, it was all over with him and his affairs. The man whom mortals had once believed incapable would be esteemed incapable until the end of his days.

It was too late to prevent the mission of Ybarra, who, immediately after his arrival in Brussels, began to urge in the king's name that the words in which the provinces had been declared free by the archdukes might be expunged. What could be more childish than such diplomacy? What greater proof could be given of the incapacity of the Spanish court to learn the lesson which forty years had been teaching? Spinola again wrote a most earnest remonstrance to the king, assuring him that this was simply to break off

¹ Gallucci, 329, 331.

the negotiation. It was ridiculous to suppose, he said, that concessions already made by the archdukes, ratification of which on the part of the king had been guaranteed, could now be annulled. Those acquainted with Netherland obstinacy knew better. The very possibility of the king's refusal excited the scorn of the States-General.¹

Ybarra went about, too, prating to the archdukes and to others of supplies to be sent from Spain sufficient to carry on the war for many years, and of fresh troops to be forwarded immediately by Fuentes. As four millions of crowns a year were known to be required for any tolerable campaigning, such empty vaunts as these were preposterous. The king knew full well, said Spinola, and had admitted the fact in his letters, that this enormous sum could not be furnished.² Moreover, the war cost the Netherlanders far less in proportion. They had river transportation, by which they effected as much in two days as the Catholic army could do in a fortnight, so that every siege was managed with far greater rapidity and less cost by the rebels than by their opponents. As to sending troops from Milan, he had already stated that their arrival would have a fatal effect. The minds of the people were full of suspicion. Every passing rumor excited a prodigious sensation, and the war party was already gaining the upper hand. Spinola warned the king, in the most solemn manner, that if the golden opportunity were now neglected the war would be eternal. This, he said, was more certain than certain. For himself, he had strained every nerve, and would

¹ Letter to the king, June 25, 1607, in Gallucci, 332.

² Ibid.

continue to do his best in the interest of peace. If calamity must come, he, at least, would be held blameless.¹

Such vehement remonstrances from so eminent a source produced the needful effect. Royal letters were immediately sent, placing full powers of treating in the hands of the marquis, and sending him a ratification of the archduke's agreement. Government, moreover, expressed boundless confidence in Spinola, and deprecated the idea that Ybarra's mission was in derogation of his authority. He had been sent, it was stated, only to procure that indispensable preliminary to negotiations, the withdrawal of the Dutch fleet, but as this had now been granted, Ybarra was already recalled.

Spinola now determined to send the swift and sure-footed friar who had made himself so useful in opening the path to discussion on a secret mission to Spain. Ybarra objected, especially because it would be necessary for him to go through France, where he would be closely questioned by the king. It would be equally dangerous, he said, for the Franciscan in that case to tell the truth or to conceal it. But Spinola replied that a poor monk like him could steal through France undiscovered. Moreover, he should be disguised as a footman, traveling in the service of Aurelio Spinola, a relative of the marquis, then proceeding to Madrid. Even should Henry hear of his presence and send for him, was it to be supposed that so practised a hand would not easily parry the strokes of the French king, accomplished fencer as he undoubtedly was? After stealing into and out of Holland as he had so recently

¹ Letter last cited.

done, there was nothing that might not be expected of him. So the wily friar put on the Spinola livery, and, without impediment, accompanied Don Aurelio to Madrid.¹

Meantime the French commissioners—Pierre Jeanin, Buzanval, regular resident at The Hague, and De Russey, who was destined to succeed that diplomatist—had arrived in Holland.

The great drama of negotiation which was now to follow the forty years' tragedy involved the interests and absorbed the attention of the great Christian powers. Although serious enough in its substance and its probable consequences, its aspect was that of a solemn comedy. There was a secret disposition on the part of each leading personage, with a few exceptions, to make dupes of all the rest. Perhaps this was a necessary result of statesmanship as it had usually been taught at that epoch.

Paul V., who had succeeded Clement VIII. in 1605, with the brief interlude of the twenty-six days of Leo XI.'s pontificate, was zealous, as might be supposed, to check the dangerous growth of the pestilential little Republic of the North. His diplomatic agents, Millino at Madrid, Barberini at Paris, and the accomplished Bentivoglio, who had just been appointed to the nunciature at Brussels, were indefatigable in their efforts to suppress the heresy and the insolent liberty of which the upstart commonwealth was the embodiment.²

Especially Barberini exerted all the powers at his command to bring about a good understanding between the Kings of France and Spain. He pictured

¹ Gallucci, 335.

² Bentivoglio, 548, 549.

to Henry in darkest colors the blight that would come over religion and civilization if the progress of the rebellious Netherlands could not be arrested. The United Provinces were becoming dangerous, if they remained free, not only to the French kingdom, but to the very existence of monarchy throughout the world.¹

No potentate was ever more interested, so it was urged, than Henry IV. to bring down the pride of the Dutch rebels. There was always sympathy of thought and action between the Huguenots of France and their coreligionists in Holland. They were all believers alike in Calvinism,—a sect inimical not less to temporal monarchies than to the sovereign primacy of the Church,²—and the tendency and purpose of the French rebels were already sufficiently manifest in their efforts, by means of the so-called cities of security, to erect a state within a state—to introduce, in short, a Dutch republic into France.³

A sovereign remedy for the disease of liberty, now threatening to become epidemic in Europe, would be found in a marriage between the second son of the King of Spain and a daughter of France. As the archdukes were childless, it might be easily arranged that this youthful couple should succeed them, the result of which would of course be the reduction of all the Netherlands to their ancient obedience.

It has already been seen, and will become still further apparent, that nostrums like this were to be rec-

¹ Bentivoglio, 548, 549.

² "Sette inimica non meno alle monarchie temporali che al sovrano primato ecclesiastico."—Ibid.

³ "E di voler introdurre un governo di Olanda in Francia."—Ibid.

ommended in other directions. Meantime Jeannin and his colleagues made their appearance at The Hague.

If there were a living politician in Europe capable of dealing with Barneveldt on even terms, it was no doubt President Jeannin. An ancient Leaguer, an especial adherent of the Duke of Mayenne, he had been deep in all the various plots and counter-plots of the Guises, and often employed by the extinct Confederacy in various important intrigues. Being secretly sent to Spain to solicit help for the League after the disasters of Ivry and Arques, he found Philip II. so sincerely imbued with the notion that France was a mere province of Spain, and so entirely bent upon securing the heritage of the Infanta to that large property, as to convince him that the maintenance of the Roman religion was with that monarch only a secondary condition. Aid and assistance for the Confederacy were difficult of attainment, unless coupled with the guaranty of the Infanta's rights to reign in France.

The Guise faction, being inspired solely by religious motives of the loftiest kind, were naturally dissatisfied with the lukewarmness of his Most Catholic Majesty. When, therefore, the discomfited Mayenne subsequently concluded his bargain with the conqueror of Ivry, it was a matter of course that Jeannin should also make his peace with the successful Huguenot, now become eldest son of the Church. He was very soon taken into especial favor by Henry, who recognized his sagacity, and who knew his hands to be far cleaner than those of the more exalted Leaguers with whom he had dealt. The "good old fellow," as Henry famil-

ially called him, had not filled his pockets either in serving or when deserting the League. Placed in control of the exchequer at a later period, he was never accused of robbery or peculation. He was a hard-working, not overpaid, very intelligent public functionary. He was made president of the parliament or supreme tribunal of Burgundy, and minister of state, and was recognized as one of the ablest jurists and most skilful politicians in the kingdom. An elderly man, with a tall, serene forehead, a large dark eye, and a long gray beard, he presented an image of vast wisdom and reverend probity. He possessed—an especial treasure for a statesman in that plotting age—a singularly honest visage. Never was that face more guileless, néver was his heart more completely worn upon his sleeve, than when he was harboring the deepest or most dangerous designs.¹ Such was the “good fellow” whom that skilful reader of men, Henry of France, had sent to represent his interests and his opinions at the approaching conferences.

What were those opinions? Paul V. and his legates, Barberini, Millino, and the rest, were well enough aware of the secret strings of the king’s policy, and knew how to touch them with skill. Of all things past, Henry perhaps most regretted that not he, but the last and most wretched of the Valois line, was sovereign of France when the States-General came to Paris with that offer of sovereignty which had been so contumaciously refused.

If the object were attainable, the ex-chief of the Huguenots still meant to be King of the Netherlands

¹ Grotius, xvi. 740: “Vultus autem sermonisque adeo potens ut cum maxi me abderet sensus apertissimus videretur.”

as sincerely as Philip II. had ever intended to be monarch of France.¹ But Henry was too accurate a calculator of chances, and had hustled too much in the world of realities, to exhaust his strength in striving, year after year, for a manifest impossibility. The enthusiast who had passed away at last from the dreams of the Escorial into the land of shadows had spent a lifetime and melted the wealth of an empire; but universal monarchy had never come forth from his crucible. The French king, although possessed likewise of an almost boundless faculty for ambitious visions, was capable of distinguishing cloud-land from substantial empire. Jeannin, as his envoy, would at any rate not reveal his master's secret aspirations to those with whom he came to deal, as openly as Philip had once unveiled himself to Jeannin.

There could be no doubt that peace at this epoch was the real interest of France. That kingdom was beginning to flourish again, owing to the very considerable administrative genius of Béthune, an accomplished financier according to the lights of the age, and still more by reason of the general impoverishment of the great feudal houses and of the clergy. The result of the almost interminable series of civil and religious wars had been to cause a general redistribution of property. Capital was mainly in the hands of the middle and lower classes, and the consequence of this general circulation of wealth through all the channels of society was precisely what might have been expected, an increase of enterprise and of productive

¹ See especially *Seconde Instruction pour le S^r Jeannin*, in *Négociations de M. le Président Jeannin* (ed. Petitot, 1659), i. 40-43, 62, 63.

industry in various branches.¹ Although the financial wisdom of the age was doing its best to impede commerce, to prevent the influx of foreign wares, to prohibit the outflow of specie,—in obedience to the universal superstition, which was destined to survive so many centuries, that gold and silver alone constituted wealth,—while, at the same time, in deference to the idiotic principle of sumptuary legislation, it was vigorously opposing mulberry-culture, silk manufactures, and other creations of luxury, which, in spite of the hostility of government sages, were destined from that time forward to become better mines of wealth for the kingdom than the Indies had been for Spain, yet on the whole the arts of peace were in the ascendant in France.

The king, although an unscrupulous, self-seeking despot and the coarsest of voluptuaries, was at least a man of genius. He had also too much shrewd mother-wit to pursue such schemes as experience had shown to possess no reality. The talisman “Espoir,” emblazoned on his shield, had led him to so much that it was natural for him at times to think all things possible.

But he knew how to renounce as well as how to dare.

¹ “Anche per ricchezza avanza la città di Parigi tutte le altre perchè essendo la nobiltà rovinata per le guerre passate ed il clero medesimamente per l' istessa causa, cominciando questo da poco in qua a ristorarsi, *resta il solo popolo con denari* nel qual numero sono quelli li quali fanno la facoltà con le liti, con li giudizi e con l' amministrazione della entrate pubbliche perchè si vendono tutte queste cariche a denari contanti però si può imaginare ognuno quanto se le facciano fruttare per farsi padroni di centinaja di migliaja di scudi e vi sono molti di questi tali in Francia ma nella città di Parigi più che in ogni altra.”—A. Badoer, Relazione,

He had abandoned his hope to be declared Prince of Wales and successor to the English crown, which he had cherished for a brief period, at the epoch of the Essex conspiracy;¹ he had forgotten his magnificent dream of placing the crown of the Holy German Empire upon his head;² and if he still secretly resolved to annex the Netherlands to his realms, and to destroy his excellent ally, the usurping, rebellious, and heretic Dutch Republic, he had craft enough to work toward his aim in the dark, and the common sense to know that by now throwing down the mask he would be forever baffled of his purpose.

The history of France, during the last three quarters of a century, had made almost every Frenchman old enough to bear arms an accomplished soldier. Henry boasted that the kingdom could put three hundred thousand veterans into the field—a high figure, when it is recollected that its population certainly did not exceed fifteen millions.³ No man, however, was better aware than he that, in spite of the apparent

¹ “I quali sono che egli pretende di essere dichiarato principe di Galles e successore del regno e spera in questa congiuntura di poter ottenere quello che per il passato no gli è riuscito.”—Despatch of Cavalli, Venetian ambassador in England, April 16, 1601, in Barozzi, S. II. vol. i. p. 38.

² “Era stata sua Maestà già tempo desiderosa di farsi eleggere re de’ Romani ed allora si tratteneva più amorevolmente con quei principi ma scuoprendo poi d’ aver debole fondamento per tale pretensione se la è levata del tutto dall’ animo.”—A. Badoer, Relazione, *ibid.*

“Ebbe anco opinione di procurarsi la elezione a re dei Romani dubitando che il re di Spagna avesse questo medesimo pensiero ma avendo scoperto d’ altra inclinazione non se n’ è molto occupato.”—P. Priuli, Relazione.

³ “Computandosi che in tutto il regno vi possono essere quindici

pacification of parties, the three hundred thousand would not be all on one side, even in case of a foreign war. There were at least four thousand great feudal lords,¹ as faithful to the Huguenot faith and cause as he had been false to both; many of them still wealthy, notwithstanding the general ruin which had swept over the high nobility, and all of them with vast influence and a splendid following, both among the lesser gentry and the men of lower rank.

Although he kept a Jesuit priest ever at his elbow,² and did his best to persuade the world and perhaps himself that he had become a devout Catholic in consequence of that memorable five hours' instruction from the Bishop of Bourges, and that there was no hope for France save in its return to the bosom of the Church, he was yet too politic and too far-seeing to doubt that for him to oppress the Protestants would be not only suicidal, but, what was worse in his eyes, ridiculous.

He knew, too, that with thirty or forty thousand fighting men³ in the field, with seven hundred and forty churches in the various provinces⁴ for their places of worship, with all the best fortresses in France

milioni d' anime."—Angelo Badoer, *Relazione*, 1603, in Barozzi and Berchet, S. II. vol. i.

The population of Paris was estimated by the same ambassador at four hundred thousand. Pietro Priuli (*Relazione di Francia*, 1608) was often told by the king that he had three hundred thousand veterans in France.

¹ A. Badoer, *Relazione*. P. Priuli.

² "Non avendo li religiosi in Francia maggior protettore di lui tenendo sempre a canto a sè un gesuita suo favoritissimo che mai lo abbandona."—*Ibid.*

³ Badoer estimates the force at only twenty-five thousand.

⁴ P. Priuli, *Relazione*.

in their possession, with leaders like Rohan, Lesdiguières, Bouillon, and many others, and with the most virtuous, self-denying Christian government¹ established and maintained by themselves, it would be madness for him and his dynasty to deny the Protestants their political and religious liberty, or to attempt a crusade against their brethren in the Netherlands.

France was far more powerful than Spain, although the world had not yet recognized the fact. Yet it would have been difficult for both united to crush the new commonwealth, however paradoxical such a proposition seemed to contemporaries.

Sully was conscientiously in favor of peace, and Sully was the one great minister of France. Not a Lerma, certainly; for France was not Spain, nor was Henry IV. a Philip III. The Huguenot duke was an inferior financier to his Spanish contemporary, if it were the height of financial skill for a minister to exhaust the resources of a great kingdom in order to fill his own pocket. Sully certainly did not neglect his own interests, for he had accumulated a fortune of at least seventy thousand dollars a year, besides a cash capital estimated at a million and a half.² But while enriching himself, he had wonderfully improved

¹ "Il governo politico degli eretici," said one who cordially hated heretics, "è così diligente ed accurato quanto ogni altro che sia al mondo ed in questo avanzano veramente loro medesimi perchè trascurano affatto l'interesse particolare per attender al solo pubblico, proprietà contraria alla natura Francese se non vogliano dire che l'interesse pubblico serva per conservazione del particolare."—A. Badoer.

"Le più importanti fortezze del regno sono da essi tenute," etc.—P. Priuli.

² P. Priuli, Relazione.

the condition of the royal treasury. He had reformed many abuses and opened many new sources of income. He had, of course, not accomplished the whole Augean task of purification. He was a vigorous Huguenot, but no Hercules, and demigods might have shrunk appalled at the filthy mass of corruption which great European kingdoms everywhere presented to the reformer's eye. Compared to the Spanish government, that of France might almost have been considered virtuous, yet even there everything was venal.

To negotiate was to bribe right and left, and at every step. All the ministers and great functionaries received presents, as a matter of course, and it was necessary to pave the pathway even of their antechambers with gold.

The king was fully aware of the practice, but winked at it, because his servants, thus paid enormous sums by the public and by foreign governments, were less importunate for rewards and salaries from himself.¹

One man in the kingdom was said to have clean hands, the venerable and sagacious chancellor Pomponne de Bellièvre. His wife, however, was less scrupulous, and readily disposed of influence and court favor for a price, without the knowledge, so it was thought, of the great judge.²

¹ "Con tutti il ministri indifferentemente l' uomo si fa strada in Francia con quei mezzi che oramai mi pare che usino per tutto il mondo . . . il re medesimo lo sa e lo permette forse perchè profitando li ministri lascino di molestare la S. M. per altre ricompense del servizio che prestano ed essi per questa via pretendono riportare le giuste mercedi delle loro fatiche mentre veggono poter difficilmente sperarne altre dal re."—*Ibid.*

² "Il signore cancelliere solo si mantiene in concetto di molto ingegno ma ha una moglie che supplisce al suo mancamento, ben

Jeannin, too, was esteemed a man of personal integrity, ancient Leaguer and tricky politician though he were.

Highest offices of magistracy and judicature, church and state, were objects of a traffic almost as shameless as in Spain.¹ The ermine was sold at auction, miters were objects of public barter, church preferments were bestowed upon female children in their cradles. Yet there was hope in France, notwithstanding that the pragmatic sanction of St. Louis, the foundation of the liberties of the Gallican Church, had been annulled by Francis, who had divided the seamless garment of church patronage with Leo.

Those four thousand great Huguenot lords, those thirty thousand hard-fighting weavers and blacksmiths

si crede senza sua saputa, poichè nè anco la moglie basta a fargli fare quello che non conviene.”—*Ibid.* The ambassador adds, on the general subject of corruption and bribery at the French court: “Queste cose sono tanto pubbliche nella corte che non pretendo far torto ad alcuno a riferirle in questo sacrario dove sono nondimeno sicuro che saranno custodite con le altre cose dette e da darsi sotto quel sigillo di segretezza che conviene al servizio ed alla riputazione di questo stimatissimo consiglio.”

¹ “Di qua nasce che oltre alle altre invenzioni s’è introdotto vendere non solo tutti li ufficii e le cariche anco di giustizia ma di più gli stessi servizii della casa del re di maestri di casa dei gentiluomini della camera, dei valletti, ed in sino li capitani delle guardie della propria persona dei re che non si può dire più; il che rende molto mal sodisfatto la nobiltà alla quale erano in altri tempi riservati per premii de’ loro servizii questi luoghi che ora vendendosi convengono cadere in mano a chi ha più denari senza alcuna distinzione de’ meriti. E siccome il re non è sotto posto all’ odio manco è soggetto all’ affezione verso le persone che per esso patiscono nell’ interesse come faceva il re passato che per troppa amorevolezza donava più che non aveva.”—A. Badoer, *Relazione*.

and other plebeians, those seven hundred and forty churches, those very substantial fortresses in every province of the kingdom, were better facts than the Holy Inquisition to preserve a great nation from sinking into the slough of political extinction.

Henry was most anxious that Sully should convert himself to the ancient Church, and the gossips of the day told each other that the duke had named his price for his conversion. To be made high constable of France, it was said, would melt the resolve of the stiff Huguenot.¹ To any other inducement or blandishment he was adamant. Whatever truth may have been in such chatter, it is certain that the duke never gratified his master's darling desire.

Yet it was for no lack of attempts and intrigues on the part of the king, although it is not probable that he would have ever consented to bestow that august and coveted dignity upon a Béthune.

The king did his best by intrigue, by calumny, by tale-bearing, by inventions, to set the Huguenots against each other and to excite the mutual jealousy of all his most trusted adherents, whether Protestant or Catholic. The most good-humored, the least vindictive, the most ungrateful, the falsest of mankind, he made it his policy, as well as his pastime, to repeat, with any amount of embroidery that his most florid fancy could devise, every idle story or calumny that could possibly create bitter feeling and make mischief

¹ P. Priuli, *Relazione*: "Procura (il re) che egli (Sully) si faccia cattolico . . . seppure avesse a venire a tal risoluzione si è lasciato intendere con i suoi confidenti che non lo farebbe per altro che con essere dichiarato Contestabile di Francia dignità sì sublime che tiensi fermo che il re non gliela conferirebbe."

among those who surrounded him. Being aware that this propensity was thoroughly understood, he only multiplied fictions, so cunningly mingled with truth as to leave his hearers quite unable to know what to believe and what to doubt. By such arts, force being impossible, he hoped one day to sever the band which held the conventicles together, and to reduce Protestantism to insignificance. He would have cut off the head of D'Aubigné or Duplessis-Mornay to gain an object, and have not only pardoned but caressed and rewarded Biron when reeking from the conspiracy against his own life and crown, had he been willing to confess and ask pardon for his stupendous crime. He hated vindictive men almost as much as he despised those who were grateful.¹

¹ "Non vi è delitto per grande che pensassero commettere del quale non sieno sicuri d'ottenere il perdono dalla Maestà sua e di siffatta maniera che da quell'ora in poi userà il re con essi gli stessi termini di confidenza che usa con i più antichi e fedeli servitori che abbia, il che non si scuopre solo nel trattare apparente, accarezzando tutti ad uno modo ma nell'esistente ancora perchè quando il re ha bisogno dell'opera di qualcheduno conosciuto che possa valere in quel servizio non distingue antica da nuova, sincera da interessata servitù nè in somma fedeltà infideltà ma chiama S. M. quel tale gli comunica il tutto e l'incarica di negoziare come ad un più vecchio più sincero e più fedele servitore suo. In fine è proprio del re non solo perdonare indifferentemente ad ognuno qual si voglia colpa mentre la confessi e gli dimandi il perdono ma quando conosce un uomo che sia di natura vendicativa l'odia più che per qualsivoglia altro vizio. Usa S. M. un altro termine con li suoi servitori credendo convenirgli viver geloso dell'azione di ciascheduno che quando stima che qualche unione di particolari persone possa apportare pregiudizio al servizio suo procura disunirle con porle al punto l'uno contra l'altra non lasciando di ridire tutto quello che gli fosse stato riferito ranco con obbligo di segretezza mente ciò possa giovare al suo disegno ed orna la relazione

He was therefore far from preferring Sully to Ville-roy or Jeannin, but he was perfectly aware that, in financial matters at least, the duke was his best friend and an important pillar of the state.

The minister had succeeded in raising the annual revenue of France to nearly eleven millions of dollars, and in reducing the annual expenditures to a little more than ten millions.¹ To have a balance on the right side of the public ledger was a feat less easily accomplished in those days even than in our own. Could the duke have restrained his sovereign's reckless extravagance in buildings, parks, hunting establishments, and harems, he might have accomplished even greater miracles. He lectured the king roundly, as a parent might remonstrate with a prodigal son, but it was impossible even for a Sully to rescue that hoary-headed and most indomitable youth from wantonness and riotous living. The civil list of the king amounted to more than one tenth of the whole revenue.²

con quei fregi d' invenzione che vengono felicemente composti dal suo florido ingegno, quando conosca potere con essi generare e nutrire gelosia fra quelli amici, per disunirli e farli anco venire alli mani come molte volte accade. Con questo arriva S. M. al fine che desidera, di dissolver le con venticole delle quali vive gelosissimo ma ne conviene provare anco danno notabile, perchè conosciuto ormai la sua natura non vi è chi si fidi di dirgli molte cose che saria suo servizio il saperle. Conosce il re medesimo questa sua facilità di ridire ma essendogli impossibile il mutare natura per rimediarvi in quanto può fra le cose vere mischia con arte dell' invenzione per ridurre l' uomo a non saper che si credere."—A. Badoer, Relazione.

¹ Badoer says 12,000,000 of scudi (four to the pound sterling), of which, however, 6,000,000 were pledged. P. Priuli puts the whole receipts of the exchequer at \$10,727,907, and the expenses at \$10,333,114.

² To \$1,233,632, according to P. Priuli.

On the whole, however, it was clear, as France was then constituted and administered, that a general peace would be, for the time at least, most conducive to its interests, and Henry and his great minister were sincerely desirous of bringing about that result.

Preliminaries for a negotiation which should terminate this mighty war were now accordingly to be laid down at The Hague. Yet it would seem rather difficult to effect a compromise. Besides the powers less interested, but which nevertheless sent representatives to watch the proceedings,—such as Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg, the Elector Palatine,—there were Spain, France, England, the Republic, and the archdukes.

Spain knew very well that she could not continue the war; but she hoped by some quibbling recognition of an impossible independence to recover that authority over her ancient vassals which the sword had for the time struck down. Distraction in councils, personal rivalries, the well-known incapacity of a people to govern itself, commercial greediness, provincial hatreds, envies, and jealousies, would soon reduce that jumble of cities and villages, which aped the airs of sovereignty, into insignificance and confusion. Adroit management would easily reassert afterward the sovereignty of the Lord's anointed. That a republic of freemen, a federation of independent states, could take its place among the nations did not deserve a serious thought.

Spain in her heart preferred, therefore, to treat. It was, however, indispensable that the Netherlands should reestablish the Catholic religion throughout the land, should abstain then and forever from all insolent pretenses to trade with India or America, and

should punish such of their citizens as attempted to make voyages to the one or the other. With these trifling exceptions, the court of Madrid would look with favor on propositions made in behalf of the rebels.

France, as we have seen, secretly aspired to the sovereignty of all the Netherlands, if it could be had. She was also extremely in favor of excluding the Hollanders from the Indies, East and West. The king, fired with the achievements of the Republic at sea, and admiring their great schemes for founding empires at the antipodes by means of commercial corporations, was very desirous of appropriating to his own benefit the experience, the audacity, the perseverance, the skill, and the capital of their merchants and mariners. He secretly instructed his commissioners, therefore, and repeatedly urged it upon them, to do their best to procure the renunciation, on the part of the Republic, of the Indian trade, and to contrive the transplantation into France of the mighty trading companies so successfully established in Holland and Zealand.¹

The plot thus to deprive the provinces of their India trade was supposed by the statesmen of the Republic to have been formed in connivance with Spain. That power, finding itself half pushed from its seat of power in the East by the "grand and infallible society created by the United Provinces,"² would be but too happy to make use of this French intrigue in order to force the intruding Dutch navy from its conquests.

¹ *Négociations de Jeannin*, i. 71, 153, 183, especially 196, 219. Compare Gallucci, 345, 346, and see especially the memoir of F. Aertsens, in Deventer, iii. 26-31; correspondence between Henry IV. and Olden-Barneveldt, 46-50, *ibid*.

² *Memoir of Aertsens*, *ubi sup*.

Olden-Barneveldt, too politic to offend the powerful and treacherous ally by a flat refusal, said that the king's friendship was more precious than the India trade. At the same time he warned the French government that, if they ruined the Dutch East India Company, "neither France nor any other nation would ever put its nose into India again."¹

James of England, too, flattered himself that he could win for England that sovereignty of the Netherlands which England as well as France had so decidedly refused. The marriage of Prince Henry with the Spanish Infanta was the bait steadily dangled before him by the politicians of the Spanish court, and he deluded himself with the thought that the Catholic king, on the death of the childless archdukes, would make his son and daughter-in-law a present of the obedient Netherlands. He already had some of the most important places in the United Netherlands—the famous cautionary towns—in his grasp, and it should go hard but he would twist that possession into a sovereignty over the whole land. As for recognizing the rebel provinces as an independent sovereignty, that was most abhorrent to him. Such a tampering with the great principles of government was an offense against all crowned heads, a crime in which he was unwilling to participate.

His instinct against rebellion seemed like second sight. The king might almost be imagined to have foreseen in the dim future those memorable months in which the proudest triumph of the Dutch commonwealth was to be registered before the forum of Christendom at the Congress of Westphalia, and in which

¹ Deventer, iii. 50.

the solemn trial and execution of his own son and successor, with the transformation of the monarchy of the Tudors and Stuarts into a British republic, were simultaneously to startle the world. But it hardly needed the gift of prophecy to inspire James with a fear of revolutions.

He was secretly desirous, therefore, sustained by Salisbury and his other advisers, of effecting the restoration of the provinces to the dominion of his Most Catholic Majesty.¹ It was of course the interest of England that the Netherland rebels should renounce the India trade. So would James be spared the expense and trouble of war; so would the great doctrine of divine right be upheld; so would the way be paved toward the ultimate absorption of the Netherlands by England. Whether his theological expositions would find as attentive pupils when the pope's authority had been reëstablished over all his neighbors; whether the Catholic rebels in Ireland would become more tranquil by the subjugation of the Protestant rebels in Holland; whether the principles of Guy Fawkes might not find more effective application with no bulwark beyond the seas against the incursion of such practitioners—all this he did not perhaps sufficiently ponder.

Thus far had the discursive mind of James wandered from the position which it occupied at the epoch of Maximilian de Béthune's memorable embassy to England.

The archdukes were disposed to quiet. On them fell the burden of the war. Their little sovereignty, where—if they could only be allowed to expend the

¹ *Négociations de Jeannin*, i. 128, 129, 152, 184, 199, 217, 240, 524, et passim.



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money squeezed from the obedient provinces in court diversions, stately architecture, splendid encouragement of the fine arts, and luxurious living, surrounded by a train of great nobles, fit to command regiments in the field or assist in the councils of state, but chiefly occupied in putting dishes on the court table, handing ewers and napkins to their Highnesses, or in still more menial offices—so much enjoyment might be had, was reduced to a mere parade-ground for Spanish soldiery.¹ It was ridiculous, said the politicians of Madrid, to suppose that a great empire like Spain would not be continually at war in one direction or another, and would not perpetually require the use of large armies. Where, then, could there be a better mustering-place for their forces than those very provinces, so easy of access, so opulent, so conveniently situate in the neighborhood of Spain's most insolent enemies?² It was all very fine for the archduke, who knew nothing of war, they declared, who had no hope of children, who longed only for a life of inglorious ease, such as he could have had as archbishop, to prate of peace and thus to compromise the dignity of the realm. On the contrary, by making proper use of the Netherlands, the repose and grandeur of the mon-

¹ "Il se fait servir par les plus grands et même par ses confrères et compagnons d'ordre jusques aux choses indignes d'être nommées. . . ."

"L'on voit chacun jour grand nombre de noblesse, qui pourroit bien s'employer à la tête d'une compagnie de cavalerie ou d'un regiment, ne s'exercer qu'à porter des plats sur une table, et d'autres encore à d'autres choses moins nécessaires."—Letter from Brussels, in P. de l'Estoile, Supplément au Journal du Règne de Henri IV., 1599–1606, tom. iii. 460, 461, in Petitot, vol. xlvii.

² Bentivoglio, 564.

archy would be secured, even should the war become eternal.¹

This prospect, not agreeable certainly for the archdukes or their subjects, was but little admired outside the Spanish court.

Such, then, were the sentiments of the archdukes, and such the schemes and visions of Spain, France, and England. On two or three points those great powers were mainly, if unconsciously, agreed: the Netherlands should not be sovereign; they should renounce the India navigation; they should consent to the reëstablishment of the Catholic religion.

On the other hand, the States-General knew their own minds, and made not the slightest secret of their intentions. They would be sovereign; they would not renounce the India trade; they would not agree to the reëstablishment of the Catholic religion.

Could the issue of the proposed negotiations be thought hopeful, or was another half-century of warfare impending?

On the 28th May the French commissioners came before the States-General.²

There had been many wild rumors flying through the provinces in regard to the king's secret designs upon the Republic, especially since the visit made to The Hague a twelvemonth before by Francis Aertsens, states' resident at the French court.³ That diplomatist, as we know, had been secretly commissioned by Henry to feel the public pulse in regard to the sovereignty, so far as that could be done by very private and delicate fingering. Although only two or three

¹ Bentivoglio, 564.

² Meteren, 551. Jeannin, i. 109.

³ Wagenaer, ix. 261 seq.

personages had been dealt with, the suggestions being made as the private views of the ambassadors only, there had been much gossip on the subject, not only in the Netherlands, but at the English and Spanish courts. Throughout the commonwealth there was a belief that Henry wished to make himself king of the country.

As this happened to be the fact, it was natural that the president, according to the statecraft of his school, should deny it at once, and with an air of gentle melancholy.

Wearing, therefore, his most ingenuous expression, Jeannin addressed the assembly.

He assured the states that the king had never forgotten how much assistance he had received from them when he was struggling to conquer the kingdom legally belonging to him, and at a time when they, too, were fighting in their own country for their very existence.¹

The king thought that he had given so many proofs of his sincere friendship as to make doubt impossible; but he had found the contrary, for the states had accorded an armistice, and listened to overtures of peace, without deigning to consult him on the subject. They had proved, by beginning and concluding so important a transaction without his knowledge, that they regarded him with suspicion and had no respect for his name. Whence came the causes of that suspicion it was difficult to imagine, unless from certain false rumors of propositions said to have been put forward in his behalf, although he had never authorized any one to make them, by which men had been induced to believe that he aspired to the sovereignty of the provinces.

¹ Jeannin, i. 109.

“This falsehood,” continued the candid president, “has cut our king to the heart, wounding him more deeply than anything else could have done. To make the armistice without his knowledge showed merely your contempt for him and your want of faith in him. But he blamed not the action in itself, since you deemed it for your good, and God grant that you may not have been deceived. But to pretend that his Majesty wished to grow great at your expense, this was to do a wrong to his reputation, to his good faith, and to the desire which he has always shown to secure the prosperity of your state.”¹

Much more spoke Jeannin in this vein, assuring the assembly that those abominable falsehoods proceeded from the enemies of the king and were designed expressly to sow discord and suspicion in the provinces. The reader, already aware of the minute and detailed arrangements made by Henry and his ministers for obtaining the sovereignty of the United Provinces and destroying their liberties, will know how to appreciate the eloquence of the ingenuous president.

After the usual commonplaces concerning the royal desire to protect his allies against wrong and oppression and to advance their interests, the president suggested that the states should forthwith communicate the pending deliberations to all the kings and princes who had favored their cause, and especially to the King of England, who had so thoroughly proved his desire to promote their welfare.²

As Jeannin had been secretly directed to pave the way by all possible means for the king's sovereignty over the provinces; as he was not long afterward to

¹ Jeannin, i. 110.

² Ibid., 113.

receive explicit instructions to expend as much money as might be necessary in bribing Prince Maurice, Count Louis William, Barneveldt and his son, together with such others as might seem worth purchasing, in order to assist Henry in becoming monarch of their country;¹ and as the English king was at that moment represented in Henry's private letters to the commissioners as actually loathing the liberty, power, and prosperity of the provinces,² it must be conceded that the president had acquitted himself very handsomely in his first oration.

Such was the virtue of his honest face.

Barneveldt answered with generalities and common-places. No man knew better than the advocate the exact position of affairs; no man had more profoundly fathomed the present purposes of the French king; no man had more acutely scanned his character. But he knew the critical position of the commonwealth. He knew that, although the public revenue might be raised by extraordinary and spasmodic exertion to nearly³ a million sterling, a larger income than had ever been at the disposition of the great Queen of England, the annual deficit might be six millions of florins—more than half the revenue—if the war continued,⁴ and that there was necessity of peace, could the substantial objects of the war be now obtained. He was well aware, too, of the subtle and scheming brain which lay hid beneath that reverend brow of the president, although he felt capable of coping with him in debate or intrigue. Doubtless he was inspired with as much ardor for the intellectual conflict as Henry might

¹ Jeannin, i. 43, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71.

² Ibid., 157.

³ Wagenaer, ix. 274, 275.

⁴ Ibid., 277.

have experienced on some great field-day with Alexander Farnese.

On this occasion, however, Barneveldt preferred to glide gently over the rumors concerning Henry's schemes. Those reports had doubtless emanated, he said, from the enemies of Netherland prosperity. The private conclusion of the armistice he defended on the ground of necessity and of temporary financial embarrassment, and he promised that deputies should at once be appointed to confer with the royal commissioners in regard to the whole subject.

In private he assured Jeannin that the communications of Aertsens had only been discussed in secret and had not been confided to more than three or four persons.¹

The advocate, although the leader of the peace party, was by no means over-anxious for peace.

The object of much insane obloquy, because disposed to secure that blessing for his country on the basis of freedom and independence, he was not disposed to trust in the sincerity of the archdukes, or the Spanish court, or the French king. "*Timeo Danaos etiam dona ferentes*," he had lately said to Aertsens.² Knowing that the resistance of the Netherlands had been forty years long the bulwark of Europe against the designs of the Spaniard for universal empire, he believed the Republic justified in expecting the support of the leading powers in the negotiations now proposed. "Had it not been for the opposition of these provinces," he said, "he might, in the opinion of the wisest,

¹ Resol. Holl., 146, 147. Wagenaer, ix. 270.

² Olden-Barneveldt to Aertsens, June 2, 1607, in Deventer, iii. 135.

have long ago been monarch of all Europe, with small expense of men, money, or credit.”¹ He was far from believing, therefore, that Spain, which had sacrificed, according to his estimate, three hundred thousand soldiers and two hundred million ducats in vain endeavors to destroy the resistance of the United Provinces, was now ready to lay aside her vengeance and submit to a sincere peace. Rather he thought to see “the lambkins now frisking so innocently about the commonwealth suddenly transform themselves into lions and wolves.”² It would be a fatal error, he said, to precipitate the dear fatherland into the net of a simulated negotiation, from unwise impatience for peace. The Netherlanders were a simple, truthful people, and could hope for no advantage in dealing with Spanish friars, nor discover all the danger and deceit lurking beneath their fair words. Thus the man whom his enemies perpetually accused of being bought by the enemy, of wishing peace at any price, of wishing to bring back the Catholic party and ecclesiastical influence to the Netherlands, was vigorously denouncing a precipitate peace and warning his countrymen of the danger of premature negotiations.

“As one can hardly know the purity and value of gold,” he said, “without testing it, so it is much more difficult to distinguish a false peace from a genuine one; for one can never touch it nor taste it, and one learns the difference when one is cheated and lost. Ignorant people think peace negotiations as simple as a private lawsuit. Many sensible persons even think that, the enemy once recognizing us for a free, sov-

¹ *Mémoire van Olden-Barneveldt, in Deventer, iii. cxcix.*
137-147.

² *Ibid.*

foreign state, we shall be in the same position as England and France, which powers have lately made peace with the archdukes and with Spain. But we shall find a mighty difference. Moreover, in those kingdoms the Spanish king has since the peace been ever busy corrupting their officers of state and their subjects, and exciting rebellion and murder within their realms, as all the world must confess. And the English merchants complain that they have suffered more injustice, violence, and wrong from the Spaniards since the peace than they did during the war.”¹

The advocate also reminded his countrymen that the archduke, being a vassal of Spain, could not bind that power by his own signature, and that there was no proof that the king would renounce his pretended rights to the provinces. If he affected to do so, it would only be to put the Republic to sleep. He referred with much significance to the late proceedings of the admiral of Aragon at Emmerich, who refused to release that city according to his plighted word, saying roundly that whatever he might sign and seal one day he would not hesitate absolutely to violate on the next if the king's service was thereby to be benefited.² With such people, who had always learned law-doctors and ghostly confessors to strengthen and to absolve them, they could never expect anything but broken faith and contempt for treaties however solemnly ratified.

Should an armistice be agreed upon and negotiations begun, the advocate urged that the work of corruption and bribery would not be a moment delayed, and al-

¹ *Mémoire van Olden-Barneveldt*, in *Deventer*, iii. cxcix. 137-147.

² *Ibid.*

though the Netherlanders were above all nations a true and faithful race, it could hardly be hoped that no individuals would be gained over by the enemy.¹

“For the whole country,” said Barneveldt, “would swarm with Jesuits, priests, and monks, with calumnies and corruptions—the machinery by which the enemy is wont to produce discord, relying for success upon the well-known maxim of Philip of Macedon, who considered no city impregnable into which he could send an ass laden with gold.”²

The advocate was charged, too, with being unfriendly to the India trade, especially to the West India Company.

He took the opportunity, however, to enlarge with emphasis and eloquence upon that traffic as constituting the very life-blood of the country.

“The commerce with the East Indies is going on so prosperously,” he said, “that not only our own inhabitants but all strangers are amazed. The West India Company is sufficiently prepared, and will cost the commonwealth so little that the investment will be inconsiderable in comparison with the profits. And all our dangers and difficulties have nearly vanished since the magnificent victory of Gibraltar, by which the enemy’s ships, artillery, and sailors have been annihilated, and proof afforded that the Spanish galleys are not so terrible as they pretend to be. By means of this trade to both the Indies, matters will soon be brought into such condition that the Spaniards will be driven out of all those regions and deprived of their traffic. Thus will the great wolf’s teeth be pulled

¹ *Mémoire van Olden-Barneveldt*, in *Deventer*, iii. cxcix. 137–147.

² *Ibid.*

out, and we need have no further fear of his biting again. Then we may hope for a firm and assured peace, and may keep the Indies, with the whole navigation thereon depending, for ourselves, sharing it freely and in common with our allies.''¹

Certainly no statesman could more strongly depict the dangers of a pusillanimous treaty, and the splendid future of the Republic if she held fast to her resolve for political independence, free religion, and free trade, than did the great advocate at this momentous epoch of European history.

Had he really dreamed of surrendering the Republic to Spain, that republic whose existence ever since the middle of the previous century had been all that had saved Europe, in the opinion of learned and experienced thinkers, from the universal empire of Spain,—had the calumnies, or even a thousandth part of the calumnies, against him been true,—how different might have been the history of human liberty!

Soon afterward, in accordance with the suggestions of the French king and with their own previous intentions, a special legation was despatched by the states to England, in order to notify the approaching conferences to the sovereign of that country, and to invite his participation in the proceedings.

The states' envoys were graciously received by James, who soon appointed Richard Spencer and Ralph Winwood as commissioners to The Hague, duly instructed to assist at the deliberations, and especially to keep a sharp watch upon French intrigues. There were also missions and invitations to Denmark and to

¹ *Mémoire van Olden-Barneveldt*, in *Deventer*, iii. cxcix. 137-147.

the Electors Palatine and of Brandenburg, the two latter potentates having, during the past three years, assisted the states with a hundred thousand florins annually.¹

The news of the great victory at Gibraltar had reached the Netherlands almost simultaneously with the arrival of the French commissioners. It was thought probable that John Neyen had received the weighty intelligence some days earlier, and the intense eagerness of the archdukes and of the Spanish government to procure the recall of the Dutch fleet was thus satisfactorily explained. Very naturally this magnificent success, clouded though it was by the death of the hero to whom it was due, increased the confidence of the states in the justice of their cause and the strength of their position.

Once more, it is not entirely idle to consider the effect of scientific progress on the march of human affairs, as so often exemplified in history. Whether that half-century of continuous war would have been possible with the artillery, means of locomotion, and other machinery of destruction and communication now so terribly familiar to the world, can hardly be a question. The preterhuman prolixity of negotiation which appals us in the days when steam and electricity had not yet annihilated time and space ought also to be obsolete. At a period when the news of a great victory was thirty days on its travels from Gibraltar to Flushing, aged councilors justified themselves in a solemn consumption of time such as might have exasperated Jared or Methuselah in his boyhood. Men fought as if war was the normal condition of human-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 274.

ity, and negotiated as if they were all immortal. But has the art political kept pace with the advancement of physical science? If history be valuable for the examples it furnishes both for imitation and avoidance, then the process by which these peace conferences were initiated and conducted may be wholesome food for reflection.

John Neyen, who, since his secret transactions already described at The Hague and Fort Lillo, had been speeding back and forth between Brussels, London, and Madrid, had once more returned to the Netherlands, and had been permitted to reside privately at Delft until the king's ratification should arrive from Spain.¹

While thus established, the industrious friar had occupied his leisure in studying the situation of affairs. Especially he had felt inclined to renew some of those little commercial speculations which had recently proved so comfortable in the case of Dirk van der Does. Recorder Cornelius Aertsens came frequently to visit him, with the private consent of the government, and it at once struck the friar that Cornelius would be a judicious investment. So he informed the recorder that the archdukes had been much touched with his adroitness and zeal in facilitating the entrance of their secret agent into the presence of the prince and the advocate. Cruwel, in whose company the disguised Neyen had made his first journey to The Hague, was a near relative of Aertsens. The honest monk accordingly, in recognition of past and expected services, begged one day the recorder's acceptance of a bill, drawn by Marquis Spinola on Henry Beckman,

¹ Meteren, 553.

merchant of Amsterdam, for eighty thousand ducats. He also produced a diamond ring, valued at ten thousand florins, which he ventured to think worthy the acceptance of Madame Aertsens. Furthermore, he declared himself ready to pay fifteen thousand crowns in cash, on account of the bill, whenever it might be desired, and observed that the archdukes had ordered the house which the recorder had formerly occupied in Brussels to be reconveyed to him.¹ Other good things were in store, it was delicately hinted, as soon as they had been earned.

Aertsens expressed his thanks for the house, which, he said, legally belonged to him according to the terms of the surrender of Brussels. He hesitated in regard to the rest, but decided finally to accept the bill of exchange and the diamond, apprising Prince Maurice and Olden-Barneveldt of the fact, however, on his return to The Hague.² Being subsequently summoned by Neyen to accept the fifteen thousand crowns, he felt embarrassed at the compromising position in which he had placed himself. He decided accordingly to make a public statement of the affair to the States-General. This was done, and the states placed the ring and the bill in the hands of their treasurer, Joris de Bie.

The recorder never got the eighty thousand ducats, nor his wife the diamond; but although there had been no duplicity on his part, he got plenty of slander. His evil genius had prompted him not to listen seriously to the temptings of the monk, but to deal with him on his own terms. He was obliged to justify himself against public suspicion with explanations and pam-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 271 seq. Grotius, xvi. 741, 742.

² Ibid.

phlets, but some taint of the calumny stuck by him to the last.

Meantime the three months allotted for the reception of Philip's ratification had nearly expired. In March the royal government had expressly consented that the archdukes should treat with the rebels on the ground of their independence. In June that royal permission had been withdrawn, exactly because the independence could never be acknowledged. Albert, naturally enough indignant at such double-dealing, wrote to the king that his disapprobation was incomprehensible, as the concession of independence had been made by direct command of Philip. "I am much amazed," he said, "that, having treated with the islanders on condition of leaving them free, by express order of your Majesty (which you must doubtless very well remember), your Majesty now reproves my conduct and declares your dissatisfaction."¹ At last, on the 23d July, Spinola requested a safe-conduct for Louis Verreycken, auditor of the council at Brussels, to come to The Hague.²

On the 23d of July that functionary accordingly arrived. He came before Prince Maurice and fifty deputies of the States-General, and exhibited the document. At the same time he urged them, now that the long-desired ratification had been produced, to fulfil at once their promise, and to recall their fleet from the coast of Spain.³

Verreycken was requested to withdraw while the instrument was examined. When recalled, he was in-

¹ Extract from MS. letter cited by Deventer, iii. xxvi.

² Wagenaer, ix. 278.

³ Meteren, 552, 553. Gallucci, 336. Wagenaer, 278 seq.

formed that the states had the most straightforward intention to negotiate, but that the royal document did not at all answer their expectation. As few of the delegates could read Spanish, it would first of all be necessary to cause it to be translated. When that was done they would be able to express their opinion concerning it and come to a decision in regard to the recall of the fleet. This ended the proceedings on that occasion.

Next day Prince Maurice invited Verreycken and others to dine. After dinner the stadholder informed him that the answer of the states might soon be expected, at the same time expressing his regret that the king should have sent such an instrument. It was very necessary, said the prince, to have plain-speaking, and he, for one, had never believed that the king would send a proper ratification. The one exhibited was not at all to the purpose. The king was expected to express himself as clearly as the archdukes had done in their instrument. He must agree to treat with the States-General as with people entirely free, over whom he claimed no authority. If the king should refuse to make this public declaration, the states would at once break off all negotiations.¹

Three days afterward seven deputies conferred with Verreycken. Barneveldt, as spokesman, declared that, so far as the provinces were concerned, the path was plain and open to an honest, ingenuous, lasting peace, but that the manner of dealing on the other side was artificial and provocative of suspicion.² A most important line, which had been placed by the states at the very beginning of the form suggested by them, was

¹ Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

² *Ibid.*

wanting in the ratification now received. This hardly seemed an accidental omission. The whole document was constrained and defective. It was necessary to deal with Netherlands in clear and simple language. The basis of any possible negotiation was that the provinces were to be treated with as and called entirely free. Unless this was done negotiations were impossible. The States-General were not so unskilled in affairs as to be ignorant that the king and the archdukes were quite capable, at a future day, of declaring themselves untrammelled by any conditions. They would boast that conventions with rebels and pledges to heretics were alike invalid. If Verreycken had brought no better document than the one presented, he had better go at once. His stay in the provinces was superfluous.¹

At a subsequent interview Barneveldt informed Verreycken that the king's confirmation had been unanimously rejected by the States-General as deficient both in form and substance. He added that the people of the provinces were growing very lukewarm in regard to peace, that Prince Maurice opposed it, that many persons regretted the length to which the negotiations had already gone. Difficult as it seemed to be to recede, the archdukes might be certain that a complete rupture was imminent.

All these private conversations of Barneveldt, who was known to be the chief of the peace party, were duly reported by Verreycken in secret notes to the archduke and to Spinola. Of course they produced their effect. It surely might have been seen that the tricks and shifts of an antiquated diplomacy were en-

¹ Gallucci, 337, 338.

tirely out of place if any wholesome result were desired. But the habit of dissimulation was inveterate. That the man who cannot dissemble is unfit to reign, was perhaps the only one of his father's golden rules which Philip III. could thoroughly comprehend, even if it be assumed that the monarch was at all consulted in regard to this most important transaction of his life. Verreycken and the friar knew very well when they brought the document that it would be spurned by the states, and yet they were also thoroughly aware that it was the king's interest to begin the negotiations as soon as possible. When thus privately and solemnly assured by the advocate that they were really wasting their time by being the bearers of these royal evasions, they learned, therefore, nothing positively new, but were able to assure their employers that to thoroughly disgust the peace party was not precisely the mode of terminating the war.

Verreycken now received public and formal notification that a new instrument must be procured from the king. In the ratification which had been sent, that monarch spoke of the archdukes as princes and sovereign proprietors of all the Netherlands. The clause by which, according to the form prescribed by the states and already adopted by the archdukes, the United Provinces were described as free countries over which no authority was claimed had been calmly omitted, as if, by such a subterfuge, the independence of the Republic could be winked out of existence. Furthermore, it was objected that the document was in Spanish, that it was upon paper instead of parchment, that it was not sealed with the great, but with the little seal, and that it was subscribed "I the King."

This signature might be very appropriate for decrees issued by a monarch to his vassals, but could not be rightly appended, it was urged, to an instrument addressed to a foreign power. Potentates treating with the States-General of the United Provinces were expected to sign their names.

Whatever may be thought of the technical requirements in regard to the parchment, the signature, and the seal, it would be difficult to characterize too strongly the polity of the Spanish government in the most essential point. To seek relief from the necessity of recognizing—at least in the sense of similitude, according to the subtlety of Bentivoglio—the freedom of the provinces, simply by running the pen through the most important line of a most important document, was diplomacy in its dotage. Had not Marquis Spinola, a man who could use his brains and his pen as well as his sword, expressly implored the politicians of Madrid not to change even a comma in the form of ratification which he sent to Spain?

Verreycken, placed face to face with plain-spoken straightforward, strong-minded men, felt the dreary absurdity of the position. He could only stammer a ridiculous excuse about the clause having been accidentally left out by a copying secretary.¹ To represent so important an omission as a clerical error was almost as great an absurdity as the original device; but it was necessary for Verreycken to say something. He promised, however, that the form prescribed by the states should be again transmitted to Madrid, and expressed confidence that the ratification would now be

¹ Grotius, xvi. 744, 745. Meteren, 352. Wagenaer, ix. 279.

sent as desired. Meantime he trusted that the fleet would be at once recalled.

This at once created a stormy debate which lasted many days, both within the walls of the house of assembly and out of doors. Prince Maurice bitterly denounced the proposition, and asserted the necessity rather of sending out more ships than of permitting their cruisers to return. It was well known that the Spanish government, since the destruction of Avila's fleet, had been straining every nerve to procure and equip other war-vessels, and that even the Duke of Lerma had offered a small portion of his immense plunderings to the crown in aid of naval armaments.¹

On the other hand, Barneveldt urged that the states, in the preliminary armistice, had already agreed to send no munitions nor reinforcements to the fleet already cruising on the coasts of the Peninsula. It would be better, therefore, to recall those ships than to leave them where they could not be victualled nor strengthened without a violation of good faith.

These opinions prevailed, and on the 9th August Verreycken was summoned before the assembly, and informed by Barneveldt that the states had decided to withdraw the fleet and to declare invalid all prizes made six weeks after that date. This was done, it was said, out of respect to the archdukes, to whom no blame was imputed for the negligence displayed in regard to the ratification. Furthermore, the auditor was requested to inform his masters that the documents brought from Spain were not satisfactory, and he was furnished with a draft made both in Latin and French. With this form, it was added, the king was

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 280, 281.

to comply within six weeks, if he desired to proceed further in negotiations with the states.¹

Verreycken thanked the States-General, made the best of promises, and courteously withdrew.

Next day, however, just as his preparations for departure had been made, he was once more summoned before the assembly to meet with a somewhat disagreeable surprise. Barneveldt, speaking as usual in behalf of the States-General, publicly produced Spinola's bill of exchange for eighty thousand ducats, the diamond ring intended for Madame Aertsens, and the gold chain given to Dirk van der Does, and expressed the feelings of the republican government in regard to those barefaced attempts of Friar John at bribery and corruption in very scornful language.² Netherlanders were not to be bought,—so the agent of Spain and of the archdukes was informed,—and, even if the citizens were venal, it would be necessary in a popular government to buy up the whole nation. “It is not in our commonwealth as in despotisms,” said the advocate, “where affairs of state are directed by the nod of two or three individuals, while the rest of the inhabitants are a mob of slaves. By turns we all govern and are governed. This great council, this senate, should it seem not sufficiently fortified against your presents, could easily be enlarged. Here is your chain, your ring, your banker's draft. Take them all back to your masters. Such gifts are not necessary to insure a just peace, while to accept them would be a crime against liberty, which we are incapable of committing.”³

¹ Meteren, 352. Wagenaer, ix. 281.

² Meteren, 553^{vo}. Grotius, xvi. 745. Wagenaer, ix. 283. ³ Ibid.

Verreycken, astonished and abashed, could answer little save to mutter a few words about the greediness of monks, who, judging every one else by themselves, thought no one inaccessible to a bribe.¹ He protested the innocence of the archdukes in the matter, who had given no directions to bribe, and who were quite ignorant that the attempt had been made.

He did not explain by whose authority the chain, the ring, and the draft upon Beckman had been furnished to the friar.

Meantime that ecclesiastic was cheerfully wending his way to Spain in search of the new ratification, leaving his colleague vicariously to bide the pelting of the republican storm and to return somewhat weather-beaten to Brussels.

During the suspension, thus ridiculously and gratuitously caused, of preliminaries which had already lasted the better portion of a year, party spirit was rising day by day higher and spreading more widely throughout the provinces. Opinions and sentiments were now sharply defined and loudly announced. The clergy, from a thousand pulpits, thundered against the peace, exposing the insidious practices, the faithless promises, the monkish corruptions, by which the attempt was making to reduce the free Republic once more into vassalage to Spain. The people everywhere listened eagerly and applauded. Especially the mariners, cordwainers, smiths, ship-chandlers, boatmen, the tapestry-weavers, lace manufacturers, shopkeepers, and, above all, the India merchants and stockholders in the great commercial companies for the East and

¹ "Nec mirum si monachi avarum imprimis hominum genus alios ex se æstimarent."—Grotius, ubi sup.

West, lifted up their voices for war. This was the party of Prince Maurice, who made no secret of his sentiments, and opposed, publicly and privately, the resumption of negotiations. Doubtless his adherents were the most numerous portion of the population.

Barneveldt, however, was omnipotent with the municipal governments, and although many individuals in those bodies were deeply interested in the India navigation and the great corporations, the advocate turned them, as usual, around his finger.

Ever since the memorable day of Nieuport there had been no love lost between the stadholder and the advocate. They had been nominally reconciled to each other, and had, until lately, acted with tolerable harmony, but each was thoroughly conscious of the divergence of their respective aims.

Exactly at this period the long-smothered resentment of Maurice against his old preceptor, counselor, and, as he believed, betrayer, flamed forth anew. He was indignant that a man so infinitely beneath him in degree should thus dare to cross his plans, to hazard, as he believed, the best interests of the state, and to interfere with the course of his legitimate ambition.¹ There was more glory for a great soldier to earn in future battle-fields, a higher position before the world to be won. He had a right by birth, by personal and family service, to claim admittance among the monarchs of Europe. The pistol of Balthazar Gérard had alone prevented the elevation of his father to the sovereignty of the provinces. The patents, wanting only a few formalities, were still in possession of the son. As the war went on—and nothing but blind belief in

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 283-285.

Spanish treachery could cause the acceptance of a peace which would be found to mean slavery—there was no height to which he might not climb. With the return of peace and submission, his occupation would be gone, obscurity and poverty the sole recompense for his lifelong services and the sacrifices of his family. The memory of the secret movements twice made but a few years before to elevate him to the sovereignty, and which he believed to have been baffled by the advocate, doubtless rankled in his breast. He did not forget that when the subject had been discussed by the favorers of the scheme in Barneveldt's own house, Barneveldt himself had prophesied that one day or another "the rights would burst out which his Excellency had to become prince of the provinces, on strength of the signed and sealed documents addressed to the late Prince of Orange; that he had further alluded to the efforts then on foot to make him Duke of Gelderland; adding, with a sneer, that Zeeland was all agog on the subject, while in that province there were individuals very desirous of becoming children of Zebedee."¹

Barneveldt, on his part, although accustomed to speak in public of his Excellency Prince Maurice in terms of profoundest respect, did not fail to communicate in influential quarters his fears that the prince was inspired by excessive ambition, and that he desired to protract the war, not for the good of the commonwealth, but for the attainment of greater power in the state. The envoys of France, expressly instructed on that subject by the king, whose purposes would be

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 100–103, 396–400; *i. e.*, zealous disciples of their master, as Van der Kemp explains.

frustrated if the ill blood between these eminent personages could not be healed, did their best to bring about a better understanding, but with hardly more than an apparent success.

Once more there were stories flying about that the stadholder had called the advocate liar, and that he had struck him or offered to strike him¹—tales as void of truth, doubtless, as those so rife after the battle of Nieuport, but which indicated the exasperation which existed.

When the news of the rejection of the king's ratification reached Madrid, the indignation of the royal conscience-keepers was vehement.²

That the potentate of so large a portion of the universe should be treated by those lately his subjects with less respect than that due from equals to equals seemed intolerable. So thoroughly inspired, however, was the king by the love of religion and the public good,—as he informed Marquis Spinola by letter,—and so intense was his desire for the termination of that disastrous war, that he did not hesitate indulgently to grant what had been so obstinately demanded. Little was to be expected, he said, from the stubbornness of the provinces and from their extraordinary manner of transacting business, but looking, nevertheless, only to divine duty, and preferring its dictates to a selfish regard for his own interests, he had resolved to concede that liberty to the provinces which had been so importunately claimed. He, however, imposed the condition that the states should permit free and public exercise of the Catholic religion throughout their territories, and that so long as such worship

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 285.

² Gallucci, 338.

was unobstructed, so long and no longer should the liberty now conceded to the provinces endure.¹

“Thus did this excellent prince,” says an eloquent Jesuit, “prefer obedience to the Church before subjection to himself, and insist that those whom he emancipated from his own dominions should still be loyal to the sovereignty of the pope.”²

Friar John, who had brought the last intelligence from the Netherlands, might have found it difficult, if consulted, to inform the king how many bills of exchange would be necessary to force this wonderful condition on the government of the provinces. That the Republic should accept that liberty as a boon which she had won with the red right hand, and should establish within her domains as many agents for Spanish reaction as there were Roman priests, monks, and Jesuits to be found, was not very probable. It was not thus nor then that the great lesson of religious equality and liberty for all men—the inevitable result of the Dutch revolt—was to be expounded. The insertion of such a condition in the preamble to a treaty with a foreign power would have been a desertion on the part of the Netherlands of the very principle of religious or civil freedom.

The monk, however, had convinced the Spanish government that in six months after peace had been made the states would gladly accept the dominion of Spain once more, or, at the very least, would annex themselves to the obedient Netherlands under the scepter of the archdukes.

Secondly, he assured the duke that they would

¹ The king to Spinola, apud Gallucci, ubi sup.

² Gallucci, ubi sup.

publicly and totally renounce all connection with France.

Thirdly, he pledged himself that the exercise of the Catholic religion would be as free as that of any other creed.¹

And the Duke of Lerma believed it all: such and no greater was his capacity for understanding the course of events which he imagined himself to be directing. Certainly Friar John did not believe what he said.

"Master Monk is not quite so sure of his stick as he pretends to be," said Secretary of State Villeroy.² Of course no one knew better the absurdity of those assurances than Master Monk himself.

"It may be that he has held such language," said Jeannin, "in order to accomplish his object in Spain. But 't is all dreaming and moonshine, which one should laugh at rather than treat seriously. These people here mean to be sovereign forever and will make no peace except on that condition. This grandeur and vanity have entered so deeply into their brains that they will be torn into little pieces rather than give it up."³

Spinola, as acute a politician as he was a brilliant commander, at once demonstrated to his government the impotence of such senile attempts. No definite agreements could be made, he wrote, except by a general convention. Before a treaty of peace, no permission would be given by the states to the public exercise of the Catholic religion, for fear of giving offense to what were called the Protestant powers. Unless they

¹ *Négociations de Jeannin*, i. 360.

² *Ibid.*, letter of September 19, 1607.

³ *Négociations de Jeannin*, i. 394, letter of October 6, 1607.

saw the proper ratification they would enter into no negotiations at all. When the negotiations had produced a treaty, the Catholic worship might be demanded. Thus peace might be made, and the desired conditions secured, or all parties would remain as they had been.¹

The Spanish government replied by sending a double form of ratification.² It would not have been the Spanish government had one simple, straightforward document been sent. Plenty of letters came at the same time, triumphantly refuting the objections and arguments of the States-General. To sign "Yo el Rey" had been the custom of the king's ancestors in dealing with foreign powers. Thus had Philip II. signed the treaty of Vervins. Thus had the reigning king confirmed the treaty of Vervins. Thus had he signed the recent treaty with England, as well as other conventions with other potentates. If the French envoys at The Hague said the contrary they erred from ignorance or from baser reasons. The provinces could not be declared free until Catholic worship was conceded. The donations must be mutual and simultaneous, and the states would gain a much more stable and diuturnal liberty, founded not upon a simple declaration, but lawfully granted them as a compensation for a just and pious work performed. To this end the king sent ratification number one, in which his sentiments were fully expressed. If, however, the provinces were resolved not to defer the declaration so ardently desired and to refuse all negotiation until they had received it, then ratification number two, therewith sent and drawn up in the required form, might

¹ Gallucci, 338.

² Ibid., 340.

be used. It was, however, to be exhibited, but not delivered. The provinces would then see the clemency with which they were treated by the king, and all the world might know that it was not his fault if peace were not made.¹

Thus the politicians of Madrid, speaking in the name of their august sovereign and signing "Yo el Rey" for him without troubling him even to look at the documents.

When these letters arrived, the time fixed by the states for accepting the ratification had run out, and their patience was well-nigh exhausted. The archduke held counsel with Spinola, Verreycken, Richardot, and others, and it was agreed that ratification number two, in which the Catholic worship was not mentioned, should be forthwith sent to the states. Certainly no other conclusion could have been reached, and it was fortunate that a lucid interval in the deliberations of the lunatics at Madrid had furnished the archduke with an alternative. Had it been otherwise and had number one been presented, with all the accompanying illustrations, the same dismal comedy might have gone on indefinitely until the Dutchmen hissed it away and returned to their tragic business once more.

On the 25th October Friar John and Verreycken came before the States-General, more than a hundred members being present, besides Prince Maurice and Count Louis William.²

The monk stated that he had faithfully represented to his Majesty at Madrid the sincere, straightforward, and undissembling proceedings of their Lordships in

¹ Gallucci, 340.

² Wagenaer, ix. 285.

these negotiations.¹ He had also explained the constitution of their government and had succeeded in obtaining from his Royal Majesty the desired ratification, after due deliberation with the council. This would now give the assurance of a firm and durable peace, continued Neyen, even if his Majesty should come one day to die, being mortal. Otherwise there might be inconveniences to fear. Now, however, the document was complete in all its parts, so far as regarded what was principal and essential, and in conformity with the form transmitted by the States-General. "God the Omnipotent knows," proceeded the friar, "how sincere is my intention in this treaty of peace as a means of delivering the Netherlands from the miseries of war, as your Lordships will perceive by the form of the agreement, explaining itself and making manifest its pure and undissembling intentions, promising nothing and engaging to nothing which will not be effectually performed. This would not be the case if his Majesty were proceeding by finesse or deception. The ratification might be nakedly produced as demanded, without any other explanation. But his Majesty, acting in good faith, has now declared his last determination in order to avoid anything that might be disputed at some future day, as your Lordships will see more amply when the auditor has exhibited the document." ²

When the friar had finished Verreycken spoke.

He reminded them of the proofs already given by the archdukes of their sincere desire to change the long and sanguinary war into a good and assured peace. Their Lordships the states had seen how liberally, sin-

¹ Jeannin, i. 423.

² Ibid., 422, 423.

cerely, and roundly their Highnesses had agreed to all demands and had procured the ratification of his Majesty, even although nothing had been proposed in that regard at the beginning of the negotiations.

He then produced the original document, together with two copies, one in French, the other in Flemish, to be carefully collated by the states.¹

“It is true,” said the auditor, “that the original is not made out in Latin nor in French, as your Lordships demanded, but in Spanish, and in the same form and style as used by his Majesty in treating with all the kings, potentates, and republics of Christendom. To tell you the truth, it has seemed strange that there should be a wish to make so great and puissant a king change his style, such demand being contrary to all reason and equity, and more so as his Majesty is content with the style which your Lordships have been pleased to adopt.”

The ratification was then exhibited.

It set forth that Don Philip, by grace of God King of Castile, Leon, Aragon, the Two Sicilies, Portugal, Navarre, and of fourteen or fifteen other European realms duly enumerated; King of the Eastern and Western Indies and of the continents on terra firma adjacent, King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Antioch, Duke of Burgundy, and King of the Ocean, having seen that the archdukes were content to treat with the States-General of the United Provinces in quality of, and as holding them for, countries, provinces, and free states over which they pretended to no authority; either by way of a perpetual peace or for a truce or suspension of arms for twelve, fifteen, or twenty years,

¹ Jeannin, i. 423, 424.

at the choice of the said states, and knowing that the said most serene archdukes had promised to deliver the king's ratification, had, after ripe deliberation with his council, and out of his certain wisdom and absolute royal power, made the present declarations, similar to the one made by the archdukes, for the accomplishment of the said promise so far as it concerned him.

"And we principally declare," continued the King of Spain, Jerusalem, America, India, and the Ocean, "that we are content that in our name, and on our part, shall be treated with the said states in the quality of, and as held by us for, free countries, provinces, and states, over which we make no pretensions. Thus we approve and ratify every point of the said agreement, promising on faith and word of a king to guard and accomplish it as entirely as if we had consented to it from the beginning."

"But we declare," said the king, in conclusion, "that if the treaty for a peace or a truce of many years, by which the pretensions of both parties are to be arranged, as well in the matter of religion as all the surplus, shall not be concluded, then this ratification shall be of no effect and as if it never had been made, and, in virtue of it, we are not to lose a single point of our right, nor the United Provinces to acquire one, but things are to remain, so far as regards the rights of the two parties, exactly as they are at present, each to do what to each shall seem best."¹

Such were the substantial parts of the document, with much superfluous verbiage lopped away, which had been signed "I the king" at Madrid on the 18th

¹ Jeannin, i. 425-429.

September, and the two copies of which were presented to the States-General on the 25th October, the commissioners retaining the original.

The papers were accepted, with a few general commonplaces by Barneveldt meaning nothing, and an answer was promised after a brief delay.¹

A committee of seven, headed by the advocate as chairman and spokesman, held a conference with the ambassadors of France and England at four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, and another at ten o'clock next morning.²

The states were not very well pleased with the ratification. What especially moved their discontent was the concluding clause, according to which it was intimated that if the pretensions of Spain in regard to religion were not fulfilled in the final treaty, the ratification was waste paper and the king would continue to claim all his rights.

How much more loudly would they have vociferated could they have looked into Friar John's wallet and have seen ratification number one! Then they would have learned that, after nearly a year of what was called negotiation, the king had still meant to demand the restoration of the Catholic worship before he would even begin to entertain the little fiction that the provinces were free.

As to the signature, the paper, and the Spanish language, those were minor matters. Indeed, it is difficult to say why the King of Spain should not issue a formal document in Spanish. It is doubtful whether, had he taken a fancy to read it, he could have understood it in any other tongue. Moreover, Spanish

¹ Jeannin, i. 433.

² Ibid., 432-438.

would seem the natural language for Spanish state papers. Had he, as King of Jerusalem, America, or India, chosen the Hebrew, Aztec, or Sanskrit in his negotiations with the United Provinces, there might have been more cause for dissatisfaction.

Jeannin, who was of course the leading spirit among the foreign members of the conference, advised the acceptance of the ratification. Notwithstanding the technical objections to its form, he urged that in substance it was in sufficient conformity to the draft furnished by the states. Nothing could be worse, in his opinion, for the provinces than to remain any longer suspended between peace and war. They would do well, therefore, to enter upon negotiations so soon as they had agreed among themselves upon three points.

They must fix the great indispensable terms which they meant to hold, and from which no arguments would ever induce them to recede. Thus they would save valuable time and be spared much frivolous discourse.

Next, they ought to establish a good interior government.

Thirdly, they should at once arrange their alliances and treaties with foreign powers, in order to render the peace to be negotiated a durable one.¹

As to the first and second of these points, the Netherlands needed no prompter. They had long ago settled the conditions without which they would make no treaty at all, and certainly it was not the States-General that had thus far been frivolously consuming time.

As to the form of government, defective though it

¹ Jeannin, i. 432-437.

was, the leaders of the Republic knew very well in whose interests such sly allusions to their domestic affairs were repeatedly ventured by the French envoys. In regard to treaties with foreign powers it was, of course, most desirable for the Republic to obtain the formal alliance of France and England. Jeannin and his colleagues were ready to sign such a treaty, offensive and defensive, at once; but they found it impossible to induce the English ambassadors, with whom there was a conference on the 26th October, to come into any written engagement on the subject. They expressed approbation of the plan individually and in words, but deemed it best to avoid any protocol by which their sovereign could be implicated in a promise. Should the negotiations for peace be broken off, it would be time enough to make a treaty to protect the provinces. Meantime they ought to content themselves with the general assurance, already given them, that in case of war the monarchs of France and England would not abandon them, but would provide for their safety, either by succor or in some other way, so that they would be placed out of danger.¹

Such promises were vague without being magnificent, and, as James had never yet lifted his finger to assist the provinces, while indulging them frequently with oracular advice, it could hardly be expected that either the French envoys or the States-General would reckon very confidently on assistance from Great Britain, should war be renewed with Spain.

On the whole, it was agreed to draw up a paper briefly stating the opinion of the French and English

¹ Jeannin, i. 434.

plenipotentiaries that the provinces would do well to accept the ratification.¹

The committee of the states, with Barneveldt as chairman, expressed acquiescence, but urged that they could not approve the clause in that document concerning religion. It looked as if the King of Spain wished to force them to consent by treaty that the Catholic religion should be reëstablished in their country. As they were free and sovereign, however, and so recognized by himself, it was not for him to meddle with such matters. They foresaw that this clause would create difficulties when the whole matter should be referred to the separate provinces, and that it would, perhaps, cause the entire rejection of the ratification.

The envoys, through the voice of Jeannin, remonstrated against such a course. After all, the objectionable clause, it was urged, should be considered only as a demand which the king was competent to make, and it was not reasonable, they said, for the states to shut his mouth and prevent him from proposing what he thought good to propose.

On the other hand, they were not obliged to acquiesce in the proposition. In truth, it would be more expedient that the states themselves should grant this grace to the Catholics, thus earning their gratitude, rather than that it should be inserted in the treaty.²

A day or two later there was an interview between the French envoys and Count Louis William, for whose sage, dispassionate, and upright character they had all a great respect.³ It was their object, in obedience to the repeated instructions of the French king,

¹ Jeannin, i. 429.

² Ibid., 435.

³ Ibid., 437.

to make use of his great influence over Prince Maurice in favor of peace. It would be better, they urged, that the stadholder should act more in harmony with the states than he had done of late, and should reflect that, the ratification being good, there was really no means of preventing a peace, except in case the King of Spain should refuse the conditions necessary for securing it. The prince would have more power by joining with the states than in opposing them. Count Louis expressed sympathy with these views, but feared that Maurice would prefer that the ratification should not be accepted until the states of the separate provinces had been heard, feeling convinced that several of those bodies would reject that instrument on account of the clause relating to religion.

Jeannin replied that such a course would introduce great discord into the provinces, to the profit of the enemy, and that the King of France himself, so far from being likely to wish the ratification rejected because of a clause, would never favor the rupture of negotiations if it came on account of religion. He had always instructed them to use their efforts to prevent any division among the states, as sure to lead to their ruin. He would certainly desire the same stipulation as the one made by the King of Spain, and would support rather than oppose the demand thus made, in order to content the Catholics. To be sure, he would prefer that the states should wisely make this provision of their own accord rather than on the requisition of Spain, but a rupture of the pending negotiations from the cause suggested would be painful to him and very damaging to his character at Rome.¹

¹ Jeannin, i. 432-437.

On the 2d November the States-General gave their formal answer to the commissioners in regard to the ratification.

That instrument, they observed, not only did not agree with the form as promised by the archdukes in language and style, but also in regard to the seal, and to the insertion and omission of several words. On this account, and especially by reason of the concluding clause, there might be inferred the annulment of the solemn promise made in the body of the instrument. The said king and archdukes knew very well that these States-General of free countries and provinces, over which the king and archdukes pretended to no authority, were competent to maintain order in all things regarding the good constitution and government of their land and its inhabitants. On this subject nothing could be pretended or proposed on the part of the king and archdukes without violation of formal and solemn promises.¹

“Nevertheless,” continued the States-General, “in order not to retard a good work, already begun, for the purpose of bringing the United Provinces out of a long and bloody war into a Christian and assured peace, the letters of ratification will be received in respect that they contain the declaration, on part of both the king and the archdukes, that they will treat for a peace or a truce of many years with the States-General of the United Provinces, in quality of, and as holding them to be, free countries, provinces, and states, over which they make no pretensions.”²

It was further intimated, however, that the ratifica-

¹ Ibid. Van der Kemp, iii. 30. Wagenaer, ix. 287, 288.

² Jeannin, i. 430.

tion was only received for reference to the estates of each of the provinces, and it was promised that within six weeks the commissioners should be informed whether the provinces would consent or refuse to treat. It was, moreover, declared that, neither at that moment nor at any future time, could any point in the letters of ratification be accepted which, directly or indirectly, might be interpreted as against that essential declaration and promise in regard to the freedom of the provinces. In case the decision should be taken to enter into negotiation upon the basis of that ratification, or any other that might meantime arrive from Spain, then firm confidence was expressed by the states that, neither on the part of the king nor that of the archdukes, would there be proposed or pretended, in contravention of that promise, any point touching the good constitution, welfare, state, or government of the United Provinces and of the inhabitants. The hope was furthermore expressed that, within ten days after the reception of the consent of the states to treat, commissioners would be sent by the archdukes to The Hague, fully authorized and instructed to declare roundly their intentions, in order to make short work of the whole business. In that case the states would duly authorize and instruct commissioners to act in their behalf.

Thus in the answer especial warning was given against any possible attempt to interfere with the religious question. The phraseology could not be mistaken.

At this stage of the proceedings the states demanded that the original instrument of ratification should be deposited with them. The two commissioners declared

that they were without power to consent to this. Here-upon the assembly became violent, and many members denounced the refusal as equivalent to breaking off the negotiations. Everything indicated, so it was urged, a desire on the Spanish side to spin delays out of delays, and meantime to invent daily some new trap for deception. Such was the vehemence upon this point that the industrious Franciscan posted back to Brussels, and returned with the archduke's permission to deliver the document.¹ Three conditions, however, were laid down. The states must give a receipt for the ratification. They must say in that receipt that the archdukes, in obtaining the paper from Spain, had fulfilled their original promise. If peace should not be made, they were to return the document.

When these conditions were announced, the indignation of the republican government at the trifling of their opponents was fiercer than ever. The discrepancies between the form prescribed and the ratification obtained had always been very difficult of digestion, but, although willing to pass them by, the states stoutly refused to accept the document on these conditions.

Tooth and nail ² Verreycken and Neyen fought out the contest and were worsted. Once more the nimble friar sped back and forth between The Hague and his employer's palace, and at last, after tremendous discussions in cabinet council, the conditions were abandoned.

"Nobody can decide," says the Jesuit historian, "which was greater—the obstinacy of the federal government in screwing out of the opposite party every-

¹ Gallucci, 342.

² "Mordicus" (ibid.).

thing it deemed necessary, or the indulgence of the archdukes in making every necessary concession.”¹

Had these solemn tricksters of an antiquated school perceived that, in dealing with men who meant what they said and said what they meant, all these little dilatory devices were superfluous, perhaps the wholesome result might have sooner been reached. In a contest of diplomacy against time it generally happens that time is the winner, and on this occasion time and the Republic were fighting on the same side.

On the 13th December the States-General reassembled at The Hague, the separate provinces having in the interval given fresh instructions to their representatives. It was now decided that no treaty should be made, unless the freedom of the commonwealth was recognized in phraseology which, after consultation with the foreign ambassadors, should be deemed satisfactory. Further it was agreed that, neither in ecclesiastical nor secular matters, should any conditions be accepted which could be detrimental to freedom. In case the enemy should strive for the contrary, the world would be convinced that he alone was responsible for the failure of the peace negotiations. Then, with the support of other powers friendly to the Republic, hostilities could be resumed in such a manner as to insure a favorable issue for an upright cause.

The armistice begun on the 4th May was running to an end, and it was now renewed at the instance of the states. That government, moreover, on the 23d December, formally notified to the archdukes that, trusting to their declarations and to the statements of Neyen and Verreycken, it was willing to hold confer-

¹ “Mordicus,” Gallucci, *ubi sup.*

ences for peace.¹ Their Highnesses were accordingly invited to appoint seven or eight commissioners at once, on the same terms as formally indicated.

The original understanding had been that no envoys but Netherlanders should come from Brussels for these negotiations.²

Barneveldt and the peace party, however, were desirous that Spinola, who was known to be friendly to a pacific result, should be permitted to form part of the mission. Accordingly, the letters publicly drawn up in the assembly adhered to the original arrangement, but Barneveldt, with the privity of other leading personages, although without the knowledge of Maurice, Louis William, and the states council, secretly inclosed a little note in the principal despatch to Neyen and Verreycken.³ In this billet it was intimated that, notwithstanding the prohibition in regard to foreigners, the states were willing—it having been proposed that one or two who were not Netherlanders should be sent—that a single Spaniard, provided he were not one of the principal military commanders, should make part of the embassy.⁴

The phraseology had a double meaning. Spinola was certainly the chief military commander, but he was not a Spaniard. This eminent personage might be supposed to have thus received permission to come to the Netherlands, despite all that had been urged by the war party against the danger incurred, in case

¹ Resol. Holl., December 4, 1607. Wagenaer, ix. 290, 291.

² Wagenaer, ix. 247, 293.

³ Resol. Holl., December 4, 1607. Wagenaer, ix. 293-295. Van der Kemp, iii. 31, 134, 135.

⁴ Ibid.

of a renewal of hostilities, by admitting so clear-sighted an enemy into the heart of the Republic. Moreover, the terms of the secret note would authorize the appointment of another foreigner, even a Spaniard, while the crafty President Richardot might creep into the commission, on the ground that, being a Burgundian, he might fairly call himself a Netherlander.

And all this happened.

Thus, after a whole year of parley, in which the States-General had held firmly to their original position, while the Spanish government had crept up inch by inch, and through countless windings and subterfuges, to the point on which they might have all stood together at first, and thus have saved a twelvemonth, it was finally settled that peace conferences should begin.

Barneveldt had carried the day. Maurice and his cousin Louis William had uniformly, deliberately, but not factiously used all their influence against any negotiations. The prince had all along loudly expressed his conviction that neither the archdukes nor Spain would ever be brought to an honorable peace. The most to be expected of them was a truce of twelve or fifteen years, to which his consent, at least, should never be given, and during which cessation of hostilities, should it be accorded, every imaginable effort would be made to regain by intrigue what the king had lost by the sword.¹ As for the King of England and his councilors, Maurice always denounced them as more Spanish than Spaniards, as doing their best to put themselves on the most intimate terms with his Catholic Majesty, and as secretly desirous—insane pol-

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 16.

icy as it seemed—of forcing the Netherlands back again under the scepter of that monarch.

He had at first been supported in his position by the French ambassadors, who had felt or affected disinclination for peace, but who had subsequently thrown the whole of their own and their master's influence on the side of Barneveldt. They had done their best, and from time to time they had been successful, to effect at least a superficial reconciliation between those two influential personages. They had employed all the arguments at their disposal to bring the prince over to the peace party. Especially they had made use of the *argumentum ad crumenam*, which that veteran broker in politics, Jeannin, had found so effective in times past with the great lords of the League. But Maurice showed himself so proof against the golden inducements suggested by the president that he and his king both arrived at the conclusion that there were secret motives at work, and that Maurice was not dazzled by the brilliant prospects held out to him by Henry only because his eyes were steadfastly fixed upon some unknown but splendid advantage to be gained through other combinations. It was naturally difficult for Henry to imagine the possibility of a man playing a first part in the world's theater being influenced by so weak a motive as conviction.

Louis William, too, that "grave and wise young man," as Lord Leicester used to call him twenty years before, remained steadily on the side of the prince. Both in private conversation and in long speeches to the States-General, he maintained that the Spanish court was incapable of sincere negotiations with the

commonwealth, that to break faith with heretics and rebels would always prove the foundation of its whole policy, and that to deceive them by pretenses of a truce or a treaty, and to triumph afterward over the results of its fraud, was to be expected as a matter of course. Sooner would the face of nature be changed than the cardinal maxim of Catholic statesmanship be abandoned.¹

But the influence of the Nassaus, of the province of Zealand, of the clergy, and of the war party in general had been overbalanced by Barneveldt and the city corporations, aided by the strenuous exertions of the French ambassadors.

The decision of the States-General was received with sincere joy at Brussels. The archdukes had something to hope from peace, and little but disaster and ruin to themselves from a continuance of the war. Spinola, too, was unaffectedly in favor of negotiations. He took the ground that the foreign enemies of Spain, as well as her pretended friends, agreed in wishing her to go on with the war, and that this ought to open her eyes as to the expediency of peace. While there was a general satisfaction in Europe that the steady exhaustion of her strength in this eternal contest made her daily less and less formidable to other nations, there were, on the other hand, puerile complaints at court that the conditions prescribed by impious and insolent rebels to their sovereign were derogatory to the dignity of monarchy.² The spectacle of Spain sending ambassadors to The Hague to treat for peace,

¹ See especially *Resol. Stat.-Gen.*, October 30, 1607, in *Van der Kemp*, iii. 126-130.

² Spinola's letters, *apud Gallucci*, 347 seq. Bentivoglio.

on the basis of Netherland independence, would be a humiliation such as had never been exhibited before. That the haughty confederation should be allowed thus to accomplish its ends, to trample down all resistance to its dictation, and to defy the whole world by its insults to the Church and to the sacred principle of monarchy, was most galling to Spanish pride. Spinola, as a son of Italy, and not inspired by the fervent hatred to Protestantism which was indigenous to the other peninsula, steadily resisted those arguments. None knew better than he the sternness of the stuff out of which that Republic was made, and he felt that now or never was the time to treat, even as, five years before, "*Jam aut nunquam*" had been inscribed on his banner outside Ostend. But he protested that his friends gave him even harder work than his enemies had ever done, and he stoutly maintained that a peace against which all the rivals of Spain seemed to have conspired, from fear of seeing her tranquil and disembarassed, must be advantageous to Spain. The genial and quick-witted Genoese could not see and hear all the secret letters and private conversations of Henry and James and their ambassadors, and he may be pardoned for supposing that, notwithstanding all the crooked and incomprehensible politics of Greenwich and Paris, the serious object of both England and France was to prolong the war. In his most private correspondence he expressed great doubts as to a favorable issue to the pending conferences, but avowed his determination that if they should fail it would be from no want of earnest effort on his part to make them succeed. It should never be said that he preferred his own private advan-

tage to the duty of serving the best interests of the crown.¹

Meantime the India trade, which was to form the great bone of contention in the impending conferences, had not been practically neglected of late by the enterprising Hollanders. Peter Verhoef, fresh from the victory of Gibraltar, toward which he had personally so much contributed by the splendid manner in which he had handled the *Æolus* after the death of Admiral Heemskerk, was placed in command of a fleet to the East Indies, which was to sail early in the spring.²

Admiral Matelieff, who had been cruising in those seas during the three years past, was now on his way home. His exploits had been worthy the growing fame of the republican navy. In the summer of 1606 he had laid siege to the town and fortress of Malacca, constructed by the Portuguese at the southmost extremity of the Malay peninsula. Andreas Hurtado de Mendoza commanded the position, with a force of three thousand men, among whom were many Indians. The King or Sultan of Johore, at the southeastern extremity of the peninsula, remained faithful to his Dutch allies, and accepted the proposition of Matelieff to take part in the hostilities now begun. The admiral's fleet consisted of eleven small ships, with fourteen hundred men. It was not exactly a military expedition. To the sailors of each ship were assigned certain shares of the general profits, and as it was obvious that more money was likely to be gained by trade with the natives, or by the capture of such stray caracks and other merchantmen of the enemy as were frequently to be met in these regions, the men were

¹ Gallucci, 349, 350.

² Wagenaer, ix. 301.

not particularly eager to take part in sieges of towns or battles with cruisers. Matelieff, however, had sufficient influence over his comrades to inflame their zeal on this occasion for the fame of the Republic, and to induce them to give the Indian princes and the native soldiery a lesson in Batavian warfare.

A landing was effected on the peninsula, the sailors and guns were disembarked, and an imposing auxiliary force, sent, according to promise, after much delay, by the Sultan of Johore, proceeded to invest Malacca. The ground proved wet, swampy, and impracticable for trenches, galleries, covered ways, and all the other machinery of a regular siege. Matelieff was not a soldier nor a naval commander by profession, but a merchant skipper, like so many other heroes whose achievements were to be the permanent glory of their fatherland. He would not, however, have been a Netherlander had he not learned something of the science which Prince Maurice had so long been teaching, not only to his own countrymen, but to the whole world. So movable turrets, constructed of the spice-trees which grew in rank luxuriance all around, were filled with earth and stones, and advanced toward the fort. Had the natives been as docile to learn as the Hollanders were eager to teach a few easy lessons in the military art, the doom of Andreas Hurtado de Mendoza would have been sealed. But the great truths which those youthful pedants, Maurice and Louis William, had extracted twenty years before from the works of the Emperor Leo and earlier pagans, amid the jeers of veterans, were not easy to transplant to the Malayan peninsula.

It soon proved that those white-turbaned, loose-gar-

mented, supple-jointed, highly picturesque troops of the sultan were not likely to distinguish themselves for anything but wonderful rapidity in retreat. Not only did they shrink from any advance toward the distant forts, but they were incapable of abiding an attack within or behind their towers, and at every random shot from the enemy's works they threw down their arms and fled from their stations in dismay. It was obvious enough that the conquest and subjugation of such feeble warriors by the Portuguese and Spaniards were hardly to be considered brilliant national trophies. They had fallen an easy prey to the first European invader. They had no discipline, no obedience, no courage; and Matelieff soon found that to attempt a scientific siege with such auxiliaries against a well-constructed stone fortress, garrisoned with three thousand troops, under an experienced Spanish soldier, was but midsummer madness.

Fevers and horrible malaria, bred by the blazing sun of the equator out of those pestilential jungles, poisoned the atmosphere. His handful of troops, amounting to not much more than a hundred men to each of his ships, might melt away before his eyes. Nevertheless, although it was impossible for him to carry the place by regular approach, he would not abandon the hope of reducing it by famine. During four months long, accordingly, he kept every avenue by land or sea securely invested. In August, however, the Spanish viceroy of India, Don Alfonso de Castro, made his appearance on the scene. Coming from Goa with a splendid fleet, numbering fourteen great galleons, four galleys, and sixteen smaller vessels, manned by three thousand seven hundred Portuguese and other

Europeans and an equal number of native troops, he had at first directed his course toward Atsgen, on the northwest point of Sumatra. Here, with the magnificent arrogance which Spanish and Portuguese viceroys were accustomed to manifest toward the natives of either India, he summoned the king to surrender his strongholds, to assist in constructing a fortress for the use of his conquerors, to deliver up all the Netherlanders within his domains, and to pay the expenses of the expedition which had thus been sent to chastise him. But the King of Atsgen had not sent ambassadors into the camp of Prince Maurice before the city of Grave in vain. He had learned that there were other whiteskins besides the Spaniards at the antipodes, and that the Republic, whose achievements in arts and arms were conspicuous trophies of Western civilization, was not, as it had been represented to him, a mere nest of pirates. He had learned to prefer an alliance with Holland to slavery under Spain. Moreover, he had Dutch engineers and architects in his service, and a well-constructed system of Dutch fortifications around his capital. To the summons to surrender himself and his allies he returned a defiant answer. The viceroy ordered an attack upon the city. One fort was taken. From before the next he was repulsed with great loss. The Sumatrans had derived more profit from intercourse with Europeans than the inhabitants of Johore or the Moluccas had done. De Castro abandoned the siege. He had received intelligence of the dangerous situation of Malacca, and moved down upon the place with his whole fleet. Admiral Matelieff, apprised by scouts of his approach, behaved with the readiness and coolness of a veteran cam-

paigner. Before De Castro could arrive in the roadstead of Malacca, he had withdrawn all his troops from their positions, got all his artillery reshipped, and was standing out in the straits, awaiting the enemy.

On the 17th August, the two fleets, so vastly disproportionate in number, size, equipment, and military force,—eighteen galleons and galleys, with four or five thousand fighting men, against eleven small vessels and twelve or fourteen hundred sailors,—met in that narrow sea. The action lasted all day. It was neither spirited nor sanguinary. It ought to have been within the power of the Spaniard to crush his diminutive adversary. It might have seemed a sufficient triumph for Matelieff to manœuvre himself out of harm's way. No vessel on either side was boarded, not one surrendered, but two on each side were set on fire and destroyed. Eight of the Dutchmen were killed—not a very sanguinary result after a day's encounter with so imposing an armada. De Castro's losses were much greater, but still the battle was an insignificant one, and neither fleet gained a victory. Night put an end to the cannonading, and the Spaniards withdrew to Malacca, while Matelieff bore away to Johore. The siege of Malacca was relieved, and the Netherlands now occupied themselves with the defense of the feeble sovereign at the other point of the peninsula.

Matelieff lay at Johore a month, repairing damages and laying in supplies. While still at the place, he received information that a large part of the Spanish armada had sailed from Malacca. Several of his own crew, who had lost their shares in the adventure by the burning of the ships to which they belonged in the action of 17th August, were reluctant and almost mu-

tinous when their admiral now proposed to them a sudden assault on the portion of the Spanish fleet still remaining within reach. They had not come forth for barren glory, many protested, but in search of fortune; they were not elated by the meager result of the expedition. Matelieff succeeded, however, at last in inspiring all the men of his command with an enthusiasm superior to sordid appeals, and made a few malcontents. On the 21st September he sailed to Malacca, and late in the afternoon again attacked the Spaniards. Their fleet consisted of seven great galleons and three galleys lying in a circle before the town. The outermost ship, called the *St. Nicholas*, was boarded by men from three of the Dutch galiots with sudden and irresistible fury. There was a brief but most terrible action, the Netherlands seeming endowed with superhuman vigor. So great was the panic that there was hardly an effort at defense, and within less than an hour nearly every Spaniard on board the *St. Nicholas* had been put to the sword. The rest of the armada engaged the Dutch fleet with spirit, but one of the great galleons was soon set on fire and burned to the water's edge. Another, dismasted and crippled, struck her flag, and all that remained would probably have been surrendered or destroyed had not the sudden darkness of a tropical nightfall put an end to the combat at set of sun. Next morning another galleon, in a shattered and sinking condition, was taken possession of and found filled with dead and dying. The rest of the Spanish ships made their escape into the harbor of Malacca. Matelieff stood off and on in the straits for a day or two, hesitating for fear of shallows to follow into the roadstead. Before he could

take a decision he had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy, panic-stricken, save him any further trouble. Not waiting for another attack, the Spaniards set fire to every one of their ships and retired into their fortress, while Matelieff and his men enjoyed the great conflagration as idle spectators. Thus the enterprising Dutch admiral had destroyed ten great war-ships of the enemy, and, strange to relate, had scarcely lost one man of his whole squadron. Rarely had a more complete triumph been achieved on the water than in this battle in the Straits of Malacca. Matelieff had gained much glory, but very little booty. He was also encumbered with a great number of prisoners. These he sent to Don Alfonso, exchanging them for a very few Netherlanders then in Spanish hands, at the rate of two hundred Spaniards for ten Dutchmen—thus showing that he held either the enemy very cheap, or his own countrymen very dear. The captured ships he burned as useless to him, but retained twenty-four pieces of artillery.

It was known to Matelieff that the Spanish viceroy had received instructions to inflict chastisement on all the Oriental potentates and their subjects who had presumed of late to trade and to form alliances with the Netherlanders. Johore, Atsgen, Pahang, Patani, Amboina, and Bantam were the most probable points of attack. Johore had now been effectually defended; Atsgen had protected itself. The Dutch fleet proceeded at first to Bantam for refreshment, and from this point Matelieff sent three of his ships back to Holland. With the six remaining to him he sailed for the Moluccas, having heard of various changes which had taken place in that important archipelago. Paus-

ing at the great emporium of nutmegs and allspice, Amboina, he took measures for strengthening the fortifications of the place, which was well governed by Frederick Houtmann, and then proceeded to Ternate and Tidore.

During the absence of the Netherlanders, after the events on those islands recorded in a previous chapter, the Spaniards had swept down upon them from the Philippines with a fleet of thirty-seven ships, and had taken captive the Sultan of Ternate; while the potentate of Tidore, who had been left by Stephen van der Hagen in possession of his territories on condition of fidelity to the Dutch, was easily induced to throw aside the mask and to renew his servitude to Spain. Thus both the coveted Clove Islands had relapsed into the control of the enemy. Matelieff found it dangerous, on account of quicksands and shallows, to land on Tidore, but he took very energetic measures to recover possession of Ternate. On the southern side of the island the Spaniards had built a fort and a town. The Dutch admiral disembarked upon the northern side, and, with assistance of the natives, succeeded in throwing up substantial fortifications at a village called Malaya. The son of the former sultan, who was a Spanish prisoner at the Philippines, was now formally inducted into his father's sovereignty, and Matelieff established at Malaya for his protection a garrison of forty-five Hollanders and a navy of four small yachts. Such were the slender means with which Oriental empires were founded in those days by the stout-hearted adventurers of the little Batavian Republic.

With this miniature army and navy, and by means of his alliance with the distant commonwealth, of whose

power this handful of men was a symbol, the King of Ternate was thenceforth to hold his own against the rival potentate on the other island, supported by the Spanish king. The same convention of commerce and amity was made with the Ternatians as the one which Stephen van der Hagen had formerly concluded with the Bandians, and it was agreed that the potentate should be included in any treaty of peace that might be made between the Republic and Spain.

Matelieff, with three ships and a cutter, now sailed for China, but lost his time in endeavoring to open trade with the Celestial Empire. The dilatory mandarins drove him at last out of all patience, and, on turning his prows once more southward, he had nearly brought his long expedition to a disastrous termination. Six well-armed, well-equipped Portuguese galleons sailed out of Macao to assail him. It was not Matelieff's instinct to turn his back on a foe, however formidable, but on this occasion discretion conquered instinct. His three ships were out of repair; he had a deficiency of powder; he was in every respect unprepared for a combat; and he reflected upon the unfavorable impression which would be made on the Chinese mind should the Hollanders, upon their first appearance in the flowery regions, be vanquished by the Portuguese. He avoided an encounter, therefore, and by skilful seamanship eluded all attempts of the foe at pursuit. Returning to Ternate, he had the satisfaction to find that during his absence the doughty little garrison of Malaya had triumphantly defeated the Spaniards in an assault on the fortifications of the little town. On the other hand, the King of Johore, panic-stricken on the departure of his Dutch pro-

tectors, had burned his own capital, and had betaken himself, with all his court, into the jungle.

Commending the one and rebuking the other potentate, the admiral provided assistance for both, some Dutch trading-vessels having meantime arrived in the archipelago. Matelieff now set sail for Holland, taking with him some ambassadors from the King of Siam and five ships well laden with spice. On his return he read a report of his adventures to the States-General, and received the warm commendations of their High Mightinesses.¹ Before his departure from the tropics, Paul van Kaarden, with eight war-ships, had reached Bantam. On his arrival in Holland the fleet of Peter Verhoef was busily fitting out for another great expedition to the East.² This was the nation which Spanish courtiers thought to exclude forever from commerce with India and America, because the pope a century before had divided half the globe between Ferdinand the Catholic and Emmanuel the Fortunate.

It may be supposed that the results of Matelieff's voyage were likely to influence the pending negotiations for peace.

¹ The authorities for Matelieff's voyages are Grotius, xvii. 792-800; Meteren, 562, 563; and especially the original journals and records in *Begin ende Voortgang*.

² *Ibid.*

CHAPTER L

Movements of the Emperor Rudolph—Marquis Spinola's reception at The Hague—Meeting of Spinola and Prince Maurice—Treaty of the Republic with the French government—The Spanish commissioners before the States-General—Beginning of negotiations—Stormy discussions—Real object of Spain in the negotiations—Question of the India trade—Abandonment of the peace project—Negotiations for a truce—Prolongation of the armistice—Further delays—Treaty of the states with England—Proposals of the Spanish ambassadors to Henry of France and to James of England—Friar Neyen at the court of Spain—Spanish procrastination—Decision of Philip on the conditions of peace—Further conference at The Hague—Answer of the States-General to the proposals of the Spanish government—General rupture.

TOWARD the close of the year 1607 a very feeble demonstration was made in the direction of the Dutch Republic by the very feeble Emperor of Germany. Rudolph, awaking as it might be from a trance, or descending for a moment from his star-gazing tower and his astrological pursuits to observe the movements of political spheres, suddenly discovered that the Netherlands were no longer revolving in their preordained orbit. Those provinces had been supposed to form part of one great system, deriving light and heat from the central imperial sun. It was time, therefore, to put an end to these perturbations. The emperor accordingly, as if he had not enough on his hands at that precise mo-

ment with the Hungarians, Transylvanians, Bohemian Protestants, his brother Matthias and the Grand Turk, addressed a letter to the states of Holland, Zealand, and the provinces confederated with them.¹

Reminding them of the care ever taken by himself and his father to hear all their petitions and to obtain for them a good peace, he observed that he had just heard of their contemplated negotiations with King Philip and Archduke Albert, and of their desire to be declared free states and peoples. He was amazed, he said, that they should not have given him notice of so important an affair, inasmuch as all the United Provinces belonged to and were fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire. They were warned, therefore, to undertake nothing that might be opposed to the feudal law except with his full knowledge. This letter was dated the 9th October. The states took time to deliberate, and returned no answer until after the new year.²

On the 2d January, 1608, they informed the emperor that they could never have guessed of his requiring notification as to the approaching conferences. They had not imagined that the archduke would keep them a secret from his brother, or the king from his uncle-cousin. Otherwise the states would have sent due notice to his Majesty. They well remembered, they said, the appeals made by the provinces to the emperor from time to time, at the imperial diets, for help against the tyranny of the Spaniards. They well remembered, too, that no help was ever given them in

¹ Meteren, 553 seq. Wagenaer, ix. 295-299. Grotius, xvi. 751, 752.

² Ibid.

response to those appeals. They had not forgotten, either, the famous Cologne negotiations for peace in presence of the imperial envoys, in consequence of which the enemy had carried on war against them with greater ferocity than before. At that epoch they had made use of an extreme remedy for an intolerable evil, and had solemnly renounced allegiance to the king. Since that epoch a whole generation of mankind had passed away, and many kings and potentates had recognized their freedom, obtained for just cause and maintained by the armed hand. After a long and bloody war Albert and Philip had at last been brought to acknowledge the provinces as free countries over which they pretended to no right, as might be seen by the letters of both, copies of which were forwarded to the emperor. Full confidence was now expressed, therefore, that the emperor and all Germany would look with favor on such a God-fearing transaction, by which an end would be put to so terrible a war.¹ Thus the States-General, replying with gentle scorn to the antiquated claim of sovereignty on the part of imperial majesty. Duly authenticated by citations of investitures, indulgences, and concordates, engrossed on yellowest parchment, sealed with reddest sealing-wax, and reposing in a thousand pigeonholes in mustiest archives, no claim could be more solemn or stately. Unfortunately, however, rebel pikes and matchlocks, during the past forty years, had made too many rents in those sacred parchments to leave much hope of their ever being pieced handsomely together again. As to the historical theory of imperial enfeoffment, the states thought it more delicate to glide

¹ Meteren, Wagenaer, ubi sup.

smoothly and silently over the whole matter. It would have been base to acknowledge and impolite to refute the claim.¹

It is as well to imitate this reserve. It is enough simply to remind the reader that, although so late as the time of Charles V. the provinces had been declared constituent parts of the empire, liable to its burdens and entitled to its protection, the Netherlanders, being practical people, and deeming burdens and protection correlative, had declined the burden because always deprived of the protection.

And now, after a year spent in clearing away the mountains of dust which impeded the pathway to peace, and which one honest, vigorous human breath might at once have blown into space, the envoys of the archduke set forth toward The Hague.

Marquis Spinola, Don Juan de Mancicidor, private secretary to the King of Spain, President Richardot, Auditor Verreycken, and Brother John Neyen,—a Genoese, a Spaniard, a Burgundian, a Fleming, and a Franciscan friar,—traveling in great state, with a long train of carriages, horses, lackeys, cooks, and secretaries, by way of Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, Dort, Rotterdam, and Delft, and being received in each town and village through which they passed with great demonstrations of respect and cordial welcome, arrived at last within a mile of The Hague.²

It was the dead of winter, and of the severest winter that had occurred for many years. Every river, estuary, canal was frozen hard. All Holland was one

¹ "*De feudo silebatur quia et refellere odiosum et fateri inglorium.*"—Grotius, xvi. 752.

² Meteren, 563.

broad level sheet of ice, over which the journey had been made in sledges. On the last day of January Prince Maurice, accompanied by Louis William and by eight state coaches filled with distinguished personages, left The Hague and halted at the Hoorn bridge, about midway between Ryswyk and the capital. The prince had replied to the first request of the states, that he should go forward to meet Spinola, by saying that he would do so willingly if it were to give him battle; otherwise not. Olden-Barneveldt urged upon him, however, that, as servant of the Republic, he was bound to do what the states commanded, as a matter involving the dignity of the nation. In consequence of this remonstrance Maurice consented to go, but he went unwillingly.¹ The advancing procession of the Spanish ambassadors was already in sight. Far and wide, in whatever direction the eye could sweep, the white surface of the landscape was blackened with human beings. It seemed as if the whole population of the Netherlands had assembled, in mass-meeting, to witness the pacific interview between those two great chieftains who had never before stood face to face except upon the battle-field.

In carriages, in donkey-carts, upon horseback, in sledges, on skates, upon foot,—men, women, and children, gentle and simple, Protestants, Catholics, Gomarites, Arminians, Anabaptists, country squires in buff and bandoleer, city magistrates and merchants in furs and velvet, artisans, boatmen, and peasants, with their wives and daughters in well-starched ruff and tremendous head-gear,—they came thronging in countless multitudes, those honest Hollanders, cheering and

¹ Letter of Aertsens, in Deventer, iii. 168.

throwing up their caps in honor of the chieftain whose military genius had caused so much disaster to their country. This uproarious demonstration of welcome on the part of the multitude moved the spleen of many who were old enough to remember the horrors of Spanish warfare within their borders. "Thus unreflecting, gaping, boorish, are nearly all the common people of these provinces,"¹ said a contemporary, describing the scene, and forgetting that both high and low, according to his own account, made up the mass of spectators on that winter's day. Moreover, it seems difficult to understand why the Hollanders should not have indulged a legitimate curiosity and made a holiday on this memorable occasion. Spinola was not entering their capital in triumph, a Spanish army was not marching—as it might have done had the course of events been different—over the protective rivers and marshes of the fatherland, now changed by the exceptional cold into solid highways for invasion. On the contrary, the arrival of the great enemy within their gates, with the olive-branch instead of the sword in his hand, was a victory, not for Spain, but for the Republic. It was known throughout the land that he was commissioned by the king and the archdukes to treat for peace with the States-General of the United Provinces as with the representatives of a free and independent nation, utterly beyond any foreign control.

Was not this opening of a cheerful and pacific prospect, after a half-century's fight for liberty, a fair cause for rejoicing?

The Spanish commissioners arrived at the Hoorn

¹ Meteren, 563.

bridge. Spinola alighted from his coach; Prince Maurice stepped forward into the road to greet him. Then the two eminent soldiers, whose names had of late been so familiar in the mouths of men, shook hands and embraced with heroic cordiality, while a mighty shout went up from the multitude around. It was a stately and dramatic spectacle, that peaceful meeting of the rival leaders in a war which had begun before either of them was born. The bystanders observed, or thought that they observed, signs of great emotion on the faces of both. It has also been recorded that each addressed the other in epigrammatic sentences of compliment. "God is my witness," Maurice was supposed to have said, "that the arrival of these honorable negotiators is most grateful to me. Time, whose daughter is truth, will show the faith to be given to my words."¹

"This fortunate day," replied Spinola, "has filled full the measures of my hopes and wishes, and taken from me the faculty of ever wishing for anything again. I trust in divine clemency that an opportunity may be given to show my gratitude, and to make a fit return for the humanity thus shown me by the most excellent prince that the sun shines upon."²

With this both got into the stadholder's carriage, Spinola being placed on Maurice's right hand. Their conversation during their brief drive to the capital, followed by their long retinue and by the enthusiastic and vociferating crowd, has not been chronicled. It is also highly probable that the second-rate theatrical dialogue which the Jesuit historian, writing from Spinola's private papers, has preserved for posterity was

¹ Gallucci, 352.

² Ibid.

rather what seemed to his imagination appropriate for the occasion than a faithful shorthand report of anything really uttered. A few commonplace phrases of welcome, with a remark or two, perhaps, on the unexampled severity of the frost, seem more likely to have formed the substance of that brief conversation.

A couple of trumpeters of Spinola went braying through the streets of the village capital, heralding their master's approach with superfluous noise, and exciting the disgust of the quieter portion of the burghers.¹ At last, however, the envoys and their train were all comfortably housed. The marquis, President Richardot, and Secretary Mancidor were established at a new mansion on the Vyverberg, belonging to Goswyn Menskens. The rest of the legation were lodged at the house of Wassenaer.²

It soon became plain that the ways of life and the style of housekeeping habitual to great officers of the Spanish crown were very different from the thrifty manners and customs of Dutch republicans. It was so long since anything like royal pomp and circumstance had been seen in their borders that the exhibition now made excited astonishment. It was a land where every child went to school, where almost every individual inhabitant could read and write, where even the middle classes were proficient in mathematics and the classics, and could speak two or more modern languages; where the whole nation, with but few exceptions, were producers of material or intellectual wealth, and where comparatively little of unproductive consumption prevailed. Those self-governing and self-sustaining municipalities had almost

¹ Meteren, 563.

² Ibid.

forgotten the existence of the magnificent nothings so dear to the hearts of kings.

Spinola's house was open day and night. The gorgeous plate, gigantic candelabra, mighty ewers, shields, and lavers of silver and gold, which decorated his tables and sideboards, amazed the gaping crowd. He dined and supped in state every day, and the public were admitted to gaze upon his banquets as if he had been a monarch. It seemed, said those homely republicans, as if "a silver christening were going on every day in his house."¹

There were even grave remonstrances made to the magistracy and to the States-General against the effect of such ostentatious and immoral proceedings upon the popular mind, and suggestions that at least the doors should be shut, so that the scandal might be confined to Spinola's own household. But the republican authorities, deciding, not without wisdom, that the spectacle ought to serve rather as a wholesome warning than as a contaminating example, declined any inquisitorial interference with the housekeeping of the Spanish ambassadors.²

Before the negotiations began, a treaty had been made between the Republic and the French government, by which it was stipulated that every effort should be made by both contracting parties to bring about an honorable and assured peace between the United Provinces, Spain, and the archdukes. In case of the continuance of the war, however, it was agreed that France should assist the states with ten thousand men, while in case at any time during the continuance of the league France should be attacked by a

¹ Meteren, 564.

² Ibid.

foreign enemy, she should receive from her ally five thousand auxiliary troops, or their equivalent in maritime assistance. This convention was thought by other powers to be so profitable to the Netherlands as to excite general uneasiness and suspicion.

The states would have gladly signed a similar agreement with England, but nothing was to be done with that government until an old-standing dispute in regard to the cloth trade had been arranged. Middelburg had the exclusive right of deposit for the cloths imported from England. This monopoly for Zealand being naturally not very palatable to Amsterdam and other cities of Holland, the States-General had at last authorized the merchant adventurers engaged in this traffic to deposit their goods in any city of the United Provinces.¹ The course of trade had been to import the raw cloth from England, to dress and dye it in the Netherlands, and then to reëxport it to England. Latterly, however, some dyers and clothiers emigrating from the provinces to that country had obtained a monopoly from James for practising their art in his dominions. In consequence of this arrangement the exportation of undyed cloths had been forbidden. This prohibition had caused irritation both in the Kingdom and the Republic, had necessarily deranged the natural course of trade and manufacture, and had now prevented for the time any conclusion of an alliance offensive and defensive between the countries, even if political sentiment had made such a league possible. The States-General had recourse to the usual expedient by which bad legislation on one side was countervailed by equally bad legislation on the other.

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 317, 318.

The exportation of undyed English cloths being forbidden by England, the importation of dyed English cloths was now prohibited by the Netherlands. The international cloth trade stopped. This embargo became at last so detestable to all parties that concession was made by the crown for a limited export of raw cloths. The concession was soon widened by custom into a general exportation, the royal government looking through its fingers at the open infraction of its own laws, while the natural laws of trade before long reëstablished the old equilibrium. Meantime the ill feeling produced by this dissension delayed any cordial political arrangement between the countries.

On the 5th February the Spanish commissioners came for the first time before the States-General, assembled to the number of a hundred and thirty in their palace at The Hague.¹

The first meeting was merely one of mutual compliment, President Richardot, on behalf of his colleagues, expressing gratitude for the cordial welcome which had been manifested to the envoys on their journey through so many towns of the United Provinces. They had been received, he said, not as enemies with whom an almost perpetual war had been waged, but as friends, confederates, and allies. A warmer reception they could never have hoped for nor desired.

Two special commissioners were now appointed by the States-General to negotiate with the envoys. These were Count Louis William and Brederode. With these delegates at large were associated seven others, one from each province. Barneveldt of course represented Holland; Maldere, Zealand; Berk, Utrecht;

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 137 seq. Meteren, 564, 565.

Hillama, Friesland; Sloat, Overijssel; Koender van Helpen, Groningen; Cornelius van Gend, Gelderland.¹

The negotiations began at once. The archdukes had empowered the five envoys to deal in their name and in that of the King of Spain. Philip had authorized the archdukes to take this course by an instrument dated 10th January. In this paper he called the archdukes hereditary sovereigns of the Netherlands.

It was agreed that the various points of negotiation should be taken up in regular order; but the first question of all that presented itself was whether the conferences should be for a truce or a peace.²

The secret object of Spain was for a truce of years. Thus she thought to save her dignity, to reserve her rights of reconquest, to replenish her treasury, and to repair her military strength. Barneveldt and his party, comprising a large majority of the States-General, were for peace. Prince Maurice, having done his utmost to oppose negotiations for peace, was, for still stronger reasons, determined to avoid falling into what he considered the ambush of a truce. The French ambassadors were also for peace. The Spanish envoys accordingly concealed their real designs, and all parties began discussions for the purpose of establishing a permanent peace.

This preliminary being settled, Barneveldt asked the Spaniards if they had full powers to treat with the states as with a free nation, and if they recognized them as such.

“The most ample power,” was the reply; “and we

¹ Wagesaer, ix. 322, 323. Gallucci, 352-355.

² Ibid. Meteren, 564, 565.

are content to treat with you even if you should choose to call yourself a kingdom.”

“By what right, then, are the archdukes called by the king hereditary sovereigns of the Netherlands, and why do they append the seals of the seven United Provinces to this document?” asked the advocate, taking up from the table the full power of Albert and Isabella, and putting his finger on the seals.¹

“By the same right,” replied President Richardot, “that the King of France calls himself King of Navarre, that the King of Great Britain calls himself King of France, that the King of Spain calls himself King of Jerusalem.”

Nothing could be more logical, nothing more historically accurate. But those plain-spoken republicans saw no advantage in beginning a negotiation for peace on the basis of their independence by permitting the archduke to call himself their sovereign and to seal solemn state papers with their signet. It might seem picturesque to genealogical minds, it might be soothing to royal vanity, that paste counterfeits should be substituted for vanished jewels. It would be cruelty to destroy the mock glitter without cause. But there was cause. On this occasion the sham was dangerous. James Stuart might call himself King of France. He was not more likely to take practical possession of that

¹ *Négociations de Jeannin*, i. 538, 539. Gallucci, Meteren, Wagenaer, ubi sup. Compare also, for the whole course of these ratifications, the Minutes of Olden-Barneveldt during the conferences, now first published in the invaluable and admirably edited collection of Van Deventer, *Verhaal der Onderhandelingen te 's Hage tussehen de Nederlandsche en Spaansche gevolmagtigden*, etc., 1 Februarij, 1608—4 Maart, 1609. Deventer, iii. ccviii. 169—239, passim.

kingdom than of the mountains in the moon. Henry of Bourbon was not at present contemplating an invasion of the hereditary possessions of the house of Albret. It was a matter of indifference to the Netherlands whether Philip III. were crowned in Jerusalem that very day, or the week afterward, or never. It was very important, however, that the United Provinces should have it thoroughly recognized that they were a free and independent republic, nor could that recognition be complete so long as any human being in the whole world called himself their master and signed with their seals of state. "'T is absurd," said the Hollanders, "to use the names and arms of our provinces. We have as yet no precedent to prove that you consider the United Provinces as lost, and name and arms to be but wind." Barneveldt reminded them that they had all expressed the most straightforward intention, and that the father commissary especially had pledged his very soul for the sincerity of the king and the archdukes. "We ourselves never wished and never could deceive any one," continued the advocate, "and it is also very difficult for others to deceive us."¹

This being the universal sentiment of the Netherlands, it was thought proper to express it in respectful but vigorous language. This was done, and the session was terminated. The Spanish envoys, knowing very well that neither the king nor the archduke regarded the retention of the titles and seals of all the seventeen Netherlands as an empty show, but that a secret and solid claim lurked beneath that usurpation, were very indignant. They, however, dissembled their

¹ Minutes of Olden-Barneveldt.

wrath from the states' commissioners. They were unwilling that the negotiations should be broken up at the very first session, and they felt that neither Prince Maurice nor Barneveldt was to be trifled with upon this point.¹ But they were loud and magnificent in their demonstrations when they came to talk the matter over with the ambassadors of France and England.² It was most portentous, they thought, to the cause of monarchy and good government all over the world, that these republicans, not content to deal with kings and princes on a footing of equality, should presume to dictate to them as to inferiors. Having passed through rebellion to liberty, they were now proceeding to trample upon the most hallowed customs and rites. What would become of royalty if in the same breath it should not only renounce the substance, but even put away the symbols of authority? This insolence of the people was not more dangerous to the king and the archdukes than it was to every potentate in the universe. It was a sacred duty to resist such insults.³ Sage Jeannin did his best to pacify the vehemence of the commissioners. He represented to them that foreign titles borne by anointed kings were only ensigns of historical possessions which they had forever renounced, but that it might become one day the pleasure of Spain, or lie in the power of Spain, to vindicate her ancient rights to the provinces.

Hence the anxiety of the states was but natural. The old Leaguer and political campaigner knew very

¹ Gallucci, 355, 356. Grotius, xvii. 764, 765. Wagenaer, ix. 324-326. Meteren, 564^{vo}. Bentivoglio, 564.

² Ibid.

³ Gallucci, Bentivoglio, *ubi sup.*

well, moreover, that at least one half of Richardot's noble wrath was feigned.¹ The commissioners would probably renounce the title and the seven seals, but in so doing would drive a hard bargain. For an empty phrase and a pennyworth of wax they would extort a heavy price. And this was what occurred. The commissioners agreed to write for fresh instructions to Brussels. A reply came in due time from the archdukes, in which they signified their willingness to abandon the title of sovereigns over all the Netherlands, and to abstain from using their signet. In exchange for this concession they merely demanded from the States-General a formal abandonment of the navigation to both the Indies. This was all. The archdukes granted liberty to the Republic. The Republic would renounce its commerce with more than half the world.

The scorn of the states' commissioners at this proposition can be imagined, and it became difficult indeed for them to speak on the subject in decorous language. Because the archdukes were willing to give up something which was not their property, the Republic was voluntarily to open its veins and drain its very life-blood at the bidding of a foreign potentate. She was to fling away all the trophies of Heemskerk and Sebald de Weerdt, of Balthazar de Cordes, Van der Hagen, Matelieff, and Verhoef; she was to abdicate the position which she had already acquired of mistress of the seas, and she was to deprive herself forever of that daily increasing ocean commerce which was rapidly converting a cluster of puny, half-submerged provinces into a mighty empire. Of a certainty the Span-

¹ Gallucci, 356.

ish court at this new epoch was an astounding anachronism. In its view Pope Alexander VI. still lived and reigned.

Liberty was not a boon conferred upon the Netherlanders by their defeated enemy. It had been gained by their own right hands, by the blood and the gold and the sweat of two generations. If it were the king's to give, let him try once more if he could take it away. Such were the opinions and emotions of the Dutchmen, expressed in as courteous language as they could find.

"It would be a political heresy," said Barneveldt to the Spanish commissioners at this session, "if my lords the states should by contract banish their citizens out of two thirds of the world, both land and sea."

"'T is strange," replied the Spaniards, "that you wish to have more than other powers—kings or republics—who never make any such pretensions. The Indies, East and West, are our house, privately possessed by us for more than a hundred years, and no one has a right to come into it without our permission. This is not banishment, but a custom to which all other nations submit. We give you your sovereignty before all the world, quitting all claims upon it. We know very well that you deny receiving it from us; but to give you a quitclaim and to permit free trade besides would be a little more than you have a right to expect."¹

¹ Minutes of Olden-Barneveldt, ubi sup.: "Dattet hunl. Huys was over hondert jaren privatim beseten en dat men daer jegens hun danck niet behoorde te komen. Datter geen bannissement was maer een gebruyck als de andere Coningen en Republiquen deden," etc.

Was it not well for the cause of liberty, commercial intercourse, and advancement of the human intellect that there was this obstinate little Republic in the world, refusing to tolerate that to which all other great powers of the earth submitted; that there was one nation determined not to acknowledge three quarters of the world, including America and India, as the private mansion of the King of Spain, to be locked against the rest of the human race?

The next session of the negotiators after the arrival of this communication from the archdukes was a stormy one. The India trade was the sole subject of discussion. As the states were firmly resolved never to relinquish that navigation which in truth was one of their most practical and valuable possessions, and as the royal commissioners were as solemnly determined that it should never be conceded, it may be imagined how much breath, how much foolscap paper, was wasted.

In truth, the negotiation for peace had been a vile mockery from the beginning. Spain had no real intention of abdicating her claim to the United Provinces.

At the very moment when the commissioners were categorically making that concession in Brussels and claiming such a price for it, Hoboken, the archduke's diplomatic representative in London, was earnestly assuring King James that neither his master nor Philip had the remotest notion of renouncing his sovereignty over all the Netherlands. What had been said and written to that effect was merely a device, he asserted, to bring about a temporary truce. During the interval of imaginary freedom it was certain that the prov-

inces would fall into such dire confusion that it would be easier for Spain to effect their reconquest, after a brief delay for repairing her own strength, than it would be by continuing the present war without any cessation.¹

The Spanish ambassador at Vienna, too, on his part assured the Emperor Rudolph that his master was resolved never to abdicate the sovereignty of the provinces. The negotiations then going on, he said, were simply intended to extort from the states a renunciation of the India trade and their consent to the reintroduction of the Catholic religion throughout their territories.

Something of all this was known and much more suspected at The Hague; the conviction, therefore, that no faith would be kept with rebels and heretics, whatever might be said or written, gained strength every day. That these delusive negotiations with the Hollanders were not likely to be so successful as the comedy enacted twenty years before at Oudenbourg, for the amusement of Queen Elizabeth and her diplomats while the tragedy of the Armada was preparing, might be safely prophesied. Richardot was as effective as ever in the part which he had so often played, but Spinola labored under the disadvantage of being a far honester man than Alexander Farnese. Far from equal to that famous chieftain in the management of a great military campaign, it is certain that he was infinitely inferior to him in genteel comedy. Whether Maurice and Louis William, Barneveldt and Brederode, were to do better in the parts formerly assigned to John Rogers, Valentine Dale, Comp-

¹ Meteren, 565.

troller Croft, and their colleagues, remained to be seen.

On the 15th February, at the fifth conference of the commissioners, the first pitched battle on the India trade was fought. Thereafter the combat was almost every day renewed. Exactly as, a year before, the news of Heemskerk's victory at Gibraltar had made the king and the archdukes eager to obtain an armistice with the rebels both by land and sea, so now the report of Matelieff's recent achievements in the Indian Ocean was increasing their anxiety to exclude the Netherlanders from the regions which they were rapidly making their own.

As we look back upon the negotiations after the lapse of two centuries and a half, it becomes difficult to suppress our amazement at those scenes of solemn trickery and superhuman pride. It is not necessary to follow, step by step, the proceedings at each daily conference, but it is impossible for me not to detain the reader for yet a season longer with those transactions, and especially to invite him to ponder the valuable lesson which in their entirety they convey.

No higher themes could possibly be laid before statesmen to discuss. Questions of political self-government, religious liberty, national independence, divine right, rebellious power, freedom of commerce, supremacy of the seas, omnipotence claimed by the Old World over the destiny of what was called the New, were importunately demanding solution. All that most influenced human passion or stirred human reason to its depths, at that memorable point of time when two great epochs seemed to be sweeping against each other in elemental conflict, was to be dealt with.

The emancipated currents of human thought, the steady tide of ancient dogma, were mingling in wrath. There are times of paroxysm in which nature seems to effect more in a moment, whether intellectually or materially, than at other periods during a lapse of years. The shock of forces, long preparing and long delayed, is apt at last to make itself sensible to those neglectful of gradual but vital changes. Yet there are always ears that remain deaf to the most portentous din.

Thus, after that half-century of war, the policy of Spain was still serenely planting itself on the position occupied before the outbreak of the revolt. The commonwealth, solidly established by a free people, already one of the most energetic and thriving among governments, a recognized member of the great international family, was now gravely expected to purchase from its ancient tyrant the independence which it had long possessed, while the price demanded for the free papers was not only extravagant, but would be disgraceful to an emancipated slave. Holland was not likely at that turning-point in her history, and in the world's history, to be false to herself and to the great principles of public law. It was good for the cause of humanity that the Republic should reappear at that epoch. It was wholesome for Europe that there should be just then a plain, self-governing people, able to speak homely and important truths. It was healthy for the moral and political atmosphere, in those days and in the time to come, that a fresh breeze from that little sea-born commonwealth should sweep away some of the ancient fog through which a few very feeble and very crooked mortals had so long loomed forth like giants and gods.

To vindicate the laws of nations and of nature; to make a noble effort for reducing to a system—conforming, at least approximately, to divine reason—the chaotic elements of war and peace; to recall the great facts that earth, sea, and sky ought to belong to mankind, and not to an accidental and very limited selection of the species, was not an unworthy task for a people which had made such unexampled sacrifices for liberty and right.

Accordingly, at the conference on the 15th February, the Spanish commissioners categorically summoned the states to desist entirely from the trade to either India, exactly as before the war. To enforce this prohibition, they said, was the principal reason why Philip desired peace. To obtain their freedom was surely well worth renunciation of this traffic, the more so because their trade with Spain, which was so much shorter and safer, was now to be reopened. If they had been able to keep that commerce, it was suggested, they would have never talked about the Indies. The commissioners added that this boon had not been conceded to France nor England by the treaties of Verbins and London, and that the states therefore could not find it strange that it should be refused to them.¹

The states' commissioners stoutly replied that commerce was open to all the world, that trade was free by the great law of nature, and that neither France, England, nor the United Provinces were to receive edicts on this great subject from Spain and Portugal. It was absurd to circumscribe commercial intercourse at the very moment of exchanging war for peace.

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 327 seq. Meteren, 565, 567-593. Grotius, xvii. 763-781. Gallucci, 356-358.

To recognize the liberty of the states upon paper, and to attempt the imposition of servitude in reality, was a manifest contradiction. The ocean was free to all nations. It had not been inclosed by Spain with a rail fence.¹

The debate grew more stormy every hour. Spinola expressed great indignation that the Netherlanders should be so obstinate upon this point. The tall, spare president arose in wrath from his seat at the council-board, loudly protesting that the King of Spain would never renounce his sovereignty over the provinces until they had forsworn the India trade, and with this menace stalked out of the room.²

The states' commissioners were not frightened. Barneveldt was at least a match for Richardot, and it was better, after all, that the cards should be played upon the table. Subsequent meetings were quite as violent as the first, the country was agitated far and wide,

¹ "*Oceanum quippe nullis clausum cancellis cunctis nationibus patere.*"—Gallucci, 357. It is impossible in this connection not to recall the quaint words of a great poet of our own country in a famous idyl written two and a half centuries later than these transactions:

"We own the ocean, too, John;
You must n't think it hard
If we can't think, with you, John,
It's just your own back yard.

"Old Uncle S., says he, I guess,
If that's his game, says he,
The fencing stuff will cost enough
To bust up friend J. B.
As well as you and me."

J. R. Lowell.

² Meteren, Grotius, Gallucci, Wagenaer, ubi sup.

the prospects of pacification dwindled to a speck in the remote horizon. Arguments at the board of conference, debates in the States-General, pamphlets by merchants and advocates, especially several emanating from the East India Company, handled the great topic from every point of view, and it became more and more evident that Spain could not be more resolute to prohibit than the Republic to claim the trade.¹

It was an absolute necessity, so it was urged, for the Hollanders to resist the tyrannical dominion of the Spaniards. But this would be impossible for them, should they rely on the slender natural resources of their own land. Not a sixth part of the population could be nourished from the soil. The ocean was their inheritance, their birthright, their empire. It was necessary that Spain should understand this first, last, and always. She ought to comprehend, too, that her recognition of Dutch independence was not a gift, but the acknowledgment of a fact. Without that acknowledgment peace was impossible. If peace were to be established, it was not to be bought by either party. Each gave and each received, and certainly Spain was in no condition to dictate the terms of a sale. Peace without freedom of commerce would be merely war without killing, and therefore without result. The Netherlanders, who in the middle of the previous century had risen against unjust taxation and arbitrary laws, had not grown so vile as to accept from a vanquished foe what they had spurned from their prince. To be exiled from the ocean was an unimaginable position for the Republic. Moreover, to retire from the Indies would be to abandon her Oriental

¹ Authorities last cited.

allies, and would be a dishonor as well as a disaster. Her good faith, never yet contaminated, would be stained, were she now to desert the distant peoples and potentates with whom she had formed treaties of friendship and commerce, and hand them over to the vengeance of the Spaniards and Portuguese.¹

And what a trade it was which the United Provinces were thus called upon to renounce! The foreign commerce of no other nation could be compared in magnitude to that of their commonwealth. Twenty ships traded regularly to Guinea, eighty to the Cape Verde Islands, twenty to America, and forty to the East Indies. Ten thousand sailors, who gained their living in this traffic, would be thrown out of employment if the states should now listen to the Spanish propositions.²

It was well known, too, that the profits of the East India Company had vastly increased of late and were augmenting with every year. The trade with Cambay, Malabar, Ceylon, Coromandel, and Keda had scarcely begun, yet was already most promising. Should the Hollanders only obtain a footing in China, they felt confident of making their way through the South Seas and across the pole to India. Thus the search for a great commercial highway between Cathay, Europe, and the New World, which had been baffled in the arctic regions, should be crowned with success at the antarctic, while it was deemed certain that there were many lands lighted by the Southern Cross awaiting the footsteps of the fortunate European discoverer. What was a coasting-trade with Spain compared with this boundless career of adventure? Now that the world's commerce, since the discovery of America and

¹ Authorities last cited.

² Ibid.

the passage around the Cape of Good Hope, had become oceanic and universal, was the nation which took the lead on blue water to go back to the creeping, landlocked navigation of the ancient Greeks and Phenicians? If the East India Company, in whose womb was empire, were now destroyed, it would perish with its offspring forever. There would be no regeneration at a future day. The company's ships, too, were a navy in themselves, as apt for war as for trade. This the Spaniards and Portuguese had already learned to their cost. The merchant traders to Spain would be always in the power of Spain, and at any favorable moment might be seized by Spain. The Spanish monopoly in the East and West was the great source of Spanish power, the chief cause of the contempt with which the Spanish monarchy looked down upon other nations. Let those widely expanded wings be clipped, and Spain would fall from her dizzy height. To know what the states ought to refuse the enemy, it was only necessary to observe what he strenuously demanded, to ponder the avowed reason why he desired peace. The enemy was doing his best to damage the commonwealth; the states were merely anxious to prevent injury to themselves and to all the world, to vindicate for themselves and for all men the common use of ocean, land, and sky.

A nation which strove to shut up the seas and to acquire a monopoly of the world's trade was a pirate, an enemy of mankind. She was as deserving of censure as those who created universal misery in time of famine by buying up all the corn in order to enrich themselves. According to the principles of the ancients, it was legitimate to make war upon such states

as closed their own ports to foreign intercourse. Still more just was it, therefore, to carry arms against a nation which closed the ports of other people.¹

The dispute about the India navigation could be settled in a moment, if Spain would but keep her word. She had acknowledged the great fact of independence, which could not be gainsaid. Let each party to the negotiation, therefore, keep that which it already possessed. Let neither attempt to prescribe to the other, both being free and independent states, any regulations about interior or foreign trade.²

Thus reasoned the States-General, the East India directors, the great majority of the population of the provinces, upon one great topic of discussion. A small minority only attempted to defend the policy of renouncing the India trade as a branch of industry, in which a certain class, and that only in the maritime provinces, was interested. It is certainly no slight indication of the liberty of thought, of speech, and of the press, enjoyed at that epoch in the Netherlands—and nowhere else to anything like the same extent—that such opinions, on a subject deemed vital to the very existence of the Republic, were freely published and listened to with toleration, if not with respect. Even the enlightened mind of Grotius was troubled with terrors as to the effect on the public mind at this crisis of anonymous pamphlets concerning political affairs.³ But in this regard it must be admitted that

¹ Authorities last cited.

² Ibid.

³ “Non minimum ego istius reipublicæ malum arbitror tantam in plebe libellis concitanda proterviam vetitam sæpe et tunc novo edicto nec repressam tamen, dum acris indago et graves pœnæ repudiantur ut libertati contraria.”—Grotius, xvii. 776.

Grotius was not in advance of his age, although fully conceding that press laws were inconsistent with human liberty.

Maurice and Barneveldt were equally strenuous in maintaining the India trade: the prince, because he hoped that resistance to Spain upon this point would cause the negotiations to be broken off; the advocate, in the belief that firmness on the part of the states would induce the royal commissioners to yield.

The States-General were not likely to be deficient in firmness. They felt that the Republic was exactly on the point of wresting the control of the East from the hands of the Portuguese, and they were not inclined to throw away the harvest of their previous labors just as it was ripening. Ten thousand persons at least, besides the sailors employed, were directly interested in the traffic, most of whom possessed great influence in the commonwealth, and would cause great domestic dissension should they now be sacrificed to Spain. To keep the India trade was the best guaranty for the future possession of the traffic to Spain; for the Spanish government would never venture an embargo upon the direct intercourse between the provinces and its own dominions, for fear of vengeance in the East. On the other hand, by denouncing oceanic commerce they would soon find themselves without a navy at all, and their peaceful coasting-ships would be at the mercy of Spain or of any power possessing that maritime energy which would have been killed in the Republic. By abandoning the ocean the young commonwealth would sink into sloth and become the just object of contempt to the world. It would cease to be an independent power,

and deserve to fall a prey to any enterprising neighbor.¹

Even Villeroy admitted the common belief to be that if the India trade were abandoned "the states would melt away like snow in the sun."² He would not, on that account, however, counsel to the states obstinacy upon the subject, if Spain refused peace or truce except on condition of their exclusion from the traffic.³ Jeannin, Villeroy, and their master, Isaac Le Maire and Peter Plancius, could have told the reason why if they had chosen.

Early in March a triple proposition was made by the states' commissioners. Spain might take her choice to make peace on the basis of free trade; to make peace, leaving everything beyond the tropic of Cancer to the chance of war; or to make peace in regard to all other than the tropical regions, concluding for those only a truce during a definite number of years.⁴

The Spaniards rejected decidedly two of these suggestions. Of course they would not concede freedom of the sea. They considered the mixture of peace and war a monstrous conception. They were, however, willing to favor peace for Europe and truce in the tropics, provided the states bound themselves, on the expiration of the limited period, to abandon the Indian and American trade forever. And to this proposition the states of course were deaf. And thus they went on spinning around, day after day, in the same vicious circle, without more hope of progress than squirrels in a cage.

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 332, 334.

² Jeannin, i. 625.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Wagenaer, ix. 334. Gallucci, 358, 359. Bentivoglio, 565.

Barneveldt, always overbearing with friend or foe, and often violent, was not disposed to make preposterous concessions, notwithstanding his eager desire for peace. "The might of the States-General," said he, "is so great, thank God, that they need not yield so much to the King of Spain as seems to be expected, nor cover themselves with dishonor."

"And do you think yourselves more mighty than the Kings of England and France?" cried Richardot, in a great rage; "for they never dared to make any attempt upon the Indies, East or West."¹

"We are willing to leave the king in his own quarters," was the reply, "and we expect him to leave us in ours."

"You had better take a sheet of paper at once," said Richardot, "write down exactly what you wish, and order us to agree to it all without discussion."

"We demand nothing that is unreasonable in these negotiations," was the firm rejoinder, "and expect that nothing unjust will be required of us."²

It was now suggested by the states' commissioners that a peace, with free navigation, might be concluded for Europe, and a truce for other parts of the world, without any stipulations as to what should take place on its termination.

This was hardly anything new, but it served as a theme for more intellectual buffeting. Hard words were freely exchanged during several hours, and all parties lost their temper. At last the Spaniards left the conference-chamber in a rage. Just as they were going, Barneveldt asked them whether he should make

¹ Minutes of Olden-Barneveldt, 191, and note from *Mémoire van Staet*.

² *Ibid.*

a protocol of the session for the States-General, and whether it was desirable in future to resume the discussion.

"Let every one do exactly as he likes," replied Spinola, wrathfully, as he moved to the door.

Friar John, always plausible, whispered a few soothing words in the ear of the marquis, adding aloud, so that the commissioners might hear, "Night brings counsel." These words he spoke in Latin.

"He who wishes to get everything is apt to lose everything," cried out Maldere, the Zealand deputy, in Spanish, to the departing commissioners.

"Take that to yourselves," rejoined Richardot, very fiercely; "you may be sure that it will be your case."¹

So ended that interview.

Directly afterward there was a conference between the states' commissioners and the French envoys.

Jeannin employed all his powers of argument and persuasion to influence the Netherlanders against a rupture of the negotiations because of the India trade. It would be better to abandon that commerce, so he urged, than to give up the hope of peace. The commissioners failed to see the logic or to melt at the eloquence of his discourse. They would have been still less inclined, if that were possible, to move from their position, had they known of the secret conferences which Jeannin had just been holding with Isaac Le Maire of Amsterdam, and other merchants practically familiar with the India trade. Carrying out the French king's plan to rob the Republic of that lucrative traffic, and to transplant it, by means of experi-

¹ Jeannin, i. 595.

enced Hollanders, into France, the president, while openly siding with the states, as their most disinterested friend, was secretly doing all in his power to destroy the very foundation of their commonwealth.¹

Isaac Le Maire came over from Amsterdam in a mysterious manner, almost in disguise. Had his nocturnal dealings with the French minister been known, he would have been rudely dealt with by the East India Company. He was a native of Tournay, not a sincere republican therefore, was very strongly affected to France, and declared that all his former fellow-townsmen, and many more, had the fleur-de-lis stamped on their hearts. If peace should be made without stipulation in favor of the East India Company, he, with his three brothers, would do what they could to transfer that corporation to France. All the details of such a prospective arrangement were thoroughly discussed, and it was intimated that the king would be expected to take shares in the enterprise. Jeannin had also repeated conferences on the same subject with the great cosmographer Plancius. It may be well understood, therefore, that the minister of Henry IV. was not very ardent to encourage the states in their resolve to oppose peace or truce, except with concession of the India trade.²

The states preferred that the negotiations should come to naught on the religious ground rather than on account of the India trade. The provinces were nearly unanimous as to the prohibition of the Catholic worship, not from bigotry for their own or hatred of other creeds, but from larger views of what was then called

¹ Jeannin, i. 603-606.

² Ibid.

tolerance, and from practical regard for the necessities of the state. To permit the old worship, not from a sense of justice, but as an article of bargain with a foreign power, was not only to abase the government of the states, but to convert every sincere Catholic throughout the Republic into a grateful adherent of Philip and the archdukes. It was deliberately to place a lever, to be used in all future time, for the overthrow of their political structure.

In this the whole population was interested, while the India navigation, although vital to the well-being of the nation, was not yet universally recognized as so supremely important, and was declared by a narrow-minded minority to concern the provinces of Holland and Zealand alone.

All were silently agreed, therefore, to defer the religious question to the last.

Especially, commercial greed induced the states to keep a firm clutch on the great river on which the once splendid city of Antwerp stood. Ever since that commercial metropolis had succumbed to Farnese, the Republic had maintained the lower forts, by means of which, and of Flushing at the river's mouth, Antwerp was kept in a state of suspended animation. To open the navigation of the Schelde, to permit free approach to Antwerp, would, according to the narrow notions of the Amsterdam merchants, be destructive to their own flourishing trade.

In vain did Richardot, in one well-fought conference, do his best to obtain concessions on this important point. The states' commissioners were as deaf as the Spaniards had been on the India question. Richardot, no longer loud and furious, began to cry.

With tears running down his cheeks,¹ he besought the Netherlanders not to insist so strenuously upon all their points, and to remember that concessions were mutually necessary if an amicable arrangement were to be framed. The chances for peace were promising. "Let not a blight be thrown over all our hopes," he exclaimed, "by too great pertinacity on either side. Above all, let not the states dictate terms as to a captive or conquered king, but propose such conditions as a benevolent but powerful sovereign could accept."

These adjurations might be considered admirable, if it had been possible for the royal commissioners to point to a single mustard-seed of concession ever vouchsafed by them to the Republic.

Meantime the month of March had passed. Nothing had been accomplished, but it was agreed to prolong the armistice through April and May.

The negotiations having feebly dribbled off into almost absolute extinction, Friar John was once more set in motion and despatched to Madrid. He was sent to get fresh instructions from Philip, and he promised, on departing, to return in forty days. He hoped as his reward, he said, to be made Bishop of Utrecht. "That will be a little above your caliber," replied Barneveldt.² Forty days was easily said, and the states consented to the additional delay.

During his absence there was much tedious discussion of minor matters, such as staple rights of wine and cloths, regulations of boundaries, removal of restrictions on trade and navigation, passports, sequestered estates, and the like; all of which were subordinate to the all-important subjects of India and Reli-

¹ Grotius, xvii. 769. ² Minutes of Olden-Barneveldt, 205.

gion, those two most tender topics growing so much more tender the more they were handled as to cause at last a shiver whenever they were approached. Nevertheless, both were to be dealt with, or the negotiations would fall to the ground.¹

The states felt convinced that they would fall to the ground, that they had fallen to the ground, and they, at least, would not stoop to pick them up again.

The forty days passed away, but the friar never returned. April and May came and went, and again the armistice expired by its own limitation. The war party was disgusted with the solemn trifling, Maurice was exasperated beyond endurance, Barneveldt and the peace men began to find immense difficulty in confronting the gathering storm.

The prince, with difficulty, consented to a prolongation of the armistice for two months longer, resolute to resume hostilities should no accord be made before the end of July. The advocate, with much earnestness, and with more violence than was habitual with him, insisted on protracting the temporary truce until the end of the year. The debates in the States-General and the state council were vehement; passion rose to fever-heat; but the stadholder, although often half beside himself with rage, ended by submitting once more to the will of Barneveldt.

This was the easier as the advocate at last proposed an agreement which seemed to Maurice and Louis William even better than their own original suggestion. It was arranged that the armistice should be prolonged until the end of the year, but it was at the

¹ Grotius, xvii. Wagenaer, ix. 343 seq. Meteren, xxix. Van der Kemp, 36, 37, 154-157.

same time stipulated that unless the negotiations had reached a definite result before the 1st August they should be forthwith broken off.

Thus a period of enforced calm—a kind of vacation, as if these great soldiers and graybeards had been a troop of idle school-boys—was now established, without the slightest reason.

President Jeannin took occasion to make a journey to Paris, leaving The Hague on the 20th June.

During his absence a treaty of the states with England, similar in its terms to the one recently concluded between the Republic and France, but only providing for half the number of auxiliary troops arranged for in the French convention, was signed at The Hague. The English plenipotentiaries, Winwood and Spencer, wished to delay the exchange of signatures until the pending negotiations with Spain and the archdukes were brought to a close, as King James was most desirous at that epoch to keep on good terms with his Catholic Majesty. The states were so urgent, however, to bring at least this matter to a termination, and the English so anxious lest France should gain still greater influence than she now enjoyed in the provinces, that they at last gave way. It was further stipulated in the convention that the debt of the states to England, then amounting to £818,408 sterling, should be settled by annual payments of £60,000, to begin with the expected peace.¹

Besides this debt to the English government, the States-General owed nine millions of florins (£900,000), and the separate provinces altogether eighteen millions (£1,800,000). In short, there would be a de-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 344.

ficiency of at least three hundred thousand florins¹ a month if the war went on, although every imaginable device had already been employed for increasing the revenue from taxation. It must be admitted, therefore, that the Barneveldt party were not to be severely censured for their desire to bring about an honorable peace.

That Jeannin was well aware of the disposition prevailing throughout a great part of the commonwealth is certain. It is equally certain that he represented to his sovereign, while at Paris, that the demand upon his exchequer by the states, in case of the resumption of hostilities, would be more considerable than ever. Immense was the pressure put upon Henry by the Spanish court, during the summer, to induce him to abandon his allies. Very complicated were the nets thrown out to entangle the wary old politician in "the gray jacket and with the heart of gold," as he was fond of designating himself, into an alliance with Philip and the archdukes.

Don Pedro de Toledo, at the head of a magnificent embassy, arrived in Paris with projects of arranging single, double, or triple marriages between the respective nurseries of France and Spain. The Infanta might marry with a French prince, and have all the Netherlands for her dower, so soon as the childless archdukes should have departed this life; or an Infante might espouse a daughter of France, with the same heritage assigned to the young couple.

Such proposals, duly set forth in sonorous Spanish by the constable of Castile, failed to produce a very soothing effect on Henry's delicate ear. He had seen

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 377. Compare Grotius, xvii. 777.

and heard enough of gaining thrones by Spanish marriages. Had not the very crown on his own head, which he had won with foot in stirrup and lance in rest, been hawked about for years, appended to the wedding-ring of the Spanish Infanta? It might become convenient to him, at some later day, to form a family alliance with the house of Austria, although he would not excite suspicion in the United Provinces by openly accepting it then. But to wait for the shoes of Albert and Isabella, and until the Dutch Republic had been absorbed into the obedient Netherlands by his assistance, was not a very flattering prospect for a son or daughter of France. The ex-Huguenot and indomitable campaigner in the field or in politics was for more drastic measures. Should the right moment come, he knew well enough how to strike, and could appropriate the provinces, obedient or disobedient, without assistance from the Spanish babies.¹

Don Pedro took little by his propositions. The king stoutly declared that the Netherlands were very near to his heart, and that he would never abandon them on any consideration. So near, indeed, that he meant to bring them still nearer, but this was not then suspected by the Spanish court; Henry, the while, repelling as a personal insult to himself the request that he should secretly labor to reduce the United Provinces under subjection to the archdukes. It had even been proposed that he should sign a secret convention to that effect, and there were those about the court who were not ill disposed for such a combination. The king was, however, far too adroit to be caught in any such trap. The marriage proposals in themselves he

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 350-357. Grotius, xvii. 774. Jeannin,

did not dislike, but Jeannin and he were both of a mind that they should be kept entirely secret.

Don Pedro, on the contrary, for obvious reasons, was for making the transactions ostentatiously public, and, as a guaranty of his master's good faith in regard to the heritage of the Netherlands, he proposed that every portion of the Republic thenceforth to be conquered by the allies should be confided to hands in which Henry and the archdukes would have equal confidence.

But these artifices were too trivial to produce much effect. Henry remained true, in his way, to the States-General, and Don Pedro was much laughed at in Paris, although the public scarcely knew wherefore.

These intrigues had not been conducted so mysteriously but that Barneveldt was aware of what was going on. Both before Jeannin's departure from The Hague in June, and on his return in the middle of August, he catechized him very closely on the subject. The old Leaguer was too deep, however, to be thoroughly pumped, even by so practised a hand as the advocate's, so that more was suspected than at the time was accurately known.

As, at the memorable epoch of the accession of the King of Scots to the throne of Elizabeth, Maximilian de Béthune had flattered the new monarch with the prospect of a double marriage, so now Don Fernando Girono had been sent on solemn mission to England, in order to offer the same infants to James which Don Pedro was placing at the disposition of Henry.

The British sovereign, as secretly fascinated by the idea of a Spanish family alliance as he had ever been by the proposals of the Marquis de Rosny for the

French marriages, listened with eagerness. Money was scattered as profusely among the English courtiers by Don Fernando as had been done by De Béthune four years before.¹ The bribes were accepted, and often by the very personages who knew the color of Bourbon money, but the ducats were scarcely earned. Girono, thus urging on the English government the necessity of deserting the Republic and cementing a cordial, personal, and political understanding between James and Philip, effected but little. It soon became thoroughly understood in England that the same bargaining was going on simultaneously in France. As it was evident that the Spanish children could not be disposed of in both markets at the same time, it was plain to the dullest comprehension that either the brokerage of Toledo or of Girono was a sham, and that a policy erected upon such flimsy foundations would soon be washed away.

It is certain, however, that James, while affecting friendship for the states and signing with them the league of mutual assistance, was secretly longing to nibble the bait dangled before him by Girono, and was especially determined to prevent, if possible, the plans of Toledo.

Meantime Brother John Neyen was dealing with Philip and the Duke of Lerma in Spain.

The friar strenuously urged upon the favorite and the rest of the royal advisers the necessity of prompt action with the states. This needed not interfere with an unlimited amount of deception. It was necessary to bring the negotiations to a definite agreement. It would be by no means requisite, however, to hold to

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 355, 356. Jeannin.

that agreement whenever a convenient opportunity for breaking it should present itself. The first object of Spanish policy, argued honest John, should be to get the weapons out of the rebels' hands. The Netherlands ought to be encouraged to return to their usual pursuits of commerce and manufactures, whence they derived their support, and to disband their military and naval forces. Their sailors and traders should be treated kindly in Spain, instead of being indulged, as heretofore, with no hospitality save that of the Holy Inquisition and its dungeons. Let their minds be disarmed of all suspicion. Now the whole population of the provinces had been convinced that Spain, in affecting to treat, was secretly devising means to reimpose her ancient yoke upon their necks.¹

Time went by in Aranjuez and Madrid. The forty days promised as the period of Neyen's absence were soon gone; but what were forty days, or forty times forty, at the Spanish court? The friar, who, whatever his faults, was anything but an idler, chafed at a procrastination which seemed the more stupendous to him, coming fresh, as he did, from a busy people who knew the value of time. In the anguish of his soul he went to Rodrigo Calderon, of the privy council, and implored his influence with government to procure leave for him to depart. Calderon, in urbane but decisive terms, assured him that this would be impossible before the king should return to Madrid. The monk then went to Idiaquez, who was in favor of his proceeding at once to the Netherlands, but who, on being informed that Calderon was of a different opinion, gave up the point. More distressed than ever, Neyen

¹ Gallucci, 361, 363.

implored Prada's assistance, but Prada plunged him into still deeper despair. His Majesty, said that counselor, with matchless effrontery, was studying the propositions of the States-General, and all the papers in the negotiation, line by line, comma by comma. There were many animadversions to make, many counter-suggestions to offer. The king was pondering the whole subject most diligently. When those lucubrations were finished, the royal decision, aided by the wisdom of the privy council, would be duly communicated to the archdukes.¹

To wait for an answer to the propositions of the suspicious States-General until Philip III. had mastered the subject in detail was a prospect too dreary even for the equable soul of Brother John. Dismayed at the position in which he found himself, he did his best to ferret out the reasons for the preposterous delay, not being willing to be paid off in allusions to the royal investigations. He was still further appalled at last by discovering that the delay was absolutely for the delay's sake. It was considered inconsistent with the dignity of the government not to delay. The court and cabinet had quite made up their minds as to the answer to be made to the last propositions of the rebels, but to make it known at once was entirely out of the question. In the previous year his Majesty's administration, so it was now confessed with shame, had acted with almost indecent haste. That everything had been conceded to the confederated provinces was the common talk of Europe. Let the time-honored, inveterate custom of Spain in grave affairs to proceed slowly, and therefore surely, be in future observed.

¹ Gallucci, ubi sup.

A proper self-respect required the king to keep the universe in suspense for a still longer period upon the royal will and the decision of the royal council.¹

Were the affairs of the mighty Spanish empire so subordinate to the convenience of that portion of it called the Netherlands that no time was to be lost before settling their affairs? ²

Such dismal frivolity, such palsied pride, seems scarcely credible; but more than all this has been carefully recorded in the letters of the friar.

If it were precipitation to spend the whole year 1607 in forming a single phrase,—to wit, that the archdukes and the king would treat with the United Provinces as with countries to which they made no pretensions,—and to spend the best part of another year in futile efforts to recall that phrase—if all this had been recklessness and haste, then surely the most sluggish canal in Holland was a raging cataract, and the march of a glacier electric speed.

Midsummer had arrived. The period in which peace was to be made or abandoned altogether had passed. Jeannin had returned from his visit to Paris; the Danish envoys, sent to watch the negotiations, had left The Hague, utterly disgusted with a puppet-show all the strings of which, they protested, were pulled from the Louvre. Brother John, exasperated by the superhuman delays, fell sick of a fever at Burgos, and was sent, on his recovery, to the court at Valladolid to be

¹ "An existimationem quoque rei facere ut diutius in expectatione regie voluntatis regique senatus-consulti suspensus esset orbis terrarum."—Gallucci, ubi sup.

² Neyen's letters to Spinola, May 23, 1608, in Gallucci, 362, 363.

made ill again by the same cause, and still there came no sound from the government of Spain.¹

At last the silence was broken. Something that was called the voice of the king reached the ears of the archduke. Long had he wrestled in prayer on this great subject, said Philip III., fervently had he besought the Omnipotent for light. He had now persuaded himself that he should not fulfil his duty to God, nor satisfy his own strong desire for maintaining the Catholic faith, nor preserve his self-respect, if he now conceded his supreme right to the Confederated Provinces at any other price than the uncontrolled exercise, within their borders, of the Catholic religion. He wished, therefore, as obedient son of the Church and Defender of the Faith, to fulfil this primary duty, untrammelled by any human consideration, by any profit that might induce him toward a contrary course. That which he had on other occasions more than once signified he now confirmed. His mind was fixed; this was his last and immutable determination, that if the confederates should permit the free and public exercise of the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion to all such as wished to live and die in it, for this cause so grateful to God, and for no other reason, he also would permit to them that supreme right over the provinces, and that authority which now belonged to himself. Natives and residents of those countries should enjoy liberty just so long as the exercise of the Catholic religion flourished there, and not one day nor hour longer.

Philip then proceeded flatly to refuse the India navigation, giving reasons very satisfactory to himself why

¹ Neyen to Spinola, August 20, 1608, in Gallucci, 369.

the provinces ought cheerfully to abstain from that traffic. If the confederates, in consequence of the conditions thus definitely announced, moved by their innate pride and obstinacy, and relying on the assistance of their allies, should break off the negotiations, then it would be desirable to adopt the plan proposed by Jeannin to Richardot, and conclude a truce for five or six years. The king expressed his own decided preference for a truce rather than a peace, and his conviction that Jeannin had made the suggestion by command of his sovereign.¹

The negotiators stood exactly where they did when Friar John, disguised as a merchant, first made his bow to the prince and Barneveldt in the palace at The Hague.

The archduke, on receiving at last this peremptory letter from the king, had nothing for it but to issue instructions accordingly to the plenipotentiaries at The Hague. A decisive conference between those diplomats and the states' commissioners took place immediately afterward.

It was on the 20th August.

Although it had been agreed on the 1st May to break off negotiations on the ensuing 1st August should no result be reached, yet three weeks beyond that period had been suffered to elapse, under a tacit agreement to wait a little longer for the return of the friar. President Jeannin, too, had gone to Paris on the 20th June, to receive new and important instructions, verbal and written, from his sovereign, and during his absence it had not been thought expedient to transact much business. Jeannin returned to The Hague on

¹ King to the archdukes, in Gallucci, 365, 367.

the 15th August, and, as definite instructions from king and archduke had now arrived, there seemed no possibility of avoiding an explanation.

The Spanish envoys accordingly, with much gravity, and as if they had been propounding some cheerful novelty, announced to the assembled commissioners that all reports hitherto flying about as to the Spanish king's intentions were false.

His Majesty had no intention of refusing to give up the sovereignty of the provinces. On the contrary, they were instructed to concede that sovereignty freely and frankly to my lords the States-General—a pearl and a precious jewel, the like of which no prince had ever given away before. Yet the king desired neither gold nor silver, neither cities nor anything else of value, in exchange. He asked only for that which was indispensable to the tranquillity of his conscience before God, to wit, the reëstablishment in those countries of the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion.¹ This there could surely be no reasons for refusing. They owed it as a return for the generosity of the king, they owed it to their own relatives, they owed it to the memory of their ancestors, not to show greater animosity to the ancient religion than to the new and pernicious sect of Anabaptists, born into the world for the express purpose of destroying empires; they owed it to their many fellow-citizens, who would otherwise be driven into exile, because deprived of that which is dearest to humanity.²

In regard to the East India navigation, inasmuch

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 156–160, from Sec. Res. Stat.-Gen. Grotius, xvii. 775. Wagenaer.

² Grotius, ubi sup.

as the provinces had no right whatever to it, and as no other prince but the sovereign of Spain had any pretensions to it, his Majesty expected that the states would at once desist from it.¹

This was the magnificent result of twenty months of diplomacy. As the king's father had long ago flung away the pearl and precious jewel which the son now made a merit of selling to its proprietors at the price of their life's blood,—the world's commerce,—it is difficult to imagine that Richardot, while communicating this preposterous ultimatum, could have kept his countenance. But there were case-hardened politicians on both sides. The proposition was made and received with becoming seriousness, and it was decided by the states' commissioners to make no answer at all on that occasion. They simply promised to render their report to the States-General, who doubtless would make short work with the matter.

They made their report, and it occasioned a tumult. Every member present joined in a general chorus of wrathful denunciation. The Spanish commissioners were infamous swindlers, it was loudly asserted. There should be no more dealings with them at all. Spain was a power only to be treated with on the battle-field. In the tempest of general rage no one would listen to argument, no one asked which would be the weaker, which the stronger party, what resources for the renewed warfare could be found, or who would be the allies of the Republic. Hatred, warlike fury, and scorn at the duplicity with which they had been treated, washed every more politic sentiment away, and metamorphosed that body of burghers as in an

¹ Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.*

instant. The negotiations should be broken off, not on one point, but on all points, and nothing was left but to prepare instantly for war.¹

Three days later, after the French and English ambassadors, as well as Prince Maurice and Count Louis William, had been duly consulted, comparative calm was restored, and a decisive answer was unanimously voted by the States-General. The proposition of the commissioners was simply declared to be in direct violation of the sovereignty and freedom of the country, and it was announced that, if it should be persisted in, the whole negotiation might be considered as broken off. A formal answer to the royal propositions would be communicated likewise to the envoys of foreign powers, in order that the royal commissioners might be placed completely in the wrong.²

On the 25th August an elaborate response was accordingly delivered in writing by the states' commissioners to those of the archdukes and king, it being at the same time declared by Barneveldt and his colleagues that their functions were ended, and that this document, emanating from the States-General, was a sovereign resolution, not a diplomatic note.³

The contents of this paper may be inferred from all that has been previously narrated. The Republic knew its own mind, and had always expressed itself with distinctness. The Spanish government having at last been brought to disclose its intentions, there was an end to the negotiations for peace. The rupture was formally announced.

¹ Jeannin, i. 819.

² Van der Kemp, *ubi sup.* Wagenaer, ix. 357, 358.

³ See the paper in Meteren, 605, 606.

CHAPTER LI

Designs of Henry IV.—New marriage project between France and Spain—Formal proposition of negotiating for a truce between the states and Spain—Exertions of Prince Maurice to counteract the designs of Barneveldt—Strife between the two parties in the Republic—Animosity of the people against Barneveldt—Return of the Spanish commissioners—Further trifling—Dismissal of the commissioners—Close of the negotiations—Accidental discovery of the secret instructions of the archdukes to the commissioners—Opposing factions in the Republic—Oration of President Jeannin before the States-General—Comparison between the Dutch and Swiss republics—Calumnies against the advocate—Ambassador Lambert in France—Henry's letter to Prince Maurice—Reconciliation of Maurice and Barneveldt—Agreement of the states to accept a truce.

PRESIDENT JEANNIN had long been prepared for this result. It was also by no means distasteful to him. A peace would not have accorded with the ulterior and secretly cherished schemes of his sovereign, and during his visit to Paris he had succeeded in persuading Henry that a truce would be far the most advantageous solution of the question, so far as his interests were concerned.

For it had been precisely during that midsummer vacation of the president at Paris that Henry had completed his plot against the liberty of the Republic, of which he professed himself the only friend. Another phase of Spanish marriage-making had excited

his ever-scheming and insidious brain. It had been proposed that the second son of the Spanish king should espouse one of Henry's daughters.

The papal nuncius asked what benefit the King of Spain would receive for his share in case of the marriage. The French king replied by plainly declaring to the nuncius that the United States should abstain from and renounce all navigation to and commerce with the Indies, and should permit public exercise of the Catholic religion. If they refused, he would incontinently abandon them to their fate. More than this, he said, could not honestly be expected of him.¹

Surely this was enough. Honestly or dishonestly, what more could Spain expect of the Republic's best ally than that he should use all his efforts to bring her back into Spanish subjection, should deprive her of commerce with three quarters of the world, and compel her to reëstablish the religion which she believed, at that period, to be incompatible with her constitutional liberties? It is difficult to imagine a more profligate or heartless course than the one pursued at this juncture by Henry. Secretly he was intriguing, upon the very soil of the Netherlands, to filch from them that splendid commerce which was the wonder of the age, which had been invented and created by

¹ "Le nonce avait demandé au roy quel benefice recevait de sa part le Roy d'Espagne en respect des mariages. Et pour parler plus clair le roy déclara au nonce que les Etats se deporteront de toute navigation et commerce aux Indes, et permettront quelque exereise public de la foy Catholique ès Provinces Unies, ou à faute de ce il les delaissera et abandonnera incontinent, en quoy il dit estre compris tout se que l'on peut honnêtement prétendre de luy pour le présent."—Extract of letter of Pecquius, cited in Deventer, iii. 250.

Dutch navigators and men of science, which was the very foundation of their state, and without which they could not exist, in order that he might appropriate it to himself and transfer the East India Company to France, while at Paris he was solemnly engaging himself in a partnership with their ancient and deadly enemy to rob them of their precious and nobly gained liberty. Was better proof ever afforded that God alone can protect us against those whom we trust? Who was most dangerous to the United Provinces during those memorable peace negotiations, Spain the avowed enemy, or France the friend?

The little Republic had but her own sword, her own brain, and her own purse to rely upon. Elizabeth was dead, and James loved Spain better than he did the Netherlands, and quiet better than Spain. "I have told you often," said Caron, "and I say it once more, the Spaniard is lucky that he has such a peaceable king as this to deal with in England."¹

The details of the new marriage project were arranged at Paris between the nuncius, the Spanish ambassador, Don Pedro de Toledo, the diplomatic agent of the archdukes, and Henry's ministers, precisely as if there had been no negotiations going on between the states and Spain. Yet the French king was supposed to be the nearest friend of the states, and was consulted by them on every occasion, while his most intimate and trusted councilor, the ingenuous Jeannin, whose open brow was stamped with sincerity, was privy to all their most secret deliberations.

But the statesman thus dealing with the Hollanders under such a mask of friendly candor knew perfectly

¹ Deventer, iii. 253.

well the reason why his government preferred a truce to a peace. During a prolonged truce the two royal children would grow old enough for the consummation of marriage, and the states, so it was hoped, would be corrupted and cajoled into renouncing their liberty. All the Netherlands would be then formed into a secundogeniture for Spain, and the first sovereign would be the husband of a French princess.¹ Even as an

¹ "Et le point auquel nous travaillons maintenant est de pénétrer à quoy le Roy de France se résouldra advenant faulte de paix ; et tachons de faire trouver bon à ses dits ministres qu'en ce cas il abandonne les dits Etats et empoigne le party du mariage du second fils d'Espagne avecq l'une de ses filles aux conditions ja proposées ; pour à quoy les induire sert de beaucoup de les avoir mené jusques là qu'ils confessent y avoir de la raison, equité et justice es conditions concernans la religion et la navigation aux Indes, sous lesquelles l'on est content de quitter la souveraineté des dites provinces ; ce qu'aussi le roy mesme advoua assez clérement en ma derniere audience. Et sur ce a resparti qu'estans les dites conditions telles, il auroit juste occasion de s'offenser et retirer des dits Estats s'il ne s'y accomodaient, il me dit qu'il s'entendoit comme cela. . . . Et se resolvant le roy à cest abandon et delaisement des dits Estats, le dit Don Pedro m'a dit qu'il a pouvoir d'accorder en tel cas le dit mariage avecq l'investiture des Pais-Bas et aultres conditions plus fortes pour asseurer le roy qu'iceulx pays demeurent séparés de la couronne d'Espagne. Mais il semble à aulecuns des ministres qu'à faulte de paix le plus expédient sera de faire une longue trêve avecq les dits Estats et cependant arrester le dit mariage et attendre le temps de consommation d'icelluy et de la lignée qui en pourra procéder. Auquel cas le roy tres Chretien ne seroit seulement content d'abandonner les dits Estats, mais encore de tenir la main à les faire rejoindre aux aultres provinces de l'obeyssance de votre altesse."—Pecquius to the archduke, August 18, 1608, in Deventer, iii. 250-252.

Two months before Pecquius had written that the Duc de Sully had been feeling his pulse in regard to a truce in the Netherlands with reference to these marriage projects (*ibid.*).

object of ambition, the prize to be secured by so much procrastination and so much treachery was paltry.

When the Spanish commissioners came to the French and English ambassadors accordingly, complaining of the abrupt and peremptory tone of the states' reply, the suggestion of conferences for truce, in place of fruitless peace negotiations, was made at once, and of course favorably received. It was soon afterward laid before the States-General. To this end, in truth, Richardot and his colleagues had long been secretly tending. Moreover, the subject had been thoroughly but secretly discussed long before between Jeannin and Barneveldt.

The French and English ambassadors, accordingly, on the 27th August, came before the States-General, and made a formal proposition for the opening of negotiations for a truce. They advised the adoption of this course in the strongest manner. "Let the truce be made with you," they said, "as with free states, over which the king and the archdukes have no pretensions, with the understanding that *during the time of the truce* you are to have free commerce as well to the Indies as to Spain and the obedient Netherlands, and to every part of the Spanish dominions; that you are to retain all that you possess at present, and that such other conditions are to be added as you may find it reasonable to impose. During this period of leisure you will have time to put your affairs in order, to pay your debts, and to reform your government, and if you remain united, the truce will change into an absolute peace."¹

Maurice was more indignant when the new scheme was brought to his notice than he had ever been before,

¹ Jeannin, i. 827.

and used more violent language in opposing a truce than he had been used to employ when striving against a peace. To be treated with, *as* with a free state, and to receive permission to trade with the outside world until the truce should expire, seemed to him a sorry result for the Republic to accept.

The state council declared, by way of answer to the foreign ambassadors, that the principal points and conditions which had been solemnly fixed, before the states had consented to begin the negotiations, had been disputed with infinite effrontery and shamelessness by the enemy.¹ The pure and perfect sovereignty notoriously included religion and navigation to any part of the world; and the Republic would never consent to any discussion of truce unless these points were confirmed beforehand with the Spanish king's signature and seal.

This resolution of the council—a body which stood much under the influence of the Nassaus—was adopted next day by the States-General, and duly communicated to the friendly ambassadors.²

The foreign commissioners, when apprised of this decision, begged for six weeks' time in order to be able to hear from Madrid.

Even the peace party was disgusted with this impertinence. Maurice boiled over with wrath. The ambassadors recommended compliance with the proposal. Their advice was discussed in the States-General, eighty members being present, besides Maurice and Louis William. The stadholder made a violent and indignant speech.³

¹ "Vermeetelyk en onbeschaemd."

² Van der Kemp, iii. 160, 162.

³ Ibid., 40.

He was justified in his vehemence. Nothing could exceed the perfidy of their great ally.

"I know that the King of France calculates thus," wrote Aertsens at that moment from Paris: "'If the truce lasts seven years, my son will be old enough to accomplish the proposed marriage, and they will be obliged to fulfil their present offers. Otherwise I would break the truce in the Netherlands, and my own peace with them, in order to take from the Spaniard by force what he led me to hope from alliance.'" Thus it is," continued the states' envoy, "that his Majesty condescends to propose to us a truce, which may have a double interpretation, according to the disposition of the strongest, and thus our commonwealth will be kept in perpetual disquiet, without knowing whether it is sovereign or not. Nor will it be sovereign unless it shall so please our neighbor, who by this means will always keep his foot upon our throat."¹

"To treat with the states as if they were free," said Henry to the nuncius soon afterward, "is not to make them free. This clause does no prejudice to the rights of the King of Spain, except for the time of the truce." Aertsens taxed the king with having said this. His Majesty flatly denied it. The republican envoy bluntly adduced the testimony of the ambassadors of Venice and of Würtemberg. The king flew into a rage on seeing that his secrets had been divulged, and burst out with these words: "What you demand is not reasonable. You wish the King of Spain to renounce his rights in order to arrive at a truce. You wish to dictate the law to him. If you had just gained four battles over him, you could not demand more.

¹ Correspondence in Deventer, iii. 262-267.

I have always held you for sovereigns, because I am your friend, but if you would judge by equity and justice, you are not sovereigns. It is not reasonable that the King of Spain should quit the sovereignty *for always*, and you ought to be satisfied with having it so long as the treaty shall last.”¹

Here was playing at sovereignty with a vengeance. Sovereignty was a rattle for the states to amuse themselves with until the royal infants, French and Spanish, should be grown old enough to take the sovereignty for good. Truly this was indeed keeping the Republic under the king's heel to be crushed at his pleasure, as Aertsens, with just bitterness, exclaimed.

Two days were passed at The Hague in vehement debate. The deputies of Zealand withdrew. The deputies from Holland were divided, but, on the whole, it was agreed to listen to propositions of truce, provided the freedom of the United Provinces—not under conditions nor during a certain period, but simply and for all time—should be recognized beforehand.²

It was further decided on the 14th September to wait until the end of the month for the answer from Spain.

After the 1st October it was distinctly intimated to the Spanish commissioners that they must at once leave the country unless the king had then acknowledged the absolute independence of the provinces.³

A suggestion which had been made by these diplomatists to prolong the actually existing armistice into a truce of seven years, a step which they professed themselves willing to take upon their own responsi-

¹ Deventer, ubi sup.

² Wagenaer, ix. 378-380.

³ Van der Kemp, iii. 41.

bility, had been scornfully rejected by the states. It was already carrying them far enough away, they said, to take them away from a peace to a truce, which was something far less secure than a peace, but the continuance of this floating, uncertain armistice would be the most dangerous insecurity of all. This would be going from firm land to slippery ice, and from slippery ice into the water. By such a process they would have neither war nor peace, neither liberty of government nor freedom of commerce, and they unanimously refused to listen to any such schemes.¹

During the fortnight which followed this provisional consent of the states, the prince redoubled his efforts to counteract the Barneveldt party.

He was determined, so far as in him lay, that the United Netherlands should never fall back under the dominion of Spain. He had long maintained the impossibility of effecting their thorough independence except by continuing the war, and had only with reluctance acquiesced in the arguments of the French ambassadors in favor of peace negotiations. As to the truce, he vehemently assured those envoys that it was but a trap. How could the Netherlanders know who their friends might be when the truce should have expired, and under what unfavorable auspices they might not be compelled to resume hostilities?²

As if he had been actually present at the council-boards in Madrid and Valladolid, or had been reading the secret letters of Friar John to Spinola, he affirmed that the only object of Spain was to recruit her strength and improve her finances, now entirely exhausted. He believed, on the other hand, that the peo-

¹ Meteren, 606, 607.

² Jeannin, i. 889 seq.

ple of the provinces, after they should have once become accustomed to repose, would shrink from exchanging their lucrative pursuits for war, and would prefer to fall back under the yoke of Spain. During the truce they would object to the furnishing of necessary contributions for garrison expenses, and the result would be that the most important cities and strongholds, especially those on the frontier, which were mainly inhabited by Catholics, would become insecure. Being hostile to a government which only controlled them by force, they would with difficulty be kept in check by diminished garrisons, unless they should obtain liberty of Catholic worship.¹

It is a dismal proof of the inability of a leading mind, after half a century's war, to comprehend the true lesson of the war, that toleration of the Roman religion seemed to Maurice an entirely inadmissible idea. The prince could not rise to the height on which his illustrious father had stood; and those about him, who encouraged him in his hostility to Catholicism, denounced Barneveldt and Arminius as no better than traitors and atheists. In the eyes of the extreme party, the mighty war had been waged, not to liberate human thought, but to enforce predestination; and heretics to Calvinism were as offensive in their eyes as Jews and Saracens had ever been to Torquemada.

The reasons were unanswerable for the refusal of the states to bind themselves to a foreign sovereign in regard to the interior administration of their commonwealth; but that diversity of religious worship should be considered incompatible with the health of the young Republic, that the men who had so bravely

¹ Jeannin, i. 889 seq.

fought the Spanish Inquisition should now claim their own right of inquisition into the human conscience, this was almost enough to create despair as to the possibility of the world's progress. The seed of intellectual advancement is slow in ripening, and it is almost invariably the case that the generation which plants—often but half conscious of the mightiness of its work—is not the generation which reaps the harvest. But all mankind at last inherits what is sown in the blood and tears of a few. That government, whether regal or democratic, should dare to thrust itself between man and his Maker; that the state, not satisfied with interfering in a thousand superfluous ways with the freedom of individual human action in the business of life, should combine with the Church to reduce human thought to slavery in regard to the sacred interests of eternity, was one day to be esteemed a blasphemous presumption in lands which deserved to call themselves free. But that hour had not yet come.

“If the garrisons should be weakened,” said the prince, “nothing could be expected from the political fidelity of the town populations in question, unless they should be allowed the exercise of their own religion. But the states could hardly be disposed to grant this voluntarily, for fear of injuring the general security and violating the laws of the commonwealth, built as it is upon a foundation which cannot suffer this diversity in the public exercise of religion. Already,” continued Maurice, “there are the seeds of dissension in the provinces and in the cities, sure to ripen in the idleness and repose of peace to an open division. This would give the enemy a means of in-

triguing with and corrupting those who are already wickedly inclined.”¹

Thus in the year 1608 the head of the Dutch Republic, the son of William the Silent, seemed to express himself in favor of continuing a horrible war, not to maintain the political independence of his country, but to prevent Catholics from acquiring the right of publicly worshiping God according to the dictates of their conscience.

Yet it would be unjust to the prince, whose patriotism was as pure and unsullied as his sword, to confound his motives with his end. He was firmly convinced that liberty of religious worship, to be acquired during the truce, would inevitably cause the United Provinces to fall once more under the Spanish yoke. The French ambassador, with whom he conferred every day, never doubted his sincerity. Gelderland, Friesland, Overijssel, Groningen, and Utrecht, five provinces out of the united seven, the prince declared to be chiefly inhabited by Catholics. They had only entered the union, he said, because compelled by force. They could only be kept in the union by force, unless allowed freedom of religion. His inference from such a lamentable state of affairs was, not that the experiment of liberty of religious worship should be tried, but that the garrisons throughout the five provinces ought to be redoubled and the war with Spain indefinitely waged. The president was likewise of opinion that “a revolt of these five provinces against the union might be at any moment expected, ill disposed as they were to recognize a sovereignty which abolished their religion.” Being himself a Catholic, however,

¹ Jeannin, i. 889 seq.

it was not unnatural that he should make a different deduction from that of the prince, and warmly recommend, not more garrisons, but more liberty of worship.¹

Thus the very men who were ready to dare all and to sacrifice all in behalf of their country really believed themselves providing for the imperishable security of the commonwealth by placing it on the narrow basis of religious intolerance.

Maurice, not satisfied with making these vehement arguments against the truce in his conferences with the envoys of the French and British sovereigns, employed the brief interval yet to elapse before definitely breaking off or resuming the conferences with the Spanish commissioners in making vigorous appeals to the country.

"The weal or woe of the United Provinces for all time," he said, "is depending on the present transactions.² Weigh well the reasons we urge, and make use of those which seem to you convincing. You know that the foe, according to his old deceitful manner, laid down very specious conditions at the beginning, in order to induce my lords the States-General to treat.

"If the king and the archdukes sincerely mean to relinquish absolutely their pretensions to these provinces, they can certainly have no difficulty in finding honest and convenient words to express their intention.

¹ Thus Jeannin (i. 891, 892) reported in his letters to Villeroy the prince's conversation, yet certainly the prince was erroneously or falsely quoted. Compare Van der Kemp, iii. 43.

² The letter, dated September 21, 1608, is published in full by Van der Kemp, iii. 166-174. It is less accurately given by Meteren, 606-608.

As they are seeking other phrases than the usual and straightforward ones, they give certain proof that they mean to keep back from us the substance. They are trying to cheat us with dark, dubious, loosely screwed terms,¹ which secure nothing and bind to nothing. If it be wise to trust the welfare of our state to ambiguous words, you can judge according to your own discretion.

“Recognition of our sovereignty is the foundation-stone of these negotiations.

“Let every man be assured that, with such mighty enemies, we can do nothing by halves. We cannot afford to retract, mutilate, or moderate our original determination. He who swerves from the straight road at the beginning is lost; he who stumbles at the first step is apt to fall down the whole staircase. If, on account of imaginable necessity, we postpone that most vital point, the assurance of our freedom, we shall very easily allow less important points to pass muster,² and at last come tamely into the path of reconciliation. That was exactly the danger which our ancestors in similar negotiations always feared, and against which we, too, have always done our best to guard ourselves.

“Wherefore, if the preservation of our beloved fatherland is dear to you, I exhort you to maintain that great fundamental resolution at all times and against all men, even if this should cause the departure of the enemy's commissioners. What can you expect from them but evil fruit?”

He then advised all the estates and magistracies

¹ “Op schroeven gestelde woorden en termen.”

² “Geringere punten ook wel door de monsterring passeren.”

which he was addressing to instruct their deputies, at the approaching session of the States-General, to hold on to the first article of the often-cited preliminary resolution without allowing one syllable to be altered. Otherwise nothing could save the commonwealth from dire and notorious confusion. Above all, he entreated them to act in entire harmony and confidence with himself and his cousin, even as they had ever done with his illustrious father.

Certainly the prince fully deserved the confidence of the states, as well for his own signal services and chivalrous self-devotion as for the unexampled sacrifices and achievements of William the Silent. His words had the true patriotic ring of his father's frequent and eloquent appeals; and I have not hesitated to give these extracts from his discourse, because comparatively few of such utterances of Maurice have been preserved, and because it gives a vivid impression of the condition of the Republic and the state of parties at that momentous epoch. It was not merely the fate of the United Netherlands and the question of peace or war between the little Republic and its hereditary enemy that were upon the issue. The peace of all Christendom, the most considerable material interests of civilization, and the highest political and moral principles that can influence human action, were involved in those negotiations.

There were not wanting many to impeach the purity of the stadholder's motives. As admiral or captain-general he received high salaries, besides a tenth part of all prize-money gained at sea by the fleets, or of ransom and blackmail on land by the armies of the Republic. His profession, his ambition, his delights,

were those of a soldier. As a soldier in a great war he was more necessary to his countrymen than he could expect to be as a statesman in time of peace. But nothing ever appeared, in public or in private, which threw a reasonable suspicion upon his lofty patriotism. Peace he had always believed to be difficult of attainment. It had now been proved impossible. A truce he honestly considered a pitfall of destruction, and he denounced it, as we have seen, in the language of energetic conviction. He never alluded to his pecuniary losses in case peace should be made. His disinterested patriotism was the frequent subject of comment in the most secret letters of the French ambassadors to the king. He had repeatedly refused enormous offers if he would forsake the cause of the Republic. The King of France was ever ready to tempt him with bribes, such as had proved most efficacious with men as highly born and as highly placed as a cadet of the house of Orange-Nassau. But there is no record that Jeannin assailed him at this crisis with such temptations, although it has not been pretended that the prince was obdurate to the influence of Mammon when that deity could be openly approached.

That Maurice loved power, pelf, and war can hardly be denied. That he had a mounting ambition; that he thought a monarchy founded upon the historical institutions and charters of the provinces might be better than the burgher aristocracy which, under the lead of Barneveldt, was establishing itself in the country; that he knew no candidate so eligible for such a throne as his father's son—all this is highly probable and scarcely surprising. But that such sentiments or aspirations caused him to swerve the ninth part of a

hair from what he considered the direct path of duty; that he determined to fight out the great fight with Spain and Rome until the states were free in form, in name, and in fact, only that he might then usurp a sovereignty which would otherwise revert to Philip of Spain or be snatched by Henry of Navarre—of all this there is no proof whatever.

The language of Louis William to the provinces under his government was quite as vigorous as the appeals of Maurice.¹

During the brief interval remaining before the commissioners should comply with the demands of the states or take their departure, the press throughout the Netherlands was most active. Pamphlets fell thick as hail. The peace party and the war party contended with each other, over all the territory of the provinces, as vigorously as the troops of Fuentes or Bucquoy had ever battled with the columns of Bax and Meetkerken. The types of Blaauw and Plantin were as effective during the brief armistice as pike and harquebus in the field, but unfortunately they were used by Netherlanders against each other. As a matter of course, each party impeached the motives as well as the actions of its antagonist. The adherents of the advocate accused the stadholder of desiring the continuance of the war for personal aims. They averred that six thousand men for guarding the rivers would be necessary, in addition to the forty-five thousand men now kept constantly on foot. They placed the requisite monthly expenses, if hostilities were resumed, at eight hundred thousand florins, while they pointed to the twenty-seven million of debt, over and above

¹ His letter is published by Van der Kemp, iii. 174-176.

the eight million due to the British crown, as a burden under which the Republic could scarcely stagger much longer.¹ Such figures seem modest enough as the price of a war of independence.

Familiar with the gigantic budgets of our own day, we listen with something like wonder, now that two centuries and a half have passed, to the fierce denunciations by the war party of these figures as wilful fictions. Science has made in that interval such gigantic strides. The awful intellect of man may at last make war impossible for his physical strength. He can forge, but cannot wield, the hammer of Thor; nor has science yet discovered the philosopher's stone. Without it, what exchequer can accept chronic warfare and escape bankruptcy? After what has been witnessed in these latest days, the sieges and battles of that distant epoch seem like the fights of pygmies and cranes. Already an eighty years' war, such as once was waged, has become inconceivable. Let two more centuries pass away, and perhaps a three week's campaign may exhaust an empire.²

Meantime the war of words continued. A proclamation with penalties was issued by the states against the epidemic plague of pamphlets, or "blue books," as those publications were called in Holland,³ but with little result.⁴ It was not deemed consistent with liberty by those republicans to put chains on the press because its utterances might occasionally be distaste-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 377.

² This was written in March, 1866.

³ "Blaauw boekje." Was the phrase derived from the name of the great printer Blaauw?

⁴ Groot Plakkaat Boek, i. d. kol. 437. Wagenaer, ix. 373.

ful to magistrates.¹ The writers, printers, and sellers of the blue books remained unpunished and snapped their fingers at the placard.

We have seen the strenuous exertions of the Nassaus and their adherents by public appeals and private conversation to defeat all schemes of truce. The people were stirred by the eloquence of the two stadholders. They were stung to fury against Spain and against Barneveldt by the waspish effusions of the daily press. The magistrates remained calm and took part by considerable majorities with Barneveldt. That statesman, while exercising almost autocratic influence in the estates, became more and more odious to the humbler classes, to the Nassaus, and especially to the Calvinist clergy. He was denounced as a papist, an atheist, a traitor, because striving for an honorable peace with the foe, and because admitting the possibility of more than one road to the kingdom of heaven. To doubt the infallibility of Calvin was as heinous a crime, in the eyes of his accusers, as to kneel to the host. Peter Titelmann, half a century earlier, dripping with the blood of a thousand martyrs, seemed hardly a more loathsome object to all Netherlanders than the advocate now appeared to his political enemies, thus daring to preach religious toleration, and boasting of humble ignorance as the safest creed.² Alas! we must always have something to persecute, and individual man is never so convinced of his own wisdom

¹ "Alzo het streng onderzoeken naar schryvers en verspreiden voor strydig met de vryheid aangezien en daerom gemyd werdt."—Wagenaer, ix. 373.

² "Nil seire tutissima fides."—Device of the Olden-Barneveldt family (vide vol. i. of this work, p. 395).

as when dealing with subjects beyond human comprehension.

Unfortunately, however, while the great advocate was clear in his conscience, he had scarcely clean hands. He had very recently accepted a present of twenty thousand florins from the King of France. That this was a bribe by which his services were to be purchased for a cause not in harmony with his own convictions it would be unjust to say. We of a later generation, who have had the advantage of looking through the portfolio of President Jeannin, and of learning the secret intentions of that diplomatist and of his master, can fully understand, however, that there was more than sufficient cause at the time for suspecting the purity of the great advocate's conduct. We are perfectly aware that the secret instructions of Henry gave his plenipotentiaries almost unlimited power to buy up as many influential personages in the Netherlands as could be purchased. So they would assist in making the king master of the United Provinces at the proper moment there was scarcely any price that he was not willing to pay.

Especially Prince Maurice, his cousin, and the advocate of Holland were to be secured by life-pensions, property, offices, and dignities, all which Jeannin might offer to an almost unlimited amount, if by such means those great personages could possibly be induced to perform the king's work.

There is no record that the president ever held out such baits at this epoch to the prince. There could never be a doubt, however, in any one's mind that if the political chief of the Orange-Nassau house ever wished to make himself the instrument by which

France should supplant Spain in the tyranny of the Netherlands, he might always name his own price. Jeannin never insulted him with any such trading propositions. As for Barneveldt, he avowed long years afterward that he had accepted the twenty thousand florins, and that the king had expressly exacted secrecy in regard to the transaction. He declared, however, that the money was a reward for public services rendered by him to the French government ten years before, in the course of his mission to France at the time of the peace of Vervins. The reward had been promised in 1598, and the pledge was fulfilled in 1608. In accepting wages fairly earned, however, he protested that he had bound himself to no dishonorable service, and that he had never exchanged a word with Jeannin or with any man in regard to securing for Henry the sovereignty of the Netherlands.¹

His friends, moreover, maintained in his defense that there were no laws in the Netherlands forbidding citizens to accept presents or pensions from foreign powers. Such an excuse was as bad as the accusation. Woe to the republic whose citizens require laws to prevent them from becoming stipendiaries of foreign potentates! If public virtue, the only foundation of republican institutions, be so far washed away that laws in this regard are necessary to save it from complete destruction, then already the republic is impossible. Many who bore illustrious names, and occupied the highest social positions at that day in France, England, and the obedient provinces, were as venal as

¹ See for this whole story of the twenty thousand florins paid to the advocate, Van der Kemp, iii. 43, 165, 166; Brandt, *Rechtspleging*, 87, 88; Wagenaer, ix. 367-370.

cattle at a fair. Philip and Henry had bought them over and over again, whenever either was rich enough to purchase and strong enough to enforce the terms of sale. Bribes were taken with both hands in overflowing measure; the difficulty was only in obtaining the work for the wage.

But it would have been humiliating beyond expression had the new commonwealth, after passing through the fiery furnace of its great war, proved no purer than leading monarchies at a most corrupt epoch. It was no wonder, therefore, that men sought to wipe off the stain from the reputation of Barneveldt, and it is at least a solace that there was no proof of his ever rendering, or ever having agreed to render, services inconsistent with his convictions as to the best interests of the commonwealth. It is sufficiently grave that he knew the color of the king's money, and that in a momentous crisis of history he accepted a reward for former professional services, and that the broker in the transaction, President Jeannin, seriously charged him by Henry's orders to keep the matter secret. It would be still more dismal if Jeannin, in his private letters, had ever intimated to Villeroy or his master that he considered it a mercantile transaction, or if any effort had ever been made by the advocate to help Henry to the Batavian throne. This, however, is not the case.

In truth, neither Maurice nor Barneveldt was likely to assist the French king in his intrigues against the independence of their fatherland. Both had higher objects of ambition than to become the humble and well-paid servants of a foreign potentate. The stadholder doubtless dreamed of a crown which might have

been his father's, and which his own illustrious services might be supposed to have earned for himself. If that tempting prize were more likely to be gained by a continuance of the war, it is none the less certain that he considered peace, and still more truce, as fatal to the independence of the provinces.

The advocate, on the other hand, loved his country well. Perhaps he loved power even better. To govern the city magistracies of Holland, through them the Provincial Estates, and through them again the States-General of the whole commonwealth; as first citizen of a republic to wield the powers of a king; as statesman, diplomatist, and financier to create a mighty empire out of those slender and but recently emancipated provinces of Spain, was a more flattering prospect for a man of large intellect, iron will, and infinite resources than to sink into the contemptible position of stipendiary to a foreign master. He foresaw change, growth, transformation in the existing condition of things. Those great corporations, the East and West India companies, were already producing a new organism out of the political and commercial chaos which had been so long brooding over civilization. Visions of an imperial zone extending from the little Batavian island around the earth; a chain of forts and factories dotting the newly discovered and yet undiscovered points of vantage, on island or promontory, in every sea; a watery, nebulous, yet most substantial empire, not fantastic, but practical, not picturesque and mediæval, but modern and lucrative; a world-wide commonwealth with a half-submerged metropolis, which should rule the ocean with its own fleets and, like Venice and Florence, job its land wars with mercenary armies—

all these dreams were not the cloudy pageant of a poet, but the practical schemes of a great creative mind. They were destined to become reality. Had the geographical conditions been originally more favorable than they were, had nature been less a step-mother to the metropolis of the rising Batavian realm, the creation might have been more durable. Barneveldt and the men who acted with him comprehended their age, and with slender materials were prepared to do great things. They did not look very far, perhaps, into futurity, but they saw the vast changes already taking place, and felt the throb of forces actually at work.

The days were gone when the iron-clad man on horseback conquered a kingdom with his single hand. Doubtless there is more of poetry and romance in his deeds than in the achievements of the counting-house aristocracy, the hierarchy of joint-stock corporations that was taking the lead in the world's affairs. Enlarged views of the social compact and of human liberty, as compared with those which later generations ought to take, standing upon the graves, heaped up mountains high, of their predecessors, could hardly be expected of them. But they knew how to do the work before them. They had been able to smite a foreign and sacerdotal tyranny into the dust at the expense of more blood and more treasure, and with sacrifices continued through a longer cycle of years than had ever been recorded by history.

Thus the advocate believed that the chief fruits of the war—political independence, religious liberty, commercial expansion—could be now secured by diplomacy, and that a truce could be so handled as to be

come equivalent to a peace. He required no bribes, therefore, to labor for that which he believed to be for his own interests and for those of the country.

First citizen of Holland, perpetual chairman of a board of ambitious shopkeepers who purposed to dictate laws to the world from their counting-house table, with an unerring eye for the interests of the commonwealth and his own, with much vision, extraordinary eloquence, and a magnificent will, he is as good a sample of a great burgher—an imposing, not a heroic figure—as the times had seen.

A vast stride had been taken in the world's progress. Even monopoly was freedom compared to the sloth and ignorance of an earlier epoch and of other lands, and although the days were still far distant when the earth was to belong to mankind, yet the modern republic was leading, half unconsciously, to a period of wider liberty of government, commerce, and, above all, of thought.

Meantime the period assigned for the departure of the Spanish commissioners, unless they brought a satisfactory communication from the king, was rapidly approaching.

On the 24th September Verreycken returned from Brussels, but it was soon known that he came empty-handed. He informed the French and English ambassadors that the archdukes, on their own responsibility, now suggested the conclusion of a truce of seven years for Europe only. This was to be negotiated with the States-General as with free people, over whom no pretensions of authority were made, and the hope was expressed that the king would give his consent to this arrangement.

The ambassadors naturally refused to carry the message to the states. To make themselves the mouthpieces of such childish suggestions was to bring themselves and their masters into contempt. There had been trifling enough, and even Jeannin saw that the storm of indignation about to burst forth would be irresistible. There was no need of any attempt on the part of the commissioners to prolong their stay if this was the result of the fifteen days' grace which had so reluctantly been conceded to them. To express a hope that the king might perhaps give his future approval to a proceeding for which his signed and sealed consent had been exacted as an indispensable preliminary was carrying effrontery further than had yet been attempted in these amazing negotiations.

Prince Maurice once more addressed the cities of Holland, giving vent to his wrath in language with which there was now more sympathy than there had been before. "Verreycken has come back," he said, "not with a signature, but with a hope. The longer the enemy remains in the country the more he goes back from what he had originally promised. He is seeking for nothing more than, in this cheating way and in this pretense of waiting for the king's consent, which we have been expecting now for more than eighteen months, to continue the ruinous armistice. Thus he keeps the country in a perpetual uncertainty, the only possible consequence of which is our complete destruction. We abjure you, therefore, to send a resolution in conformity with our late address, in order that through these tricks and snares the fatherland may not fall into the clutch of the enemy, and thus

into eternal and intolerable slavery. God save us all from such a fate!"¹

Neither Barneveldt nor Jeannin attempted to struggle against the almost general indignation. The deputies of Zealand withdrew from the assembly of the States-General, protesting that they would never appear there again so long as the Spanish commissioners remained in the country. The door was opened wide, and it was plain that those functionaries must take their departure. Pride would not allow them to ask permission of the states to remain, although they intimated to the ambassadors their intense desire to linger for ten or twelve days longer. This was obviously inadmissible, and on the 30th September they appeared before the assembly to take leave.²

There were but three of them, the Genoese, the Spaniard, and the Burgundian—Spinola, Mancicidor, and Richardot. Of the two Netherlands, Brother John was still in Spain, and Verreycken found it convenient that day to have a lame leg.

President Richardot, standing majestically before the States-General, with his robes wrapped around his tall, spare form, made a solemn farewell speech of mingled sorrow, pity, and the resentment of injured innocence. They had come to The Hague, he said, sent by the King of Spain and the archdukes to treat for a good and substantial peace, according to the honest intention of his Majesty and their Highnesses. To this end they had sincerely and faithfully dealt with

¹ Document given in Van der Kemp, iii. 177, 178.

² Meteren, 608. Grotius, xvii. 780, 781. Wagenaer, ix. 385-388. Van der Kemp, iii. 178-183.

the gentlemen deputed for that purpose by their High Mightinesses the states, doing everything they could think of to further the cause of peace. They lamented that the issue had not been such as they had hoped, notwithstanding that the king and archdukes had so far derogated from their reputation as to send their commissioners into the United Netherlands, it having been easy enough to arrange for negotiations on other soil. It had been their wish thus to prove to the world how straightforward were their intentions by not requiring the states to send deputies to them. They had accorded the first point in the negotiations, touching the free state of the country. Their High Mightinesses had taken offense upon the second, regarding the restoration of religion in the United Provinces. Thereupon the father commissary had gone to Spain, and had remained longer than was agreeable. Nevertheless, they had meantime treated of other points. Coming back at last to the point of religion, the States-General had taken a resolution, and had given them their dismissal, without being willing to hear a word more, or to make a single proposition of moderation or accommodation.

He could not refrain from saying that the commissioners had been treated roughly. Their High Mightinesses had fixed the time for their dismissal more precisely than one would do with a servant who was discharged for misconduct; for the lackey, if he asked for it, would be allowed at least a day longer to pack his trunk for the journey. They protested before God and the assembly of the states that the king and princes had meant most sincerely and had dealt with all roundness and sincerity. They at least remained

innocent of all the disasters and calamities to come from the war.

"As for myself," said Richardot, "I am no prophet, nor the son of a prophet; yet I will venture the prediction to you, my lords the States-General, that you will bitterly rue it that you did not embrace the peace thus presented, and which you might have had. The blood which is destined to flow, now that you have scorned our plan of reconciliation, will be, not on our heads, but your own."¹

Barneveldt replied by temperately but firmly repelling the charges brought against the states in this artful oration of the president. They had proceeded in the most straightforward manner, never permitting themselves to enter into negotiations except on the preliminary condition that their freedom should be once for all conceded and recognized. "You and you only," he continued, "are to bear the blame that peace has not been concluded, you who have not been willing or not been able to keep your promises. One might, with better reason, hold you guilty of all the bloodshed, you whose edicts, bloodier and more savage than war itself, long ago forced these provinces into the inevitable necessity of waging war; you whose cruelty, but yesterday exercised on the crews of defenseless and innocent merchantmen and fishing-vessels, has been fully exhibited to the world."

Spinola's countenance betrayed much emotion as he listened to the exchange of bitter recriminations which took place on this farewell colloquy. It was obvious that the brave and accomplished soldier honestly lamented the failure of the attempt to end the war.

¹ Authorities last cited.

But the rupture was absolute. The marquis and the president dined that day with Prince Maurice, by whom they were afterward courteously accompanied a part of the way on their journey to Brussels.¹

Thus ended the comedy which had lasted nearly two years. The dismal leave-taking, as the curtain fell, was not as entertaining to the public outside as the dramatic meeting between Maurice and Spinola had been at the opening scene near Ryswyk. There was no populace to throw up their hats for the departing guests. From the winter's night in which the subtle Franciscan had first stolen into the prince's cabinet down to this autumn evening, not a step of real progress could be recorded as the result of the intolerable quantity of speech-making and quill-driving. There were boat-loads of documents, protocols, and notes, drowsy and stagnant as the canals on which they were floated off toward their tombs in the various archives. Peace to the dust which we have not wantonly disturbed, believing it to be wholesome for the cause of human progress that the art of ruling the world by doing nothing, as practised some centuries since, should once and again be exhibited.

Not in vain do we listen to those long-bearded, venerable, very tedious old presidents, advocates, and friars of orders gray, in their high ruffs, taffeta robes or gowns of frieze, as they squeak and gibber, for a fleeting moment, to a world which knew them not. It is something to learn that grave statesmen, kings, generals, and presidents could negotiate for two years long, and that the only result should be the distinction between a conjunction, a preposition, and an adverb.

¹ Authorities last cited.

That the provinces should be held *as* free states, not *for* free states,—that they should be free in similitude, not in substance,—thus much and no more had been accomplished.

And now to all appearance every chance of negotiation was gone. The half-century war, after this brief breathing-space, was to be renewed for another century or so, and more furiously than ever. So thought the public. So meant Prince Maurice. Richardot and Jeannin knew better.

The departure of the commissioners was recorded upon the register of the resolutions of Holland, with the ominous note: “God grant that they may not have sown evil seed here, the effects of which will one day be visible in the ruin of this commonwealth.”¹

Hardly were the backs of the commissioners turned before the indefatigable Jeannin was ready with his scheme for repatching the rupture. He was at first anxious that the deputies of Zealand should be summoned again, now that the country was rid of the Spaniards. Prince Maurice, however, was wrathful when the president began to talk once more of truce. The proposition, he said, was simply the expression of a wish to destroy the state. Holland and Zealand would never agree to any such measure, and they would find means to compel the other provinces to follow their example. If there were but three or four cities in the whole country to reject the truce, he would, with their assistance alone, defend the freedom of the Republic, or at least die an honorable death in its defense. This at least would be better than after a few months to become slaves of Spain. Such a result

¹ Resol. Holl., September 30, 1608, bl. 223. Wagenaer, ix. 388.

was the object of those who began this work, but he would resist it at the peril of his life.¹

A singular incident now seemed to justify the wrath of the stadholder and to be likely to strengthen his party.

Young Count John of Nassau happened to take possession of the apartments in Goswyn Menskens's hostelry at The Hague, just vacated by Richardot. In the drawer of a writing-table was found a document, evidently left there by the president. This paper was handed by Count John to his cousin Frederick Henry, who at once delivered it to his brother Maurice. The prince produced it in the assembly of the States-General, members from each province were furnished with a copy of it within two or three hours, and it was soon afterward printed and published. The document, being nothing less than the original secret instructions of the archdukes to their commissioners, was naturally read with intense interest by the States-General, by the foreign envoys, and by the general public.²

It appeared, from an inspection of the paper,³ that the commissioners had been told that, if they should find the French, English, and Danish ambassadors desirous of being present at the negotiations for the treaty, they were to exclude them from all direct participation in the proceedings. They were to do this, however, so sweetly and courteously that it would be impossible for those diplomatists to take offense or to imagine themselves distrusted. On the contrary, the States-General were to be informed that their commu-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 389, 390. Jeannin.

² Jeannin, i. 925 seq.

³ See the document itself in Jeannin, i. 51-58.

nication in private on the general subject with the ambassadors was approved by the archdukes, because they believed the sovereigns of France, England, and Denmark their sincere and affectionate friends. The commissioners were instructed to domesticate themselves as much as possible with President Jeannin and to manifest the utmost confidence in his good intentions. They were to take the same course with the English envoys, but in more general terms, and were very discreetly to communicate to them whatever they already knew, and, on the other hand, carefully to conceal from them all that was still a secret.

They were distinctly told to make the point of the Catholic religion first and foremost in the negotiations, the arguments showing the indispensable necessity of securing its public exercise in the United Provinces being drawn up with considerable detail. They were to insist that the Republic should absolutely renounce the trade with the East and West Indies, and should pledge itself to chastise such of its citizens as might dare to undertake those voyages, as disturbers of the peace and enemies of the public repose, whether they went to the Indies in person or associated themselves with men of other nations for that purpose, under any pretext whatever. When these points, together with many matters of detail less difficult of adjustment, had been satisfactorily settled, the commissioners were to suggest measures of union for the common defense between the united and the obedient provinces. This matter was to be broached very gently. "In the sweetest terms possible" it was to be hinted that the whole body of the Netherlanders could protect itself against every enemy, but if dismembered, as it was about to

be, neither the one portion nor the other would be safe. The commissioners were therefore to request the offer of some proposition from the States-General for the common defense. In case they remained silent, however, then the commissioners were to declare that the archdukes had no wish to speak of sovereignty over the United Provinces, however limited. "Having once given them that morsel to swallow," said their Highnesses, "we have nothing of the kind in our thoughts. But if they reflect, it is possible that they may see fit to take us for protectors."

The scheme was to be managed with great discretion and delicacy, and accomplished by hook or by crook, if the means could be found. "You need not be scrupulous as to the form or law of protection, provided the name of protector can be obtained," continued the archdukes.

At least the greatest pains were to be taken that the two sections of the Netherlands might remain friends. "We are in great danger unless we rely upon each other," it was urged. "But touch this chord very gently, lest the French and English, hearing of it, suspect some design to injure them. At least we may each mutually agree to chastise such of our respective subjects as may venture to make any alliance with the enemies of the other."

It was much disputed whether these instructions had been left purposely or by accident in the table-drawer. Jeannin could not make up his mind whether it was a trick or not, and the vociferous lamentations of Richardot upon his misfortunes made little impression upon his mind. He had small confidence in any austerity of principle on the part of his former fellow-Leaguer

that would prevent him from leaving the document by stealth, and then protesting that he had been foully wronged by its coming to light. On the whole, he was inclined to think, however, that the paper had been stolen from him.¹

Barneveldt, after much inquiry, was convinced that it had been left in the drawer by accident.²

Richardot himself manifested rage and dismay when he found that a paper left by chance in his lodgings had been published by the states. Such a proceeding was a violation, he exclaimed, of the laws of hospitality. With equal justice, he declared it to be an offense against the religious respect due to ambassadors, whose persons and property were sacred in foreign countries. "Decency required the states," he said, "to send the document back to him, instead of showing it as a trophy, and he was ready to die of shame and vexation at the unlucky incident."³

Few honorable men will disagree with him in these complaints, although many contemporaries obstinately refused to believe that the crafty and experienced diplomatist could have so carelessly left about his most important archives. He was generally thought by those who had most dealt with him to prefer, on principle, a crooked path to a straight one. "'T is a mischievous old monkey," said Villeroy on another occasion, "that likes always to turn its tail instead of going directly to the purpose."⁴ The archduke, however, was very indulgent to his plenipotentiary. "My good master," said the president, "so soon as he learned the loss of that accursed paper, benignantly

¹ Jeannin, i. 914, 919, 925.

² Ibid., 919.

³ Ibid., 924.

⁴ Ibid., ii. 129.

consoled, instead of chastising me, and, after having looked over the draft, was glad that the accident had happened; for thus his sincerity had been proved, and those who sought profit by the trick had been confounded.”¹ On the other hand, what good could it do to the cause of peace that these wonderful instructions should be published throughout the Republic? They might almost seem a fiction, invented by the war party to inspire a general disgust for any further negotiation. Every loyal Netherlander would necessarily be qualmish at the word “peace,” now that the whole design of the Spanish party was disclosed.

The public exercise of the Roman religion was now known to be the indispensable condition, first, last, and always, to any possible peace. Every citizen of the Republic was to be whipped out of the East and West Indies, should he dare to show his face in those regions. The States-General, while swallowing the crumb of sovereignty vouchsafed by the archdukes, were to accept them as protectors, in order not to fall a prey to the enemies whom they imagined to be their friends.

What could be more hopeless than such negotiations? What more dreary than the perpetual efforts of two lines to approach each other which were mathematically incapable of meeting? That the young Republic, conscious of her daily growing strength, should now seek refuge from her nobly won independence in the protectorate of Albert, who was himself the vassal of Philip, was an idea almost inconceivable to the Dutch mind. Yet so impossible was it for the archdukes to put themselves into human relations with

¹ Jeannin, i. 21.

this new and popular government that in the inmost recesses of their breasts they actually believed themselves, when making the offer, to be performing a noble act of Christian charity.

The efforts of Jeannin and of the English ambassador were now unremitting, and thoroughly seconded by Barneveldt. Maurice was almost at daggers drawn not only with the advocate, but with the foreign envoys. Sir Ralph Winwood, who had, in virtue of the old treaty arrangements with England, a seat in the state council at The Hague, and who was a man of a somewhat rough and insolent deportment, took occasion at a session of that body, when the prince was present, to urge the necessity of at once resuming the ruptured negotiations. The King of Great Britain, he said, only recommended a course which he was himself always ready to pursue. Hostilities which were necessary, and no others, were just. Such, and such only, could be favored by God or by pious kings. But wars were not necessary which could be honorably avoided. A truce was not to be despised, by which religious liberty and commerce were secured, and it was not the part of wisdom to plunge into all the horrors of immediate war in order to escape distant and problematical dangers that might arise when the truce should come to an end. If a truce were now made, the kings of both France and England would be guaranties for its faithful observance. They would take care that no wrong or affront was offered to the States-General.¹

Maurice replied, with a sneer, to these sententious

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 408, 409. Grotius, xvii. 785. Van der Kemp, iii. 48. Jeannin.

commonplaces derived at second-hand from King James that great kings were often very indifferent to injuries sustained by their friends. Moreover, there was an eminent sovereign, he continued, who was even very patient under affronts directly offered to himself. It was not very long since a horrible plot had been discovered to murder the King of England, with his wife, his children, and all the great personages of the realm. That this great crime had been attempted under the immediate instigation of the King of Spain was notorious to the whole world, and certainly no secret to King James. Yet his Britannic Majesty had made haste to exonerate the great criminal from all complicity in the crime, and had ever since been fawning upon the Catholic king and hankering for a family alliance with him. Conduct like this the prince denounced in plain terms as cringing and cowardly, and expressed the opinion that guaranties of Dutch independence from such a monarch could hardly be thought very valuable.

These were terrible words for the representative of James to have hurled in his face in full council by the foremost personage of the Republic. Winwood fell into a furious passion, and of course there was a violent scene, with much subsequent protesting and protocolling.

The British king insisted that the prince should make public amends for the insult, and Maurice firmly refused to do anything of the kind. The matter was subsequently arranged by some amicable concessions made by the prince in a private letter to James, but there remained for the time a state of alienation between England and the Republic, at which the French

sincerely rejoiced. The incident, however, sufficiently shows the point of exasperation which the prince had reached, for, although choleric, he was a reasonable man, and it was only because the whole course of the negotiations had offended his sense of honor and of right that he had at last been driven quite beyond the bounds of self-control.¹

On the 13th October the envoys of France, England, Denmark, and of the Elector Palatine, the Elector of Brandenburg, and other German princes, came before the States-General.

Jeannin, in the name of all these foreign ministers, made a speech warmly recommending the truce.²

He repelled the insinuation that the measure proposed had been brought about by the artifices of the enemy and was therefore odious. On the contrary, it was originated by himself and the other good friends of the Republic.

In his opinion, the terms of the suggested truce contained sufficient guaranties for the liberty of the provinces, not only during the truce, but forever.

No stronger recognition of their independence could be expected than the one given. It was entirely without example, argued the president, that, in similar changes brought about by force of arms, sovereigns, after having been despoiled of their states, have been compelled to abandon their rights shamefully by a public confession, unless they had absolutely fallen into the hands of their enemies and were completely at their mercy. "Yet the princes who made this great

¹ Jeannin, ii. 303, 304, and authorities last cited. Winwood, ii. 353, 354.

² See the text in Jeannin, ii. 3-8.

concession," continued Jeannin, "are not lying vanquished at your feet, nor reduced by dire necessity to yield what they have yielded."

He reminded the assembly that the Swiss enjoyed at that moment their liberty in virtue of a simple truce, without ever having obtained from their former sovereign a declaration such as was now offered to the United Provinces.

The president argued, moreover, with much force and acuteness, that it was beneath the dignity of the states, and inconsistent with their consciousness of strength, to lay so much stress on the phraseology by which their liberty was recognized. That freedom had been won by the sword, and would be maintained against all the world by the sword.

"In truth," said the orator, "you do wrong to your liberty by calling it so often in doubt, and in claiming with so much contentious anxiety from your enemies a title-deed for your independence. You hold it by your own public decree. In virtue of that decree, confirmed by the success of your arms, you have enjoyed it long. Nor could anything obtained from your enemies be of use to you if those same arms with which you gained your liberty could not still preserve it for you."

Therefore, in the opinion of the president, this persistence in demanding a more explicit and unlimited recognition of independence was only a pretext for continuing the war, ingeniously used by those who hated peace.

Addressing himself more particularly to the celebrated circular letter of Prince Maurice against the truce, the president maintained that the liberty of the

Republic was as much acknowledged in the proposed articles as if the words "for ever" had been added. "To acknowledge liberty is an act which, by its very nature, admits of no conditions," he observed with considerable force.¹

The president proceeded to say that in the original negotiations the qualifications obtained had seemed to him enough. As there was an ardent desire, however, on the part of many for a more explicit phraseology, as something necessary to the public safety, he had thought it worth attempting.

"We all rejoiced when you obtained it," continued Jeannin, "but not when they agreed to renounce the names, titles, and arms of the United Provinces, for that seemed to us shameful for them beyond all example. That princes should make concessions so entirely unworthy of their grandeur excited at once our suspicion, for we could not imagine the cause of an offer so specious. We have since found out the reason."²

The archdukes being unable, accordingly, to obtain for the truce those specious conditions which Spain had originally pretended to yield, it was the opinion of the old diplomatist that the king should be permitted to wear the paste substitutes about which so many idle words had been wasted.

It would be better, he thought, for the states to be contented with what was precious and substantial, and not to lose the occasion of making a good treaty of truce, which was sure to be converted with time into an absolute peace.

¹ Écrit fait par M. Jeannin, October 13, 1608. Text in Jeannin, ii. 8-19.

² Jeannin, ii. 8-19.

“It is certain,” he said, “that the princes with whom you are treating will never go to law with you to get an exposition of the article in question. After the truce has expired they will go to war with you if you like, but they will not trouble themselves to declare whether they are fighting you as rebels or as enemies, nor will it very much signify. If their arms are successful, they will give you no explanations. If you are the conquerors, they will receive none. The fortune of war will be the supreme judge to decide the dispute, not the words of a treaty. Those words are always interpreted to the disadvantage of the weak and the vanquished, although they may be so perfectly clear that no man could doubt them; never to the prejudice of those who have proved the validity of their rights by the strength of their arms.”¹

This honest, straightforward cynicism, coming from the lips of one of the most experienced diplomatists of Europe, was difficult to gainsay. Speaking as one having authority, the president told the States-General in full assembly that there was no law in Christendom, as between nations, but the good old fist-law, the code of brute force.

Two centuries and a half have rolled by since that oration was pronounced, and the world has made immense progress in science during that period. But there is still room for improvement in this regard in the law of nations. Certainly there is now a little more reluctance to come so nakedly before the world. But has the cause of modesty or humanity gained very much by the decorous fig-leaves of modern diplomacy?

¹ Jeannin, ii.8-19.

The president alluded also to the ungrounded fears that bribery and corruption would be able to effect much, during the truce, toward the reduction of the provinces under their repudiated sovereign. After all, it was difficult to buy up a whole people. In a commonwealth, where the People was sovereign, and the persons of the magistrates ever changing, those little comfortable commercial operations could not be managed so easily as in civilized realms like France and England. The old Leaguer thought with pensive regret, no doubt, of the hard but still profitable bargains by which the Guises and Mayennes and Mercœurs, and a few hundred of their noble adherents, had been brought over to the cause of the king. He sighed at the more recent memories of the Marquis de Rosny's embassy in England, and his largess scattered broadcast among the great English lords. It would be of little use, he foresaw,—although the instructions of Henry were in his portfolio, giving him almost unlimited powers to buy up everybody in the Netherlands that could be bought,—to attempt that kind of traffic on a large scale in the Netherlands.

Those republicans were greedy enough about the navigation to the East and West Indies, and were very litigious about the claim of Spain to put up railings around the ocean as her private lake, but they were less keen than were their more polished contemporaries for the trade in human souls.

“When we consider,” said Jeannin, “the constitution of your state, and that to corrupt a few people among you does no good at all, because the frequent change in magistracies takes away the means of gaining over many of them at the same time, capable by

a long duration of their power to conduct an intrigue against the commonwealth, this fear must appear wholly vain.”¹

And then the old Leaguer, who had always refused bribes himself, although he had negotiated much bribery of others, warmed into sincere eloquence as he spoke of the simple virtues on which the little Republic, as should be the case with all republics, was founded. He did homage to the Dutch love of liberty.

“Remember,” he said, “the love of liberty which is engraved in the hearts of all your inhabitants, and that there are few persons now living who were born in the days of the ancient subjection, or who have not been nourished and brought up for so long a time in liberty that they have a horror for the very name of servitude. You will then feel that there is not one man in your commonwealth who would wish or dare to open his mouth to bring you back to subjection, without being in danger of instant punishment as a traitor to his country.”²

He again reminded his hearers that the Swiss had concluded a long and perilous war with their ancient masters by a simple truce, during which they had established so good a government that they were nevermore attacked. Honest republican principles, and readiness at any moment to defend dearly won liberties, had combined with geographical advantages to secure the national independence of Switzerland.³

Jeannin paid full tribute to the maritime supremacy of the Republic.

“You may have as much good fortune,” he said, “as the Swiss, if you are wise. You have the ocean at

¹ Jeannin, ii. 8-19.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

your side, great navigable rivers inclosing you in every direction, a multitude of ships, with sailors, pilots, and seafaring men of every description, who are the very best soldiers in battles at sea to be found in Christendom. With these you will preserve your military vigor and your habits of navigation, the long voyages to which you are accustomed continuing as usual. And such is the kind of soldiers you require. As for auxiliaries, should you need them you know where to find them.”¹

The president implored the States-General accordingly to pay no attention to the writings which were circulated among the people to prejudice them against the truce.

This was aimed directly at the stadholder, who had been making so many direct personal appeals to the people, and who was now the more incensed, recognizing the taunt of the president as an arrow taken from Barneveldt’s quiver. There had long ceased to be any communication between the prince and the advocate, and Maurice made no secret of his bitter animosity both to Barneveldt and to Jeannin.

He hesitated on no occasion to denounce the advocate as traveling straight on the road to Spain, and although he was not aware of the twenty thousand florins recently presented by the French king, he had accustomed himself, with the enormous exaggeration of party spirit, to look upon the first statesman of his country and of Europe as a traitor to the Republic and a tool of the archdukes. As we look back upon those passionate days, we cannot but be appalled at the depths to which theological hatred could descend.

¹ Jeannin, ii. 8-19.

On the very morning after the session of the assembly in which Jeannin had been making his great speech and denouncing the practice of secret and incendiary publication, three remarkable letters were found on the door-step of a house in The Hague. One was addressed to the States-General, another to the states of Holland, and a third to the burgomaster of Amsterdam. In all these documents the advocate was denounced as an infamous traitor, who was secretly intriguing to bring about a truce for the purpose of handing over the commonwealth to the enemy. A shameful death, it was added, would be his fitting reward.¹

These letters were read in the assembly of the States-General, and created great wrath among the friends of Barneveldt. Even Maurice expressed indignation, and favored a search for the anonymous author, in order that he might be severely punished.

It seems strange enough that anonymous letters picked up in the street should have been deemed a worthy theme of discussion before their High Mightinesses the States-General. Moreover, it was raining pamphlets and libels against Barneveldt and his supporters every day, and the stories which grave burghers and pious elders went about telling to each other, and to everybody who would listen to them, about the advocate's depravity, were wonderful to hear.

At the end of September, just before the Spanish commissioners left The Hague, a sledge of the kind used in the Dutch cities as drays stopped before Barneveldt's front door one fine morning, and deposited several large baskets, filled with money, sent by the

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 411, 412. Van der Kemp, iii. 51, 52.

envoys for defraying certain expenses of forage, hire of servants, and the like, incurred by them during their sojourn at The Hague, and disbursed by the states. The sledge, with its contents, was at once sent, by order of the advocate, under guidance of Commissary John Spronsen, to the receiver-general of the Republic.¹

Yet men wagged their beards dismally as they whispered this fresh proof of Barneveldt's venality. As if Spinola and his colleagues were such blunderers in bribing as to send bushel-baskets full of Spanish dollars on a sledge, in broad daylight, to the house of a great statesman whom they meant to purchase, expecting doubtless a receipt in full to be brought back by the drayman! Well might the advocate say at a later moment, in the bitterness of his spirit, that his enemies, not satisfied with piercing his heart with their false, injurious, and honor-fleching libels and stories, were determined to break it. "He begged God Almighty," he said, "to be merciful to him, and to judge righteously between him and them."²

Party spirit has rarely run higher in any commonwealth than in Holland during these memorable debates concerning a truce. Yet the leaders both of the war party and the truce party were doubtless pure, determined patriots, seeking their country's good with all their souls and strength.

Maurice answered the discourse of Jeannin by a second and very elaborate letter. In this circular, addressed to the magistracies of Holland, he urged his countrymen once more, with arguments already employed by him, and in more strenuous language than

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 54, 229, 230.

² Ibid., 229.

ever, to beware of a truce even more than of a peace, and warned them not to swerve by a hair's-breadth from the formula in regard to the sovereignty agreed upon at the very beginning of the negotiations.¹ To this document was appended a paper of considerations, drawn up by Maurice and Louis William, in refutation, point by point, of all the arguments of President Jeannin in his late discourse.

It is not necessary to do more than allude to these documents, which were marked by the close reasoning and fiery spirit which characterized all the appeals of the prince and his cousin at this period, because the time had now come which comes to all controversies when argument is exhausted and either action or compromise begins.

Meantime Barneveldt, stung almost to madness by the poisonous though ephemeral libels which buzzed so perpetually about him, had at last resolved to retire from the public service. He had been so steadily denounced as being burdensome to his superiors in birth by the power which he had acquired, and to have shot up so far above the heads of his equals, that he felt disposed to withdraw from a field where his presence was becoming odious.

His enemies, of course, considered this determination a trick by which he merely wished to prove to the country how indispensable he was, and to gain a fresh lease of his almost unlimited power by the alarm which his proposed abdication would produce. Certainly, however, if it were a trick, and he were not indispensable, it was easy enough to prove it and to punish him by taking him at his word.

¹ Jeannin (ii. 25-33) gives the text.

On the morning after the anonymous letters had been found in the street he came into the house of assembly and made a short speech. He spoke simply of his thirty-one years of service, during which he believed himself to have done his best for the good of the fatherland and for the welfare of the house of Nassau. He had been ready thus to go on to the end, but he saw himself environed by enemies, and felt that his usefulness had been destroyed. He wished, therefore, in the interest of the country, not from any fear for himself, to withdraw from the storm, and for a time at least to remain in retirement. The displeasure and hatred of the great were nothing new to him, he said. He had never shrunk from peril when he could serve his fatherland, for against all calumnies and all accidents he had worn the armor of a quiet conscience. But he now saw that the truce, in itself an unpleasant affair, was made still more odious by the hatred felt toward him. He begged the provinces, therefore, to select another servant less hated than himself to provide for the public welfare.¹

Having said these few words with the dignity which was natural to him, he calmly walked out of the assembly house.²

The personal friends of Barneveldt and the whole truce party were in consternation. Even the enemies of the advocate shrank appalled at the prospect of losing the services of the foremost statesman of the commonwealth at this critical juncture. There was a brief and animated discussion as soon as his back was turned. Its result was the appointment of a com-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 411, 412. Van der Kemp, iii. 51, 52.

² Ibid.

mittee of five to wait upon Barneveldt and solemnly to request him to reconsider his decision. Their efforts were successful. After a satisfactory interview with the committee he resumed his functions with greater authority than ever.¹ Of course there were not wanting many to whisper that the whole proceeding had been a comedy, and that Barneveldt would have been more embarrassed than he had ever been in his life had his resignation been seriously accepted. But this is easy to say, and is always said, whenever a statesman who feels himself aggrieved, yet knows himself useful, lays down his office. The advocate had been the mark of unceasing and infamous calumnies. He had incurred the deadly hatred of the highest-placed, the most powerful, and the most popular man in the commonwealth. He had more than once been obliged to listen to opprobrious language from the prince, and it was even whispered that he had been threatened with personal violence. That Maurice was perpetually denouncing him in public and private, as a traitor, a papist, a Spanish partizan, was notorious. He had just been held up to the states of the Union and of his own province by unknown voices as a criminal worthy of death. Was it to be wondered at that a man of sixty, who had passed his youth, manhood, and old age in the service of the Republic, and was recognized by all as the ablest, the most experienced, the most indefatigable of her statesmen, should be seriously desirous of abandoning an office which might well seem to him rather a pillory than a post of honor?

“As for neighbor Barneveldt,” said Recorder Aert-

¹ Authorities last cited.

sens,¹ little dreaming of the foul witness he was to bear against that neighbor at a terrible moment to come, "I do what I can and wish to help him with my blood. He is more courageous than I. I should have sunk long ago had I been obliged to stand against such tempests. The Lord God will, I hope, help him and direct his understanding for the good of all Christendom and for his own honor. If he can steer this ship into a safe harbor we ought to raise a golden statue of him. I should like to contribute my mite to it. He deserves twice as much honor, despite all his enemies, of whom he has many rather from envy than from reason. May the Lord keep him in health, or it will go hardly with us all."²

Thus spoke some of his grateful countrymen when the advocate was contending at a momentous crisis with storms threatening to overwhelm the Republic. Alas! where is the golden statue?

He believed that the truce was the most advantageous measure that the country could adopt. He believed this with quite as much sincerity as Maurice held to his conviction that war was the only policy. In the secret letter of the French ambassador there is not a trace of suspicion as to his fidelity to the commonwealth, not the shadow of proof of the ridiculous accusation that he wished to reduce the provinces to the dominion of Spain. Jeannin, who had no motive for concealment in his confidential correspondence with his sovereign, always rendered unequivocal hom-

¹ Aertsens and the advocate were next-door neighbors in the Spui straat, at The Hague (Deventer, iii. 271).

² Aertsens to Van der Veecken, November 7, 1608, in Deventer, iii. 272.

age to the purity and patriotism of the advocate and the prince.

He returned to the States-General and to the discharge of his functions as advocate-general of Holland. His policy for the time was destined to be triumphant, his influence more extensive than ever. But the end of these calumnies and anonymous charges was not yet.

Meantime the opposition to the truce was confined to the states of Zealand and two cities of Holland.¹ Those cities were very important ones, Amsterdam and Delft, but they were already wavering in their opposition. Zealand stoutly maintained that the treaty of Utrecht forbade a decision of the question of peace and war except by a unanimous vote of the whole confederacy. The other five provinces and the friends of the truce began with great vehemence to declare that the question at issue was now changed. It was no longer to be decided whether there should be truce or war with Spain, but whether a single member of the confederacy could dictate its law to the other six states. Zealand, on her part, talked loudly of seceding from the Union and setting up for an independent, sovereign commonwealth.² She would hardly have been a very powerful one, with her half-dozen cities, one prelate, one nobleman, her hundred thousand burghers at most, bustling and warlike as they were, and her few thousand mariners, although the most terrible fighting men that had ever sailed on blue water. She was destined ere long to abandon her doughty resolution of leaving her sister provinces to their fate.

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 414.

² Ibid., 416: "Zo ver liep de twist dat de Zeeuwen spraaken van zich te willen af zonderen van de overigen."

Maurice had not slackened in his opposition to the truce, despite the renewed vigor with which Barneveldt pressed the measure since his return to the public counsels. The prince was firmly convinced that the Kings of France and England would assist the Republic in the war with Spain so soon as it should be renewed. His policy had been therefore to force the hand of those sovereigns, especially that of Henry, and to induce him to send more stringent instructions to Jeannin than those with which he believed him to be furnished. He had accordingly despatched a secret emissary to the French king, supplied with confidential and explicit instructions. This agent was a Captain Lambert. Whether it was "Pretty Lambert," "Dandy Lambert," the vice-admiral who had so much distinguished himself at the great victory of Gibraltar, does not distinctly appear. If it were so, that hard-hitting mariner would seem to have gone into action with the French government as energetically as he had done eighteen months before, when, as master of the *Tiger*, he laid himself aboard the Spanish admiral and helped send the *St. Augustine* to the bottom. He seemed indisposed to mince matters in diplomacy. He intimated to the king and his ministers that Jeannin and his colleagues were pushing the truce at The Hague much further and faster than his Majesty could possibly approve, and that they were obviously exceeding their instructions. Jeannin, who was formerly so much honored and cherished throughout the Republic, was now looked upon askance because of his intimacy with Barneveldt and his partizans.¹ He assured the king that nearly all the cities of Holland and the whole

¹ Jeannin, i. 932.

of Zealand were entirely agreed with Maurice, who would rather die than consent to the proposed truce.¹ The other provinces, added Lambert, would be obliged, will ye, nill ye, to receive the law from Holland and Zealand. Maurice, without assistance from France or any other power, would give Spain and the archdukes as much exercise as they could take for the next fifty years before he would give up, and had declared that he would rather die sword in hand than basely betray his country by consenting to such a truce.² As for Barneveldt, he was already discovering the blunders which he had made, and was trying to curry favor with Maurice.³ Barneveldt and both the Aertsens were traitors to the state, had become the objects of general hatred and contempt, and were in great danger of losing their lives, or at least of being expelled from office.⁴

Here was altogether too much zeal on the part of Pretty Lambert—a quality which, not for the first time, was thus proved to be less useful in diplomatic conferences than in a sea-fight. Maurice was obliged to disavow his envoy and to declare that his secret instructions had never authorized him to hold such language. But the mischief was done. The combustion in the French cabinet was terrible. The Dutch admiral had thrown hot shot into the powder-magazine of his friends, and had done no more good by such tactics than might be supposed. Such diplomacy was denounced as a mere mixture of “indiscretion and

¹ Jeannin, i. 932, 933, and ii. 49.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. Compare for this mission of Lambert, Wagenaer, ix. 384, 385; Van der Kemp, iii. 57, 232.

impudence.”¹ Henry was very wroth, and forthwith indited an imperious letter to his cousin Maurice.²

“Lambert’s talk to me by your orders,” said the king, “has not less astonished than scandalized me. I now learn the new resolution which you have taken, and I observe that you have begun to entertain suspicions as to my will and my counsels on account of the proposition of truce.”

Henry’s standing orders to Jeannin, as we know, were to offer Maurice a pension of almost unlimited amount, together with ample rewards to all such of his adherents as could be purchased, provided they would bring about the incorporation of the United Provinces into France.³ He was therefore full of indignation that the purity of his intentions and the sincerity of his wish for the independence of the Republic could be called in question.

“People have dared to maliciously invent,” he continued, “that I am the enemy of the repose and the liberty of the United Provinces, and that I was afraid lest they should acquire the freedom which had been offered them by their enemies, because I derived a profit from their war and intended in time to deprive them of their liberty. Yet these falsehoods and jealousies

¹ Jeannin, i. 932. Every one of these amazing assertions of “the gentle ambassador Lambert” was denounced by Jeannin in his letters to Villeroy as an impudent falsehood. Especially in regard to the pretended vaunt of Maurice that he could carry on the war fifty years if France would only remain neutral, the president said that he had been expressly informed by the prince that without the assistance of France the Republic was lost forever (Jeannin, ii. 45-51).

² The letter is given in Jeannin, ii. 58-64.

³ Jeannin, i. 43, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71.

have not been contradicted by you nor by any one else, although you know that the proofs of my sincerity and good faith have been entirely without reproach or example. You knew what was said, written, and published everywhere, and I confess that when I knew this malice, and that you had not taken offense at it, I was much amazed and very malcontent."

Queen Elizabeth in her most waspish moods had not often lectured the States-General more roundly than Henry now lectured his cousin Maurice.

The king once more alluded to the secret emissary's violent talk, which had so much excited his indignation.

"If by weakness and want of means," he said, "you are forced to abandon to your enemies one portion of your country in order to defend the other,—as Lambert tells me you are resolved to do, rather than agree to the truce without recognition of your sovereignty forever,—I pray you to consider how many accidents and reproaches may befall you. Do you suppose that any ally of the states, or of your family, would risk his reputation and his realms in such a game, which would seem to be rather begun in passion and despair than required by reason or necessity?"

Here certainly was plain-speaking enough, and Maurice could no longer expect the king for his partner, should he decide to risk once more the bloody hazard of the die.

But Henry was determined to leave no shade of doubt on the subject.

"Lambert tells me," he said, "that you would rather perish with arms in your hands than fall shamefully into inevitable ruin by accepting truce. I have been and am of a contrary opinion. Perhaps I am mis-

taken, not knowing as well as you do the constitution of your country and the wishes of your people. But I know the general affairs of Christendom better than you do, and I can therefore judge more soundly on the whole matter than you can, and I know that the truce, established and guaranteed as proposed, will bring you more happiness than you can derive from war."

Thus the king, in the sweeping, slashing way with which he could handle an argument as well as a sword, strode forward in conscious strength, cutting down right and left all opposition to his will. He was determined, once for all, to show the stadholder and his adherents that the friendship of a great king was not to be had by a little republic on easy terms, nor every day. Above all, the Prince of Nassau was not to send a loud-talking, free-and-easy Dutch sea-captain to dictate terms to the King of France and Navarre. "Lambert tells me"—and Maurice might well wish that Pretty Lambert had been sunk in the Bay of Gibraltar, *Tiger* and all, before he had been sent on this diplomatic errand—"Lambert tells me," continued his Majesty, "that you and the States-General would rather that I should remain neutral, and let you make war in your own fashion, than that I should do anything more to push on this truce. My cousin, it would be very easy for me, and perhaps more advantageous for me and my kingdom than you think, if I could give you this satisfaction, whatever might be the result. If I chose to follow this counsel, I am, thanks be to God, in such condition that I have no neighbor who is not as much in need of me as I can be of him, and who is not glad to seek for and to preserve my friend-

ship. If they should all conspire against me, moreover, I can by myself, and with no assistance but Heaven's, which never failed me yet, wrestle with them altogether, and fling them all, as some of my royal predecessors have done. Know, then, that I do not favor war nor truce for the United Provinces because of any need I may have of the one or the other for the defense of my own scepter. The counsels and the succors which you have so largely received from me were given because of my consideration for the good of the states, and of yourself in particular, whom I have always favored and cherished, as I have done others of your house on many occasions."

The king concluded his lecture by saying that after his ambassadors had fulfilled their promise, and had spoken the last word of their master at The Hague, he should leave Maurice and the states to do as they liked.

"But I desire," he said, "that you and the states should not do that wrong to yourselves or to me as to doubt the integrity of my counsels nor the actions of my ambassadors. I am an honest man and a prince of my word, and not ignorant of the things of this world. Neither the states nor you, with your adherents, can permit my honor to be compromised without tarnishing your own, and without being branded for ingratitude. I say not this in order to reproach you for the past nor to make you despair of the future, but to defend the truth. I expect, therefore, that you will not fall into this fault, knowing you as I do. I pay more heed to what you said in your letter than in all Lambert's fine talk, and you will find out that nobody wishes your prosperity and that of the states

more sincerely than I do, or can be more useful to you than I can.”¹

There could be but little doubt in the mind of Prince Maurice, after this letter had been well pondered, that Barneveldt had won the game, and that the peace party had triumphed.

To resume the war, with the French king not merely neutral but angry and covertly hostile, and with the sovereign of Great Britain an almost open enemy in the garb of an ally, might well seem a desperate course.

And Maurice, although strongly opposed to the truce and confident in his opinions at this crisis, was not a desperado.

He saw at once the necessity of dismounting from the high horse upon which, it must be confessed, he had been inclined for more rough-riding of late than the situation warranted. Peace was unattainable, war was impossible, truce was inevitable; Berneveldt was master of the field.

The prince acquiesced in the result which the letter from the French king so plainly indicated. He was, however, more incensed than ever against Barneveldt; for he felt himself not only checkmated but humiliated by the advocate, and believed him a traitor, who was selling the Republic to Spain. It was long since the two had exchanged a word.

Maurice now declared, on more than one occasion, that it was useless for him any longer to attempt opposition to the policy of truce. The states must travel on the road which they had chosen, but it should not

¹ I have abbreviated this remarkable letter, but of course the text of the passages cited is literally given.

be under his guidance, and he renounced all responsibility for the issue.

Dreading disunion, however, more than aught else that could befall the Republic, he now did his best to bring about the return of Zealand to the federal councils. He was successful.¹ The deputies from that province reappeared in the States-General on the 11th November. They were still earnest, however, in their opposition to the truce, and warmly maintained, in obedience to instructions, that the Union of Utrecht forbade the conclusion of a treaty except by unanimous consent of the seven provinces. They were very fierce in their remonstrances, and again talked loudly of secession. After consultation with Barneveldt, the French envoys now thought it their duty to take the recalcitrant Zealanders in hand, Maurice having, as it were, withdrawn from the contest.

On the 18th November, accordingly, Jeannin once more came very solemnly before the States-General, accompanied by his diplomatic colleagues.²

He showed the impossibility of any arrangement except by the submission of Zealand to a vote of the majority. "It is certain," he said, "that six provinces will never be willing to be conquered by a single one, nor permit her to assert that, according to a fundamental law of the commonwealth, her dissent can prevent the others from forming a definite conclusion.

"It is not for us," continued the president, "who are strangers in your Republic, to interpret your laws, but common sense teaches us that, if such a law exist,

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 58. Jeannin.

² The speech of the president is given in full in his *Négociations* (Jeannin, ii. 106-112).

it could only have been made in order to forbid a surrender.

“If any one wishes to expound it otherwise, to him we would reply in the words of an ancient Roman, who said of a law which seemed to him pernicious, that at least the tablet upon which it was inscribed, if it could not be destroyed, should be hidden out of sight. Thus at least the citizens might escape observing it, when it was plain that it would cause detriment to the Republic, and they might then put in its place the most ancient of all laws, *salus populi suprema lex*.”

The president, having suggested this ingenious expedient of the antique Roman for getting rid of a constitutional provision by hiding the statute-book, proceeded to give very practical reasons for setting up the supreme law of the people's safety on this occasion. And certainly that magnificent commonplace, which has saved and ruined so many states, the most effective weapon in the political arsenal, whether wielded by tyrants or champions of freedom, was not unreasonably recommended at this crisis to the states in their contest with the refractory Zealanders. It was easy to talk big, but, after all, it would be difficult for that doughty little sand-bank, notwithstanding the indomitable energy which it had so often shown by land and sea, to do battle by itself with the whole Spanish empire. Nor was it quite consistent with republican principles that the other six provinces should be plunged once more into war, when they had agreed to accept peace and independence instead, only that Zeeland should have its way.

The orator went on to show the absurdity, in his opinion, of permitting one province to continue the war, when all seven united had not the means to do it with-

out the assistance of their allies. He pointed out, too, the immense blunders that would be made should it be thought that the Kings of France and England were so much interested in saving the provinces from perdition as to feel obliged in any event to render them assistance.

"Beware of committing an irreparable fault," he said, "on so insecure a foundation. You are deceiving yourselves. And, in order that there may be no doubt on the subject, we declare to you by express command that if your adversaries refuse the truce, according to the articles presented to you by us, it is the intention of our kings to assist you with armies and subsidies, not only as during the past, but more powerfully than before. If, on the contrary, the rupture comes from your side, and you despise the advice they are giving you, you have no succor to expect from them. The refusal of conditions so honorable and advantageous to your commonwealth will render the war a useless one, and they are determined to do nothing to bring the reproach upon themselves."

The president then intimated, not without adroitness, that the Republic was placing herself in a proud position by accepting the truce, and that Spain was abasing herself by giving her consent to it. The world was surprised that the states should hesitate at all.¹

There was much more of scholastic dissertation in the president's address, but enough has been given to show its very peremptory character.

If the war was to go on it was to be waged mainly by Zealand alone. This was now plain beyond all peradventure. The other provinces had resolved to accept the proposed treaty. The cities of Delft and

¹ Jeannin, *ubi sup.*

Amsterdam, which had stood out so long among the estates of Holland, soon renounced their opposition. Prince Maurice, with praiseworthy patriotism, reconciled himself with the inevitable, and, now that the great majority had spoken, began to use his influence with the factious minority.

On the day after Jeannin's speech he made a visit to the French ambassadors. After there had been some little discussion among them, Barneveldt made his appearance. His visit seemed an accidental one, but it had been previously arranged with the envoys.¹

The general conversation went on a little longer, when the advocate, frankly turning to the prince, spoke of the pain which he felt at the schism between them. He defended himself with honest warmth against the rumors circulated, in which he was accused of being a Spanish partizan. His whole life had been spent in fighting Spain, and he was now more determined than ever in his hostility to that monarchy. He sincerely believed that by the truce now proposed all the solid advantages of the war would be secured, and that such a result was a triumphant one for the Republic. He was also most desirous of being restored to the friendship and good opinion of the house of Nassau, having proved during his whole life his sincere attachment to their interests, a sentiment never more lively in his breast than at that moment.²

This advance was graciously met by the stadholder, and the two distinguished personages were, for the time at least, reconciled.³

It was further debated as to the number of troops

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 59, 60. Compare Wagenaer, ix. 422, 423.

² Van der Kemp, Wagenaer, ubi sup.

³ Ibid.

that it would be advisable for the states to maintain during the truce, and Barneveldt expressed his decided opinion that thirty thousand men, at least, would be required. This opinion gave the prince at least as much pleasure as did the personal devotion expressed by the advocate, and he now stated his intention of working with the peace party.

The great result was now certain. Delft and Amsterdam withdrew from their opposition to the treaty, so that Holland was unanimous before the year closed; Zealand, yielding to the influence of Maurice, likewise gave in her adhesion to the truce.

The details of the mode in which the final arrangement was made are not especially interesting. The discussion was fairly at an end. The subject had been picked to the bones. It was agreed that the French ambassadors should go over the frontier and hold a preliminary interview with the Spanish commissioners at Antwerp.

The armistice was to be continued by brief and repeated renewals, until it should be superseded by the truce of years.

Meantime Archduke Albert sent his father confessor, Inigo Brizuelas, to Spain, in order to make the treaty proposed by Jeannin palatable to the king.¹

The priest was to set forth to Philip, as only a ghostly confessor could do with full effect, that he need not trouble himself about the recognition by the proposed treaty of the independence of the United Provinces. Ambiguous words had been purposely made use of in this regard, he was to explain, so that not only the foreign ambassadors were of opinion that

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 425, 426. Jeannin.

the rights of Spain were not curtailed, but the emptiness of the imaginary recognition of Dutch freedom had been proved by the sharp criticism of the states.

It is true that Richardot, in the name of the archduke, had three months before promised the consent of the king, as having already been obtained. But Richardot knew very well when he made the statement that it was false. The archduke, in subsequent correspondence with the ambassadors in December, repeated the pledge. Yet not only had the king not given that consent, but he had expressly refused it by a courier sent in November.¹

Philip, now convinced by Brother Inigo that while agreeing to treat with the States-General as with a free commonwealth, over which he pretended to no authority, he really meant that he was dealing with vassals over whom his authority was to be resumed when it suited his convenience, at last gave his consent to the proposed treaty. The royal decision was, however, kept for a time concealed, in order that the states might become more malleable.²

¹ Documents in Deventer, iii. 273.

² Wagenaer, ix. 425, 426. Jeannin. The reasoning was quite in accordance with the views of the French court. "Maintenant la caption est tout claire," wrote Aertsens, "en ce qu'ils refusent d'ôter le mot comme. Et ajoutent nos amis, que cette clause a esté conçue ainsi douteusement par M. Janin, pour au bout des dix ans réserver au roy de nous déclarer libres ou non selon que le Roy d'Espagne luy tiendra parole sur les mariages."—Deventer, iii. 275. "If a peace it prove," wrote Cornwallis from Madrid, "such are the difficulties as for my own part I should think it like the peace of God, which passeth all understanding."—Winwood, ii. 387.

CHAPTER LII

Vote of the States-General on the groundwork of the treaty—Meeting of the plenipotentiaries for arrangement of the truce—Signing of the twelve years' truce—Its purport—The negotiations concluded—Ratification by the States-General, the archdukes, and the King of Spain—Question of toleration—Appeal of President Jeannin on behalf of the Catholics—Religious liberty the fruit of the war—Internal arrangements of the states under the rule of peace—Deaths of John, Duke of Cleves, and Jacob Arminius—Doctrines of Arminius and Gomarus—Theological warfare—Twenty years' truce between the Turkish and Roman empires—Ferdinand of Styria—Religious peace—Prospects of the future.

ON the 11th January, 1609, the States-General decided by unanimous vote that the first point in the treaty should be not otherwise fixed than thus:

“That the archdukes—to superfluity—declare, as well in their own name as in that of the King of Spain, their willingness to treat with the lords States of the United Provinces in the capacity of, and as holding them for, free countries, provinces, and states, over which they have no claim, and that they are making a treaty with them in those said names and qualities.”¹

It was also resolved not to permit that any ecclesiastical or secular matters conflicting with the above-

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 429, 430.

mentioned freedom should be proposed, nor that any delay should be sought for by reason of the India navigation or any other point.

In case anything to the contrary should be attempted by the king or the archdukes, and the deliberations protracted in consequence more than eight days, it was further decided by unanimous vote that the negotiations should at once be broken off, and the war forthwith renewed, with the help, if possible, of the kings, princes, and states, friends of the good cause.¹

This vigorous vote was entirely the work of Barneveldt, the man whom his enemies dared to denounce as the partizan of Spain, and to hold up as a traitor deserving of death. It was entirely within his knowledge that a considerable party in the provinces had grown so weary of the war, and so much alarmed at the prospect of the negotiations for truce coming to naught, as to be ready to go into a treaty without a recognition of the independence of the states. This base faction was thought to be instigated by the English government, intriguing secretly with President Richardot. The advocate, acting in full sympathy with Jeannin, frustrated the effects of the manœuvre by obtaining all the votes of Holland and Zealand for this supreme resolution. The other five provinces dared to make no further effort in that direction against the two controlling states of the Republic.

It was now agreed that the French and English ambassadors should delay going to Antwerp until informed of the arrival in that city of Spinola and his colleagues, and that they should then proceed thither, taking with them the main points of the treaty, as laid

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 429, 430.

down by themselves and accepted with slight alterations by the states.¹

When the Spanish commissioners had signed these points the plenipotentiaries were to come to Antwerp in order to settle other matters of less vital import. Meantime the States-General were to be summoned to assemble in Bergen-op-Zoom, that they might be ready to deal with difficulties, should any arise.²

The first meeting took place on the 10th February, 1609. The first objection to the draft was made by the Spaniards. It was about words and wind. They liked not the title of "high and puissant lords"³ which was given to the States-General, and they proposed to turn the difficulty by abstaining from giving any qualifications whatever, either to the archdukes or the republican authorities. The states refused to lower these ensigns of their new-born power. It was, however, at last agreed that, instead of "high and mighty," they should be called "illustrious and serene."⁴

This point being comfortably adjusted, the next and most important one was accepted by the Spaniards. The independence of the states was recognized according to the prescribed form. Then came the great bone of contention, over which there had been such persistent wrangling—the India trade.

The Spanish government had almost registered a vow in heaven that the word "India" should not be mentioned in the treaty. It was no less certain that

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 431. Jeannin.

² Ibid. Jeannin. Grotius, xviii.

³ Ibid., 132. "Hoogmogende heeren," "hauts et puissants seigneurs."

⁴ Wagenaer, ix. 432.

India was stamped upon the very heart of the Republic, and could not be torn from it while life remained. The subtle diplomatists now invented a phrase in which the word should not appear, while the thing itself should be granted. The Spaniards, after much altercation, at last consented.¹

By the end of February most of the plenipotentiaries thought it safe to request the appearance of the States-General at Bergen-op-Zoom.²

Jeannin, not altogether satisfied, however, with the language of the Spaniards in regard to India, raised doubts as to the propriety of issuing the summons. Putting on his most reverend and artless expression of countenance, he assured Richardot that he had just received a despatch from The Hague to the effect that the India point would, in all probability, cause the states at that very moment to break off the negotiations.³ It was surely premature, therefore, to invite them to Bergen. The despatch from The Hague was a neat fiction on the part of the president, but it worked admirably. The other president, himself quite as ready at inventions as Jeannin could possibly be, was nevertheless taken in, the two ex-Leaguers being, on the whole, fully a match for each other in the art of intrigue. Richardot, somewhat alarmed, insisted that the states should send their plenipotentiaries to Antwerp as soon as possible. He would answer for it that they would not go away again without settling upon

¹ "Huic additamento Hispanici valde reluctabantur tum quod Indiam non minus quam si nominaretur claris indicibus exprimeret," etc.—Grotius, xviii. 808, 809.

² Wagenaer, ix. 432, 433, 434. Jeannin, vol. ii. Resol. Holl., March 4, 1609.

³ Jeannin, ii. 383.

the treaty.¹ The commissioners were forbidden, by express order from Spain, to name the Indies in writing, but they would solemnly declare, by word of mouth, that the states should have full liberty to trade to those countries, the King of Spain having no intention of interfering with such traffic during the period of the truce.²

The commissioners came to Antwerp. The States-General assembled at Bergen. On the 9th April, 1609, the truce for twelve years was signed. This was its purport:

The preamble recited that the most serene princes and archdukes, Albert and Isabella Clara Eugenia, had made, on the 24th April, 1607, a truce and cessation of arms for eight months with the illustrious lords the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, in quality of, and as holding them for, states, provinces, and free countries, over which they pretended to nothing; which truce was ratified by his Catholic Majesty, as to that which concerned him, by letters patent of 18th September, 1607; and that, moreover, a special power had been given to the archdukes on the 10th January, 1608, to enable them, in the king's name as well as their own, to do everything that they might think proper to bring about a peace or a truce of many years.

It then briefly recited the rupture of the negotiations for peace, and the subsequent proposition, originated by the foreign ambassadors, to renew the conference for the purpose of concluding a truce. The articles of the treaty thus agreed upon were:

That the archdukes declared, as well in their own

¹ Jeannin, ii. 333.

² Winwood, ii. 489.

name as that of the king, that they were content to treat with the lords the States-General of the United Provinces in quality of, and as holding them for, countries, provinces, and free states, over which they pretended to nothing, and to make with them a truce on certain following conditions, to wit:

That the truce should be good, firm, loyal, inviolable, and for the term of twelve years, during which time there was to be cessation of all acts of hostility between the king, archdukes, and States-General, as well by sea and other waters as by land, in all their kingdoms, countries, lands, and lordships, and for all their subjects and inhabitants of whatever quality and condition, without exception of places or of persons;

That each party should remain seized of their respective possessions, and be not troubled therein by the other party during the truce;

That the subjects and inhabitants of the respective countries should preserve amity and good correspondence during the truce, without referring to past offenses, and should freely and securely entertain communication and traffic with each other by land and sea. This provision, however, was to be expressly understood as limited by the king to the kingdoms and countries possessed by him in Europe, and in other places and seas where the subjects of other kings and princes, his friends and allies, have amicable traffic. In regard, however, to places, cities, ports, and harbors which he possessed outside of those limits, the states and their subjects were to exercise no traffic without express permission of the king. They could, however, if they chose, trade with the countries of all other

princes, potentates, and peoples who were willing to permit it, even outside those limits, without any hindrance by the king;

That the truce should begin in regard to those distant countries after a year from date, unless actual notification could be sooner served there on those concerned;

That the subjects of the United Provinces should have the same liberty and privilege within the states of the king and archdukes as had been accorded to the subjects of the King of Great Britain, according to the last treaty made with that sovereign;

That letters of marque and reprisal should not be granted during the truce, except for special cause, and in cases permitted by the laws and imperial constitutions, and according to the rules therein prescribed;

That those who had retired into neutral territory during the war were also to enjoy the benefit of the truce, and could reside wherever they liked without being deprived of their property;

That the treaty should be ratified by the archdukes and the States-General within four days. As to the ratification of the king, the archdukes were bound to deliver it in good and due form within three months, in order that the lords the States-General, their subjects and inhabitants, might enjoy effectively the fruits of the treaty;

That the treaty should be published everywhere immediately after the ratification of the archdukes and States-General.

This document was signed by the ambassadors of the Kings of France and Great Britain, as mediators, and

then by the deputies of the archdukes, and afterward by those of the lords the States-General.¹

There were thirty-eight articles in all, but the chief provisions have been indicated. The other clauses, relating to boundaries, confiscations, regulations of duties, frontier fortifications, the estates of the Nassau family, and other sequestered property, have no abiding interest.

There was also a secret and special treaty which was demanded of the King of Spain by the States-General, and by him accorded.

This secret treaty consisted of a single clause. That clause was made up of a brief preamble and of a promise. The preamble recited textually Article IV. of the public treaty relative to the India trade. The promise was to this effect:² For the period of the truce the Spanish commissioners pledged the faith of the king and of his successors that his Majesty would cause no impediment, whether by sea or land, to the states nor their subjects in the traffic that thereafter might be made in the countries of all princes, potentates, and peoples who might permit the same, in whatever place it might be, even without the limits designated, and everywhere else, nor similarly to those carrying on such traffic with them, and that the king and his successors would faithfully carry into effect everything thus laid down, so that the said traffic should be free and secure, consenting even, in order that the clause might be the more authentic, that it should be consid-

¹ See the treaty in full in Jeannin, ii. 446-457. Compare Meteren, 613.

² The text of the second treaty is given in Jeannin, ii. 457, 458.

ered as inserted in the principal treaty and as making part thereof.¹

It will be perceived that the first article of all and the last or secret article contained the whole marrow of the treaty. It may be well understood, therefore, with what wry faces the Spanish plenipotentiaries ultimately signed the document.

After two years and a quarter of dreary negotiation the Republic had carried all its points, without swerving a hair's-breadth from the principles laid down in the beginning. The only concession made was that the treaty was for a truce of twelve years, and not for peace. But as, after all, in those days, an interval of twelve years might be almost considered an eternity of peace, and as calling a peace perpetual can never make it so, the difference was rather one of phraseology than of fact.

On the other hand, the states had extorted from their former sovereign a recognition of their independence.

They had secured the India trade.

They had not conceded Catholic worship.

Mankind were amazed at this result—an event hitherto unknown in history. When before had a sovereign acknowledged the independence of his rebellious subjects and signed a treaty with them as with equals? When before had Spain, expressly or by implication, admitted that the East and West Indies were not her private property, and that navigators to those regions from other countries than her own were not to be chastised as trespassers and freebooters?

Yet the liberty of the Netherlands was acknowledged

¹ Jeannin, ii. 457, 458.

in terms which convinced the world that it was henceforth an established fact. And India was as plainly expressed by the omission of the word as if it had been engrossed in large capitals in Article IV.¹

The king's government might seek solace in syntax. They might triumph in Cardinal Bentivoglio's subtleties, and persuade themselves that to treat with the republic *as* a free nation was not to hold it *for* a free nation then and forever. But the whole world knew that the Republic really was free, and that it had treated face to face with its former sovereign exactly as the King of France or Great Britain, or the Grand Turk, might treat with him. The new commonwealth had taken its place among the nations of the earth. Other princes and potentates made not the slightest difficulty in recognizing it for an independent power and entering into treaties and alliances with it as with any other realm.

To the Republic the substantial blessing of liberty; to his Catholic Majesty the grammatical quirk. When the twelve years should expire, Spain might reconquer the United Provinces if she could, relying upon the great truth that an adverb was not a preposition. And

¹ The words, too, of the certificate signed by the ambassadors of France and England were very explicit: "Certifion aussi les députés des archiducs avoir consenty et accordé tout, ainsi que les sieurs estats et leurs sujets ne pourront trafiquer aux ports, lieux et places que tiennent les dits sieurs estats ès dites Indes si ce n'est avec leur permission. Et outre ce que les députés des dits sieurs ont déclaré plusieurs fois en notre présence et des députés des archiducs, si on entreprend sur leurs amis et allies ès dits pays qu'ils entendent les secourir et assister sans qu'on puisse prétendre la trefve estre enfreinte et violée à cette occasion."—Anvers, 9 Avril, 1609, *Négociations de Jeannin*, ii. 458, 459.

France or Great Britain might attempt the same thing if either felt strong enough for the purpose. Did as plausible a pretext as that ever fail to a state ambitious of absorbing its neighbors?

Jeannin was right enough in urging that this famous clause of recognition ought to satisfy both parties. If the United Provinces, he said, happened not to have the best muskets and cannons on their side when it should once more come to blows, small help would they derive from verbal bulwarks and advantages in the text of treaties.¹

Richardot consoled himself with his quibbles, for quibbles were his daily bread. "Thank God our truce is made," said he, "and we have only lost the sovereignty for twelve years, if after that we have the means or the will to resume the war—whatever Don Pedro de Toledo may say."²

Barneveldt, on his part, was devoutly and soberly pleased with the result. "To-day we have concluded our negotiations for the truce," he wrote to Aertsens. "We must pray to the Lord God, and we must do our highest duty that our work may redound to his honor and glory and to the nation's welfare. It is certain that men will make their criticisms upon it according to their humors. But those who love their country, and all honest people who know the condition of the land, will say that it is well done."³

Thus modestly, religiously, and sincerely spoke a statesman who felt that he had accomplished a great work, and that he had indeed brought the commonwealth through the tempest at last.

¹ Bentivoglio, 576.

² Deventer, iii. 308.

³ Ibid., 309.

The Republic had secured the India trade. On this point the negotiators had taken refuge in that most useful figure of speech for hard-pressed diplomatists and law-makers, the ellipsis. They had left out the word "India," and his Catholic Majesty might persuade himself that by such omission a hemisphere had actually been taken away from the Dutch merchants and navigators. But the whole world saw that Article IV. really contained both the East and West Indies. It hardly needed the secret clause to make assurance doubly sure.

President Richardot was facetiously wont to observe that this point in the treaty was so obscure that he did not understand it himself.¹ But he knew better. He understood it very well. The world understood it very well. The United Provinces had throughout the negotiations ridiculed the idea of being excluded from any part of the Old World or the New by reason of the Borgian grant. All the commissioners knew that the war would be renewed if any attempt were to be seriously made to put up those famous railings around the ocean, of which the Dutch diplomatists spoke in such bitter scorn. The Spanish plenipotentiaries, therefore, had insisted that the word itself should be left out, and that the Republic should be forbidden access to territories subject to the crown of Spain.

So the Hollanders were thenceforth to deal directly with the kings of Sumatra and the Moluccas, and the republics of Banda, and all the rich commonwealths and principalities of nutmegs, cloves, and indigo, unless, as grew every day more improbable, the Spaniards and Portuguese could exclude them from that traffic

¹ Bentivoglio, 576.

by main force. And the orange flag of the Republic was to float with equal facility over all America, from the isle of Manhattan to the shores of Brazil and the Straits of Magellan, provided Philip had not ships and soldiers to vindicate with the sword that sovereignty which Spanish swords and Spanish genius had once acquired.

As for the Catholic worship, the future was to prove that liberty for the old religion and for all forms of religion was a blessing more surely to flow from the enlightened public sentiment of a free people, emerging out of the most tremendous war for liberty ever waged, than from the stipulations of a treaty with a foreign power.

It was characteristic enough of the parties engaged in the great political drama that the Republic now requested from France and Great Britain a written recognition of its independence, and that both France and England refused.¹

It was strange that the new commonwealth, in the very moment of extorting her freedom from the ancient tyranny, should be so unconscious of her strength as to think free papers from neutral powers a boon. As if the sign manual of James and Henry were a better guaranty than the trophies of the Nassaus, of Heemskerk, of Matelieff, and of Olden-Barneveldt!

It was not strange that the two sovereigns should decline the proposition; for we well know the secret aspirations of each, and it was natural that they should be unwilling to sign a formal quitclaim, however improbable it might be that those dreams should ever become a reality.

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 445. Jeannin, vol. ii.

Both powers, however, united in a guaranty of the truce. This was signed on the 17th June, and stipulated that, without their knowledge and consent, the states should make no treaty during the period of truce with the King of Spain or the archdukes. On the other hand, in case of an infraction of the truce by the enemy, the two kings agreed to lend assistance to the states in the manner provided by the treaties concluded with the Republic previously to the negotiation of the truce.¹

The treaty had been at once ratified by the States-General, assembled for the purpose with an extraordinary number of deputies at Bergen-op-Zoom. It was also ratified without delay by the archdukes. The delivery of the confirmation by his Catholic Majesty had been promised within three months after the signatures of the plenipotentiaries.

It would, however, have been altogether inconsistent with the dignity and the traditions of the Spanish court to fulfil this stipulation. It was not to be expected that "I the King" could be written either by the monarch himself, or by his *alter ego* the Duke of Lerma, in so short a time as a quarter of a year.

Several weeks accordingly went by after the expiration of the stated period. The ratification did not come, and the Netherlands began to be once more indignant. Before the storm had risen very high, however, the despatches arrived. The king's signature was antedated 7th April, being thus brought within the term of three months, and was a thorough confirmation of what had been done by his plenipotentiaries. His Majesty, however, expressed a hope that during

¹ Jeannin, ii. 536, 538. Wagenaer, ix. 446.

the truce the states would treat their Catholic subjects with kindness.¹

Certainly no exception could be taken to so reasonable an intimation as this. President Jeannin, too, just before his departure, handed in to the States-General an eloquent appeal on behalf of the Catholics of the Netherlands, a paper which was not immediately made public.²

“Consider the great number of Catholics,” he said, “in your territory, both in the cities and the country. Remember that they have worked with you, spent their property, have been exposed to the same dangers, and have always kept their fidelity to the commonwealth inviolate as long as the war endured, never complaining that they did not enjoy liberty of religious worship, believing that you had thus ordained because the public safety required such guaranty. But they always promised themselves, should the end of the war be happy, and should you be placed in the enjoyment of entire freedom, that they too would have some part in this good fortune, even as they had been sharers in the inconveniences, the expenses, and the perils of the war.

“But those cannot be said to share in any enjoyment from whom has been taken the power of serving God according to the religion in which they were brought up. On the contrary, no slavery is more intolerable nor more exasperates the mind than such restraint. You know this well, my lords states; you know, too, that it was the principal, the most puissant cause that

¹ Meteren, xxx. 579^{vo}. Wagenaer, ix. 467.

² Jeannin (ii. 589–597) gives the whole text of his address on this occasion.

made you fly to arms and scorn all dangers in order to effect your deliverance from this servitude. You know that it has excited similar movements in various parts of Christendom, and even in the kingdom of France, with such fortunate success everywhere as to make it appear that God had so willed it, in order to prove that religion ought to be taught and inspired by the movements which come from the Holy Ghost, and not by the force of man. Thus kings and princes should be induced by the evils and ruin which they and their subjects have suffered from this cause, as by a sentiment of their own interest, to take more care than has hitherto been taken to practise in good earnest those remedies which were wont to be used at a time when the church was in its greatest piety, in order to correct the abuses and errors which the corruption of mankind had tried to introduce as being the true and sole means of uniting all Christians in one and the same creed."

Surely the world had made progress in these forty years of war. Was it not something to gain for humanity, for intellectual advancement, for liberty of thought, for the true interests of religion, that a Roman Catholic, an ex-Leaguer, a trusted representative of the immediate successor of Charles IX. and Henry III., could stand up on the blood-stained soil of the Netherlands and plead for liberty of conscience for all mankind?

"Those cannot be said to share in any enjoyment from whom has been taken the power of serving God according to the religion in which they have been brought up. No slavery is more intolerable nor more exasperating to the mind than such restraint."

Most true, O excellent president! No axiom in mathematics is more certain than this simple statement. To prove its truth William the Silent had lived and died. To prove it a falsehood, emperors and kings and priests had issued bans and curses and damnable decrees. To root it out they had butchered, drowned, shot, strangled, poisoned, tortured, roasted alive, buried alive, starved, and driven mad thousands and tens of thousands of their fellow-creatures. And behold, there had been almost a century of this work, and yet the great truth was not rooted out, after all; and the devil-worshippers, who had sought at the outset of the great war to establish the Holy Inquisition in the Netherlands upon the ruins of religious and political liberty, were overthrown at last and driven back into the pit. It was progress; it was worth all the blood and treasure which had been spilled, that, instead of the Holy Inquisition, there was now holy liberty of thought.

That there should have been a party, that there should have been an individual here and there, after the great victory was won, to oppose the doctrine which the Catholic president now so nobly advocated, would be enough to cause every believer in progress to hide his face in the dust, did we not know that the march of events was destined to trample such opposition out of existence, and had not history proved to us that the great lesson of the war was not to be rendered naught by the efforts of a few fanatics. Religious liberty was the ripened and consummate fruit, and it could not but be gathered.

"Consider, too," continued the president, "how much injury your refusal, if you give it, will cause to

those of your religion in the places where they are the weakest, and where they are every day imploring with tears and lamentations the grace of those Catholic sovereigns to whom they are subject, to enable them to enjoy the same religious liberty which our king is now demanding in favor of the Catholics among you. Do not cause it to come again into the minds of those sovereigns and their peoples, whom an inconsiderate zeal has often driven into violence and ferocity against Protestants, that a war to compel the weakest to follow the religion of the strongest is just and lawful."

Had not something been gained for the world when this language was held by a Catholic on the very spot where less than a half-century before the whole population of the Netherlands, men, women, and children, had been condemned to death by a foreign tyrant, for the simple reason that it was just, legal, and a Christian duty to punish the weak for refusing to follow the religion of the strong?

"As for the perils which some affect to fear," said Jeannin, further, "if this liberty of worship is accorded, experience teaches us every day that diversity of religion is not the cause of the ruin of states, and that a government does not cease to be good, nor its subjects to live in peace and friendship with one another, rendering due obedience to the laws and to their rulers as well as if they had all been of the same religion, without having another thought save for the preservation of the dignity and grandeur of the state in which God had caused them to be born. The danger is not in the permission, but in the prohibition of religious liberty."

All this seems commonplace enough to us on the

western side of the Atlantic, in the middle of the nineteenth century, but it would have been rank blasphemy in New England in the middle of the seventeenth, many years after Jeannin spoke. It was a horrible sound, too, in the ears of some of his audience.

To the pretense so often urged by the Catholic persecutors, and now set up by their Calvinistic imitators, that those who still clung to the old religion were at liberty to depart from the land, the president replied with dignified scorn.

“With what justice,” he asked, “can you drive into exile people who have committed no offense, and who have helped to conquer the very country from which you would now banish them? If you do drive them away, you will make solitudes in your commonwealth, which will be the cause of evils such as I prefer that you should reflect upon without my declaring them now. Although these reasons,” he continued, “would seem sufficient to induce you to accord the free and public exercise of the Catholic religion, the king, not hoping as much as that, because aware that you are not disposed to go so far, is content to request only this grace in behalf of the Catholics, that you will tolerate them, and suffer them to have some exercise of their religion within their own households, without interference or inquiry on that account, and without execution of the rigorous decrees heretofore enforced against them.”

Certainly if such wholesome, moderate, and modest counsels as these had been rejected, it would have been sound doctrine to proclaim that the world did not move. And there were individuals enough, even an influential party, prepared to oppose them for both

technical and practical reasons. And the cause of intolerance derived much warmth and comfort at this juncture from that great luminary of theology and political philosophy, the King of Great Britain. Direful and solemn were the warnings uttered by James to the Republic against permitting the old religion, or any religion save his own religion, to obtain the slightest foothold within her borders.

“Let the religion be taught and preached in its purity throughout your provinces without the least mixture,” said Sir Ralph Winwood, in the name of his sovereign.

“On this foundation the justice of your cause is built. There is but one verity. Those who are willing to tolerate any religion, whatever it may be, and try to make you believe that liberty for both is necessary in your commonwealth, are paving the way toward atheism.”¹

Such were the counsels of King James to the United States of the Netherlands against harboring Catholics. A few years later he was casting forth Calvinists from his own dominions as if they had been lepers; and they went forth on their weary pilgrimage to the howling wilderness of North America, those exiled Calvinists, to build a greater republic than had ever been dreamed of before on this planet; and they went forth, not to preach, but in their turn to denounce toleration and to hang heretics. “He who would tolerate another religion that his own may be tolerated would, if need be, hang God’s Bible at the devil’s girdle.” So spoke an early Massachusetts Pilgrim, in the very spirit, almost the very words, of the royal

¹ Cited in Van der Kemp, iii. 264.

persecutor who had driven him into outer darkness beyond the seas. He had not learned the lesson of the mighty movement in which he was a pioneer, any more than Gomarus or Uytenbogart had comprehended why the Dutch Republic had risen.

Yet the founders of the two commonwealths, the United States of the seventeenth and of the nineteenth centuries, although many of them fiercely intolerant, through a natural instinct of resistance, not only to the oppressor but to the creed of the oppressor, had been breaking out the way, not to atheism, as King James believed, but to the only garden in which Christianity can perennially flourish—religious liberty.

Those most ardent and zealous pathfinders may be forgiven, in view of the inestimable benefits conferred by them upon humanity, that they did not travel on their own road. It should be sufficient for us if we make due use of their great, imperishable work ourselves, and if we never cease rendering thanks to the Omnipotent that there is at least one great nation on the globe where the words "toleration" and "dissenter" have no meaning whatever.

For the Dutch fanatics of the Reformed Church, at the moment of the truce, to attempt to reverse the course of events, and to shut off the mighty movement of the great revolt from its destined expanse, was as hopeless a dream as to drive back the Rhine, as it reached the ocean, into the narrow channel of the Rheinwald glacier, whence it sprang.

The Republic became the refuge for the oppressed of all nations, where Jews and Gentiles, Catholics, Calvinists, and Anabaptists, prayed after their own manner to the same God and Father. It was too much,

however, to hope that passions which had been so fiercely bubbling during fifty years would subside at once, and that the most intense religious hatreds that ever existed would exhale with the proclamation of truce. The march of humanity is rarely rapid enough to keep pace with the leaders in its most sublime movements, and it often happens that its chieftains are dwarfed, in the estimation of the contemporaneous vulgar, by the very distance at which they precede their unconscious followers. But even if the progress of the human mind toward the truth is fated to be a spiral one, as if to remind us that mankind is of the earth, earthy, a worm in the dust while inhabiting this lower sphere, it is at least a consolation to reflect upon the gradual advancement of the intellect from age to age.

The spirit of Torquemada, of Charles, of Philip, of Titelmann, is even now not extinct on this globe, but there are counter-forces at work which must ultimately blast it into insignificance. At the moment of the great truce that evil spirit was not exorcised from the human breast, but the number of its victims and the intensity of its influence had already miraculously diminished.

The truce was made and announced all over the Netherlands by the ringing of bells, the happy discharge of innocent artillery, by illuminations, by Te Deums in all the churches. Papist and Presbyterian fell on their knees in every grand cathedral or humblest village church, to thank God that what had seemed the eternal butchery was over. The inhabitants of the United and of the obedient Netherlands rushed across the frontiers into a fraternal embrace,

like the meeting of many waters when the flood-gates are lifted. It was pity that the foreign sovereignty established at Brussels could not then and there have been forever swept away, and self-government and beneficent union extended over all the seventeen Netherlands, Walloon and Flemish, Catholic and Reformed. But it hardly needs a word to show that the course of events had created a deeper chasm between the two sections than the gravest physical catastrophe could have produced. The opposing cliffs which religious hatred had rent asunder, and between which it seemed destined to flow forever, seemed very close, and yet eternally separated.

The great war had established the Republic, and apparently doomed the obedient Netherlands to perpetual servitude.

There were many details of minor importance to be settled between the various governments involved in these great transactions; but this history draws to its predestined close, and it is necessary to glide rapidly over matters which rather belong to a later epoch than the one now under consideration.

The treaty between the Republic and the government of Great Britain, according to which each was to assist the other in case of war with four thousand troops and twenty ships of war, was confirmed in the treaty of truce. The debt of the United Provinces to the crown of England was definitely reckoned at 8,184,080 florins, and it was settled by the truce that 200,000 florins should be paid semiannually, to begin with the year 1611, until the whole debt should be discharged.¹

¹ Meteren, 614^{vo}.

The army establishment of the Republic was fixed during the truce at thirty thousand infantry and three thousand horse. This was a reduction from the war footing of fifteen thousand men. Of the force retained, four thousand were a French legion maintained by the king, two thousand other French at the expense of the states and distributed among other troops, two thousand Scotch, three thousand English, three thousand Germans. The rest were native Netherlanders, among whom, however, were very few Hollanders and Zealanders, from which races the navy, both public and mercantile, was almost wholly supplied.

The revenue of the United Provinces was estimated at between seven and eight millions of florins.

It is superfluous to call attention again to the wonderful smallness of the means, the minuteness of the physical enginery, as compared with more modern manifestations, especially in our own land and epoch, by which so stupendous a result had been reached. In the midst of an age in which regal and sacerdotal despotism had seemed as omnipotent and irreversible as the elemental laws of the universe, the Republic had been reproduced. A commonwealth of sand-banks, lagoons, and meadows, less than fourteen thousand square miles in extent, had done battle for nearly half a century with the greatest of existing powers, a realm whose territory was nearly a third of the globe, and which claimed universal monarchy. And this had been done with an army averaging forty-six thousand men, half of them foreigners hired by the job, and by a seafaring population, volunteering into ships of every class and denomination, from a flyboat to a galiot of war.

And when the Republic had won its independence, after this almost eternal warfare, it owed four or five millions of dollars, and had sometimes an annual revenue of nearly that amount.

It was estimated by Barneveldt, at the conclusion of the truce, that the interest on the public debt of Spain was about thrice the amount of the yearly income of the Republic, and it was characteristic of the financial ideas of the period that fears were entertained lest a total repudiation of that burden by the Spanish government would enable it to resume the war against the provinces with redoubled energy.¹

The annual salary of Prince Maurice, who was to see his chief occupation gone by the cessation of the war, was fixed by the states at one hundred and twenty thousand florins.² It was agreed that in case of his marriage he should receive a further yearly sum of twenty-five thousand florins, and this addition was soon afterward voted to him outright,³ it being obvious that the prince would remain all his days a bachelor.

Count Frederick Henry likewise received a military salary of twenty-five thousand florins,⁴ while the emoluments of Louis William were placed at thirty-six thousand florins a year.⁵

It must be admitted that the Republic was grateful. Seventy thousand dollars a year, in the seventeenth century, not only for life, but to be inherited afterward by his younger brother, Frederick Henry, was

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 223.

² Van der Kemp (from the Sec. Res. Stat.-Gen.), iii. 250, 251.

³ Ibid., 251, 252. "No one thing hath been of greater trouble to us," wrote Spencer and Winwood, "than the craving humor of Count Maurice."—Winwood's Memorials, iii. 1, 2.

⁴ Ibid., 255.

⁵ Ibid.

surely a munificent sum to be accorded from the puny exchequer of the States-General to the chief magistrate of the nation.

The mighty transatlantic republic, with its population of thirty or forty millions and its revenue of five hundred millions of dollars, pays twenty-five thousand dollars annually for its President during his four years of office, and this in the second half of the nineteenth century, when a dollar is worth scarcely one fifth of its value two hundred and fifty years ago.

Surely here is improvement, both in the capacity to produce and in the power to save.

In the year 1609 died John, the last sovereign of Cleves and Juliers, and Jacob Arminius, doctor of divinity at Leyden. It would be difficult to imagine two more entirely dissimilar individuals of the human family than this lunatic duke and that theological professor. And yet perhaps the two names, more concisely than those of any other mortals, might serve as an index to the ghastly chronicle over which a coming generation was to shudder. The death of the duke was at first thought likely to break off the negotiations for truce. The States-General at once declared that they would permit no movements on the part of the Spanish party to sieze the inheritance in behalf of the Catholic claimants. Prince Maurice, nothing loath to make use of so well-timed an event in order to cut forever the tangled skein at The Hague, was for marching forthwith into the duchies.

But the archdukes gave such unequivocal assurances of abstaining from interference, and the desire for peace was so strong both in the obedient and in the United Provinces, that the question of the duchies was



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postponed. It was to serve as both torch and fuel for one of the longest and most hideous tragedies that had ever disgraced humanity. A thirty years' war of demons was, after a brief interval, to succeed the forty years' struggle between slaves and masters which had just ended in the recognition of Dutch independence.

The gentle Arminius was in his grave, but a bloody harvest was fast ripening from the seeds which he had sown. That evil story must find its place in the melancholy chapter where the fortunes of the Dutch Republic are blended with the grim chronicle of the Thirty Years' War. Until the time arrives for retracing the course of those united transactions to their final termination in the peace of Westphalia, it is premature to characterize an epoch which, at the moment with which we are now occupied, had not fairly begun.

The Gomarites accused the Arminians of being more lax than papists, and of filling the soul of man with vilest arrogance and confidence in good works, while the Arminians complained that the God of the Gomarites was an unjust God, himself the origin of sin.¹

The disputes on these themes had been perpetual in the provinces ever since the early days of the Reformation. Of late, however, the acrimony of theological conflict had been growing day by day more intense. It was the eternal struggle of religious dogma to get possession of the state, and to make use of political forces in order to put fetters on the human soul—to condemn it to slavery where most it requires freedom. The conflict between Gomarus and Arminius proceeded with such ferocity in Leyden that, since the days of the memorable siege, to which the university owed its

¹ Grotius, xvii. 790-792.

origin, men's minds had never been roused to such feverish anxiety. The theological cannonades which thundered daily from the college buildings and caused all Holland to quake seemed more appalling to the burghers than the enginery of Valdez and Boisot had ever seemed to their fathers.

The Gomarite doctrine gained most favor with the clergy, the Arminian creed with the municipal magistracies. The magistrates claimed that decisions concerning religious matters belonged to the supreme authority. The Gomarites contended that sacred matters should be referred to synods of the clergy.¹ Here was the germ of a conflict which might one day shake the Republic to its foundations.

Barneveldt, the great leader of the municipal party, who loved political power quite as well as he loved his country, was naturally a chieftain of the Arminians; for church matters were no more separated from political matters in the commonwealth at that moment than they were in the cabinets of Henry, James, or Philip.

It was inevitable, therefore, that the war party should pour upon his head more than seven vials of theological wrath. The religious doctrines which he espoused were odious not only because they were deemed vile in themselves, but because he believed in them.

Arminianism was regarded as a new and horrible epidemic, daily gaining ground, and threatening to destroy the whole population. Men deliberated concerning the best means to cut off communication with the infected regions, and to extirpate the plague even

¹ Grotius, xvii. 791.

by desperate and heroic remedies, as men in later days take measures against the cholera or the rinderpest.

Theological hatred was surely not extinct in the Netherlands. It was a consolation, however, that its influence was rendered less noxious by the vastly increased strength of principles long dormant in the atmosphere. Anna van der Hoven, buried alive in Brussels simply because her Calvinistic creed was a crime in the eyes of the monks who murdered her, was the last victim to purely religious persecution. If there were one day to be still a tragedy or two in the Netherlands it was inevitable that theological hatred would be obliged to combine with political party spirit in its most condensed form before any deadly effect could be produced.

Thus the year 1609 is a memorable one in the world's history. It forms a great landmark in human progress. It witnessed the recognition of a republic powerful in itself, and whose example was destined to be most influential upon the career of two mighty commonwealths of the future. The British Empire, just expanding for wider flight than it had hitherto essayed, and about to pass through a series of vast revolutions, gathering strength of wing as it emerged from cloud after cloud; and the American Republic, whose frail and obscure beginnings at that very instant of time scarcely attracted a passing attention from the contemporaneous world—both these political organisms, to which so much of mankind's future liberties had been intrusted, were deeply indebted to the earlier self-governing commonwealth.

The Dutch Republic was the first free nation to put a girdle of empire around the earth. It had courage,

enterprise, intelligence, perseverance, faith in itself, the instinct of self-government and self-help, hatred of tyranny, the disposition to domineer, aggressiveness, greediness, inquisitiveness, insolence, the love of science, of liberty, and of money—all this in unlimited extent. It had one great defect—it had no country. Upon the meager standing-ground its hand had moved the world with an impulse to be felt through all the ages, but there was not soil enough in those fourteen thousand square miles to form the metropolis of the magnificent empire which the genius of liberty had created beyond the seas.

That the political institutions bequeathed by the United States of the seventeenth century have been vastly improved, both in theory and practice, by the United States of the nineteenth, no American is likely to gainsay. That the elder Republic showed us also what to avoid, and was a living example of the perils besetting a Confederacy which dared not become a Union, is a lesson which we might take closely to heart.

But the year 1609 was not only memorable as marking an epoch in Dutch history. It was the beginning of a great and universal pause. The world had need of rest. Disintegration had been going on too rapidly, and it was absolutely necessary that there should be a new birth, if civilization were not to vanish.

A twenty years' truce between the Turkish and Holy Roman empires was nearly simultaneous with the twelve years' truce between Spain and the United Provinces. The Emperor Rudolph, having refused to ratify the treaty which his brother Matthias had made, was in consequence partially disrowned. The same

archduke who, thirty years before, had slipped away from Vienna in his nightgown, with his face blackened, to outwit and outgeneral William the Silent at Brussels, was now more successful in his manœuvres against his imperial brother. Standing at the head of his army in battle array, in the open fields before the walls of Prague, he received from the unfortunate Rudolph the crown and regalia of Hungary, and was by solemn treaty declared sovereign of that ancient and chivalrous kingdom.¹

His triumphal entrance into Vienna succeeded, where, surrounded by great nobles and burghers, with his brother Maximilian at his side, with immense pomp, and with flowers strewn before his feet, he ratified that truce with Ahmed which Rudolph had rejected. Three months later he was crowned at Pressburg, having first accepted the conditions proposed by the estates of Hungary. Foremost among these was the provision that the exercise of the Reformed religion should be free in all the cities and villages beneath his scepter, and that every man in the kingdom was to worship God according to his conscience.

In the following March, at the very moment accordingly when the conclusive negotiations were fast ripening at Antwerp, Matthias granted religious peace for Austria likewise. Great was the indignation of his nephew Leopold, the nuncius, and the Spanish ambassador in consequence, by each and all of whom the revolutionary mischief-maker, with his brother's crown on his head, was threatened with excommunication.²

¹ Meteren, 600, 601.

² Ibid.

As for Ferdinand of Styria, his wrath may well be imagined. He refused religious peace in his dominions with scorn ineffable. Not Gomarus in Leyden could have shrunk from Arminianism with more intense horror than that with which the archduke at Gratz recoiled from any form of Protestantism. He wrote to his brother-in-law the King of Spain and to other potentates—as if the very soul of Philip II. were alive within him—that he would rather have a country without inhabitants than with a single Protestant on its soil.¹ He strongly urged upon his Catholic Majesty—as if such urging were necessary at the Spanish court—the necessity of extirpating heresy root and branch.

Here was one man at least who knew what he meant, and on whom the dread lessons of fifty years of bloodshed had been lost. Magnificent was the contempt which this pupil of the Jesuits felt for any little progress made by the world since the days of Torquemada. In Ferdinand's view Alva was a Christian hero, scarcely second to Godfrey of Bouillon, Philip II. a sainted martyr, while the Dutch Republic had never been born.

And Ferdinand was one day to sit on the throne of the Holy Roman Empire. Might not a shudder come over the souls of men as coming events vaguely shaped themselves to prophetic eyes?

Meantime there was religious peace in Hungary, in Austria, in Bohemia, in France, in Great Britain, in the Netherlands. The hangman's hands were for a period at rest, so far as theology had need of them. Butchery in the name of Christ was suspended

¹ Meteren, 600, 601.

throughout Christendom. The cross and the crescent, Santiago and the orange banner, were for a season in repose.

There was a vast lull between two mighty storms. The Forty Years' War was in the past, the Thirty Years' War in the not far-distant future.

CHAPTER LIII

CONCLUSION

FORTY-THREE years had passed since the memorable April morning in which the great nobles of the Netherlands presented their "request" to the Regent Margaret at Brussels.

They had requested that the Holy Spanish Inquisition might not be established on their soil to the suppression of all their political and religious institutions.

The war which those high-born "Beggars" had then kindled, little knowing what they were doing, had now come to a close, and the successor of Philip II., instead of planting the Inquisition in the provinces, had recognized them as an independent, sovereign, Protestant republic.

In the ratification which he had just signed of the treaty of truce the Most Catholic King had in his turn made a request. He had asked the States-General to deal kindly with their Catholic subjects.

That request was not answered with the ax and fagot, with the avenging sword of mercenary legions. On the contrary, it was destined to be granted. The world had gained something in forty-three years. It had at least begun to learn that the hangman is not the most appropriate teacher of religion.

During the period of apparent chaos with which

this history of the great revolt has been occupied, there had in truth been a great reorganization, a perfected new birth. The republic had once more appeared in the world.

Its main characteristics have been indicated in the course of the narrative, for it was a polity which gradually unfolded itself out of the decay and change of previous organisms.

It was, as it were, in their own despite and unwittingly that the United Provinces became a republic at all.

In vain, after originally declaring their independence of the ancient tyrant, had they attempted to annex themselves to France and to England. The sovereignty had been spurned. The magnificent prize which France for centuries since has so persistently coveted, and the attainment of which has been a cardinal point of her perpetual policy,—the Low Countries and the banks of the Rhine,—was deliberately laid at her feet, and as deliberately refused.

It was the secret hope of the present monarch to repair the loss which the kingdom had suffered through the imbecility of his two immediate predecessors. But a great nation cannot with impunity permit itself to be despotically governed for thirty years by lunatics. It was not for the Béarnese, with all his valor, his wit, and his duplicity, to obtain the prize which Charles IX. and Henry III. had thrown away. Yet to make himself sovereign of the Netherlands was his guiding but most secret thought during all the wearisome and tortuous negotiations which preceded the truce, nor did he abandon the great hope with the signature of the treaty of 1609.

Maurice of Nassau, too, was a formidable rival to Henry. The stadholder prince was no republican. He was a good patriot, a noble soldier, an honest man. But his father had been offered the sovereignty of Holland and Zealand, and the pistol of Balthazar Gérard had alone, in all human probability, prevented the great prince from becoming constitutional monarch of all the Netherlands, Batavian and Belgic.

Maurice himself asserted that not only had he been offered a million of dollars, and large estates besides in Germany, if he would leave the provinces to their fate, but that the archdukes had offered, would he join his fortunes with theirs, to place him in a higher position over all the Netherlands than he had ever enjoyed in the United Provinces, and that they had even unequivocally offered him the sovereignty over the whole land.¹

Maurice was a man of truth, and we have no right to dispute the accuracy of the extraordinary statement. He must, however, have reflected upon the offer once made by the Prince of Darkness from the mountain-top, and have asked himself by what machinery the archdukes proposed to place him in possession of such a kingdom.

There had, however, been serious question among leading Dutch statesmen of making him constitutional, hereditary monarch of the United Netherlands. As late as 1602 a secret conference was held at the house of Olden-Barneveldt, in which the advocate had himself urged the claims of the prince to the sovereignty, and reminded his guests that the signed and sealed documents, with the concurrence of the Amsterdam

¹ Jeannin, i. 174, 175.

municipality alone lacking, by which William the Silent had been invited to assume the crown were still in the possession of his son.¹

Nothing came of these deliberations. It was agreed that to stir in the matter at that moment would be premature, and that the pursuit by Maurice of the monarchy in the circumstances then existing would not only over-burden him with expense, but make him a more conspicuous mark than ever for the assassin. It is certain that the prince manifested no undue anxiety at any period in regard to those transactions.

Subsequently, as Olden-Barneveldt's personal power increased, and as the negotiations for peace became more and more likely to prove successful, the advocate lost all relish for placing his great rival on a throne. The whole project, with the documents and secret schemes therewith connected, became mere alms for oblivion. Barneveldt himself, although of comparatively humble birth and station, was likely with time to exercise more real power in the state than either Henry or Maurice; and thus while there were three individuals who in different ways inspired to supreme power, the Republic, notwithstanding, asserted and established itself.

Freedom of government and freedom of religion were, on the whole, assisted by this triple antagonism. The prince, as soon as the war was over, hated the advocate and his daily increasing power more and more. He allied himself more closely than ever with the Gomarites and the clerical party in general, and did his best to inflame the persecuting spirit, already

¹ Van der Kemp, ii. 100-102, 390-395. Leven van Olden-Barneveldt, 156. Wagenaer, ix. 454.

existing in the provinces, against the Catholics and the later sects of Protestants.

Jeannin warned him that "by thus howling with the priests" he would be suspected of more desperately ambitious designs than he perhaps really cherished.¹

On the other hand, Barneveldt was accused of a willingness to wink at the introduction, privately and quietly, of the Roman Catholic worship. That this was the deadliest of sins there was no doubt whatever in the minds of his revilers. When it was added that he was suspected of the Arminian leprosy, and that he could tolerate the thought that a virtuous man or woman, not predestined from all time for salvation, could possibly find the way to heaven, language becomes powerless to stigmatize his depravity. Whatever the punishment impending over his head in this world or the next, it is certain that the cause of human freedom was not destined on the whole to lose ground through the life-work of Barneveldt.

A champion of liberties rather than of liberty, he defended his fatherland with heart and soul against the stranger; yet the government of that fatherland was, in his judgment, to be transferred from the hand of the foreigner, not to the self-governing people, but to the provincial corporations. For the People he had no respect, and perhaps little affection. He often spoke of popular rights with contempt. Of popular sovereignty he had no conception. His patriotism, like his ambition, was provincial. Yet his perceptions as to eternal necessity in all healthy governments taught him that comprehensible relations between the state and the population were needful to the very ex-

¹ Van der Kemp, iii. 72. Jeannin.

istence of a free commonwealth. The United Provinces, he maintained, were not a republic, but a league of seven provinces very loosely hung together, a mere provisional organization for which it was not then possible to substitute anything better. He expressed this opinion with deep regret, just as the war of independence was closing, and added his conviction that without some well-ordered government no republic could stand.

Yet, as time wore on, the advocate was destined to acquiesce more and more in this defective constitution. A settled theory there was none, and it would have been difficult legally and historically to establish the central sovereignty of the States-General as matter of right.

Thus Barneveldt, who was anything but a democrat, became, almost unwittingly, the champion of the least venerable or imposing of all forms of aristocracy—an oligarchy of traders who imagined themselves patricians. Corporate rights, not popular liberty, seemed, in his view, the precious gains made by such a prodigious expenditure of time, money, and blood. Although such acquisitions were practically a vast addition to the stock of human freedom then existing in the world, yet torrents of blood and millions of treasure were to be wasted in the coming centuries before mankind was to convince itself that a republic is only to be made powerful and perpetual by placing itself upon the basis of popular right rather than on that of municipal privilege.

The singular docility of the Dutch people, combined with the simplicity, honesty, and practical sagacity of the earlier burgher patricians, made the defects of the

system tolerable for a longer period than might have been expected; nor was it until theological dissensions had gathered to such intensity as to set the whole commonwealth aflame that the grave defects in the political structure could be fairly estimated.

It would be anticipating a dark chapter in the history of the United Provinces were the reader's attention now to be called to those fearful convulsions. The greatest reserve is therefore necessary at present in alluding to the subject.

It was not to be expected that an imperious, energetic, but somewhat limited nature like that of Barneveldt should at that epoch thoroughly comprehend the meaning of religious freedom. William the Silent alone seems to have risen to that height. A conscientious Calvinist himself, the father of his country would have been glad to see Protestant and papist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Anabaptist, living together in harmony and political equality. This was not to be. The soul of the immortal prince could not inspire the hearts of his contemporaries. That Barneveldt was disposed to a breadth of religious sympathy unusual in those days seems certain. It was inevitable, too, that the mild doctrines of Arminius should be more in harmony with such a character than were the fierce dogmas of Calvin. But the struggle either to force Arminianism upon the Church which considered itself the established one in the Netherlands, or to expel the Calvinists from it, had not yet begun, although the seeds of religious persecution of Protestants by Protestants had already been sown broadcast.

The day was not far distant when the very Calvinists, to whom, more than to any other class of men, the

political liberties of Holland, England, and America are due, were to be hunted out of churches into farm-houses, suburban hovels, and canal-boats by the arm of provincial sovereignty and in the name of state rights, as pitilessly as the early reformers had been driven out of cathedrals in the name of emperor and pope, and when even those refuges for conscientious worship were to be denied by the dominant sect. And the day was to come, too, when the Calvinists, regaining ascendancy in their turn, were to hunt the heterodox as they had themselves been hunted, and this at the very moment when their fellow-Calvinists of England were driven by the Church of that kingdom into the American wilderness.

Toleration—that intolerable term of insult to all who love liberty—had not yet been discovered. It had scarcely occurred to Arminian or Presbyterian that civil authority and ecclesiastical doctrine could be divorced from each other. As the individual sovereignty of the seven states established itself more and more securely, the right of provincial power to dictate religious dogmas and to superintend the popular conscience was exercised with a placid arrogance which papal infallibility could scarcely exceed. The alternation was only between the sects, each in its turn becoming orthodox, and therefore persecuting. The lessened intensity of persecution, however, which priesthood and authority were now allowed to exercise, marked the gains secured.

Yet while we censure—as we have a right to do from the point of view which we have gained after centuries—the crimes committed by bigotry against liberty, we should be false to our faith in human progress did we

not acknowledge our debt of gratitude to the hot gospelers of Holland and England.

The doctrine of predestination, the consciousness of being chosen soldiers of Christ, inspired those Puritans, who founded the commonwealths of England, of Holland, and of America, with a contempt of toil, danger, and death which enabled them to accomplish things almost supernatural.

No uncouthness of phraseology, no unlovely austerity of deportment, could, except to vulgar minds, make that sublime enthusiasm ridiculous, which on either side the ocean ever confronted tyranny with dauntless front, and welcomed death on battle-field, scaffold, or rack with perfect composure.

The early Puritan at least believed. The very intensity of his belief made him, all unconsciously to himself, and narrowed as was his view of his position, the great instrument by which the widest human liberty was to be gained for all mankind.

The elected favorite of the King of kings feared the power of no earthly king. Accepting in rapture the decrees of a supernatural tyranny, he rose on mighty wings above the reach of human wrath. Prostrating himself before a God of vengeance, of jealousy, and of injustice, he naturally imitated the attributes which he believed to be divine. It was inevitable, therefore, that Barneveldt, and those who thought with him, when they should attempt to force the children of Belial into the company of the elect and to drive the faithful out of their own churches, should be detested as bitterly as papists had ever been.

Had Barneveldt's intellect been broad enough to imagine in a great republic the separation of church and

state, he would deserve a tenderer sympathy, but he would have been far in advance of his age. It is not cheerful to see so powerful an intellect and so patriotic a character daring to intrust the relations between man and his Maker to the decree of a trading corporation. But alas! the world was to wait for centuries until it should learn that the state can best defend religion by letting it alone, and that the political arm is apt to wither with palsy when it attempts to control the human conscience.

It is not entirely the commonwealth of the United Netherlands that is of importance in the epoch which I have endeavored to illustrate. History can have neither value nor charm for those who are not impressed with a conviction of its continuity.

More than ever during the period which we call modern history has this idea of the continuousness of our race, and especially of the inhabitants of Europe and America, become almost oppressive to the imagination. There is a sense of immortality even upon earth when we see the succession of heritages in the domains of science, of intellectual and material wealth by which mankind, generation after generation, is enriching itself.

If this progress be a dream, if mankind be describing a limited circle instead of advancing toward the infinite, then no study can be more contemptible than the study of history.

Few strides more gigantic have been taken in the march of humanity than those by which a parcel of outlying provinces in the north of Europe exchanged slavery to a foreign despotism and to the Holy Inquisition for the position of a self-governing common-

wealth, in the front rank of contemporary powers, and in many respects the foremost of the world. It is impossible to calculate the amount of benefit rendered to civilization by the example of the Dutch Republic. It has been a model which has been imitated, in many respects, by great nations. It has even been valuable in its very defects, indicating to the patient observer many errors most important to avoid.

Therefore, had the little Republic sunk forever in the sea so soon as the treaty of peace had been signed at Antwerp, its career would have been prolific of good for all succeeding time.

Exactly at the moment when a splendid but decaying despotism, founded upon wrong,—upon oppression of the human body and the immortal soul, upon slavery, in short, of the worst kind,—was awaking from its insane dream of universal empire to a consciousness of its own decay, the new Republic was recognized among the nations.

It would hardly be incorrect to describe the Holland of the beginning of the seventeenth century as the exact reverse of Spain. In the commonwealth labor was most honorable; in the kingdom it was vile. In the North to be idle was accounted and punished as a crime. In the Southern peninsula, to be contaminated with mechanical, mercantile, commercial, manufacturing pursuits, was to be accursed. Labor was for slaves, and at last the mere spectacle of labor became so offensive that even the slaves were expelled from the land. To work was as degrading in the South as to beg or to steal was esteemed unworthy of humanity in the North. To think a man's thought upon high matters of religion and government, and through a thou-

sand errors to pursue the truth, with the aid of the Most High and with the best use of human reason, was a privilege secured by the commonwealth at the expense of two generations of continuous bloodshed. To lie fettered, soul and body, at the feet of authority wielded by a priesthood in its last stage of corruption, and monarchy almost reduced to imbecility, was the lot of the chivalrous, genial, but much-oppressed Spaniard.

The pictures painted of the Republic by shrewd and caustic observers, not inclined by nature or craft to portray freedom in too engaging colors, seem, when contrasted with those revealed of Spain, almost like enthusiastic fantasies of an ideal commonwealth.

During the last twenty years of the great war the material prosperity of the Netherlands had wonderfully increased. They had become the first commercial nation in the world. They had acquired the supremacy of the seas. The population of Amsterdam had in twenty years increased from seventy thousand to a hundred and thirty thousand, and was destined to be again more than doubled in the coming decade.¹ The population of Antwerp had sunk almost as rapidly as that of its rival had increased, having lessened by fifty thousand during the same period.² The com-

¹ Tommaso Contarini, ritornato Ambro dalli Signori Stati di Fiandra, anno 1610, MS. Archives of Venice. Antonio Donato, in 1618, puts the number of inhabitants at three hundred thousand, and describes the city as "the very image of Venice in its prime." The streets and public places were so thronged and bustling that "the scene looked to him like a fair to end in one day" (*Relazione MS.*).

² *Ibid.* Antwerp had sunk from one hundred and fifty thousand to eighty thousand.

mercial capital of the obedient provinces, having already lost much of its famous traffic by the great changes in the commercial current of the world, was unable to compete with the cities of the United Provinces in the vast trade which the geographical discoveries of the preceding century had opened to civilization. Freedom of thought and action was denied, and without such liberty it was impossible for oceanic commerce to thrive. Moreover, the possession by the Hollanders of the Schelde forts below Antwerp, and of Flushing at the river's mouth, suffocated the ancient city, and would of itself have been sufficient to paralyze all its efforts.

In Antwerp the exchange, where once thousands of the great merchants of the earth held their daily financial parliament, now echoed to the solitary footfall of the passing stranger. Ships lay rotting at the quays; brambles grew in the commercial streets. In Amsterdam the city had been enlarged by two thirds, and those who swarmed thither to seek their fortunes could not wait for the streets to be laid out and houses to be built, but established themselves in the environs, building themselves hovels and temporary residences, although certain to find their encampments swept away with the steady expanse of the city.¹ As much land as could be covered by a man's foot was worth a ducat in gold.²

In every branch of human industry these republi-

¹ Contarini, *Relazione* MS.

² *Ibid.*: "All' habitationi di questa città concorrono i popoli con tanto ardore che non ostante la proibitione di alloggiarsi per certo spatio all' incontro si fabbrice non di meno ogni anno con allegro animo ogni giorno case di legni ben che sia certo di vederse

cans took the lead. On that scrap of solid ground, rescued by human energy from the ocean, were the most fertile pastures in the world. On those pastures grazed the most famous cattle in the world. An ox often weighed more than two thousand pounds.¹ The cows produced two and three calves at a time, the sheep four and five lambs.² In a single village four thousand kine were counted.³ Butter and cheese were exported to the annual value of a million, salted provisions to an incredible extent. The farmers were industrious, thriving, and independent. It is an amusing illustration of the agricultural thrift and republican simplicity of this people that on one occasion a farmer proposed to Prince Maurice that he should marry his daughter, promising with her a dowry of a hundred thousand florins.⁴

The mechanical ingenuity of the Netherlanders, already celebrated by Julius Cæsar and by Tacitus, had lost nothing of its ancient fame. The contemporary world confessed that in many fabrics the Hollanders were at the head of mankind. Dutch linen, manufactured of the flax grown on their own fields or imported from the obedient provinces, was esteemed a fitting present for kings to make and to receive. The name of the country had passed into the literature of England as synonymous with the delicate fabric itself. The Venetians confessed themselves equaled, if not

le distruggere in breve tanto stimano il poter cominciare a metter il loro nido almeno vicino se non dentro a quella città nelle quale per il semplice fondo si paga un ducato d' oro tanto terreno quanto può coprire un huomo con la pianta del piede."

¹ MS. before cited.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

outdone, by the crystal-workers and sugar-refiners of the Northern Republic.¹ The tapestries of Arras, the name of which Walloon city had become a household word of luxury in all modern languages, were now transplanted to the soil of freedom, more congenial to the advancement of art. Brocades of the precious metals; splendid satins and velvets; serges and homely fustians; laces of thread and silk; the finer and coarser manufactures of clay and porcelain; iron, steel, and all useful fabrics for the building and outfitting of ships; substantial broadcloths manufactured of wool imported from Scotland—all this was but a portion of the industrial production of the provinces.

They supplied the deficiency of coal, not then an article readily obtained by commerce, with other remains of antediluvian forests long since buried in the sea, and now recovered from its depths and made useful and portable by untiring industry. Peat was not only the fuel for the fireside, but for the extensive fabrics of the country, and its advantages so much excited the admiration of the Venetian envoys that they sent home samples of it, in the hope that the lagunes of Venice might prove as prolific of this indispensable article as the polders of Holland.²

But the foundation of the national wealth, the source of the apparently fabulous power by which the Republic had at last overthrown her gigantic antagonist,

¹ Contarini, Relazione MS.

² Ibid.: "E perchè pare quasi questa cosa incredibile ho fatto mettere qualche pezzi di queste turbe con le mie robbe che vengono per mare acciò si piacesse al Signore Dio che in questi contorni si trovasse terreno simile potesse il pubblico ricevere due gran benefitii; uno di cavare il terreno che riempie le lagune; l'altro di abondar la città di materia per abbrucciare."

was the ocean. The Republic was sea-born and sea-sustained.

She had nearly one hundred thousand sailors and three thousand ships.¹ The sailors were the boldest, the best disciplined, and the most experienced in the world, whether for peaceable seafaring or ocean warfare. The ships were capable of furnishing from out of their number in time of need the most numerous and the best-appointed navy then known to mankind.

The Republic had the carrying-trade for all nations. Feeling its very existence dependent upon commerce, it had strode centuries in advance of the contemporary world in the liberation of trade. But two or three per cent. *ad valorem* was levied upon imports, foreign goods, however, being subject, as well as internal products, to heavy imposts in the way of both direct and indirect taxation.

Every article of necessity or luxury known was to be purchased in profusion and at reasonable prices in the warehouses of Holland.

A swarm of river vessels and flyboats were coming daily through the rivers of Germany, France, and the Netherlands, laden with the agricultural products and the choice manufactures of central and western Europe. Wine and oil, and delicate fabrics in thread and wool, came from France, but no silks, velvets, nor satins; for the great Sully had succeeded in persuading his master that the white mulberry would not grow in his kingdom, and that silk manufactures were an impossible dream for France. Nearly a thousand ships were constantly employed in the Baltic trade.² The forests of Holland were almost as extensive as those

¹ MS. before cited.

² *Ibid.*

which grew on Norwegian hills, but they were submerged. The foundation of a single mansion required a grove, and wood was extensively used in the superstructure. The houses, built of a framework of substantial timber, and filled in with brick or rubble, were raised almost as rapidly as tents during the prodigious expansion of industry toward the end of the war.¹ From the realms of the Osterlings, or shores of the Baltic, came daily fleets laden with wheat and other grains, so that even in time of famine the granaries of the Republic were overflowing, and ready to dispense the material of life to the outer world.

Eight hundred vessels of lesser size but compact build were perpetually fishing for herrings on the Northern coasts. These hardy mariners, the militia of the sea, who had learned in their life of hardship and daring the art of destroying Spanish and Portuguese armadas and confronting the dangers of either pole, passed a long season on the deep. Commercial voyagers as well as fishermen, they salted their fish as soon as taken from the sea, and transported them to the various ports of Europe, thus reducing their herrings into specie before their return, and proving that a fishery in such hands was worth more than the mines of Mexico and Peru.

It is customary to speak of the natural resources of a country as furnishing a guaranty of material prosperity. But here was a republic almost without natural resources, which had yet supplied by human intelligence and thrift what a niggard nature had denied. Spain was overflowing with unlimited treasure, and had possessed half the world in fee; and Spain was bank-

¹ Contarini, *Relazione*, MS.

rupt, decaying, sinking into universal pauperism. Holland, with freedom of thought, of commerce, of speech, of action, placed itself, by intellectual power alone, in the front rank of civilization.

From Cathay, from the tropical coast of Africa, and from farthest Ind, came every drug, spice, or plant, every valuable jewel, every costly fabric, that human ingenuity had discovered or created. The Spaniards, maintaining a frail tenure upon a portion of those prolific regions, gathered their spice harvests at the point of the sword,¹ and were frequently unable to prevent their Northern rivals from ravaging such fields as they had not yet been able to appropriate.²

Certainly this conduct of the Hollanders was barbarism and supreme selfishness, if judged by the sounder political economy of our time. Yet it should never be forgotten that the contest between Spain and Holland in those distant regions, as everywhere else, was war to the knife between superstition and freedom, between the spirits of progress and of dogma. Hard blows and foul blows were struck in such a fight, and humanity, although gaining at last immense results, had much to suffer and much to learn ere the day was won.

But Spain was nearly beaten out of those Eastern regions, and the very fact that the naval supremacy of the Republic placed her ancient tyrant at her mercy was the main reason for Spain to conclude the treaty of truce. Lest she should lose the India trade entirely,

¹ "Tengono quà Hollandesi la maggior parte di detta Isola (Ternat) rimanendo la minore a Spagnuoli che raccolgono i loro pochi garófani con la punta della spada," etc.—Contarini, MS.

² Ibid.

Spain consented to the treaty article by which, without mentioning the word, she conceded the thing. It was almost pathetic to witness, as we have witnessed, this despotism in its dotage, mumbling so long over the formal concession to her conqueror of a portion of that India trade which would have been entirely wrested from herself had the war continued. And of this Spain was at heart entirely convinced. Thus the Portuguese, once the lords and masters, as they had been the European discoverers, of those prolific regions and of the ocean highways which led to them, now came with docility to the Republic which they had once affected to despise, and purchased the cloves and the allspice, the nutmegs and the cinnamon, of which they had held the monopoly, or waited with patience until the untiring Hollanders should bring the precious wares to the Peninsular ports.¹

A Dutch Indiaman would make her voyage to the antipodes and her return in less time than was spent by a Portuguese or a Spaniard in the outward voyage.² To accomplish such an enterprise in two years was accounted a wonder of rapidity, and when it is remembered that inland navigation through France by canal and river from the North Sea to the Mediterranean was considered both speedier and safer, because the sea-voyage between the same points might last four or five months, it must be admitted that two years occupied in passing from one end of the earth to the other and back again might well seem a miracle.

The Republic was among the wealthiest and the most powerful of organized states. Her population might be estimated at three millions and a half, about equal

¹ Contarini, *Relazione* MS.

² *Ibid.*

to that of England at the same period. But she was richer than England. Nowhere in the world was so large a production in proportion to the numbers of a people. Nowhere were so few unproductive consumers. Every one was at work. Vagabonds, idlers, and do-nothings, such as must be in every community, were caught up by the authorities and made to earn their bread.¹ The devil's pillow, idleness, was smoothed for no portion of the population.

There were no beggars, few paupers, no insolently luxurious and ostentatiously idle class. The modesty, thrift, and simple elegance of the housekeeping, even among the wealthy, was noted by travelers with surprise.² It will be remembered with how much amused

¹ Contarini.

² "In somma sono quei popoli così inchinati all' industria et al negotio che niuna cosa è tanto difficile che non ardiscono di superarla. . . . Sopra tutte le cose invigliarano a questo di mantenere il negotio et favorirlo in modo libero da soverchie gravetze che cessi ogni occasione di divertirlo e secarlo. Abbondano di ricchezze e di commodi con tal misura che non si vede nei più ricchi lusso o pompe straordinarie servando tutti et in casa et fuori nell' habito e nel rimanente la vera mediocrità di una modesta fortuna senza che si vedano nè additamenti ne argenterie ne fornimenti ne cadreghe de sete come apunto non si vedevano ne anco in questa città (Venezia) nei tempi de Vostri Antecessori. *Nei poveri non si conosce mancamento di alcuna delle cose necessarie* anzi nelle loro piccioli ed humili abitazioni non meno che nelle case de' grandi risplende una politia singolare onde riduecono da tutte le parti et sono tutti *così inimici del mal governo et dell' otio* che si sono luoghi particolari nelle città fabbricata di ordine pubblico ove quei del governo fanno serrar le genti vagabonde et otiosi o che non governano bene le cose loro bastando che o le moglie o altre dei lor congiunti se ne querelino al magistrato et in quei luoghi sono costretti di lavorare et guadagnarsi le spese ancorchè non vogliano."—Contarini, Relazione MS.

wonder, followed by something like contempt, the magnificent household of Spinola, during his embassy at The Hague, was surveyed by the honest burghers of Holland. The authorities showed their wisdom in permitting the absurd exhibition, as an example of what should be shunned, in spite of grave remonstrances from many of the citizens. Drunken helotism is not the only form of erring humanity capable of reading lessons to a republic.

There had been monasteries, convents, ecclesiastical establishments of all kinds in the country, before the great war between Holland and the Inquisition. These had, as a matter of course, been confiscated as the strife went on. The buildings, farms, and funds once the property of the Church had not, however, been seized upon, as in other Protestant lands, by rapacious monarchs, and distributed among great nobles according to royal caprice. Monarchs might give the revenue of a suppressed convent to a cook, as reward for a successful pudding; the surface of Britain and the Continent might be covered with abbeys and monasteries now converted into lordly palaces, passing thus from the dead-hand of the Church into the idle and unproductive palm of the noble; but the ancient ecclesiastical establishments of the free Netherlands were changed into eleemosynary institutions, admirably organized and administered with wisdom and economy, where orphans of the poor, widows of those slain in the battles for freedom by land and sea, and the aged

“Li popoli di questo paese sono nati al travaglio ed al stentare e tutti travagliano, chi per una via, chi per l' altra. . . . Non s' usa servitori, non si veste di seta, non si tapezza le case, tutto è menaggio molto sottile e limitato.”—Antº Donato, Relazione MS.

and the infirm who had deserved well of the Republic in the days of their strength, were educated or cherished at the expense of the public, thus endowed from the spoils of the Church.¹

In Spain monasteries upon monasteries were rising day by day, as if there were not yet receptacles enough for monks and priests, while thousands upon thousands of Spaniards were pressing into the ranks of the priesthood, and almost forcing themselves into monasteries, that they might be privileged to beg, because ashamed to work. In the United Netherlands the confiscated convents, with their revenues, were appropriated for the good of those who were too young or too old to labor, and too poor to maintain themselves without work. Need men look further than to this simple fact to learn why Spain was decaying while the Republic was rising?

The ordinary budget of the United Provinces was about equal to that of England, varying not much from four millions of florins, or four hundred thou-

¹ "Si vedono in quelle città chiese antiche bellissime parte distrutte et parte senza imagini ridotti per i loro esercitii che non consistono in altro che all' ascoltar le domeniche e pochi altri giorni le prediche da' loro predicatori. Dell' entrate di queste chiese ch' erano già dei prelati, dei monasteri, e dei sacerdoti mantengono un buon numero de hospitali nelle principale città del paese fabbricati con molte spese, governati con bellissimi ordini et custoditi con gran politia ne quali nutriscono allevano et mantengono i vecchi impotenti, i figli orfani ed altri de' benemeriti dello Stato che hanno spesi i migliori anni o perso le vite nei loro servitii. Et a questi hospitali si applicheranno ancora l' entrate di quei pochi monasterii et collegi Teutonici che si rimangono, morti che siano quelli che le godono al presente."—Contarini, MS. Antonio Donato, too, speaks of these hospitals as model institutions (*Relazione MS.*).

sand pounds. But the extraordinary revenue was comparatively without limits, and there had been years, during the war, when the citizens had taxed themselves as highly as fifty per cent. on each individual income, and doubled the receipts of the exchequer.¹ The budget was proposed once a year by the council of state, and voted by the States-General, who assigned the quota of each province, that of Holland being always one half of the whole, that of Zealand sixteen per cent., and that of the other five of course in lesser proportions. The revenue was collected in the separate provinces, one third of the whole being retained for provincial expenses, and the balance paid into the general treasury.² There was a public debt, the annual interest of which amounted to two hundred thousand florins. During the war money had been borrowed at as high a rate as thirty-six per cent., but at the conclusion of hostilities the states could borrow at six per cent., and the whole debt was funded on that basis. Taxation was enormously heavy, but patriotism caused it to be borne with cheerfulness, and productive industry made it comparatively light. Rents were charged twenty-five per cent. A hundred per cent. was levied upon beer, wine, meat, salt, spirits. Other articles of necessity and luxury were almost as severely taxed.³ It is not easy to enumerate the tax-list, scarcely anything foreign or domestic being exempted, while the grave error was often committed of taxing the same article, in different forms, four, five, and six times.

The people virtually taxed themselves, although the superstition concerning the state, as something distinct

¹ Contarini, MS.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

from and superior to the people, was to linger long and work infinite mischief among those seven republics which were never destined to be wielded theoretically and legally into a union. The sacredness of corporations had succeeded, in a measure, to the divinity which hedges kings. Nevertheless, those corporations were so numerous as to be effectively open to a far larger proportion of the population than, in those days, had ever dreamed before of participating in the government. The magistracies were in general unpaid and little coveted, being regarded as a burden and a responsibility rather than an object of ambition. The jurisconsults, called pensionaries, who assisted the municipal authorities, received, however, a modest salary, never exceeding fifteen hundred florins a year.

These numerous bodies, provincial and municipal, elected themselves by supplying their own vacancies. The magistrates were appointed by the stadholder, on a double or triple nomination from the municipal board. This was not impartial suffrage nor manhood suffrage. The germ of a hateful burgher oligarchy was in the system, but, as compared with Spain, where municipal magistracies were sold by the crown at public auction, or with France, where every office in church, law, magistrature, or court was an object of merchandise disposed of in open market, the system was purity itself, and marked a great advance in the science of government.

It should never be forgotten, moreover, that while the presidents and judges of the highest courts of judicature in other civilized lands were at the mercy of an irresponsible sovereign, and held office, even although it had been paid for in solid specie, at his pleasure,

the supreme justices of the high courts of appeal at The Hague were nominated by a senate and confirmed by a stadholder, and that they exercised their functions for life,¹ or so long as they conducted themselves virtuously in their high office—*quamdiu se bene gesserint*.

If one of the great objects of a civilized community is to secure to all men their own,—*ut sua tenerent*,—surely it must be admitted that the Republic was in advance of all contemporary states in the laying down of this vital principle, the independence of judges.

As to the army and navy of the United Provinces, enough has been said, in earlier chapters of these volumes, to indicate the improvements introduced by Prince Maurice, and now carried to the highest point of perfection ever attained in that period. There is no doubt whatever that for discipline, experience, equipment, effectiveness of movement, and general organization the army of the Republic was the model army of Europe.² It amounted to but thirty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry, but this number was a large one for a standing army at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It was composed of a variety of materials, Hollanders, Walloons, Flemings, Scotch, English, Irish, Germans, but all welded together into a machine of perfect regularity. The private foot-soldier received twelve florins for a so-called month of forty-two days, the drummer and

¹ Contarini, MS.

² “Ma tutta gente esquisita per la propria conditione per l' habito gia fermo al patire et al combattere per tanti anni di guerra et per la singolare obbedienza accompagnata da tutti gli ordini della vera militare disciplina essendo tenuti in continua esercitatione de' capitani es oggetti di gran qualità.”—Contarini, MS.

corporal eighteen, the lieutenant fifty-two, and the captain one hundred and fifty florins.¹ Prompt payment was made every week.² Obedience was implicit; mutiny, such as was of periodical recurrence in the archduke's army, entirely unknown. The slightest theft was punished with the gallows,³ and there was therefore no thieving.

The most accurate and critical observers confessed, almost against their will, that no army in Europe could compare with the troops of the states. As to the famous regiments of Sicily and the ancient legions of Naples and Milan, a distinguished Venetian envoy, who had seen all the camps and courts of Christendom, and was certainly not disposed to overrate the Hollanders at the expense of the Italians, if any rivalry between them had been possible, declared that every private soldier in the Republic was fit to be a captain in any Italian army, while, on the other hand, there was scarcely an Italian captain who would be accepted as a private in any company of the states.⁴ So low had the once famous soldiery of Alva, Don John, and Alexander Farnese descended.

¹ MS. before cited.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. : "Ogni minimo furto si castiga con la forza."

⁴ "Posso affirmar a Vostra Serenità che qual si voglia fante privato fra quelle militie si stimarebbe qui buono per comandare una compagnia tanto è declinato in Italia e l'uso et l'antico splendore della militar disciplina che ci bisogna impararla dalle nationi straniere che pur l'appriessero da quelle di questa provincia. Et a tale sono arrivati i gradi della militia che molti presso di noi capitani difficilmente presso di loro sarebbono admessi per buoni soldati."—Contarini, MS.

"Le qualità delle militie terrestri che servono in questi Stati sono senza dubbio le migliori di Europa e del Mondo," says Antonio Donato, adding that among them "the first place is held by

The cavalry of the Republic was even more perfectly organized than was the infantry. "I want words to describe its perfection," said Contarini.¹ The pay was very high and very prompt. A captain received four hundred florins a month (of forty-two days), a lieutenant one hundred and eighty florins, and other officers and privates in proportion.² These rates would be very high in our own day. When allowance is made for the difference in the value of money at the respective epochs, the salaries are prodigious; but the thrifty Republic found its account in paying well and paying regularly the champions on whom so much depended, and by whom such splendid services had been rendered.³

While the soldiers in the pay of Queen Elizabeth were crawling to her palace gates to die of starvation before her eyes, while the veterans of Spain and of Italy had organized themselves into a permanent military, mutinous republic, on the soil of the so-called obedient Netherlands, because they were left by their masters without clothing or food, the cavalry and infantry of the Dutch commonwealth, thanks to the organizing spirit and the wholesome thrift of the burgher authorities, were contented, obedient, well fed, well clothed, and well paid, devoted to their government, and ever ready to die in its defense.

Nor was it only on the regular army that reliance

the English infantry, best beloved by the natives, brave, patient veterans, whose habits and character are in conformity with the country" (*Relazione MS.*).

¹ *Ibid.* : "Della Cavalleria debbo dire poco poiche poco si può dire che arrivi ad esprimere la sua perfezione."

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

was placed. On the contrary, every able-bodied man in the country was liable to be called upon to serve at any moment in the militia. All were trained to arms and provided with arms, and there had been years during this perpetual war in which one man out of three of the whole male population was ready to be mustered at any moment into the field.¹

Even more could be said in praise of the navy than has been stated of the armies of the Republic; for the contemporary accounts of foreigners, and of foreigners who were apt to be satirical, rather than enthusiastic, when describing the institutions, leading personages, and customs of other countries, seemed ever to speak of the United Provinces in terms of eulogy. In commerce, as in war, the naval supremacy of the Republic was indisputable. It was easy for the states to place two thousand vessels of war in commission, if necessary, of tonnage varying from four hundred to twelve hundred tons, to man them with the hardiest and boldest sailors in the world, and to despatch them with promptness to any quarter of the globe.²

¹ "Si dimostrano tutti quei popoli così inchinati alla militia per la difesa commune che si piacesse a' Serenissimi Stati di ricercare il terzo uomo da tutto il paese offerirano essi che pochi si sarebbono i quali non desiderassero che a loro ne toccasse la sorte tanto si rende piacevole all' orecchie di quelle genti il nome della guerra."—Contarini, MS.

² Ibid.: "Le forze del mare dei Serenissimi Stati sono veramente stimate le maggiori che posse havere altro Principe per la copia dei vascelli et per il numero di marinari et per la qualità degli uomini di comando. Tenendosi per cosa certa che possan essere in quelle Provincie settanta mille marinari buoni et intelligenti non solo per l' uso delle navigationi ma insieme ancora per le battaglie navali nelle quali si adoperano per soldati et ognuno di essi per la singolare attitudine et ordinaria assuefattione è solito

It was recognized as nearly impossible to compel a war-vessel of the Republic to surrender.¹ Hardly an instance was on her naval record of submission even to far superior force, while it was filled with the tragic but heroic histories of commanders who had blown their ships, with every man on board, into the air, rather than strike their flag. Such was the character and such the capacity of the sea-born Republic.

That Republic had serious and radical defects, but the design remained to be imitated and improved upon centuries afterward. The history of the rise and progress of the Dutch Republic is a leading chapter in the history of human liberty.

The great misfortune of the commonwealth of the United Provinces, next to the slenderness of its geographical proportions, was the fact that it was without a center and without a head, and therefore not a nation capable of unlimited vitality. There were seven states. Each claimed to be sovereign. The pretension on the

di far più che molti soldati insieme. Et ogni volta che volessero fare un sforzo per qualunque occasione potrebbero metter insieme il numero di due mille vascelli sufficienti per ogni fattione senza far in essi spese di momento per la prontezza et delle genti e dei vascelli medesimi sempre apparenchiate in mano de particolari." Antonio Donato puts the number of Dutch vessels of all classes at nearly six thousand (Relazione MS.). "This fury for dominion upon the sea," he says, "increases every day, and is sustained by such assiduity, intelligence, and interest as to show that it is the business of all, and the whole business, strength, and security of the states."

¹ "Mentre sono certi che gli Hollandesi piu tosto che lasciarsi vincere darebbero fuoco al proprio vascello per abbruciare con se medesimi l' inimico insieme. Onde con questi due termini della clemenza (agli inimici) e del sommo rigore sono fatti padroni del mar."—Contarini, MS.

part of several of them was ridiculous. Overijssel, for example, contributed two and three quarters per cent. of the general budget. It was a swamp of twelve hundred square miles in extent, with some heath-spots interspersed, and it numbered perhaps a hundred thousand inhabitants. The doughty Count of Emden alone could have swallowed up such sovereignty, have annexed all the buckwheat patches and cranberry marshes of Overijssel to his own meager territories, and nobody the wiser.

Zealand, as we have seen, was disposed at a critical moment to set up its independent sovereignty. Zealand, far more important than Overijssel, had a revenue of perhaps five hundred thousand dollars—rather a slender budget for an independent republic, wedged in as it was by the most powerful empires of the earth, and half drowned by the ocean, from which it had scarcely emerged.

There was therefore no popular representation, and on the other hand no executive head. As sovereignty must be exercised in some way, however, in all living commonwealths, and as a low degree of vitality was certainly not the defect of those bustling provinces, the supreme functions had now fallen into the hands of Holland.

While William the Silent lived, the management of war, foreign affairs, and finance, for the revolted provinces, was in his control. He was aided by two council-boards, but the circumstances of history and the character of the man had invested him with an inevitable dictatorship.

After his death, at least after Leicester's time, the powers of the state council, the head of which, Prince

Maurice, was almost always absent at the wars, fell into comparative disuse. The great functions of the confederacy passed into the possession of the States-General. That body now came to sit permanently at The Hague. The number of its members, deputies from the seven provinces, envoys from those seven immortal and soulless sovereigns, was not large. The extraordinary assembly held at Bergen-op-Zoom for confirmation of the truce was estimated by Bentivoglio at eight hundred. Bentivoglio, who was on the spot, being then nuncius at Brussels, ought to have been able to count them, yet it is very certain that the number was grossly exaggerated.

At any rate, the usual assembly at The Hague rarely amounted to one hundred members. The presidency was changed once a week, the envoy of each province taking his turn as chairman.

Olden-Barneveldt, as member for Holland, was always present in the diet. As advocate-general of the leading province, and keeper of its great seal, more especially as possessor of the governing intellect of the whole commonwealth, he led the administration of Holland; and as the estates of Holland contributed more than half of the whole budget of the confederacy,¹ it was a natural consequence of the actual supremacy

¹ Gelderland contributed $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Utrecht	"	$5\frac{1}{4}$	"
Friesland	"	$11\frac{1}{4}$	"
Overijssel	"	$2\frac{1}{4}$	"
Groningen	"	$6\frac{1}{4}$	"
Zealand	"	$13\frac{1}{4}$	"
Holland	"	$55\frac{1}{4}$	"
		<hr/>	
		100	

of that province, and of the vast legal and political experience of the advocate, that Holland should govern the confederacy, and that Barneveldt should govern Holland.

The States-General remained virtually supreme, receiving envoys from all the great powers, sending abroad their diplomatic representatives, to whom the title and rank of ambassador was freely accorded, and dealing in a decorous and dignified way with all European affairs. The ability of the republican statesmen was as fully recognized all over the earth as was the genius of their generals and great naval commanders.

The People did not exist; but this was merely because, in theory, the People had not been invented. It was exactly because there was a People—an energetic and intelligent People—that the Republic was possible.

No scheme had yet been devised for laying down in primary assemblies a fundamental national law, for distributing the various functions of governmental power among selected servants, for appointing representatives according to population or property, and for holding all trustees responsible at reasonable intervals to the nation itself.

Thus government was involved, fold within fold, in successive and concentric municipal layers. The States-General were the outer husk of which the separate town council was the kernel or bulb. Yet the number of these executive and legislative boards was so large, and the whole population comparatively so slender, as to cause the original inconveniences from so incomplete a system to be rather theoretic than prac-

tical. In point of fact, almost as large a variety of individuals served the state as would perhaps have been the case under a more philosophically arranged democracy. The difficulty was rather in obtaining a candidate for the post than in distributing the posts among candidates.

Men were occupied with their own affairs. In proportion to their numbers they were more productive of wealth than any other nation then existing. An excellent reason why the people were so well governed, so productive, and so enterprising was the simple fact that they were an educated people. There was hardly a Netherlander, man, woman, or child, that could not read and write. The school was the common property of the people, paid for among the municipal expenses. In the cities, as well as in the rural districts, there were not only common schools but classical schools. In the burgher families it was rare to find boys who had not been taught Latin, or girls unacquainted with French. Capacity to write and speak several modern languages was very common, and there were many individuals in every city, neither professors nor pedants, who had made remarkable progress in science and classical literature.¹ The position, too, of women in the commonwealth proved a high degree of civilization. They are described as virtuous, well educated, energetic, sovereigns in their households, and accustomed to direct all the business at home. "It would be ridiculous," said Donato, "to see a man occupying himself with domestic housekeeping. The women do it all, and command absolutely." The Hollanders, so rebel-

¹ Antonio Donato, *Relazione MS. Grot. Paralell. Rer. pub.* (ed. Meerman), iii. 51. Van Kampen, i. 608, 609.

lions against church and king, accepted with meekness the despotism of woman.

The great movement of emancipation from political and ecclesiastical tyranny had brought with it a general advancement of the human intellect. The foundation of the Leyden University in memory of the heroism displayed by the burghers during the siege was as noble a monument as had ever been raised by a free people jealous of its fame. And the scientific luster of the university well sustained the nobility of its origin. The proudest nation on earth might be more proud of a seat of learning, founded thus amid carnage and tears, whence so much of profound learning and brilliant literature had already been diffused. The classical labors of Joseph Scaliger; Heinsius, father and son; the elder Dousa, almost as famous with his pen in Latin poetry as his sword had made him in the vernacular chronicle; of Dousa the son, whom Grotius called "the crown and flower of all good learning, too soon snatched away by envious death, than whom no man more skilled in poetry, more consummate in acquaintance with ancient science and literature, had ever lived";¹ of Hugo Grotius himself, who at the age of fifteen had taken his doctor's degree at Leyden, who as a member of Olden-Barneveldt's important legation to France and England very soon afterward had excited the astonishment of Henry IV. and Elizabeth, who had already distinguished himself by editions of classic poets and by original poems and dramas in Latin, and was already, although but twenty-six years of age, laying the foundation of that magnificent reputation as a jurist, a philosopher, a his-

¹ Van Kampen, i. 608. Grot. Paralell. Rer. pub., iii. 49.

torian, and a statesman, which was to be one of the enduring glories of humanity—all these were the precious possessions of the high school of Leyden.

The still more modern University of Franeker, founded amid the din of perpetual warfare in Friesland, could at least boast the name of Arminius, whose theological writings and whose expansive views were destined to exert such influence over his contemporaries and posterity.

The great history of Hoofd, in which the splendid pictures and the impassioned drama of the great war of independence were to be preserved for his countrymen through all time, was not yet written. It was soon afterward, however, to form not only a chief source of accurate information as to the great events themselves, but a model of style never since surpassed by any prose-writer in either branch of the German tongue.

Had Hoofd written for a wider audience, it would be difficult to name a contemporary author of any nation whose work would have been more profoundly studied or more generally admired.

But the great war had not waited to be chronicled by the classic and impassioned Hoofd. Already there were thorough and exhaustive narrators of what was instinctively felt to be one of the most pregnant episodes of human history. Bor of Utrecht, a miracle of industry, of learning, of unwearied perseverance, was already engaged in the production of those vast folios in which nearly all the great transactions of the Forty Years' War were conscientiously portrayed, with a comprehensiveness of material and an impartiality of statement such as might seem almost impossible for a

contemporary writer. Immersed in attentive study and profound contemplation, he seemed to lift his tranquil head from time to time over the wild ocean of those troublous times, and to survey with accuracy without being swayed or appalled by the tempest. There was something almost sublime in his steady, unimpassioned gaze.

Emanuel van Meteren, too, a plain Protestant merchant of Antwerp and Amsterdam, wrote an admirable history of the war and of his own times, full of precious details, especially rich in statistics, a branch of science which he almost invented, which still remains as one of the leading authorities, not only for scholars, but for the general reader.

Reyd and Burgundius, the one the Calvinist private secretary of Louis William, the other a warm Catholic partizan, both made invaluable contemporaneous contributions to the history of the war.

The trophies already secured by the Netherlanders in every department of the fine arts, as well as the splendor which was to enrich the coming epoch, are too familiar to the world to need more than a passing allusion.

But it was especially in physical science that the Republic was taking a leading part in the great intellectual march of the nations.

The very necessities of its geographical position had forced it to preëminence in hydraulics and hydrostatics. It had learned to transform water into dry land with a perfection attained by no nation before or since. The wonders of its submarine horticulture were the despair of all gardeners in the world.

And as in this gentlest of arts, so also in the dread

science of war, the Republic had been the instructor of mankind. The youthful Maurice and his cousin Louis William had so restored and improved the decayed intelligence of antique strategy that the graybeards of Europe became docile pupils in their school. The mathematical teacher of Prince Maurice amazed the contemporary world with his combinations and mechanical inventions, the flying chariots of Simon Stevinus seeming products of magical art.

Yet the character of the Dutch intellect was averse to sorcery. The small but mighty nation, which had emancipated itself from the tyranny of Philip and of the Holy Inquisition, was foremost to shake off the fetters of superstition. Out of Holland came the first voice to rebuke one of the hideous delusions of the age. While grave magistrates and sages of other lands were exorcising the devil by murdering his supposed victims, John Wier, a physician of Grave, boldly denounced the demon which had taken possession, not of the wizards, but of the judges.

The age was lunatic and sick, and it was fitting that the race which had done so much for the physical and intellectual emancipation of the world should have been the first to apply a remedy for this monstrous madness. Englishmen and their descendants were drowning and hanging witches in New England long after John Wier had rebuked and denounced the belief in witchcraft.

It was a Zealander, too, who placed the instrument in the hand of Galileo by which that daring genius traced the movements of the universe, and who, by another wondrous invention, enabled future discoverers to study the infinite life which lies all around us,

hidden not by its remoteness but its minuteness. Zacharias Jansens of Middelburg, in 1590, invented both the telescope and the microscope.

The wonder-man of Alkmaar, Cornelius Drebbel, who performed such astounding feats for the amusement of Rudolph of Germany and James of Britain, is also supposed to have invented the thermometer and the barometer. But this claim has been disputed. The inventions of Jansens are proved.

Willebrord Snellius, mathematical professor of Leyden, introduced the true method of measuring the degrees of longitude and latitude, and Huygens, who had seen his manuscripts, asserted that Snellius had invented, before Descartes, the doctrine of refraction.

But it is especially to that noble band of heroes and martyrs, the great navigators and geographical discoverers of the Republic, that science is above all indebted.

Nothing is more sublime in human story than the endurance and audacity with which those pioneers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries confronted the nameless horrors of either pole, in the interests of commerce, and for the direct purpose of enlarging the bounds of the human intellect.

The achievements, the sufferings, and the triumphs of Barentz and Cordes, Heemskerk, Van der Hagen, and many others, have been slightly indicated in these pages. The contributions to botany, mineralogy, geometry, geography, and zoölogy of Linschoten, Plancius, Wagenaer, and Houtmann, and so many other explorers of pole and tropic, can hardly be overrated.

The Netherlanders had wrung their original fatherland out of the grasp of the ocean. They had confronted for centuries the wrath of that ancient tyrant,

ever ready to seize the prey of which he had been defrauded.

They had waged fiercer and more perpetual battle with a tyranny more cruel than the tempest, with an ancient superstition more hungry than the sea. It was inevitable that a race thus invigorated by the ocean, cradled to freedom by their conflicts with its power, and hardened almost to invincibility by their struggle against human despotism, should be foremost among the nations in the development of political, religious, and commercial freedom.

The writer now takes an affectionate farewell of those who have followed him with an indulgent sympathy as he has attempted to trace the origin and the eventful course of the Dutch commonwealth. If by his labors a generous love has been fostered for that blessing without which everything that this earth can afford is worthless,—freedom of thought, of speech, and of life,—his highest wish has been fulfilled.

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